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After months of discussing only Hannah Arendt's work, let's take a break from long format books and discuss some short but insightful texts that I came across recently.

One of them is "Immoderate Greatness" by William Ophuls. This book draws on various fields to conclude that civilizations are predisposed to failure from the moment they emerge. This work piqued my interest because it draws on a variety of areas of expertise while also touching upon topics covered in Ray Dalio's books, such as the cycles of civilizations.

Furthermore, while some of the information has already been widely discussed, the way this text condenses it all into such a short book makes it easily accessible to anyone, regardless of philosophical or scientific background.

To begin this newsletter, we should start with the following quote from the first pages of the book:

“Wise men say, and not without reason, that whoever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who ever have been, and ever will be, animated by the same passions, and thus they necessarily have the same results.”

Niccolò Machiavelli

Based on this quote, we can deduce that the book's premise is that civilizations are bound by the same patterns of human behavior that eventually lead to the downfall of societies, just as they have in the past.

In essence, the homo sapiens has an innate desire to rise above the natural state of things and to transcend their own nature, which is why the book is titled "immoderate greatness". Attempting to go beyond nature implies that there is a natural limit. Furthermore, because civilization is not natural, it requires an ongoing supply of matter, energy, and morale to function; otherwise, it deteriorates or collapses.

But what are the specific factors that contribute to these excesses, and why do we call them "excesses"? Is industrial civilization doomed to fail because it embodies the same passions as previous societies? This is the book's conclusion, but the exact reasons will be revealed shortly. 

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Ecological Exhaustion

This is probably one of the most widely known and discussed reasons. As mentioned before, civilizations are not natural; we can clearly see this in our current societies, but even ancient civilizations have caused environmental damage to some extent. For example, agriculture, by definition, contributes to soil loss and degradation. Cities require water and wood to provide housing, which means a need for ecological resources.

Furthermore, we may believe that small civilizations in the past were more modest and limited to their needs, but this is not necessarily the case. For example, the fall of the Roman Empire devastated landscapes. 

Following this, Ophuls claims that this is nothing but the nature of humanity. Every organism on Earth strives to expand its habitat by making use of available resources. However, resources are limited, and they either exhaust or cease to regenerate themselves at the rate required to consume them.

The same is true for waste; we produce it faster than it dissolves, poisoning our existing resources. We use nonrenewable resources to drive consumption, inevitably causing these limited resources to disappear without ever coming back for us to consume.

Moreover, many civilizations have tried to compensate for the lack of resources by means of conquest, but this isn’t a permanent solution because there are still biophysical limits involved everywhere in the world.

Lastly, civilizations tend to use resources to their full potential at all times. But nature varies over time. For example, water supply can fluctuate during drought years. Because civilizations use their resources to their full potential, when resources fluctuate, it is impossible to produce the same agricultural output, resulting in hunger or famine. This is very concerning because it demonstrates that while resources are sometimes available, we are accustomed to using them to their full capacity at all times, making us dependent on abundance when, in reality, nature fluctuates, and this without even considering how climate change worsens these fluctuations.

We can now understand that civilizations are doomed to collapse. But why do we continue to fall into this trap? 

Ophuls provides some answers by pointing out that signs of overdevelopment are ignored until it is too late, and humanity only realizes the error of its ecological ways in retrospect. But there are more specific causes, one of them being that environmental costs are not reflected in economic transactions.

For example, when we transact on resources, we do not consider how much degradation occurred during extraction or how long it would take for the resource to regenerate. When we trade resources for money, we do not consider these factors. This mismatch between prices and actual environmental costs is referred to as a "market failure." We essentially trade away long-term environmental wealth for short-term material gain, which means that we are not properly valuing or protecting the environment for the future. 

In other words, trade does not accurately reflect what is happening in the physical world.

In a money-based economy, money is increasingly separated from tangible goods and services. This detachment allows economies to thrive even when they harm the environment. In some cases, societies may resort to practices such as currency debasement or excessive credit in order to maintain economic growth, further separating economic activity from reality. In simple terms, money is just an abstraction and does not represent reality.

Exponential Growth

This factor connects well with the previous one. The primary reason there is ecological exhaustion is that humans are unable to understand the nature of exponential growth. 

Ophuls begins this chapter by giving an example of compound interest in money and how, over time, the compounding return becomes massive on its own. He then compares this to a bacteria, which divides in two every ten minutes. After just a few hours, one bacteria can multiply itself a billion times over, which is simply incomprehensible to the human mind, not because they are unaware of the existence of this phenomenon, but because they are only designed to envision the short term, not the long-term effects of it. 

In other words, while the first quantities of something may not seem like much, the numbers grow rapidly as they progress and continue to expand, outpacing human intuition and resources. 

Moreover, these examples might seem indefensive since they aren’t harmful scenarios. However, the same applies for negative effects. For instance, Ophuls offers the example of a city that has been steadily growing its population. With each doubling of the population, the resource consumption also doubles. So, if a city with 100,000 inhabitants has cut down five forests for fuel in its history, it would need to cut down five more to sustain its growth to 200,000 inhabitants, which is exactly what happens nowadays in our world.

The same is true for a consistent rate of inflation over time, which reduces the value of a currency in the long run due to compounding. Another example is resource extraction scenarios, in which we have abundant resource quantities but as the rate of extraction steadily increases, we exhaust the abundance in a relatively shorter period.

Following this, Ophuls offers another incredible example to explain how human intervention, once realizing the trouble, might not be the solution. The example revolves around a single bacteria placed in a bottle at 11 p.m. This bacteria doubles every minute, making the bottle get full in an hour.  If we intervene and make the bottle four times bigger, we wouldn’t help ourselves much. One minute past midnight, the bacteria would be occupying half of the expanded bottle. 

The main takeaway here is that starting with a larger bottle is not the solution, and intervening to delay the process is simply jumping into a desperate situation that will not solve the problem. So what can we do? Ophuls claims that the deceptive nature of exponential growth is the issue. We may see a quantity and not be alarmed, but by the time it becomes alarming, it is already too late, and we must move at a faster rate than the expansion rate, which is already exorbitantly large.

Furthermore, Ophuls claims that this human limitation is due to psychological reasons. First and foremost, humans are wired to prioritize immediate and concrete concerns over abstract or long-term trends. This is because humans are designed for hunter-gatherer situations and, in general, a life focused on day-to-day survival, rendering them incapable of comprehending abstraction and long-term consequences. This is why, in my opinion, humans tend to classify, categorize, and quantify everything in order to avoid abstraction to the greatest extent possible. 

These Paleolithic roots might seem a thing of the past, after all, we are now more rational. However, our reason continues to serve immediate desires and goals rather than long-term planning. For instance, economists often use discount rates to assess the present value of future outcomes, and at relatively high rates, such as 3.6 percent, the future is heavily discounted. This means that events far in the future are perceived as practically worthless in present terms, which leads to a devaluation of future considerations.

This caveman mentality that works against us serves no purpose, and even when we are aware that something is wrong, society has grown so large and complex that it is nearly impossible to manipulate it. The solution comes from controlling growth before it is too late, rather than delaying the inevitable by allowing technological advancements to keep pushing growth, which has a dark side, as Ophuls discusses in his next chapter.

Expedited Entropy

As said before this book touches on a lot of fields, and this time it touches on thermodynamics and science. The first law of thermodynamics states that energy can't be created or destroyed; it just changes from one form to another. The second law is a little trickier. It states that when energy changes forms, entropy increases, implying that energy becomes more dispersed, chaotic, or disordered. 

In other words, energy decays into increasingly less useful forms. So, whenever there is a change in energy, the quantity remains constant, but the quality decreases. 

With this in mind, civilizations tend to accelerate entropy. Human activities, such as farming, speed up this process. For example, when we farm, we are essentially extracting rich nutrients from the soil. However, in the process, we frequently damage the soil, and the nutrients we extract rarely return to it. Instead, they pollute the waterways. This increases entropy because we gradually reduce the soil and environment of their fertility and health.

In light of these issues, farmers have developed methods to reduce agricultural entropy losses over time, such as crop rotation and terracing. These methods have been proven effective in developing sustainable farming systems. However, given civilizations' tendency to expand in population, demand for agricultural products is bound to rise. Because the land in its natural state cannot meet this increased demand, external energy must be used to artificially boost yields. Thus, entropy increases as the amount of energy consumed per unit of output rises.

Another modern example of entropy is coal. When coal is burned to produce electricity, only about 35 percent of the energy in it is converted into usable electrical energy. The rest is lost as waste heat, gases, chemicals, particulates, and ash. The quality of the energy decreases significantly. This means that while electricity is produced, a lot of undesirable byproducts are also generated. So, for every unit of useful electricity created, two units of less useful or harmful byproducts are produced. What’s more, electricity generated this way doesn't last forever.

There are ways to improve the efficiency of this, but the results are not perfect. A ratio of two units of loss to one unit of gain is generally considered good. However, in some cases, such as industrial agriculture, the loss can be ten-to-one. Improving efficiency beyond a certain point produces diminishing returns. Even if we could achieve near-perfect efficiency (which is impossible due to thermodynamic laws), this would only result in a doubling of efficiency. And, as we've seen, one doubling only buys one minute of exponential time, so it's not a significant improvement.

Following that, Ophuls emphasizes the importance of understanding that technology does not generate energy, and that the more technology we use, the more energy and costs we incur. For example, using automobiles instead of horses increases both embodied energy, that is, energy required for production, and operational energy. Similarly, computers require a lot of embodied and operational energy to function. 

According to Ophuls, the notion that technology will enable us to do more with less is a myth. The more we use technology, the faster entropy increases. Technology doesn't generate energy on its own. Instead, it's a tool for using energy or converting one type of energy into another. For example, coal can be turned into gasoline using technology, but this process involves losing a significant amount of energy. This is why Ophuls believes fossil fuels, such as coal, are important. They contain a lot of energy in a small volume. This concentrated energy allows technology to perform amazing feats. In contrast, dispersed energy sources like solar power are less efficient because they're spread out and harder to capture in large amounts. 

Lastly, Ophuls main point in this part of the book, is that humanity is trapped into a thermodynamic vicious circle that it's hard to escape from. To escape it, civilization would need to radically transform its economy to mimic the efficiency of natural ecosystems. This would require tight coupling of societal elements and strong checks on human consumption and desire, which may be difficult to achieve. 

Complexity

As we can see, complexity has become a part of civilization, and the human brain isn't built to deal with it because it was designed to respond to the demands of immediate survival. Unless an outside force breaks down this complexity, it destroys civilization because it becomes impossible to repair or control it.

Moreover, Ophuls offers a metaphor with a juggler to illustrate why complexity is dangerous. As we know, a juggler can only handle a certain number of balls before losing control. Similarly, a civilization can only manage a certain level of complexity before experiencing breakdowns. As more "balls" are added, it becomes increasingly challenging to keep them all in the air without dropping any.

These “balls” in civilizations are, its size, the diversity and number of its parts, the specialization of social roles, and the mechanisms for organizing these components. Adding more entities or increasing their complexity increases the overall complexity. Ancient societies used to contain no more than a few dozen distinct social personalities, while modern societies have in between 10,000 or even 20,000 unique occupational roles, with some industrial societies reaching more than 1,000,000 different kinds of social personalities.

This is one of the chapters that I find most interesting. Complexity problems can take many different forms. The first one is sheer overload. As we have said before, the exponential nature of growth increases quantities. As civilizations expand, so do the number of balls, and as a result, the balls themselves tend to multiply exponentially.

This leads to what Thomas Homer-Dixon refers to as a "ingenuity gap," which states that the human ability to cope lags the accumulation of problems until the gap between the demand for ingenuity and the supply of it is no longer bridgeable.

In other words, the ability to cope with problems lags behind their accumulation.

However, that is not all. Solving problems increases complexity, which creates new problems to solve. This cycle continues as more complex technologies, institutions, specialists, regulations, and information processing mechanisms emerge and are integrated into society.

In short, civilizations are trapped in a vicious cycle of complexity and must continue to solve every problem that emerges. However, each solution creates new problems, necessitating new solutions, which eventually contribute to even more complexity, making the new problems more difficult to solve while increasing the likelihood of complete failure.

Aside from the new problems that arise while attempting to solve the old ones, another issue that emerges is the unpredictability and uncontrollability of these systems. As the system's complexity increases, so does its unpredictability and uncontrollability. This escalation is typically disproportionate, which means that it is not a linear increase. The system's behavior becomes increasingly impenetrable and unpredictable as a result of numerous nonlinear feedback loops. This results in "chaos," which simply means that instead of having a complex behavior on a system, everything appears random and unpredictable, making it impossible to control. The human mind, Ophuls argues, is linear and sequential, but systems occur simultaneously and overwhelm us intellectually.

Financial crises are an excellent example of the chaotic nature of systems. Despite the presence of highly motivated, talented, and well-capitalized individuals in both the public and private sectors, these crises continue, with booms leading to devastating collapses. This phenomenon continues despite an extensive knowledge of economic history.

Furthermore, decision-makers often grasp the problems that need solving and are committed to finding solutions. However, they frequently miss the mark because the required solutions are counterintuitive, meaning they go against linear thinking. Even when decision-makers accurately identify leverage points, they tend to push for changes in the wrong direction, worsening the problem.  For instance, Ophuls points out that farm subsidies, intended to preserve families, actually promoted agribusiness instead.

Following this, as we saw, human beings struggle to comprehend nonlinear systems with their linear minds, leading them to fall into various "system traps." These traps include mistaking symptoms for causes, bounded rationality, engaging in blame games, facing policy resistance, succumbing to the tragedy of the commons, experiencing a drift to low performance, escalating conflicts, engaging in competitive exclusion, fostering addiction, and resorting to rule-beating. One of the most significant traps is fanaticism, where individuals refuse to reconsider the values and goals of the system, even when they become detrimental.

In the end, collapse is largely unpredictable and uncontrollable. Overcomplexity is dangerous, and control is impossible. Ophuls believes that the only way is to reject "immoderate greatness" and advocate for simplicity. Because, in order to avoid the burst, the booms must not occur at all.

However, it is easier said than done. Despite the inherent risks, humans frequently seek complexity and greatness, which makes them reject attempts to limit growth.

Moral Decay

The last two chapters discuss the reasons humans are unable to act wisely. This first chapter on moral decay resembles a lot to Ray Dalio’s The Changing World Order. It discusses the cyclical nature of civilizations and their eventual decline, as observed by various thinkers throughout history. 

To begin the chapter, Ophuls claims that it is clear, as observed by thinkers, that the decline of a civilization is caused by the deterioration of its moral core or guiding ideal.

One of these many thinkers, Glubb Pasha, observed that every civilization begins with an Age of Pioneers, then progresses to an Age of Commerce, Affluence, and Intellect, and finally to an Age of Decadence. Every stage establishes the socioeconomic conditions for the following, and so on.

The first stage, the Age of Pioneers, is a stage in which civilizations value exploration, innovation, and conquest, as well as courage, duty, and honor, resulting in political stability and economic growth.

This stage of economic growth eventually brings the Age of Commerce, in which the merchant classes have become very wealthy. In this stage the morals are still high, and the devotion to duty is still at its peak. However, there is also a new growing focus on wealth accumulation, since there is a lot of self-confidence in the nation.

Moreover, because everything must come to an end, this stage of confidence and capital accumulation eventually leads to a stage where people feel comfortable because they are surrounded by wealth and luxury. This period of comfort is known as the Age of Affluence, and it is marked by a decline in traditional values such as duty and service.

This Age of Affluence is a civilization's peak, and I would argue that it is the one that lasts the most. If we include some of the information provided by Ray Dalio in his book, this is the stage at which weaker civilizations are afraid to confront dominant ones that are at their peak, knowing they have the power to control everything through their military power and strong currency.

However, while everything appears to be in order on the outside, this is usually the point at which greed and selfishness have crowded out the ideals of duty and service, causing a society to rot slowly from within. The population begins to become more defensive, prioritizing self-preservation over doing things for duty.

Another symptom of decay is an increased emphasis on welfare. Affluence fosters a sense of entitlement in the population, resulting in the expansion of social welfare programs. These programs, which were originally designed to ensure that no one is left behind, result in an increasing reliance on subsidies as well as a loss of personal responsibility and independence.

Eventually, the Age of Affluence gives way to the Age of Intellect, during which civilizations invest heavily in education and the pursuit of knowledge. This leads to advancements in various fields, particularly natural science. However, the flourishing intellectual climate also brings about challenges, such as excessive debate and argumentation that hinder effective decision-making and action in public affairs.

Moreover, this Age of Intellect is characterized by an excessively rational approach to life. People begin to believe that all problems can be solved through cleverness and intellect alone, without the need for effort, dedication, or sacrifice. However, this mindset often results in simplistic policies that lack political will and are destined to fail.

The increasing number of intellectual arguments leads to polarization, which, rather than fostering agreement, exacerbates divisions, resulting in more internal conflicts and tensions. This stage reflects what is happening in the United States and other countries such as Canada. 

Another source of division is the influx of foreigners drawn to the civilization's prosperity. This results in a more diverse population that no longer shares the same ideals, ultimately contributing to societal fragmentation. Furthermore, intellectuals in society contribute to a "value-free" culture in which traditional values and ideals are disregarded, resulting in a loss of civilization's original energy, virtue, and morale.

Finally, the Age of Decadence arrives, with society rotten to the core and on the verge of collapse. At this point, corruption becomes widespread, and the societal structure begins to crumble under the weight of its own excesses. Everything negative becomes apparent; hedonism, cynicism, pessimism, narcissism, consumerism, materialism, nihilism, fatalism, fanaticism, and so on are among the population's negative traits.

Moreover, Glubb and Ophuls argue that there is no way to break free from these cycles. One stage leads to the next, and this process happens over generations. Each new generation grows in different circumstances than the previous and subsequent generations, causing each generation to deviate from the original values and ideals that gave rise to civilization in the first place. In fact, Glubb points out that it takes approximately ten generations for a civilization to complete the cycle, implying that each civilization has a lifespan of about 250 years. 

As we can see, civilizations collapse due to a shift in core morals. A constant supply of energy is required for a civilization to become stable and last. As we saw in the previous chapter, matter and energy are governed by entropy, which means they tend to move downhill from concentrated to diffuse states. According to Ophuls, this implies that even social orders are subject to a force that we can call moral entropy.

Another reason it is rough to avoid core morals to decay, is that, as we saw earlier, humans aren’t good at foreseeing future consequences. Those living in the Ages of Commerce or Affluence, will just ignore the ecological and economical consequences of those that will live in the Age of Decadence. The erosion of a civilization's moral core often goes unnoticed until the consequences of decadence and decay become evident, and those who warn of the seeds of decline are often disregarded. The erosion then proceeds silently and stealthily until it is too late to reverse the damage. 

Finally, moral entropy does not destroy morale on its own. It is exacerbated at every stage by rulers' inability to respond quickly and effectively to the challenges posed by the increasing complexity of the societies over which they rule.

Practical Failure

This is the final chapter of the book and it mainly ties everything together to make sense of the entire text.

As we saw earlier, the most important reason that civilizations collapse is moral entropy. Complexity tends to become greater with time in civilizations, making them less manageable. Human beings aren’t hardwired to think in non-linear ways, hence the problems caused by complexity end up being “fixed” in ways that postpone dealing with the fundamental issues. The complexity eventually makes these fundamental problems intractable for the human mind. Because humans tend to think in present terms only and complex systems become unpredictable, decisions are never optimal and problems do not get solved. At the beginning of every civilization, systems aren’t as complex, there aren’t thousands of levels of bureaucracy, and morals are at their highest, which makes problems manageable. There is also a high sense of duty, and the population is not in a state of comfort, which contributes to innovation and a sense of responsibility toward society.

In later stages, morale is low and there is already a very complex system with an increased number of problems. Additionally, the society is already polarized and hence solving short term problems becomes urgent. This means that the complexity of the system that carries with it future problematic consequences is a luxury that the society cannot focus on. Civilization then solves, or better said “patches” the issues by taking the path of less resistance, leaving future consequences behind and unattended.

Furthermore, the complexity that comes with large social structures limits a society's freedom of action. These structures adhere to a certain way of thinking that limits freedom of choice; that is, there are so many bureaucratic levels, each with its own set of regulations and laws, that thinking any differently seems impossible. In fact, this couldn't be any different, because institutions are actually designed to be stable in order to contribute to a civilization's overall stability. Unfortunately, this limits the possibility of alternative solutions or radical changes, which may be required to address a society's fundamental underlying problems. 

Following this, another common human error is resistance to change. Even scientists often resist changing established theories or paradigms when anomalies arise that contradict them. This resistance comes from the fact that scientific investigation operates within paradigms, which are overarching frameworks guiding research. New paradigms usually gain acceptance not solely based on their merits, but through the efforts of a new generation of researchers who challenge the status quo.

With this in mind, human societies are addicted to their ideals and way of life, so they dislike reformation. They cannot admit error and cut their losses; instead, they prefer to continue. This is prevalent in any institution that refuses to adapt to changing circumstances, resulting in stagnation and eventually collapse. Unlike scientific inquiry, where there are clear criteria for evaluating evidence, the social, economic, and political spheres lack a standard of truth comparable to the scientific method. Participants in the debates for change frequently defend particular interests or ideologies, resulting in a lack of agreement on what constitutes genuine problems that require fundamental reform.

Furthermore, Ophuls sees inflation as an evasion of reality and an attempt to maintain artificial prosperity despite objective conditions that indicate otherwise. As inflation continues, governments confiscate a significant portion of their citizens' wealth. In fact, he claims that they not only confiscate, but they do so arbitrarily; and that impoverishes many, and benefits only a few.

In addition to this, inflation allows governments to artificially prop up economic indicators such as GDP growth and employment rates by injecting more money into the economy. That is, rather than addressing the root causes of economic problems, such as structural imbalances or unsustainable spending, inflationary policies seek to mask these issues, and in fact, not only mask them, but postpone the inevitable consequences of it.

In essence, Ophuls claims that inflation punishes prudence and thrift, while rewarding their opposites. It favors vice over virtue, and it imperils not only the ultimate foundation of a capitalist economy, as Keynes says, but it also corrodes the moral basis of civil society. Because once people realize that their wealth is being secretly and arbitrarily confiscated and their welfare degraded by their rulers, then the social contract breaks, with possible revolutionary consequences. 

In a nutshell, for Ophuls, inflation is one of many factors contributing to a decline in societal morale, and it is not a new problem; it has happened in previous civilizations such as the Roman Empire.

In the end, civilizations end up not being able to afford the conditions of their own existence, as claimed by Ophuls. Tainter, an American anthropologist, refers to this as the "entropy trap," which essentially means that a society's available energy and resources can no longer sustain the current level of societal complexity, causing it to consume itself. The very factors that contribute to a civilization's greatness are also responsible for its decline. The civilization can try to avoid decline by borrowing from the future or relying on past successes, but this cannot be sustained indefinitely.

As Machiavelli said: “There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. 24”

As we can see, Tainter and Machiavelli emphasize the difficulty and risk of implementing fundamental reforms in a society on the verge of collapse. Those who benefit from the status quo resist change, while potential supporters of reform may be skeptical or hesitant to embrace something new. Consequently, reform often occurs only when conditions become so dire that there is no other option.

We can conclude this book by saying that moral entropy and practical failure are entirely caused by the human mind. All the prosperity, progress and innovation that comes from the core values of each civilization, eventually contribute to the complexity and moral decay that lead to the inevitable failure of everything they once accomplished. 

Sources:

• Ophuls, W. (2012). Immoderate Greatness: Why Civilizations Fail. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

• Dalio, R. (2021). Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order: Why Nations Succeed and Fail. Avid Reader Press / Simon & Schuster.

Beyond Thought.

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YouTube videos and newsletters will no longer be in sync. Newsletters with audio versions will be marked as "Upcoming spoken version on YouTube," while those without will be marked as "Newsletter exclusive."

This is due to the fact that writing and producing audio for video are two separate tasks that take their own time, and there are thousands of books and information that I'd like to share with you that aren't necessarily worth a video, or if they are, the video takes longer than the writing, and vice versa. Because writing is our strength, we will no longer include YouTube videos in all newsletters; and if they do, they will be posted at a later date.

Having said that, this newsletter will have an upcoming spoken version on YouTube, so stay tune if listening is preferred.

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Highlights:

• Totalitarian Regimes and Classless Societies: Totalitarian movements often aim for a classless society but achieve it through different means. While Nazi Germany's society became classless relatively naturally, the Soviet Union implemented it more artificially through widespread purges and fear tactics under Stalin's rule.

• Propaganda and Fictional Reality: Totalitarian movements rely heavily on propaganda to create a coherent fictional reality for the masses, offering them a sense of purpose and belonging. The content of propaganda matters less than its ability to fabricate a narrative that explains reality, manipulating individuals' beliefs and behaviors to align with the regime's goals.

• Scientific Prophecy and Ideological Appeal: Totalitarian regimes emphasize scientific justification for their ideologies, claiming to have discovered secret forces that will bring about radical societal change. They appeal to the masses by offering a vision of a utopian future based on these supposed scientific principles.

• Constant Motion and Resistance to Stability: Totalitarian regimes must avoid stability and normalization to prevent the collapse of their fictitious world created through propaganda. They constantly shift goals and regulations to maintain momentum and control over the masses.

• Duplication of Administrative Structures: Totalitarian regimes create duplicative administrative structures, placing the party above the state while allowing the state to neutralize the party as needed. This leads to bureaucratic chaos and confusion, serving the regime's objective of maintaining instability.

• Claim to Legitimacy through Natural Laws: Totalitarian regimes claim legitimacy by asserting obedience to higher forces, such as natural or historical laws, rather than human-made laws.

• Separation of Thought from Experience: Ideologies separate thought from experience, emphasizing logical deduction over lived reality. Individuals are encouraged to rely solely on ideological dogma rather than personal experience or empirical evidence, leading to a distortion of reality.

• Prevention of Transformation of Reality: Ideologies hinder the transformation of reality by imposing rigid dogma that cannot adapt to changing circumstances. Ideology cannot learn from experience.

This part of the book may seem less significant because the other chapters have already explained the origins of totalitarianism. However, this section offers some really insightful information about how totalitarianism manipulates the masses before gaining control as well as how it functions when it is in power. 

Furthermore, the second chapter of this section, The Totalitarian Movement, is probably the most insightful and interesting. We’ll look into it in this newsletter, but for now, let’s begin with the first chapter.

A Classless Society

As the title of this chapter reveals, Hannah discusses the outcomes of a society without classes, which emerged from the instability of the nation-state structure. As we may already be aware, a central theme in Hannah's political philosophy is the sense of belonging that provides us with purpose and direction. Thus, she argues in this section that when social classes are eliminated, people often feel isolated and in search of meaning, which makes them susceptible to the influence of movements or ideologies.

Now, it's critical to comprehend what classes are in order to move forward. According to Hannah, a population's many interests are reflected in its classes. There are interests shared by the bourgeoisie, working class, and so forth. They all speak for specific political parties, which simplifies and makes it easier to distinguish between the interests of the many different groups that make up a population.

Furthermore, Hannah argues that not all the people belonging to these different classes are political. This means that most of these people are, what she calls, masses, or people with less pronounced political opinions. Individuals who are indifferent to who holds authority or not. Simply put, they don't really seem to mind. This contrasts them with the elite, which are the people who represent them and leave the masses as more passive participants. However, the only time the masses start to worry about political issues, Hannah claims, is when the class system breaks down, that is, when there isn’t a political party that represents their interests.

Consequently, the lack of strong political opinions among these masses makes them easier to organize and control. Hannah characterized these individuals as "atomized," angry, and isolated. These isolated individuals, who emerged from the disintegration of conventional social structures following World War I, felt marginalized and ignored by political parties. 

Moreover, the lack of place in society, which makes them lack purpose and direction, and the fact that they were not politically knowledgeable, made them propense to participate in political movements. They did not know what they really needed or wanted, and they did not know what problems needed to be fixed. All they knew is that they wanted to be a part of a movement that seems to be working towards an important milestone that will better the course of events.

Following this, all the totalitarian movements of the nineteenth century had classless societies. However, they all achieved them in different ways. While in Nazi Germany the classless society was achieved almost naturally, in the Soviet Union things needed to be done more artificially. 

In order to turn Lenin’s dictatorship into a totalitarian rule, Stalin had to strategically atomize and make the society a structureless mass in order to solidify control. He began by eliminating the classes that owned property, for ideological reasons, and then proceeded to eliminate workers, bureaucrats and police officials. Stalin's regime was known for its liquidation of classes, which was accomplished by widespread purges and guilt-by-association strategies that created a climate of fear and mistrust among the general public. 

The fact that both movements had quite different goals accounts for all of the differences in how they were able to achieve a structureless mass. A classless society founded on Marxist-Leninist principles was the Soviet Union's objective, while Nazi Germany wanted to create a society that was "pure" in terms of race by means of racism.

Following this, totalitarian regimes demand absolute loyalty from people in addition to their desire to establish a society without classes. By methodically cutting people off from social connections, this is accomplished. Totalitarian regimes try to eliminate all forms of activity and only allow people to feel like they belong if they join their movement. They accomplish this by offering an ideological framework, which gives them direction and purpose. Instead of discussing political programs, they simply use emotional appeals to persuade people to join a constantly evolving movement.

This brings us to a crucial aspect of these movements: they always give the impression that their actions are not motivated by self-interest. They are successful in convincing the masses that their cause transcends their individual interests.

Now, in our previous newsletter, we mentioned that intellectuals tend to be attracted to these movements. And in this section of the book, Hannah does not think any differently. 

Even though totalitarian ideologies seem evil and arbitrary, elite interest in these movements is rooted in a rejection of the status quo and a general disappointment with society. The truth is that elite members of a society, i.e., intellectuals, possess a deeper understanding of the ideological framework prevailing in their societies than anyone else. Totalitarianism provides a platform for intellectuals to question dominant ideologies and a radical break from accepted norms. 

Furthermore, by emphasizing activism and terrorism, totalitarian movements drew in both the intellectual class and the mob. In contrast to previous revolutionary societies, terrorism was a way for people to vent their anger and frustration. Hannah draws attention to a difference in the mob's and the elite's perspectives in light of this. While the mob wanted to be in power and rise in fame, the elite valued staying anonymous and despised the cult of genius perpetuated by bourgeois society. 

Nonetheless, both groups took pride in seeing reputable establishments fall from grace. This means that the elite's obsession with rewriting history was compatible with the fabrications found in totalitarian propaganda. Totalitarian regimes' distorting of historical facts fulfilled the elite's thirst for destroying established narratives and institutions. 

It is noteworthy, though, that Hannah argued that the elite was drawn to totalitarian movements and not to totalitarianism in power, which is an entirely different thing that we will discuss in the upcoming chapters. However, by the time totalitarian movements have seized power it is already too late.

The Totalitarian Movement

We have discussed what the masses are as well as the elite. But it is important to understand that while the movement's momentum convinced the elite and the mob, propaganda was necessary to persuade the masses. The mob and the elite became, in a sense, friends, since they both acted in a team to break apart existing established institutions. However, when the masses were won over, the elite and the mob were driven apart.

Having said that, the topic of this chapter is the totalitarian movement. It is about understanding propaganda and the techniques of totalitarian movements before the terror of their takeover of power materializes. 

This chapter has the potential to be especially thought-provoking because it suggests that elements of totalitarianism may be present in contemporary political movements. However, while drawing these parallels is interesting because it can help us in recognizing when things are getting out of control, it's crucial to keep in mind that Hannah is discussing the totalitarian movements of her time. 

To start this chapter Hannah discusses propaganda, which she claims is a primary component of political organization. She argues that the important thing about it isn’t the content, but the fact that it creates a coherent fictional reality out of structureless masses, making them go away from the real world and into a world fabricated by lies and false narratives. 

To put it simply, what matters is not the ideology itself, but rather that the content creates a coherent fiction that makes sense and explains reality. In a way, what matters is that it provides a sense of purpose and shape to a world in which the masses feel lost, giving them a sense of belonging, despite the fact that this reality is entirely fabricated. In a sense, the masses sacrifice their security and comfort in pursuit of this meaning. Instead of joining the movements to advance their personal interests, the masses prefer to pursue what they believe to be the truth in the midst of a complicated and meaningless existence. 

Moreover, totalitarian movements must function in a manner that keeps them close to current information, they cannot just impose their worldview by means of terror. In a sense, they must first persuade before oppressing or causing terror. 

This prompts Hannah to claim that, in terms of dealing with the non-totalitarian world, propaganda may be the most significant tool of totalitarianism. She argues that it is possible that some people under totalitarian regimes have not fully embraced the ideology, making the need for exposure to propaganda a constant necessity to further solidify the regime's beliefs.

However, she also adds that while propaganda may involve lies in order to manipulate, it is essential not to let these distortions overshadow the regime's genuine goals, which may not always be apparent.

This leads us to the claim that, once in power, totalitarianism transitions to indoctrination and employs violence not merely to instill fear but to enforce their ideological beliefs. However, what kinds of arguments are totalitarian regimes using?

The crucial point about totalitarianism, according to Hannah, is that because it is a fiction, its concern with certainty is not with facts but rather with creating a prediction or a fictional world and working towards it. That is, it does not matter if it is a lie, what it must do is create a lie and make it come true afterwards. Implying that it does not matter if it happens in the present, as long as it can happen in the future. But, how can totalitarian movements convince people into this? 

This brings us to scientific prophecy, and how totalitarian regimes make a strong emphasis on scientific nature to address to the masses. This obsession is characterized by insistence on scientific proofs rather than other means of appeal. The ideological origin of racism and socialism in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, pretended to have found secret forces that would change the universe and end all of the problems faced by humanity. 

That being said, the most important aspect of totalitarian movements is that they need to provide a consistent and coherent narrative. They seek patterns of coincidence and consistency to appeal to the masses and fabricate a narrative that makes sense to them. As argued by Hannah, the human mind needs consistency and order to counteract the chaos in reality. Totalitarian regimes exploit this by offering a fictional world that seems more consistent and understandable than reality itself.

With this in mind, the Nazis and Bolsheviks used different tactics that were aimed at manipulating reality to fit their narratives. The Soviets, for example, used the ideology of class struggle to portray the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat fighting against the bourgeoisie. The Nazis, on the other hand, promoted the idea of a Jewish world conspiracy to unify and control the masses. 

This means that totalitarian regimes seek to persuade by targeting existing prejudices and stereotypes. The Nazis, for instance, capitalized on anti-Semitic sentiments that were already present in society to scapegoat Jews for reasons that have been seen on previous newsletters. They also blend conflicting ideologies to appeal to a wider audience. The Nazis, for instance, combined nationalism with socialism and named their movement “National Socialism,” when in reality their aims were far from being either totally socialist or nationalist in nature.

Furthermore, she makes the case that totalitarian movements usually attempt to restrict their propaganda efforts to foreign policy or other overseas activities. Nonetheless, there are instances in which foreign spread propaganda clashes with what is being said domestically. Under such circumstances, the regime might provide an explanation to its domestic audience, labeling the opposing propaganda as a "temporary tactical manoeuvre." 

For instance, Hannah gives the example of Stalin who struggled with contradictory propaganda after the war with Hitler placed him in the democratic camp. As a result, he likely had to make sudden explanations to reduce the possibility of confusion brought on by the contradictory propaganda narratives. This also meant avoiding specific details about policies or laws, focusing instead on broader themes like race or class struggle. This allows totalitarian regimes to maintain flexibility and control over its message.

Now, we can understand that totalitarian movements seek to control information by isolating the masses from the real world, which ends up shaping people's beliefs and behaviors. This means that totalitarian regimes need to make the members of their world act and react according to the laws of the fictitious world that they’ve created.

This leads Hannah to explain more about the organization in totalitarian regimes. She claims that in order for these movements to control the level of commitment and indoctrination of its followers, they must make distinctions between party members and sympathizers in their front organization. Party members are usually those who have undergone deeper ideological indoctrination and are fully committed to the cause, while sympathizers may support the movement to varying degrees without being fully immersed in its ideology.

This means that totalitarian movements often restrict actual party membership to a select few while actively seeking to increase the number of sympathizers. This allows them to maintain a core of dedicated followers, which is easier to control, while also projecting the illusion of broader support within the population.

However, the primary function of the front organization—in spite of its divisions—is to establish a barrier between the real world and the totalitarian fictitious world. Members are protected from outside influences when they associate with other like-minded people, which affirms the movement's ideological purity and keeps members from challenging its principles. Additionally, these "walls" reduce the possibility of disagreement. Individuals may fear punishment if they deviate from the party line, which solidifies their loyalty to the movement. 

In other words, the “walls”create a sort of normalcy in which they start to be immersed in, because remember, totalitarianism aims at removing any touch with the outside real world. Totalitarian regimes have several degrees of fiction, and each one of them is protected from the outside world from the one further out.

Furthermore, as we continue to explain the ways in which totalitarian regimes organize themselves, we can see that although propaganda is useful for organizing, totalitarian regimes also require ongoing maintenance of the fictions they have constructed. These regimes vanish if they don't grow and exercise caution when it comes to opposing ideologies that might run counter to their imagined reality.

This means that, in addition to not admitting everyone to the party, totalitarian regimes use different levels of militancy to assist elite members in transitioning from common supporters to elite members, as well as gradually becoming accustomed to the movement's radical ideology without overwhelming them. This relates to the idea that these regimes strive for several layers of fiction until they become completely disconnected from the real world.

Surprisingly, this reminds me a lot of how secret societies or sects function. Scientology, for example, operates in the same manner: it initially persuades people, but it does not reveal its full radical thinking until the target has been gradually moving up the ranks. 

In fact, Hannah claims that totalitarian regimes are similar to secret societies in that they have hierarchical structures, consistent lies to deceive the outside world, a binary division of the world into allies and enemies, and a constant demand for loyalty from their members, even if it means accepting absurdities from leaders.

This breeds cynicism among elite party members, who believe everything the leader says despite recognizing its falsity. Elite members no longer care about the movement's ideological aspects; they understand they are false, and what matters is that the falsehood works. These members are critical to the organization because they know the truth about it and play an important role in the movement's ability to maintain its true objectives.

This leads us to the leader of a totalitarian movement that plays a central role in shaping its ideology, strategy, and organizational structure. Totalitarian leaders often rise to power through the manipulation of internal party politics rather than sheer force or charisma. They cultivate an inner circle of trusted advisors and allies and leverage their support to consolidate power and eliminate rivals.

In addition to this, the leader frequently fosters an air of authority and mystery. The leader's perceived power is increased and followers' loyalty is strengthened by this mystique. As a result, the leader's standing frequently depends on the backing of their inner circle, who act as a bridge between them and the larger membership. This inner circle significantly influences the movement's priorities and direction by limiting access to the leader and influencing decision-making. 

Furthermore, the leader ensures that his will is carried out and that everything he says or commands is beneficial to the end goal. This makes the leader irreplaceable because it convinces party members and sympathizers that the complex structures he has built cannot function without his will and commands. This also removes autonomy from members' actions, as everything they do is now the responsibility of the leader. No one needs to explain the reasoning behind their actions in any situation, turning them into instruments of the leader's will.

Finally, one interesting point Hannah makes is that the totalitarian leader's secret private life contrasts to the publicity value that all democracies find in showcasing the private lives of prime ministers, presidents, and kings, which reinforces the movement's goal without confusing or distracting sympathizers, thereby enhancing the fictitious world they seek to create and maintain. 

Totalitarianism in Power

When totalitarianism takes power, it must confront reality, which creates one of the most difficult aspects of these movements, namely the need to be in constant motion, as Hannah argues earlier in the book. These regimes must resist stability and normalization because they risk tearing down the movement and destroying the fictitious world they created through propaganda. 

Moreover, Hannah emphasizes that totalitarian regimes go beyond a mere tyranny or dictatorship by not only seizing power but also actively reshaping reality to fit their ideological narrative. This means that totalitarianism in power must constantly shift their goals. It is insufficient to simply kill Jews; new goals must be created and recreated on a continuous basis. This is because totalitarianism exists to provide people with direction and meaning, therefore people should always feel as if they are a part of a movement aiming at something bigger.

Additionally, totalitarianism in power must compete with other ideologies, which requires regimes to remove any competing ideology, resulting in perpetual expansion.

In other words, totalitarianism is a fictitious reality that fades away if it doesn't fully dominate. It must be international and global, making nationalism its polar opposite.

This leads us to Hannah's claim, which establishes that totalitarianism is not the same as tyranny or dictatorship, despite some similarities. She claims that a one-party government seizes control of the state and fills its offices with party members, resulting in unity between the state and the party. In contrast, a totalitarian regime attempts to retain the crucial link between the state and the movement. It aims to prevent the party and movement from being absorbed by the state.

As she says in her book by quoting Hitler, "Not the state, but the race is the central focus." That is, the actual power is in the institutions of the movement as opposed to the state.

Consequently, totalitarianism uses the state as a front organization, but in reality the party is the organizational structure of these regimes. The moment a dictatorship transitions to a totalitarian regime it seeks to eliminate realities not only opponents as in the case of a dictatorship. 

This means that in order to completely vanish realities, one must employ different kinds of power. Removing a reality inevitably leads to destruction, which is why totalitarianism transforms power into something different - a direct confrontation with reality, the complete eradication of freedom and spontaneity from the human experience. Organization becomes a form of power, in which it creates a unity with no room for spontaneity that eventually helps to keep the movement going. 

We will now begin to discuss the various aspects of totalitarian regimes in power, beginning with the totalitarian state. So far, we know that a totalitarian regime must avoid stability. This means that the totalitarian state is inherently unstable; it creates as much as it destroys and recreates regulations. 

This leads her to her theory of duplication, which is essentially the duplication of administrations that place the party above the state while also allowing the state to neutralize the party as needed. This means, as mentioned in the previous newsletter, that there are several bureaucracies involved, to the point where there isn't really a structure but rather just a direction. When one law or regulation overlaps with another or does not appear to be consistent with the end goal, it can be ignored or new ones can be created. Nonetheless, the most important aspect of all this chaos is that this is precisely its objective: to create confusion and chaos. 

As we saw in the previous chapter, this confusion and chaos place the leader in a position of mystery, which he must maintain in order to maintain the regime. The leader must be perceived as acting unexpectedly in order to keep the public and bureaucrats guessing what he will do next. As everything changes constantly, people continue to live in chaos and confusion, with no trust in anyone, leading them to see the leader as the only one who can be trusted.

Power becomes unstable, it seeks to be constantly mobilized by constantly organizing people and institutions. 

This brings us to the secret police whose aim is to terrorize people. These entities are very important to the process of transforming reality. They are the ones who impose the fictitious world on the masses by tormenting them if they do not comply with the new rules of reality.

Furthermore, the main ingredient of this terror is that it replaces an ordinary suspect with an objective enemy. That means that it does not matter what the person has done, as long as the rulers decide these people are enemies, such as Jews or bourgeois in the case of the Soviet Union, they must be terrorized or killed as if they have committed crimes. 

This results in suspects being something different; suspects are now everywhere. As previously stated, totalitarian regimes seek unity, forcing the masses to think and act in specific ways. This means that if a line of thought or action deviates from the main ideology, which is easy because people can think and form opinions, everyone becomes a suspect and can be arrested. If anyone can be arrested, party members are constantly terrified because they know they can be arrested and replaced at any time. Again, the goal is to instill confusion, chaos, and terror in those who make up the movement and keep it under control to the point of total domination.

This total domination, as previously stated, is the ability to organize human plurality and differentiation as if humanity were a single individual. Total domination is achieved when each individual is reduced to a never-changing identity of reactions that can be changed at random for any other. It must destroy the plurality that emerges from each individual through ideological indoctrination and terror, as well as destroy the spontaneity, freedom of choice, and action that come with being an individual.

In other words, terror prevents spontaneity and forces men into inaction, making them easier to manipulate and control.

This brings us to Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia's concentration camps, where the entire structure of people's lives was geared towards these goals by means of terror, reducing everyone to the level of animals. 

Moreover, to begin her claim, she argues that horrible things like wars have happened in the past, but they weren't as bad because they were governed by practicality and common sense, which is difficult to accept, but she is essentially saying that there was a practical aim, making them less terrible.

Totalitarianism, on the other hand, goes beyond this. It shows people that anything is possible. She argues that this is dangerous thinking because the majority of people don’t see it as a warning, but a possibility. Instead of being repelled by the atrocities of a movement, some people are attracted to the power they imply and the possibilities it can lead to. In other words, it teaches men that everything is possible beyond the terror it can cause. 

Furthermore, she claims that three things are required to prepare a person to participate in concentration camps: killing the juridical person in man, killing the moral person in man, and killing the individual in man. By killing the juridical person in man, you place certain people outside of the law; in a sense, the camps appear to be outside of a system of laws, which is in line with the arbitrariness that exists in totalitarianism; laws replace laws, resulting in a chaotic and structureless system. 

Moreover, killing the moral person renders martyrdom impossible. Setting up the camps in secret keeps morality and opposition away from the fact that they exist because there are no witnesses. Finally, by killing the moral and juridical person, you kill the individual. No room for being yourself is left; all that remains is an individual who acts as a marionette without free will, which means that people have successfully turned into obedient masses.

Finally, she argues that simply knowing about these horrors isn't enough to prevent them from happening again, and that the only effective way to keep them away, is fear of the extreme consequences. She claims that this fear should unite people across different political beliefs to oppose totalitarianism.

However, I believe it is important to consider that while instilling fear can be perceived as an effective deterrent against totalitarianism, it may also hinder progress towards better outcomes. This dynamic can be seen already in our current societies, where historical fears have influenced political discourse in different ways.

For instance, the fear of Bolshevism has led to widespread anti-communist propaganda, particularly in the United States. This avoidance has hindered discussions about alternative perspectives on societal structures and economic systems, preventing the investigation of potential solutions to our current economic system. Anything resembling communism or socialism is automatically revoked.

Similarly, fears stemming from Nazi atrocities have resulted in two different issues: The first is the rise of political correctness and anti-racism movements, which have created an environment in which any opposing viewpoints or comments about race are regarded as threats. This, in turn, has reduced the diversity of perspectives in societal discourse.

Second, this fear has encouraged minorities to rise up and advocate for their rights in an already diverse society, which is not a bad thing. However, because totalitarian movements have historically used propaganda, the opposite side of the political spectrum has responded, fueled by the same fear, by claiming that these tendencies of inclusion or visibility appear totalitarian.

At the end of the day, we have created a world in which each side of the political spectrum fights to the death to prove that the other side is totalitarian, leaving us with a world filled with perpetual hatred for one another, no meaningful or productive discourse, and, most importantly, no societal progress.

To put it simply, creating a world based on fear has prevented us from comprehending the world and each other. It has made us afraid of going the "wrong way," and it has made us vigilant to the point of insanity.

However, this is a topic for another day, and I encourage listeners and readers to expand on this argument.

Furthermore, it appears that Hannah refined her thought with her action theory on the Human Condition, because otherwise, we might be dealing with a paradox in her thinking. Her claim that fear should be used to prevent totalitarianism restricts action, as described in the Human Condition.

Nonetheless, we can leave this discussion here and emphasize Hannah's main point, which is that the only way to prevent totalitarianism in its purest form is to instill fear rather than simply remembering the horrors it has caused.

Finally, Hannah argues that throughout history, people couldn't really understand the idea of pure, extreme evil. Even philosophers like Kant, who tried to explain it, struggled. She argues that this extreme evil comes from a system where everyone, including the leaders, is seen as superfluous, which means basically disposable or worthless. This makes totalitarian leaders especially dangerous because they don't care about their own lives or anyone else's. 

This thinking of seeing people as superfluous is dangerous, Hannah argues, especially in a world where populations are growing, and more people become homeless or unproductive. The Nazis and other totalitarian regimes had factories where they killed millions of people, seeing it as a solution to problems like overpopulation or having too many “useless people.” Even after these regimes fall, the idea of using extreme methods to solve big problems like this might still be tempting to some people and Hannah warns about this in her book.

Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government

We are on to the last chapter of the book and here Hannah is going to conclude with the claim on ideology and how it is fundamental to totalitarianism.

We already know why Hannah believes totalitarianism is a completely new type of government that differs from tyranny or dictatorship. These types of governments, while attempting to control and pacify populations by breaking the law and remaking regulations on the fly, do not introduce entirely new political structures or destroy existing social, legal, and political traditions, as totalitarianism does. Totalitarian regimes reduce social classes to masses, replace traditional party systems with mass movements, delegate power from the military to the police, and pursue a foreign policy of global domination.

However, the most important aspect of totalitarianism is that, while previous governments were typically classified as lawless, totalitarianism challenges this by claiming that it strictly sticks to natural laws rather than human-made laws. Despite defying laws, totalitarian rule is not considered as arbitrary; rather, it asserts obedience to higher forces, positioning itself as a lawful embodiment of justice on earth. 

Furthermore, totalitarianism claims to know the truth by following natural or historical rules, which means it is not lawless. It aims to transform humanity into containers of these laws, actively carrying out their dictates rather than passively being subjected to them. Totalitarian regimes regard all laws as laws of movement rather than stabilizing forces. As a result, terror in totalitarianism is the realization of the movement's laws, which arise from premises that are imposed on reality.

For example, the Nazis' race laws were justified as expressions of natural laws based on Darwin's evolutionary theories, while the Soviets’ emphasis on class struggle stemmed from Marx's idea of historical determinism. In both cases, nature and history are viewed not as stabilizing sources of authority, but as dynamic movements guiding humanity. Totalitarian regimes used these views of nature, relying on terror as their essence and principle, to try to accelerate the natural or historical process they claim. However, they do so by removing individual freedom and action, reducing people to passive participants in the unstoppable movement of nature or history.

Furthermore, the most important aspect of all of this is that ideologies are scientific in nature, capable of explaining everything from a single premise. They reduce the complexities of life and phenomena to predetermined narratives. Totalitarian regimes use ideologies to justify their actions and maintain control over everything, claiming that they are working towards a predetermined goal.

To elaborate, we can see how the deductive process generated by scientific claims is then used to interpret and explain history, with each event fitting into an ideologically established logical framework.

To put it another way, all claims are logically deduced from axioms or premises that came from the ideology itself, making the processes more important than the idea. 

This line of thought appears to connect with what Hannah wrote later in the Human Condition, which explains why she believes human nature cannot be explained or known by man. At the same time, this claim about logical deduction and mental processes is related to the dangers she highlights of relying solely on mental processes that we have created, which hinders spontaneity and experience in favor of mental or human created processes. Ideologies separate thought from experience, focusing entirely on logic. We stop experiencing and exist only in the realm of logical thought and ideas. As a result, totalitarianism does not need to persuade people; instead, the ultimate goal is to render them unable to distinguish between fact and fiction, forcing them to rely solely on the laws of the imposed reality. 

Furthermore, the fact that human nature cannot be known by man means that these premises aren’t really connected with being, but with becoming. It means that they justify any act that accelerates the motions of nature or history as claimed by these ideologies.

Moreover, ideologies go beyond claiming human nature from premises. They are independent of all experience and therefore unable to learn from experience, as claimed by Hannah. This means that whatever shows in experience isn’t “truer” than the ideology itself which has created a world of fiction. And lastly, ideologies cannot transform reality since they come from a premise that emerged from a human construct. Hannah argues that reality does not work this way. Life is made up of complexities and there is no proof that there is a specific starting point nor a last destination. In order to change reality, we need to understand it and the dogmatic belief that is found in ideologies hinders them from experiencing and understanding it.

In addition to this, I think her claim on ideology is brilliant, well constructed, and well written. It is by far the easiest to understand for anyone, and even if we believe we live in a post-ideological world, when we apply this argument to our current societies, we cannot avoid seeing ideology rule our lives. Ideology negates actual experiences because it has created a world of fiction, and has constructed laws that claim to come from nature, when in reality their logical nature makes them a human construct. It causes us to reflect on what is important at the end of the day. Experience and empiricism or actual mental processes formed through reason? And most importantly, can we continue to ignore what our eyes and experience reveal to us? 

Lastly, ideologies submit entirely to the logic of history and crush freedom by viewing people merely as tools for historical progression. As seen in her book The Human Condition, Hannah describes freedom as the ability to initiate, to interact with others, and to maintain individuality which brings plurality into our societies. 

This spontaneity and the ability to initiate are crucial for true freedom in the eyes of Hannah. As described in her book The Human Condition, true freedom is in reality the true spontaneity of people in the practical world. A "beginning" could be something as simple as the birth of a new child. In other words, a beginning is the possibility of something entirely different from what has preceded it. Totalitarian regimes succeed in hindering beginnings and thus spontaneity; they isolate individuals from society and reduce them to mere cogs in a historical machine that runs its course without the possibility of new ideas or beginnings. Hannah compares this to labor, in which individuals contribute to production without truly collaborating.

However, she claims that totalitarian atomization extends beyond and is distinguished by its totalizing nature. Loneliness exists in societies, and it represents more than just being unable to interact with other men, but also being completely isolated from and abandoned by them. Loneliness is linked to men's superfluousness in modern society, because someone who has been completely abandoned by their community is irrelevant to that community. Since loneliness exists in even non-totalitarian societies, totalitarianism must be viewed as a potential threat to the world.

To further explain this, it is important to note that isolation is not synonymous with loneliness. Isolation keeps privacy, and loneliness means being deserted by all human companionship. Totalitarianism is a response to loneliness, but it is a loneliness defined by a sense of not belonging to the world or not finding it meaningful. Hannah believes that when we are immersed in loneliness and meaninglessness, we are unable to trust our experiences or ourselves, and instead rely solely on our human minds and logical reasoning. This is why Hannah encourages political discourse and the politics of friendship, both of which she later investigated. She was a firm believer in the value of human relationships and the importance of maintaining a public space where people could discuss political ideas that led to new beginnings. 

Lastly, Hannah warns that totalitarianism is a serious threat to humanity. She claims that, while Nazism and Bolshevism are no longer with us, the conditions that led to their emergence are still present in the modern world. Loneliness and meaninglessness are part of our modern world, and movements offer solutions to them. While our society is plagued by meaninglessness and loneliness, new totalitarian ideas or movements that address these modern problems may emerge. The meaning crisis at its finest.

However, she also expresses some optimism, hoping that the continuous birth of new generations will bring forth new ideas and opportunities for true freedom. 

Sources:

• Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism (2017th ed.). Penguin Classics.

Beyond Thought.

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We have reached the second part of the book The Origins of Totalitarianism, which discusses the evolution of imperialism. The way this section of the book is written connects a lot of what we have learned in the previous section and takes us on a journey to understand how totalitarianism emerged. 

According to Hannah Arendt, one of the most important aspects of imperialism is that it is the first stage of capitalism rather than the final one.

Nowadays, we would use the term "imperialism" to describe what a government does abroad. However, for the purposes of this section, we need to think a bit further:

Imperialism is the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, which refers to the transformation of a specific group's private economic interests into political interests.

This means that imperialism has an indirect impact on the government and how it operates, because the bourgeoisie's private interest is to expand without regard for politics.

In other words, imperialism is synonymous with expansion, and the reason it is the first stage rather than the final stage of capitalism is that the private economic interests of this specific group, the bourgeoisie, have always been the pursuit of more power through the accumulation of wealth, resulting in limitless expansion.

Throughout this section we will discover the development of imperialism starting with how the bourgeoisie promoted their private interests.

Highlights:

• Transformation of Bourgeoisie into Political Players: The political emancipation of the bourgeoisie marked an important turning point in history, as it became the first class to achieve economic dominance without directly pursuing political power. This transition required the integration of economic interests and political control, laying the groundwork for imperialism's need to expand beyond national borders.

• Evolution from Nation-States to Imperialism: The limitations of the nation-state system became apparent as economic growth required expansion beyond national borders. This led to the collapse of the nation-state system and the rise of imperialism, which sought unlimited power and dominance through wealth accumulation and expansion, necessitating government support and a shift in political ideologies.

• Race and Bureaucracy as Political Tools: Hannah claims that both race and bureaucracy served as instrumental tools for political organization, with race transcending national boundaries and bureaucracy replacing traditional governance structures. Together, they facilitated the rise of imperialism and laid the groundwork for totalitarian regimes.

• Impact of Race in Imperialism: Race was an important factor in early imperialism, especially in Africa, where it was used to justify brutal violence and dehumanization of indigenous populations. The colonizers' sense of superiority resulted in the exploitation of tribal cultures and the rise of racism as a means of domination.

• Bureaucracy's Role in Foreign Domination: Bureaucracy emerged as a powerful tool for foreign domination, facilitating control over conquered territories through administrative mechanisms. This bureaucratic rule, rooted in military tradition, enabled far-reaching investment policies and viewed conquered areas as stepping stones for further expansion.

• Intersection of Race and Bureaucracy: Hannah argues that race and bureaucracy developed independently but became intertwined over time, shaping political ideologies and fostering imperialism. Bureaucracy, characterized by rule by experts and a preference for secrecy and control, served as a means to justify and perpetuate racial domination.

• Decline of the Nation-State: Hannah discusses the decline of the nation-state, where the primacy of national identity overshadowed the principles of equal treatment under the law. This led to disparities among citizens, with national populations receiving preferential treatment over minorities, resulting in homelessness, statelessness, and the emergence of refugees.

• The Minority Treaties: The Minority Treaties, developed by international organizations like the League of Nations, aimed to protect minority populations within newly established states. However, these treaties failed to address the complexities of cultural diversity and demographic shifts, leading to the marginalization and vulnerability of minority groups who refused assimilation.

• Paradoxes of Human Rights: Hannah questions the conventional understanding of human rights, arguing that they require meaningful participation in a political community. She claims that the essence of humanity is not only survival or liberty, but also the ability to engage in discourse and action. Stateless people are denied not only freedom, but also the right to belong and participate in society.

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The Political Emancipation of the Bourgeoisie

“I would annex the planets if I could” - Cecil Rhodes

Hannah begins this chapter by quoting Cecil Rhodes, a British imperialist who colonized much of Southern Africa. With this quote, she illustrates how imperialism paved the way for totalitarianism through its desire for domination, bureaucratic rule, and expansion, and how, if possible, it would annex the planets in order to expand even further.

Following this, the central event of the imperialist period was the political emancipation of the bourgeoisie, which was “the first class in history to achieve economic preeminence without aspiring to political rule.” (169)  

This is important to understand because it implies that in order to achieve expansion, the bourgeoisie was forced to turn to politics in order to sustain the economic growth required for capitalism's survival. However, the main issue was the limitations of the nation-state. The pursuit of expansion was hindered by these limitations and economic growth needed to extend beyond their national borders, requiring new politics.

Now, we've been talking about nation-states for a while, and many of you may be wondering what this means. To clarify this, a nation-state is essentially a political body governed by specific laws, and individuals within this body are treated equally under the same regulations.

Moreover, this means that the inherent need for expansion is what led to the collapse of the nation-state system as well as the emphasis on unlimited power for political reasons. 

Another factor that contributed to the end of the nation-state system is the alliance of capital and the mob. In essence, these were movements that gave meaning to their members by embracing nationalism, or race-thinking. We'll get into this later, but it boils down to the idea of world dominance through the adoption of a specific race or identity. 

To put it another way, imperialism is inherently predisposed to rule over others due to its need for limitless expansion. 

Furthermore, it is important to note that when Hannah mentions the need for unlimited power, she is referring to world dominance through wealth accumulation via expansion. This means that in order to expand, we must go beyond our borders and dominate other countries by investing in their markets. This is the main reason why imperialism requires government support to thrive. The concepts of business and expansion are applied to politics.

One important thing to note here is that Hannah highlights a key difference between ancient and modern imperialism. Using the Roman Empire as an example, she notes that the Romans, upon conquering other groups, integrated them into the empire but permitted them to retain their own laws. Over time, however, these conquered people gradually adopted a shared set of Roman laws alongside their existing laws and regulations. This means their system permitted plurality. Modern imperialism, on the other hand, is based on nation-state systems in which people must assimilate and leave their differences behind, which can lead to domination and tyranny.

This idea of domination, power, and tyranny, as argued by Hannah, traces its roots back to Thomas Hobbes's theory articulated in his book Leviathan. He claims that "power… is the accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such a way that they contribute to his own advantage… Therefore, if man is actually driven by nothing but his individual interests, desire for power must be the fundamental passion of man" (181). 

However, Hannah adds to this perspective, asserting that it is not humanity at large but specifically bourgeois individuals who adopt and embody Hobbes's claims.

Furthermore, Hobbes argues that people are equal, as they all possess the ability to potentially harm one another. The inherent insecurity arising from this potential for violence, he argues, is the rationale behind the existence of the state. 

However, Hannah introduces a critical perspective by highlighting the inherent flaw in this line of thinking – the construction of a state grounded in power. 

In this context, the state emerges as a protective mechanism against the existential threat each individual poses to one another through the acquisition of more power. Nevertheless, a paradox emerges: the very existence of the state implies limitations on power, necessitating its continuous growth for sustained effectiveness. This perpetual need for expansion makes progress inevitable and becomes a defining characteristic of imperialism, which seeks to expand and overcome every limitation. 

This brings us to the final section of the chapter, which discusses the alliance between capital and the mob. Hannah claims that when we exceed the limitations of the nation-state system, the nations disintegrate. This means that a new sense of belonging and purpose emerges. When our economic and political systems reach their limits, a sense of meaninglessness emerges. People were once German, French, and so on. Now they're none of that. Hannah claims that this leads to a sense of dominance over the cultures or nations we have conquered in order to expand. This gives rise to the mob, the idea that we should consider ourselves as a race rather than as members of a state. When we go beyond our borders and abroad, we naturally seek meaning by belonging to specific groups, and in the imperialist sense, a purpose and a meaning of control over others.

Finally, Hannah argues that, while Thomas Hobbes was not a racist, he did outline political theories that gave rise to the concept of progress, the endless accumulation of capital and power, and the foundation for all current race doctrines. This sense of belonging that was unique to nationalism was inherited by imperialism and transformed itself into tribal nationalism and ideological racism paving the way for what came next. 

Race-Thinking Before Racism

We are now delving into Hannah Arendt's exploration into the history of racism, which she traces back to the eighteenth century, noting its simultaneous rise across Western countries in the nineteenth century.

Following this historical context, one of the most significant points she emphasizes in this chapter is the distinction between race-thinking and racism. While race-thinking may be a personal opinion, she claims that racism transforms into an imperialist ideology that serves as a political weapon. This ideological shift marks a crucial evolution, turning racism from an individual belief into a pervasive and influential force.

Furthermore, Hannah argues that racism, as an ideology, claims to hold the key to history. It goes beyond individual opinions, asserting a universal truth about the world. This perspective is consistent with the concepts discussed in Louis Althusser's book "On Ideology," which can be found on our blog or YouTube channel, where ideologies are defined as claiming to present the absolute truth.

As Hannah delves into the historical context, she emphasizes racism's ideological nature and its role as a political weapon. When race-thinking evolves into racism, and thus into an ideology, it gains the power to shape political landscapes, influence global perspectives, and, as Hannah claims, even contribute to internal national conflicts. 

In other words, racism is an exaggerated form of nationalism that transcends national borders and undermines national political existence. 

Following this, Hannah adds that ideologies appeal to large numbers of people and have strong persuasive power because they claim to be the absolute truth. For example, she argues that Darwinism is one of the sciences underlying racism. Darwinism has many ideas, one of them is that there is a natural and necessary competition among individuals for survival, with only the strongest succeeding.

Moreover, Darwinism has undergone multiple interpretations and applications in the social and political spheres. Darwin's "survival of the fittest" theory has been used to justify social hierarchies and inequalities. Those who succeeded in the struggle for survival were seen as the strongest, giving rise to the belief that certain individuals or races were inherently superior.

Another concept rooted in Darwinism is the idea of evolution, which believes that humanity evolved. This led to the concept of progress, which ultimately gave rise to the compulsive desire for growth and the idea that humanity can breed a better race. However, the important thing to remember here is that when a scientific theory turns into an ideology, it loses its scientific validity. It becomes a political weapon, with the scientific aspect taking a back seat. 

To put it another way, an ideology has arguments that cannot be refuted because it claims to have the truth. Science generates hypotheses that can be tested, debated, and changed; ideologies, on the other hand, deny any fact that contradicts their narrative.

Finally, to conclude this chapter, Hannah provides some examples of race-thinking that eventually led to racism. We won’t go over all of them, but one of them is the rise of German race-doctrine, rooted in the organic concept of history and romantic personality worship, which became a significant factor during and after the war of 1814. The idea of common tribal origin as essential to nationhood, formulated by German nationalists, contributed to the shaping of a racially driven mentality.

This racial ideology, according to Hannah, not only served as a substitute for political realities but also played a role in shaping discriminatory attitudes. The concept of innate personality, which is closely associated with social emancipation in Germany, became a basis for distinguishing social classes and, unfortunately, promoting discriminatory views. 

In this way, the evolution of race-thinking to racism in Germany became intertwined with social and political struggles, helping to shape an ideology that transcended national borders. As these ideas gained traction, they cultivated a distorted sense of national identity, resulting in a mentality susceptible to manipulation by political forces. 

Another event that emerged from race-thinking is Gobineau's influential essay on racial inequality. For many, he was the first racist. However, his work was merely an opinion on the decline of civilization. He claimed that the decline was caused by a loss of racial purity, which led to the deterioration of humanity, introducing the idea that the lower race dominates in racial mixtures.

Furthermore, he proposed the creation of an "elite" to replace the declining aristocracy. He claimed that this "elite" would be made up of superior people, i.e., members of a higher race. 

Now we can see why he was considered a racist. However, Hannah claims that he offered a pseudoscientific theory of decline based on race, and that racism was invented almost by accident. She argues that he tried to solve one problem and ended up creating another. He was more of a romantic who wanted to elevate one race over others without considering the consequences, since he never proposed any killing or oppression. 

This leads us to the conclusion that people can have racial opinions. But what opinions transform into political weapons? How do they become weapons?

It's simple to see how an opinion can become so persuasive that it gains a large following. We want to distinguish between ideological racism and race-thinking opinions, both of which stem from a desire to understand our differences. She claims, however, that imperialism would have needed to invent racism to explain or justify its actions. Without race-thinking, racism would have had to be invented before imperialism and the pursuit of accumulated power could emerge.

Race and Bureaucracy 

The previous chapter helped us understand that there are racial opinions, as well as how the development of opinions, or in the case of Darwinism, scientific theories, can lead to ideas that eventually become ideologies. For example, the belief that humanity is competing in races leads to racism and terror. One thing is to dislike Jews; another is to believe that they are of a lower race; and, worst of all, to believe that their differences justify violence, slavery, or murder.

In this chapter, Hannah claims that race and bureaucracy are two tools for political organization. Race replaces the nation, making it transnational and borderless, and bureaucracy becomes the principle of foreign power, replacing government and seeking expansion. Both contribute to the rise of imperialism and, ultimately, totalitarianism.

In addition to this, race played an important role in the early decades of imperialism, particularly in Africa. Race was created as an explanation for incomprehensible African cultures, resulting in dehumanization and brutal violence.

Simultaneously, bureaucracy emerged as a powerful tool for foreign domination. Administrators, who originated in a military discipline tradition, ruled through reports and decrees in a world dominated by the old trinity of war, trade, and piracy. The discovery of bureaucracy transformed foreign policy into a complex game of far-reaching investment policies, with each area viewed as a stepping stone to greater involvement and each person as a tool for conquest.

Furthermore, race and bureaucracy emerged and developed independently. The connection between the two principles became clear over time, as their relationship proved influential in shaping the political climate. 

Following this, throughout this chapter, Hannah delves deeper into the historical context of race and bureaucracy. She mentions the concept of the superfluous white men who were drawn to South Africa. These individuals who were rejected by society and were, in a sense, the refugees of capitalism, found themselves in a colonial adventure that went beyond individual madness. 

The encounter of these superfluous men with African native life provided a backdrop for their escape from civilization. These men encountered humans who were, in a sense, savages, lacking political institutions, and it was easy for them to regard them as less humane.  

Furthermore, this superiority perspective served as the foundation for racism and a race-based society. The fact that these tribes behaved more like natural beings than humans, she claims, was later exploited as a major political idea for domination. Hannah claims that it was not the color of their skin that mattered, but rather the fact that these humans did not live in a typical human world and treated nature as their master.

This brings us to one of the most significant aspects of race organizations. Hannah claims that rootlessness turns people into hordes. Race transforms both racists and victims of racism into people who want to rebuild the world while demolishing institutions in the process.

In this context, rootlessness is associated with contempt for labor, hostility toward territorial boundaries, and an active belief in a race's chosenness. This causes races to believe they are the chosen people, with the authority to dominate other races or groups.

This concept of rootlessness, or a lack of belonging or meaning, can be seen in current political movements, with the left seeking to destroy anyone who seeks profit and power, and the right seeking to dominate others through actions that are supported by racial or Judeo-Christian arguments. 

Furthermore, in the last subchapter of Race and Bureaucracy, Hannah claims that while race originated in South Africa, bureaucracy emerged in Egypt, Algeria and India. 

That said, the most important point in this chapter is Hannah's claim that race was used to avoid responsibility, with certain tribes viewed as inferior. Race is used to justify irresponsibility in the face of worldly matters and the desire for a home.

In other words, it is portrayed as an escape into rootlessness. 

On the other hand, bureaucracy emerged from the attempt to govern foreign peoples, who were regarded as inferior yet in need of protection. 

To put it another way, bureaucracy is the opposite: it involves taking on the responsibility of governing others who are deemed inferior, with the understanding that no individual can bear the burden of ruling over others without a system in place.

However, above all, the most important thing to understand is that bureaucracy is the rule by experts. For Hannah, bureaucracy is seen as a way of taking responsibility over others who are inferior. 

With this in mind, Hannah discusses different models of bureaucrats. The first one is the significance of legends. For instance, adventurers and secret agents in the British Secret Service can rightfully claim a foundation legend, such as the Great Game described by Rudyard Kipling in his novel "Kim." 

This legend became a symbol that promotes genuine brotherhood among individuals while also dividing the 'higher and lower breeds'. In this case, the legend represents a powerful force that brings people together to achieve a common goal or purpose.

In other words, the central idea in this case is that foreigners come to rule to benefit the inferiors.

On the other hand, Hannah discusses some aspects of bureaucracy. The first is that bureaucracy is distinguished by a sense of sacrifice for the inferior population and loyalty to a country. The second is that bureaucrats exercise personal influence and discretion. The main idea is that because the bureaucrats make rules, they have the personal authority to decide which rules to follow and how. 

Furthermore, the third characteristic is that bureaucrats have the authority to change rules when necessary or desired. The fourth aspect is that bureaucracy needs highly qualified professionals to sacrifice ambition for the sake of the system. The fifth is secrecy, which means that bureaucracy prefers to operate in the background. This is because they are not required to be elected or run campaigns to persuade people. And finally, bureaucracy seeks and gains power by excluding inferiors and ensuring that it is led by "experts."

This brings us to Hannah's claim that bureaucracy is the result of European attempts to rule foreign populations, and that it is an imperialist tool that operates outside of legal and moral boundaries.

To put it another way, bureaucracy operates outside of the law and in secret. In a sense, the bureaucrat becomes a member of history's secret forces because he works in secret and therefore subordinates himself to the rise of any movement, whether it is socialism, Nazism, or something else. This happens because he believes he is always moving in the right direction and feels that he possesses the necessary expertise for this to happen.

For example, Hannah presents the concept of an endless process of expansion in which individual duty is subordinated to a goal. Cromer, a bureaucratic figure who believed in personal power and secrecy, is mentioned, and Hannah claims that people like him work as anonymous agents for specific forces, in this case expansion.

The success of these figures makes them feel like gods. The bureaucratic system they establish replaces laws with temporary ones to maintain flexibility in serving their goal, which in this case, once again, is eternal expansion.

In conclusion, we can now understand that race justifies bureaucratic rule of experts over inferiors, and bureaucracy works in the background to push, "the right way." This illustrates the relationship between imperialism, racism, and bureaucracy, emphasizing the concepts of race and bureaucracy as central to what comes next: the movements.

Continental Imperialism: The Pan-Movements

We are about to look at what Hannah believes to be the root cause of totalitarianism, specifically the rise of Nazism and Bolshevism. She claims that these totalitarian movements owe more to Pan-European movements, such as Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, than to any other ideology.

Following this, what distinguishes pan-movements is that they are defined by ethnic or religious ideas that exist both within and outside of the nation-state, meaning that they are boundless, similar to imperialism. 

However, unlike imperialism, pan-movements strived to achieve their goals primarily through racist ideologies rather than economic advancement. As a result, they frequently attracted intellectuals such as students, professors, and academics; capitalists and business owners were not as engaged in these movements.

This racial concept of unity leads Hannah to refer to pan-movements as tribal nationalism, because, as previously discussed, the concept of race replaced the concept of nation, resulting in links of purpose between people regardless of their country of origin. These ideologies were driven by an ideological belief in the superiority of their respective peoples and strived to establish dominance over other groups. They relied heavily on emotional appeals and mystical notions of identity, rather than tangible economic arguments. It was no longer about Germans being born in Germany, but about the ethnic group of Germans, in the case of Pan-Germanism.

The pan-movements' emphasis on divine origin and superiority worsened divisions among ethnic and national identities. Instead of fostering a sense of shared humanity and responsibility, these movements promoted tribalism and racism. 

This leads back to antisemitism, which was a key component of these movements. However, unlike traditional antisemitism, which was often motivated by economic competition or political scapegoating, pan-movement antisemitism was based on ideological beliefs about racial superiority. Jews were targeted not only for their supposed economic power, but also because they were perceived as inherently inferior to the dominant ethnic group's identity. Both Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism saw Jews as a threat to their nationalist agendas due to their perceived rootlessness and success. Antisemitism became a powerful tool for these movements, merging with tribal nationalism. These movements sought to destroy the state, and Jews were viewed as its allies, contributing to the attack on the existing imperial structure.

Following this, one important aspect of these movements is that, because they are not limited by a nation, they are anti-nation state movements, which means they are lawless or bureaucratic. They differ from political parties in that they need bureaucratic machines and prefer bureaucracy as a model of organization. 

In simpler terms, they preferred making decisions without following usual laws. The bureaucratic control in areas ruled by pan-movements was deeply rooted and focused on keeping control rather than helping a nation.

Moreover, the preference for bureaucratic control within pan-movements reflects a broader trend observed in the transition from traditional bureaucratic rule to totalitarian ideologies.

This departure from legal norms, as well as the increase in bureaucratic control over traditional governance mechanisms, emphasized the radical nature of totalitarian pan-movements. These movements strived to exert control over all aspects of society, from political activities to individual lives, by prioritizing control and authority over conformity to established laws. Thus, by framing themselves as movements rather than parties and capitalizing on the widespread distrust of established political institutions, they paved the way for totalitarian movements. 

To put it another way, traditional bureaucratic systems have their own class interests and operate in various ways to further those interests, which are typically economic. However, they continue to operate within the law. This is the classical liberal definition of bureaucracy. The other concept of bureaucracy is more mystical. It operates beyond the law and exercises considerable power. It wishes to pursue its interests by going beyond legal boundaries and breaking any law that is incompatible with their mood or purpose. It embraces traditional bureaucracy to boost the strength of their movements.

This leads Hannah to add a brief discussion about the philosophical underpinnings of these movements. She claims that despite them being based on Hegel's theory of the state in the case of Russian Pan-slavism and Marx's theory of the proletariat as the protagonist of mankind in the case of Bolshevism, the philosophical underpinnings of these movements were distorted and misinterpreted. She argues that these thinkers never considered actual parties or human beings to be ideas in the flesh. They both believed in the history of ideas and thought that these could only be realized through dialectical movement. Despite this, the leaders of these movements adopted and distorted these theories, incorporating them into mass political movements and reinforcing their totalitarian nature.

As a result, another aspect of these movements is that they strive for a specific goal in the form of a mood. Hannah claims that these movements discovered that mood was far more important to mass appeal than actual laid-out outlines or interests. That is why they were hostile to the party system. These movements required just that: to keep moving by appealing to the masses, and in order to do so, they went above and beyond the state, sacrificing everything for an ideology.

This brings us to Hannah's controversial distinction between fascism and totalitarianism. She claims that totalitarianism is a movement, whereas fascism was a nationalist and authoritarian form of government. 

This leads her to say that Mussolini was not particularly dangerous. She claims that, while he climbed to power through a movement, once there, he strived to elevate the state and create a national interest.

This means that Mussolini's Italy was not fully totalitarian because it lacked the systematic and complete control over all aspects of life that she saw in Hitler and Stalin's regimes. While Mussolini's regime was authoritarian and oppressive, it did not completely eliminate intermediary institutions such as the family, church, or local communities, leading her to argue that a totalitarian government is opposed to liberal freedom while dictatorships are not. 

Finally, to conclude this chapter, tribal nationalism resulted in the loss of human dignity as well as the fact that all people, regardless of race, can become citizens of a state. To be a citizen, you had to belong to a race or have a specific identity. This contradicts the liberal belief that all people, regardless of their differences, have equal human dignity. 

This brings us to one of the most difficult and controversial arguments Hannah Arendt makes. She argues that people reject the concept of a shared responsibility to humanity as a whole. She believes people prioritize their own group's interests and well-being, often at the expense of others, and that there is a natural tendency to trust and prioritize one's own "tribe" while remaining skeptical or dismissive of others, since ‘... we know our own people, but mankind we do not know.’ (345) 

Consequently, she claims that tribal mentality is deeply ingrained in human nature and admits that overcoming it is difficult, posing a challenge to both individuals and political systems. She argues that developing politics that transcend tribalism is necessary but challenging. Leading us to what comes in our next chapter.

The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man

First of all, congratulations on making it this far. This section of the book is without a doubt the most difficult, and we are about to get into the final chapter on it.

This chapter discusses the rise and fall of human rights. So far, we can conclude from what we have learned that people who lack a national identity can be considered stateless or homeless, which means that they are no longer protected by laws. But what is the story behind these people? We can now say that there are human rights, but this was not always the case.

In this chapter, Hannah claims that the rise and fall of human rights is one of the causes of totalitarianism, and that human rights are not particularly beneficial.

Additionally, she discusses the decline of the nation-state, which we have been discussing, and argues that a state is a territorial entity in which people are treated equally under specific laws, whereas a nation is defined by a tribal consciousness or identity that unifies people. 

With this in mind, what happened during the decline of the nation-state was that the nation conquered the state, resulting in a disparity among their people. The territories were transformed into states which included national populations and minority groups. That is, national people had first-class citizenship, while minorities had second-class citizenship. This resulted in homelessness and statelessness, as well as the concept of a refugee, which raised concerns about human rights. 

The story begins in the aftermath of World War I, when Europe grappled with the challenges of maintaining stability in the face of shifting power dynamics and the rise of imperialism and pan-movements. The problems of the disintegration of the nation-state were attempted to be addressed with the Peace Treaties by establishing minority treaties. However, this overlooked the region's demographic complexities and cultural diversity.

The Minority Treaties, developed by the League of Nations, which later became the United Nations, were intended to protect minority populations within newly established states by assimilating them, but this proved to be flawed. The reason for this is that minorities did not want to assimilate and preferred to remain as they were.

This resulted in some options: minorities could be expelled, treated as second-class citizens, or liquidated. Hannah claims that the Minority Treaties were flawed because they were created by an international organization such as the League of Nations. They guaranteed the protection of minorities who refused to assimilate. However, because they were protected by the League of Nations, they could not be treated as second-class citizens, expelled, or killed. As a result, many people were left without basic legal protection, requiring help from international organizations such as the League of Nations to represent them and protect them against national peoples. 

Given these points, we can recall that this happened because the nation conquered the state. The national interest became more important than the law. The state, defined as a territorial entity in which everyone is treated and ruled equally, was put after the nation. This meant prioritizing national peoples over minorities, going above and beyond legal limits.

Furthermore, this resulted in stateless individuals. People who could not be repatriated because they were undesirable in their home country, but were also unable to become naturalized due to the large number of people involved. There were millions, not just a few thousand, seeking a homeland or asylum. The Minority Treaties protected some rights, but more fundamental rights, such as the right to live and work, remained uncertain.

This brings us to the problem of denaturalization, which was caused by mass migration. This process implies that you only want certain types of people in your nation, effectively eliminating anything that does not align with an ideology or purpose. Again, when the nation takes priority over the state, national peoples are given preference, and minorities are subjected to arbitrary rules or police decrees, effectively dehumanizing them.

Moreover, the effectiveness of police decrees encourages states to rule over everyone with an omnipotent police force, resulting in the rise of what Hannah Arendt refers to as totalitarianism. 

Now, you may be wondering. What about human rights? The emergence of the problem of stateless individuals raised these questions: Are rights contingent upon national affiliation? What are the boundaries of these rights?

Following this, Hannah delves into this discussion, tracing its roots back to France's declaration of the Rights of Man, which proclaims all humans inherent dignity and autonomy over traditional authorities like God or historical customs. These rights were supposed to be "natural," but they were lacking to protect stateless people who were not citizens of a sovereign state.

This led Hannah to have a very contentious perspective on human rights. She highlights paradoxes inherent in their assertion. Firstly, if rights are human constructs, they can also be revoked. Secondly, the notion of popular sovereignty, granting individuals the right to self-determination, presents a paradox: while it allows for national autonomy, it also opens the door to treating certain groups as inferior, relegating them to second-class citizenship.

Furthermore, she argues that human rights must be grounded within a political community or state. They transcend governmental authority, yet in the absence of such structures, individuals revert to their fundamental rights, that is, “human rights,” leading to paradoxes.

Fundamentally, Hannah argues that the deprivation of human rights stems from a lack of meaningful participation in the political sphere. Beyond mere survival or liberty, the essence of humanity lies in the ability to engage in meaningful discourse and action within a community.

This concept is central to her work, "The Human Condition," where she emphasizes the importance of action and meaningful participation in political life. Belonging to a community is crucial for human dignity and meaning, thereby leading her to conclude that it is the loss of community, not the loss of rights, which comes first. 

Moreover, Hannah argues that a refugee is not deprived of freedom or the right to live, but rather of the right to act and have an opinion heard by others, that is, the right to belong. Hannah's argument challenges conventional thinking, because who can argue that the most fundamental human right isn't the right to life? 

However, Hannah believes that while all humans die no matter what, what matters is the ability to act and be heard in an organized community, which thereby gives life meaning. She argues that refugees and stateless people have made us aware that the most fundamental human right is to live in a context of visibility, a place where one is considered, and a system that gives us meaning and place in the world.

This same thinking can be traced back to her argument for the right to a place to live, which is private property that is used for shelter rather than business. A sense of belonging in the world is very important to her, and it shapes her political thinking. Hannah Arendt values the right to belong, be considered, be heard, and have a place in the public sphere. Human beings are political, which means they have the ability to influence the course of events through discourse and opinion. We will not go into detail about this concept, but we can learn more about it by reviewing our discussion of her book, The Human Condition.

To summarize and comprehend her claim about the fundamental human right, we can state that for Hannah a man can lose his life and freedom while still speaking and acting; however, when someone loses the ability to create meaning through action and discourse, he loses his humanity entirely. The stateless person, stripped of community and rights, paradoxically becomes a universal "human in general," and Hannah warns that when humanity is generalized into an international community of stateless people, it may result in a descent into barbarism.

Subsequently, she emphasizes the concept of human rights, particularly Edmund Burke's skepticism, which held that national rights are more important than abstract, universal human rights. She claims that the restoration or establishment of national rights has been more effective in protecting human rights, particularly in cases of extreme persecution or statelessness. However, as previously said, Hannah Arendt's views on human rights have been widely debated, and I encourage people to reflect on them rather than disagree with them entirely.

This brings us to the end of the chapter, where she claims that while the increase in the number of refugees creates a globally interconnected civilization, it can also result in the creation of "Barbarians" from within, as millions are forced to live in savage conditions despite appearing civilized.

This is a harsh critique of a global system that allows millions of people to live in refugee camps in dehumanizing circumstances. When we subject these people to bureaucratic and police measures normally reserved for "savages," or animals, we are effectively treating humans as subordinates under police control, paving the way for totalitarianism. Which is the next section of this book.

Sources:

• Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism (2017th ed.). Penguin Classics.

Beyond Thought.

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Highlights:

• The concept of Jewish responsibility is introduced by Arendt. It stresses that discussing actions taken to avoid the assimilation of the Jews is not blaming them. She argues that to really understand antisemitism we need to confront uncomfortable truths rather than accepting convenient but false narratives.

• Despite being stateless, Jews were perceived as representatives of the state due to their economic power, particularly exemplified by the Rothschild family. The concentration of Jewish wealth led to stereotypes of Jews as a secret force controlling governments.

• Hannah Arendt distinguishes between social and political antisemitism, with the latter seeking to strip citizens of their rights. Political antisemitism is identified as the most dangerous form, capable of leading to totalitarianism. Understanding this distinction is essential for recognizing the origins and potential consequences of antisemitism in contemporary societies.

• Social antisemitism is closely tied to the concept of equality. As Jews achieved greater equality with other groups, social discrimination emerged. The idea is that as conditions become more equal, the differences between individuals and groups become more pronounced, leading to increased social resentment.

• Jews seeking assimilation faced the challenge of balancing expectations. While they were expected to be as 'educated' as the rest of society, they also needed to go above and beyond to stand out and gain acceptance. This intricate balancing act needed the development of a distinct identity that adhered to societal norms while also distinguishing itself from perceived typical Jewish characteristics.

• Hannah highlights the correlation between the growth of Jewish equality and increasing social resentment. Differences among Jews, previously unnoticed, become apparent, affecting social interactions and influencing Jewish behavior.

• Jews were regarded as exotic and mysterious in society's pursuit of entertainment and fascination with the unusual. This perception, when transformed into a psychological quality, contributed to their acceptance, though in distorted terms. The association of Jews with vices, which were considered interesting but not necessarily criminal, led to the belief that they were predisposed to commit crimes, putting them in a vulnerable position.

• Hannah Arendt introduces the concept of the "mob," which refers to a group that includes members of all social classes. She emphasizes that mistaking the mob for the people is a common mistake because the mob is essentially a collection of people from various social classes with potentially different motivations. The mob seeks a 'strong man' or a 'great leader,' and its exclusion from societal structures and representation generates animosity, which is frequently directed at groups such as Jews.

• The Dreyfus Affair is investigated in relation to the formation of the mob. During the French Third Republic, scandals involving high society and politicians contributed to the formation of the mob, which was organized and incited by the army, church, and police. The mob, fueled by its disdain for societal structures, saw Jews as a convenient target because of their perceived association with the state.

• Arendt claims that all antisemitic movements eventually led to the emergence of the Zionist movement. Jews' persecution and discrimination pushed them to seek their own state for protection.

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Antisemitism

Antisemitism as an Outrage to Common Sense

In order to avoid making this newsletter as lengthy as possible, we will attempt to discuss only the most crucial parts of every chapter in each section.

In the first chapter on antisemitism, Antisemitism as an Outrage to Common Sense, Hannah attempts to demystify all current beliefs about what antisemitism is, starting with what it is not. 

However, before we discuss this, we need to understand that antisemitism is serious and that it was not simply a strategy to sway the masses. Antisemitism, according to Hannah, should not be underestimated because it was the driving force behind Nazi ideology.

Moreover, the first thing Hannah says about antisemitism is that it was not a product of nationalism. In fact, she claims that antisemitism grew in proportion as traditional nationalism declined and that the peak of antisemitism coincided with the collapse of the European nation-state system and its balance of power.

Another widely held belief about antisemitism is that it emerged as a result of Jewish power and jealousy. Hannah claims that this belief is flawed because most Jews were poor, and those who were wealthy were losing power as antisemitism emerged. 

One of the most important aspects of this argument is Hannah's observation that power is not necessarily bad. It is simply wrong and unjustifiable when it does not provide a visible function, resulting in its rejection. In other words, when power appears to be lost, it becomes suddenly unjustified.

For instance, Hannah provides another example of this phenomenon. During the French Revolution, the French masses developed a strong and violent hatred for the aristocracy, particularly when the aristocrats were about to lose their power. When the aristocracy held significant power, they were tolerated and respected, but when they lost these privileges, particularly the ability to exploit and oppress, the people saw them as parasites with no real function. A similar effect happened when antisemitism reached a peak around the time Jews lost their public functions and influence. 

Moving on, another misconception about antisemitism is that it emerged because Jews were seen as scapegoats, or that the Nazis needed an enemy. The important thing here is that Hannah wants us to ask uncomfortable questions, such as "Why the Jews?" If the Jews were only used as a scapegoat, it implies that it could have been anyone else. An ideology, which has to persuade, cannot choose its victims randomly.

Lastly, there is the myth of eternal antisemitism. According to this idea, Jews have always been hated and persecuted. However, as noted by Hannah, the problem with this is that it absolves the Nazis of any responsibility for their actions and thus justifies antisemitism in the first place.

The concept of Jewish responsibility is one of the most difficult topics we will investigate further. It is critical to understand that she is not blaming the Jews when she discusses what they did to avoid assimilation. It is also crucial to avoid viewing antisemitism as a tool for Jewish survival. Accepting convenient explanations, Hannah argues, denies the reality of antisemitism and diminishes our humanity. To resist antisemitism, one must first fully comprehend it, which requires confronting uncomfortable truths rather than settling for comforting but false narratives.

To put it another way, the most important thing here is to understand the factors that contribute to their vulnerability, which we will go over in the following section.

The Jews, the Nation-State, and the Birth of Antisemitism

In this section on antisemitism, we will look at the rise of hatred for Jews as well as their position in society over time.

It all starts with governments in the 17th and 18th centuries, when wealthy Jews served as court Jews. They handled monarchs' financial transactions, providing capital for specific needs. This financial role, however, was not as extensive as it became later with the rise of nation states.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the rise of equality had a significant impact on Jewish antisemitism. Nations granted Jewish people equal rights during the nineteenth century. This happened as countries transitioned away from old systems and a new concept of equality emerged. 

Back then, countries needed money and business support, but most people didn't trust the government with their money. Jews, who were well-known for lending money, were approached for assistance. In exchange, the government granted them special treatment, treating them differently than the rest of the population. Thus, Jewish emancipation, or gaining equal rights, had a double meaning. On the one hand, it was about equality, but on the other, it was about preserving Jewish uniqueness. Even though equality was promoted, it also ensured that Jews remained a distinct group in society.

Moreover, as nations strived for equality, a new issue emerged: the rich and the poor divided. While America achieved social equality, Europe only achieved legal equality. This contradiction hindered the development of true republics and resulted in the formation of a class-based society. Jews, however, were an exception. They didn't fit into any category. Their status was defined by their Jewishness rather than their social standing. 

As a result, as previously said, governments played a role in keeping Jews detached from the rest of society. Being born a Jew meant being overprivileged or underprivileged in order to avoid assimilation.

We know, so far, that when nation states emerged, more capital was required for business transactions. However, things changed drastically with the rise of imperialism. Following World War I, Western Jewry, like the nation-state, disintegrated. This reduced the importance of Jewish wealth, leading to resentment of their power. As a result, Jews started to face widespread hatred and contempt.

This decline of the nation-state, which resulted in the loss of privileges for the nobility, causing resentment and hatred, prompted the emergence of political antisemitism. This is an important concept to remember; Hannah distinguishes between social and political antisemitism. The former only discriminates, while the latter seeks to take away citizens’ rights. Political antisemitism, according to Hannah, is the most dangerous form of antisemitism and can lead to totalitarianism. By learning the history of Jewish hatred, we can begin to identify the origins of each type of antisemitism when it comes to group minorities in our current societies. 

Furthermore, it is critical to recognize that Jews possessed no political power or importance. They were merely an economic asset, so their significance was economic. This also meant they never had a state or engaged in politics. On top of that, their importance was international rather than national because of their financial assistance and power. However, as antisemitism spread, their role diminished, and Jews were excluded from international affairs. 

Lastly, Hannah mentions an important paradox: despite being stateless, Jews were perceived as representatives of the state due to their economic power. She provides the example of the Rothschild family, a banker family, which brought about the concentration of Jewish wealth and the perception of a strong, international Jewish connection. This concentration of wealth, linked to power, fueled antisemitic stereotypes of Jews as a secret force controlling governments. 

Moreover, antisemitism gained traction in the late nineteenth century, initially driven by financial scandals. The lower middle class, particularly those affected by economic hardship, became antisemitic, believing that Jews were on their way to political power because of their connections with the government. This social-economic resentment, combined with a fear of Jews gaining political power, fueled the rise of antisemitism in the lower middle classes. However, Hannah emphasizes that Jews were not directly involved in politics for its own sake; rather, Jewish communities aligned with the state for security and protection. 

As some of us may be aware, Jewish communities have historically faced persecution as a result of their refusal to adopt some religious practices of other cultures. One example is the act of lending money, which was considered usury in other religions, such as Christianity. However, Hannah does not provide these examples; rather, these are some earlier events that can help us understand since when the Jews differed from other religions or groups of people.

To put it another way, in a hostile environment for Jews, aligning with the state and demonstrating loyalty through economic ties was a survival strategy. Moreover, the lesson here is to be cautious when identifying certain groups as allies of the state. It is critical to understand why certain groups may develop or appear to have close ties to the government. Current group minorities, such as LGBTQ+ groups, are examples of  groups that are being inextricably linked with the state. However, it is critical to identify the causes and trace the history of each group before progressing from discrimination to political antisemitism. 

Several antisemitic parties emerged in the nineteenth century, beginning with Austria and its various movements that targeted the Rothschilds as Jewish bankers. Similarly, France experienced a peak of antisemitism during the Dreyfus Affair, which we will discuss shortly. However, this antisemitic movement held less influence and power than those in Germany and Austria.

Finally, a period of apparent stability emerged, which Hannah labeled as "The Golden Age of Security." This stage was distinguished by the operation of political structures despite dissatisfaction and internal conflicts. The most significant aspect of this stage is that, after losing their banking power, Jews began to gain prominence in cultural institutions, contributing to newspapers, publishing, music, and theater. However, the main issue is that they faced discrimination, which resulted in antisemitism losing political ground and becoming an ideological tool. 

As Hannah Arendt said: “It became a mix of half-truths and superstitions, serving as an outlet for frustrations and resentments after World War I.”(p.68)

The Jews and Society

As we saw in the previous section, Hannah distinguishes between social and political antisemitism, emphasizing the latter as the most concerning. We also know that political antisemitism emerged around the time Jews began to be perceived as allies of the state. Hannah, however, claims that social antisemitism enables political antisemitism, leading her to focus on the former in this section.

The first and most important characteristic of social antisemitism is that it emerged from the concept of equality. Social discrimination emerged as Jews achieved greater equality with other groups.

Moreover, one of the most important quotes of the book, in my perspective, can be found in this section, and has been mentioned earlier. However, for the purposes of this section, we can recall that Arendt argues that “the more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that actually exist between people; and thus the more unequal do individuals and groups become.” (p.69).  For Arendt a challenge of the modern era is that we confront each other without the protection of differing circumstances. We are not equal, so we have to come up with reasons for inequality which is dangerous.

Furthermore, Hannah delves into the paradoxical nature of equality. In her view, equality should be a principle granting equal rights, yet she observes that it can be mistaken as an innate quality in individuals. This misunderstanding is especially dangerous in societies with limited space for special groups, as differences become apparent.

Arendt's investigation into modern race relations demonstrates that the demand for equality requires the recognition of each individual as equal. However, conflicts increase when groups fail to recognize this basic equality, particularly in the context of natural differences.

As Jewish equality grows, so does social resentment. Surprising differences among Jews fuel societal discontent. Discrimination, while socially impactful, does not result in a significant political movement against Jews. However, it poisons social interactions and influences Jewish behavior.

Moreover, Hannah compares the situation with the United States, underscoring the unique challenges posed by achieving equality in a diverse population. In the U.S., where equality is assumed, discrimination becomes a means of distinction. This paradoxical situation develops social antisemitism, which eventually evolves into a dangerous political movement.

Finally, I believe Arendt's analysis sheds light on the complex interplay between social and political antisemitism, emphasizing the importance of understanding how equality influences societal dynamics and, ultimately, the development of ideologies. 

Now, this was only Arendt's perspective on equality. However, we will now discuss her exploration of society and the assimilation of Jews.

Assimilation for Jews meant being accepted by non-Jewish society. However, this acceptance came with a condition—they had to stand out from other Jewish people. The challenge emerged from trying to stay connected to their Jewish identity while also avoiding looking like typical Jews to be accepted. As Hannah Arendt put it, they had to be "a man in the street and a Jew at home" (p.86)

This seeming contradiction had a real basis. Non-Jewish society expected assimilated Jews to be as 'educated' as everyone else. But here's the catch: while they were told not to act like regular Jews, they still needed to do something exceptional because, at the end of the day, people saw them as Jews.

Therefore, to fit in, Jews had to carefully juggle different expectations. They needed to be 'educated' like the rest of society but also had to do something extraordinary to be accepted. It wasn't just about learning things; it meant creating a unique identity that stood out from what people thought of as typical Jewish characteristics. 

As a result, Jews seeking acceptance confronted a double challenge. They faced the dilemma of conforming through differentiation while attempting to be accepted by a society that discriminated against ordinary Jews.

Following this, the constant effort to distinguish themselves resulted in the development of a distinct Jewish type, defined not by religion but by psychological characteristics and reactions. 

These characteristics eventually led to the differentiation of different types of Jews: the assimilated pariahs, who successfully integrated into society yet continued to encounter discrimination; the parvenus, who attained wealth but retained an outsider status due to their Jewish identity; the conformists; and the conscious pariahs, who deliberately resisted assimilation. Moreover, due to the complex social landscape, Jews faced the critical decision of aligning with one of these identities.

Furthermore, in the decaying societal framework, Jews were perceived as exotic and mysterious. The prevailing societal trend, driven by a morbid desire for the exotic and abnormal, welcomed the idea of Jews as entertainers, with characteristics that could be interpreted as mysteriously wicked or secretly vicious. This peculiar fascination with Jews' 'otherness' contributed to their acceptance, although on distorted and perverse terms. 

Bourgeois society, in its search for entertainment and fascination with the unusual, discovered an attraction in Jews, whose Jewishness, once transformed into a psychological quality, could easily be perverted into a vice.

In addition to this, Hannah claims a correlation between vice and crime, arguing that crime can be punished, but a vice is an integral part of one's identity. Individuals with vices are not always criminals. Jews, in this context, could be viewed as people with vices, but not necessarily criminals and potentially assimilable into society. However, this perception of Jews as possessing vices led to a belief that they were predisposed to commit crimes, subjecting them to punishment.

To put it another way, being exotic or different, while not a crime, placed them in a vulnerable position.

Now, considering the challenges of assimilation for the Jews, Hannah focuses on Benjamin Disraeli, a Jew from an assimilated family who managed to remain separate—a parvenu that took advantage of his Jewishness to advance his political career.

Furthermore, one of the most significant aspects of this case is that, despite his Jewish identity, he indirectly contributed to antisemitic narratives through his political ideas and writings. He was able to see Jews as potentially powerful because of their 'chosen' status, which developed into a race doctrine. In other words, he believed in a mysterious Jewish influence that led to social resentment among non-Jews.

Some of his writings that influenced antisemitism were "Alroy" and "Coningsby," which reflected his changing views on Jewish power. In these writings, he discusses the spread of Jewish financial dominance and influence through secret societies. 

As we can see, while Disraeli may not have intended to promote antisemitism, his ideas were later distorted and used to support beliefs that Jews control world affairs. His views on secret societies, while not grounded in reality, contributed to public fears and misinformation.

Ultimately, after the Dreyfus Affair, a critical period we will delve into shortly, Jews encountered the challenges of assimilation. It was during this period that society underwent a shift in its perception of them, recognizing them as ordinary individuals. 

This transformation, however, brought its own set of complications. No longer considered exotic or mysteriously wicked, Jews now had to navigate societal expectations and prejudices without the distorted views that had temporarily elevated them. The societal volatility, which alternated between fascination and indifference, emphasized the fragile state of the Jewish position in a society governed by ever-changing norms and prejudices. 

Benjamin Disraeli's writings influenced society's acceptance of certain behaviors that are generally considered wicked or immoral, such as vices. His views transformed them into actions that are part of individuals. That is, instead of viewing these actions as deliberate decisions, society began to see them as ingrained characteristics. 

This shift in perspective led society to perceive individuals with vices as having imposed behaviors beyond their control. This essentially means that individuals are not fully responsible for their actions, which causes society to treat them differently and impose punishments or restrictions based on the belief that these characteristics are beyond the individual's control.

To put it another way, it promotes discrimination and stigma. The main ingredients of social antisemitism.

The Dreyfus Affair

We've now reached the book's final chapter on antisemitism, delving into the well known case of The Dreyfus Affair. This historical event unfolded in France in 1894 and is considered a critical event that drastically shaped society's perception of Jews. The controversy was centered around Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer falsely accused of espionage for Germany. Surprisingly, the antisemitism that existed in the initial phase of the case increased Jews' social status. However, this perception was short-lived and ended once Dreyfus’s innocence was revealed.

Furthermore, this and other events that we will discuss shortly will guide us in discovering that society willingly seemed to assign Jews to specific roles as long as they were perceived as a threat or traitors. For example, Alfred Dreyfus was the only Jew in the French military, making him more vulnerable to being targeted as a spy or traitor. When it was discovered that a French officer was sending secret French documents to the German Embassy in Paris, it became much easier to accuse him.

Following this accusation, Dreyfus was charged and court-martialed in October 1894, serving a life sentence on Devil's Island. He was eventually found not guilty and exonerated in 1906. However, he later faced a retrial and was charged again, despite evidence proving Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy, a French major, guilty.

Moreover, this case remained significant in French politics even into the twentieth century. According to Hannah, the case is significant because it divided France into Dreyfus’s supporters and opponents. Dreyfus faced strong opposition from the military, the Catholic Church, the right wing, and, in general, the antisemites.

Attitudes toward Jews during the affair revealed that the higher strata of society, including both Catholic and anti-clerical factions, were willing to see Jews removed from the body politic. The affair became an opportunity for Parliament to regain its reputation for incorruptibility. Slogans like 'Death to the Jews' were used to reconcile societal divisions.

One of the most significant aspects of the Dreyfus Affair is that it resulted in the Catholic Church losing control of the state, and in 1905, the Church and State were officially separated in France. The military, in particular, was concerned about losing power if Dreyfus's guilt was proven to be false.

Another event covered in this chapter is the Panama Scandal. This case also revolved around suspicion of Jews, blaming them for failures, specifically financial failures. The Panama Scandal refers to a French company's failed attempt to build the Panama Canal during the French Third Republic in 1892. Many French citizens had invested in the project and eventually lost their money.

As mentioned earlier, the case eventually required someone to be held accountable, leading to the accusation of two individuals of Jewish descent who were not directly involved. These individuals, Jacques Reinach and Cornélius Herz, were only implicated in the distribution of bribes. Reinach, a secret financial advisor, played a crucial role in managing relations with the Panama Company, while Herz served as an intermediary with radical factions within Parliament.

Following this, the scandal took a tragic turn when Reinach, harassed by Herz's blackmail, committed suicide. Their actions were significant in transforming an obscure antisemitic daily newspaper, 'La Libre Parole,’ into one of France's most influential papers. Shortly before his death, Reinach provided 'La Libre Parole' with a list of suborned members of Parliament, giving the paper exclusive content. The gradual release of this list created a sense of suspense, making the journal and the entire antisemitic press powerful forces in the Third Republic.

Furthermore, the Panama Scandal revealed that most intermediaries between private enterprise and the state were Jewish. However, these Jews were newcomers, as traditional Jewish financial houses such as the Rothschilds had lost power. The scandal occurred at an important time and demonstrated how, despite not being directly involved in the financial mismanagement, Jewish people became scapegoats, contributing to the rise of antisemitic sentiments in French society. For this reason, Hannah argues that the Panama Scandal influenced the development of antisemitism, paving the way for what occurred during the Dreyfus Affair.

This brings us to one of the most significant elements of this chapter: the mob. Hannah expands on this concept and applies it later in the book. The following quote captures the most important thing she says about this concept:

‘...primarily a group in which the residue of all classes are represented. This makes it so easy to mistake the mob for the people, which also comprises all strata of society. While people in all great revolutions fight for true representation, the mob will always shout for the ‘strong man’, the ‘great leader’. For the mob hates society from which it is excluded, as well as Parliament where it is not represented.’ (p.138)

As can be seen, Hannah argues that viewing the mob as a true representation of the people is a big mistake. The mob is essentially a gathering of people from various social classes who may share a common cause or sentiment, and it is frequently portrayed as a force that can be easily swayed or manipulated. It requires a 'strong man' or a 'great leader' who can represent their collective sentiments, which can eventually lead to the leader exploiting the mob's emotions for their own purposes.

In the context of the Dreyfus Affair, this term refers to a group made up of people from various social classes. This group, as Hannah points out, is frequently misunderstood as a true representation of the general population, despite the fact that it is only a small group of people.

Following this, Hannah claims that the mob was created by scandals involving high society and politicians during the French Third Republic. As previously stated, the army, church, and police were all involved in organizing and inciting the mob. The mob, which despises societal structures and the government, found a convenient target in Jews. Their perceived tolerance in society, as well as their association with the state, made them an attractive target for the mob's animosity.

Furthermore, Hannah claims that powerful groups such as Freemasons, and Jesuits were also incorrectly portrayed as secret societies seeking global dominance. Although these perceptions were false, Hannah emphasizes how they were exploited during the Dreyfus Affair, worsening the already volatile situation.

Another group that became entwined with the mob's erratic behavior was the intellectuals, who despised society and wanted to destroy it. However, Picquart and Clemenceau were among those who attempted to protect France from the mob. Picquart, despite his background and initial hostility toward Jews, eventually demonstrated that Dreyfus had been falsely accused, and Clemenceau, a prominent figure, stood out as a rare supporter of justice and equal rights for Jews. He understood the need for oppressed groups to actively fight against their oppressors. He believed that ‘an infringement of the rights of one man was an infringement of the rights of all.' (p.147)

The turning point in the Dreyfus case, which had previously remained a source of disagreement, came with the Paris Exposition of 1900. This international event exerted a significant influence on the political landscape, particularly in prompting Parliament to reevaluate the possibility of a retrial for Captain Dreyfus. 

The fear of a boycott forced Parliament to reconsider its position on Dreyfus, resulting in a pivotal moment in the form of a pardon. This act, while resolving the immediate crisis, caused controversy. The pardon, viewed as a compromise to restore order and prevent further disruption, represented a significant defeat for Clemenceau. The renowned justice advocate expressed dissatisfaction with the pardon's ambiguity, criticizing its perceived lack of clarity as well as its role in combining honorable individuals with those deemed less credible.

Following this, the conclusion of the Dreyfus case resulted in significant political changes. The separation of Church and State, as well as restrictions on Catholic activities, effectively ended Catholicism's political influence in France. The intelligence service was now under civil authority, which limited the army's ability to exert influence through police inquiries.

The end of the Dreyfus case marked the end of clerical antisemitism. While Bernard Lazare advocated for equal rights for both sides, the state made exceptions that harmed Jews and threatened Catholics' freedom of conscience. Both the Jewish question and political Catholicism were effectively removed from practical politics.

Furthermore, another of the most significant consequences of the Dreyfus Affair was the public's perception of wealthy and noble Jewish individuals, who were still viewed as outcasts without a country or human rights. Emancipated Jews who sought acceptance separated themselves from other Jews. They even accused their own less assimilated members of causing problems and breaking ties of solidarity. 

Finally, by the end of this chapter, Hannah Arendt claims that all antisemitic movements eventually resulted in the birth of the Zionist movement - ‘the only political answer Jews have ever found to antisemitism and the only ideology in which they have ever taken seriously a hostility that would place them at the center of world events.’ (p.156) 

On top of that, if that wasn't enough, Jewish communities had only one option for protecting themselves from antisemitic movements: establish their own state.

The Relevance of Jewish Antisemitism

We have completed the first section of the book The Origins of Totalitarianism. However, before we can conclude this discussion, we must first understand it. Instead of trying to remember dates or names, we should read through the text and analyze the situation. 

It is unavoidable to notice that some of these events parallel current happenings. There are plenty of examples we could use here. However, in order to make this brief, we will only use one. We are all aware that transsexuals face social antisemitism, or discrimination. Currently, there is an increase in social antisemitism, which is progressing toward political antisemitism. This leads us to the conspiracy theories that argue that gender ideology is being taught in schools to control the population.

In other words, there is a "mob" that believes that certain groups, such as LGBTQ+, are allies of the state, and that both try to indoctrinate people into thinking certain ways in order to gain control.

However, we can step back from the situation and recognize that these groups aren't aligning with the state to gain control, but rather to seek protection and safety. It is critical that we recognize that antisemitism can cause terror and unease in this world.

Antisemitism is an ideology that stems from viewing certain groups as strangers, as individuals who are responsible for the injustices that plague society, with no solid foundation or evidence. Antisemitism is the sound of hatred, and it stems from conspiracy theories that seek an answer to the world’s problems. 

Moreover, this is not to say that group minorities are never without fault; rather, we should exercise caution when assigning blame. I don't think the Holocaust could happen again, but history does rhyme. Understanding Hannah Arendt's research on Jewish antisemitism allows us to begin identifying situations that are getting out of hand. I strongly advise everyone to read this book, particularly the section on antisemitism, because it is human nature to make connections without solid evidence, leading to discrimination that eventually turns into terror and hell.

As Hannah Arendt puts it, humanity is made up of plurality, and attempting to unify it all is a huge mistake.

Sources:

• Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism (2017th ed.). Penguin Classics.

Beyond Thought.

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As some of you may be aware, Hannah Arendt was Jewish. She also had a relationship with Martin Heidegger, which became complicated due to his Nazi Germany affiliation. Arendt was deeply involved in her research on antisemitism and worked hard to understand why it existed at all. All these circumstances eventually led her to write "The Origins of Totalitarianism," a three-part book that explains how totalitarian governments evolve. The book aims to provide shields against totalitarianism by encouraging critical thinking and the preservation of freedom.

In this and following newsletters, we'll try to understand her book by condensing it as much as possible while keeping the most important details. We'll start with the book's prefaces, which will help us understand the entire text better, then move on to the sections on antisemitism and imperialism, and finally conclude with the section on totalitarianism.

In preparation for our exploration, we must first understand that totalitarianism, according to Arendt, is the complete annihilation of human freedom in all of its forms. In her opinion, a monarchy and a tyranny can still have some sense of freedom, but totalitarianism completely eliminates it in both the public and private realms. It also seeks continuous expansion and growth, as we will see in the section on imperialism.

Another significant aspect of totalitarianism is the elimination of spontaneity. One of the most important aspects of humanity, as we have seen in her book The Human Condition, is the ability to act spontaneously and intervene in events, which is eradicated in totalitarian regimes. Totalitarianism seeks to eliminate plurality, that is, the diversity in society, and transform it into a unity.

In other words, totalitarianism turns humans into animals by removing spontaneity and plurality, transforming people into beings who simply behave and follow the curse of events without the ability to intervene or change them. This description of totalitarianism is critical because it allows us to stay attentive and recognize its characteristics, while also avoiding naming any government totalitarian. 

In the prefaces of the book, she introduces us to what is coming on each part of the text. We won't go into detail with each preface, but we will discuss the most important aspects of them in this newsletter to prepare ourselves for the three parts of the book.

One of the primary causes of totalitarianism is the presence of rootlessness and homelessness; however, in order to understand what she means, we can refer to these elements as meaninglessness.

To put it another way, one of the main reasons totalitarianism emerges is a lack of meaning that usually comes from religious or traditional beliefs. She argues that humans are meaningful beings with an innate need to find meaning. This drives people to seek it by joining movements or organizations that provide a sense of purpose and place in the world.

Furthermore, as religion declines, people seek to satisfy their need for belonging through other deep big movements. This is very powerful and true, in my perspective. The same idea has been advocated by modern thinkers such as Jordan Peterson and John Vervaeke. There is an ongoing lack of belonging in our current societies; where all we have is our daily economic lives, jobs, and responsibilities, whereas in the past people were heavily involved in larger movements, such as religion. As Hannah Arendt and, in our examples, Peterson and Vervaeke argue, a sense of belonging to a community or a larger cause is an important aspect of humanity. Therefore, totalitarianism will always be on the table if this aspect is not fulfilled, because it creates a man-made paradise of meaning and purpose.

As a matter of fact, John Vervaeke claims that the meaning crisis manifests itself in our society in a variety of ways, including political ideologies with pseudo-religious characteristics, mental health crises, addiction, and a general sense of existential unease across societies.

Preface to Part One: Antisemitism  

Before diving into each part of the book, Hannah provides introductions to each one of them. For the purposes of this newsletter, and to enhance our understanding, we will look at the main components of each one and start laying out additional information that we will discuss in more detail in the future.

Hannah begins by looking into antisemitism. This, she believes, is a critical aspect of totalitarianism, and one of the most important points to remember is that it emerged in the nineteenth century as an ideology, specifically a racist ideology.

Furthermore, understanding antisemitism requires understanding that Jews did not have a state and lived among other communities, relying on non-Jews for protection and safety.

Additionally, as the concept of equality gained traction in the nineteenth century, Jews were given the option of assimilation. They had to choose between assimilating and losing their Jewish identity or remaining distinct and retaining it.

This refusal to assimilate served the Jews' self-interest by providing a justification for remaining distinct. This, however, resulted in antisemitic ideologies. What is critical to understand is that Hannah claims that racist ideologies emerged as a result of Jews' refusal to assimilate in a society where equality was demanded. Moreover, the consequences of antisemitic movements eventually led to the creation of Zionism, a counter-ideology and response to antisemitism. 

We will go over all of this in greater detail when we discuss antisemitism, but one of the most powerful quotes Arendt provides in this section is the following: 

“Equality of condition, though it is certainly a basic requirement for justice, is nevertheless among the greatest and most uncertain ventures of modern mankind. The more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that actually exist between people; and thus the more unequal do individuals and groups become.” - Hannah Arendt

This quote is significant because, as we have seen, when we strive to become equal, there is always an inherent need to differentiate ourselves. This is because we are all different and unique, and there is plurality and diversity in our species. 

Preface to Part Two: Imperialism

The second section of the book explores imperialism, an evolution from colonialism, fueled by economic and industrial changes within the nation-state system. These economic factors led to expansionist politics, resulting in global dominance. 

According to Arendt, the main problem with imperialism is its boundless nature, which causes it to spread across the globe. Imperialism is essentially the pursuit of power without regard for borders. As a result, despite the appearance of imperialism as a nationalist movement, it is, in fact, an international one. 

Building on the concerns about power, Hannah highlights the problems associated with powerful countries engaging in imperialism, where they seek to extend their influence over other nations. She argues that these powerful nations may encounter challenges in developing fair and effective systems of government due to certain uncontrollable factors.

Moreover, she considers the rise of secret services, or the deep state, influencing various aspects of a country to be a troubling sign. She claims that the United States established such services not only in response to a direct threat, but also as a result of the country's emergence as a major world power after World War II. This raises concerns about their impact on domestic affairs as well as their potential impact on constitutional development.

Following this, she discusses the growing educational and technological gap between wealthy Western countries and the rest of the world. She claims that foreign aid programs may unintentionally contribute to one country's dominance over another, possibly to the point of becoming instruments of foreign power. This foreign aid is usually in the form of foreign currency, which does not usually help much and only increases a country's economic power.

In conclusion, Hannah sees imperialism as one of totalitarianism's key ingredients because it seeks global dominance and creates global politics.

Preface to Part Three: Totalitarianism

One of the most important points to make about this section of the book is that our ideology causes us to label things as soon as we notice or perceive certain characteristics. 

One of these flaws is our current anti-communist thinking. Hannah warns people about the obsession with pursuing expansionary liberalism, which includes anti-communist thinking that can eventually become a global ideology. The main point to remember here is that Hannah is concerned about global ideologies dominating because this is the type of thing that leads to totalitarianism.

Furthermore, we must understand that totalitarianism seeks to transform diversity into unity, ultimately limiting human freedom. The concept of freedom is crucial in this context. Hannah believes that the ability to intervene, act, and speak, that is, the ability to change events that would otherwise run their course like organisms or automatic machines, is the most important aspect of humanity. We won't go into detail about this concept here, but if we want to learn more about it, we can watch our videos or read our newsletters about her book The Human Condition, which will help us gain a deep understanding on her claims about humanity.

Finally, she talks about some points to consider when discussing totalitarianism. She argues that not all governments should be labeled as totalitarian. Totalitarianism seeks to eliminate plurality; thus, when we see laws that flatten out groups that contribute to diversity, we may start considering a government to be totalitarian. 

Another characteristic of totalitarianism is that facts that contradict the official fiction become non-facts, meaning that anything that contradicts a specific belief is false or deniable. Furthermore, totalitarianism creates multiple layers of bureaucracy, which overlap and create parallel functions. This is because totalitarianism does not have a clear goal; rather, it constantly shifts. By having multiple layers of bureaucracy, totalitarian governments can have multiple options to choose from when their circumstances or goals change. 

Lastly, totalitarian governments fabricate criminals, labeling individuals as enemies who may not necessarily commit crimes, as seen with Jews in Nazi Germany. This opposition eventually leads to terror, constituting yet another component of totalitarian governments. The imperative to exert extreme control becomes apparent when necessary.

These are the fundamental insights of each section of the book, and in our next newsletter, we will delve into the text and uncover every detail of each section, starting with antisemitism.

Please consider subscribing to our YouTube channel and newsletter, and stay tuned for more content on this exceptional book!

Sources:

• Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism (2017th ed.). Penguin Classics.

• [Alex O'Connor]. (2023, December 4). Why Can't We Find Meaning Anymore? John Vervaeke [Video].

• [Jordan B Peterson]. (2024, January 15). Dr. Peterson and John Vervaeke Discuss the Meaning Crisis [Video].

Beyond Thought.

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After reading "On Ideology" by Louis Althusser, I became more interested in understanding Freud’s perspectives on society, mainly because Althusser devotes an entire chapter to him and Lacan at the end of the book. 

After doing some research, I found that Freud’s most influential works on society were "Civilization and its Discontents" and "The Future of an Illusion." I began with the latter because it was the first to be written, and then moved on to the former. In this newsletter, we will look at Freud's thoughts on society and religion as described in these two books, and try to fully understand them.

That being said, after reading these two works, it appears Freud expects you are familiar with the theory of the structure of the mind he developed earlier. I was heavily into personal development at some point in my life, which made me have a good and basic understanding of the id, ego, and superego by the time I read these books, but for the purposes of making this newsletter easier to understand, I will assume the reader or listener does not understand or has an idea of this theory. Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding of these works, I will first explain what these concepts are.

First of all, it is important to recognize that Freud's theory was heavily influenced by the sex life, and I am inclined to believe that this was mostly due to the context in which his books were written. Things like "sex before marriage" and women being more sexually open were non-existent, so reading him with that in mind and interpreting his "libido" concept as instinctual energy works best. 

Second, according to my research, most of what Freud claimed is no longer taken seriously in psychology, and he may be viewed more as a philosopher than a scientist. However, his theory of the unconscious and childhood origins of adult personality are some of his most important contributions and are still regarded as very important, and, in general, because these theories cannot be completely disqualified scientifically, his theory of the id, ego, and superego can be used or interpreted as symbolic truths, which from a philosophical standpoint, truly make sense and shed light to the problems we face today on our societies.

Let’s begin by briefly describing what the id, the ego, and the superego are. The id is the instinctual part of our psyche and it's responsible for needs and desires. In Freud's work, you will often see him referring to it as our sexual desires or libido, but again, let’s take this more as an instinctual energy or desire. The id doesn’t really have a connection with the outside world, it just cares about his urges and needs, and is the part of the mind who remains infantile throughout our life, operating within the unconscious.

Furthermore, as we explore Freud's thoughts on society, we will gain a better understanding of these concepts, but the id is composed of Eros and Thanatos, which can be regarded as good and evil, respectively. This is quite archetypical, but interesting, in my opinion, because it is related to dialectics, particularly the idea that everything is made up of contradictions, positives and negatives. 

According to Freud, Eros is our libido, or the impulse that supports life, such as hunger, sex, and so on, whereas Thanatos is the death instinct or drive that creates destructive forces or aggressiveness in humans. 

Moving on, the superego is the part of the psyche that ensures that moral standards are followed, and it is in general the part of the mind that has everything we learn from society and our parents. It isn’t there when we are born; rather, it develops in our early stages in life. This part of the mind can be thought as the ideological part of the psyche, and it is responsible for feelings of reward, self-esteem, and even guilt.

Finally, consciousness is the ego. It is the component of the mind that mediates and makes decisions depending on the demands of the id and the superego. This component of the psyche sticks to the reality principle, or in other words, it is the part of the mind that comprehends what is going on outside, in contrast to the id, which is only concerned with his wants and conforms to the pleasure principle. According to Freud, children do not have this component of the mind formed, which is why they act only on their desires and needs.

As we can see, all of this mind theory can sound quite archetypical, which is why many psychologists do not take much of what he said seriously. 

However, our reality has been built around concepts like this, as evidenced by consumer behavior theory and behavioral economics, both of which rely heavily on theories of unconscious desires and motivations. What’s more, the superego can explain a lot about our ideological constructs from a societal standpoint. 

With that in mind, let's dive right into the books, as I believe we've given a decent overview of some earlier concepts that will help us better understand his views on society. 

Highlights:

• Religion as a Civilizing Force: According to Freud, religion is an integral part of civilization. It provides protection from nature's uncertainties and regulates societal behaviors. However, while it provides moral guidelines, it also causes conflicts due to imposed restrictions, as discussed further in "Civilization and its Discontents."

• Religion as an Illusion: In "The Future of an Illusion," Freud argues that religious beliefs are illusions driven by wishful thinking. He views religion as a psychological mechanism to cope with existential uncertainties, and he compares it to other constructs like art or intoxicants that provide relief or numbness from life's hardships.

• The "Oceanic Feeling" and Ego Development: Freud investigates the "oceanic feeling," which he describes as religious. He ends up attributing this feeling to an early, infant, undifferentiated ego state - a sense of limitlessness and unity with the universe.

• Pursuit of Happiness and Defense Mechanisms: Freud delves into the pursuit of happiness, claiming that it is deeply rooted in the avoidance of pain and the pursuit of pleasure. He claims, however, that this pursuit is hindered by both internal and external factors. He identifies defense mechanisms like isolation, intoxication, and impulse control as strategies people use to protect themselves from pain. This introduces the concept of sublimation, which is the redirection of instinctual energies into activities that are socially acceptable or beneficial.

• Civilization and Its Discontents: Freud explores the role of civilization in shaping human discontent. He investigates three sources of human misery: constitutional factors, external forces, and communal living. While the first two are inescapable, communal living, as represented by societal demands and relationships, emerges as a potential source of dissatisfaction. He explores the evolution of civilization from tools and physical advancements to societal norms and ideals, emphasizing the inherent conflict between individual instincts and the societal constraints required for communal harmony.

• Sexual Taboos and Societal Restrictions: Freud delves into societal sexual regulations and emphasizes their restrictive nature. He claims that these norms ignore the diversity of human sexual constitutions, imposing a single model of sexual life on everyone. He goes on to compare this to religion and its imposition of a certain way of life that must be followed by everyone, regardless of their differences.

• Aggressiveness and the Death Instinct: Freud delves into human aggression, claiming that it is built into individuals. He introduces the concepts of Eros and Thanatos, which represent the instincts for life and death, respectively. The death instinct seeks dissolution and self-destruction, acting in opposition to the life-giving Eros. He investigates how societies manage and control these aggressive instincts for communal harmony through various methods such as love, sexual restrictions, and sublimation.

• Inherent Conflict in Civilization: According to Freud, civilization inherently causes conflict within individuals. Society's demands, particularly the suppression of individual desires for the sake of communal harmony, result in a never-ending internal struggle and dissatisfaction.

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The “Oceanic Feeling,” and “The Future of an Illusion.”

We are starting with his views on religion, mainly because the first chapter of “Civilization and its Discontents” starts this way, and his previous work “The Future of an Illusion” is mainly about that.

We won’t go into too much detail with “The Future of an Illusion:” but will lay out the most important things he said in this book about civilization and its relation to religion. 

One of the most important things Freud says about religion is that it is an essential component within civilization. Societies were created as a way to raise humanity above animal existence and offer protection against nature, as well as to protect individuals from each other's desires through the establishment of social structures and laws.

He also claimed that, paradoxically, while society safeguards against nature, it can create conflict among individuals due to imposed restrictions, which are further developed on “Civilization and its Discontents.”

Furthermore, the primary goal of religion for Freud was to humanize natural forces and offer a psychological way to cope with and control nature's unpredictability. In his view, religion is a way to cope with the realities and difficulties of life through the figure of a father who is there to protect us.

In other words, religion is a state of helplessness, and if we can recall the psyche structure we discussed at the beginning, it is mainly the id who cannot understand the outside world, asking for protection so that his needs for survival can be accomplished.  

Following this, he mentions that even though initially gods were anthropomorphized forces of nature, like for instance the god of the rain or the sea, the rise of scientific explanations changed the belief in gods as controllers of nature. People started realizing that natural laws governed the world rather than divine entities.

As a result, the function of gods changed. They shifted from being masters of nature to being protectors of morality and justice, especially after death. They became more associated with ensuring justice in an afterlife as faith in their ability to control nature diminished. This provided relief and justice in a world where life struggles often seemed unfair and uncontrollable.

Finally, Freud mentions the Jews and credits them for the significant shift in religious thought. He claims that they consolidated multiple gods from various pantheons into the concept of a single omnipotent God, which marks the significant shift from polytheism to monotheism. 

Now, Freud argues in "The Future of an Illusion" that religious beliefs are illusions rather than delusions or errors. According to him, illusions are beliefs based on wishful thinking, regardless of whether they are true or false. An illusion, unlike a hallucination or an error, may or may not be true, but its fundamental motivation is to fulfill a psychological wish. They are beliefs that are formed by a person's desires rather than empirical evidence, whereas delusions are beliefs that contradict reality and cannot be true.

With this in mind, he claims that religion is an illusion rather than a delusion since it lacks empirical evidence and is based on faith and wish fulfillment. This explains why he believes religion is psychologically based on the desire for comfort and security in the face of life's uncertainties.

Moreover, Freud describes the dangers of a civilization that was formed by religion. He proposes to educate people to think scientifically, in order to avoid the collapse of civilization due to the loss of faith. His solution involves replacing religious justifications for morality with rational, practical reasoning to prevent chaos in societies.

This is very intriguing to me because we can already see the consequences of younger generations not basing their morality on religion. Many people still, unconsciously, rely on religion to determine what is morally wrong, basing their decisions on "truths" or rules that have existed since the beginnings of the church's ideological movement without realizing it.

With the rise of science, however, there have been modern proposals, such as the one Sam Harris claims in his book "The Moral Landscape," which is based on the concept of well-being and is similar to what Spinoza proposed but on a scientific rather than on a metaphysical level. 

Furthermore, Freud does acknowledge science limitations in providing only perceptions of the world. He challenges his own argument by claiming that just as individuals seek comfort through religion, the same could happen with other belief systems like politics or science. He points out that if science were to scrutinize itself, it might find that it, too, is a kind of illusion. 

However, Freud addresses this potential criticism by aligning with the idea that science presents the world as it appears to human senses. He acknowledges that science may not reveal the nature of the world, but despite this realization, he eventually concludes, in accordance with Kantian ideas, that science limitations are irrelevant, which basically confirms, according to him, that science is not an illusion. 

In other words, Freud claims that we cannot know the world as it truly is, but can only understand it through our senses, which is our objective truth. In that sense, science, according to Freud, cannot be an illusion because it is our closest way to objective reality.

This brings us to "Civilization and its Discontents," in which Freud describes an "oceanic feeling" that a friend has but that he is unable to experience. His friend describes it as a sense of "eternity" and limitlessness that Freud ends up describing as the religious feeling.

Furthermore, my first criticism is that he admits from the start that he has never felt this way, and yet tries to understand it, which, in my opinion, makes his case difficult. 

In addition to this, I believe that one aspect of this feeling that he could have explored further is the concept of the sublime, which is the idea of feeling small and overwhelmed in the face of something vast and powerful like nature. It is an idea that philosophers such as Kant, Nietzsche, and Schopenhauer have explored, and while it is mostly classified as an aesthetic experience in which we feel powerless in the face of nature, there has been a lot of exploration that confirms that this feeling is very similar, and can have a connection to religion. We won’t explore this idea here, but it is something that could have been explored further by Freud.

Moreover, despite the evidence for other explanations, Freud goes straight to a psychological explanation, which is understandable given his area of expertise. He goes on to say that the only certainty we can have is our ego's feelings. He argues that, as previously discussed, the ego initially encompasses everything and gradually separates an external world from itself as it evolves. 

He defines this "oceanic feeling" as a sense of limitlessness and unity of the ego with the universe, and delves into the idea that this feeling may have originated from an earlier, more inclusive ego-state, which some people may retain in some degrees alongside their mature ego, which sounds similar to the sublime feeling, a sense of belonging to something bigger than ourselves and our connection to nature. Despite this, Freud maintains that it is an infantile feeling that arises from the early stages of the ego, where it cannot distinguish between external reality and himself.

In order to understand this, Freud argues that through experiences, such as the availability or unavailability of sensory stimuli, infants begin to perceive an external world separate from the self. Pain and pleasure play a role in this differentiation, leading to the formation of the pleasure principle that seeks to separate pleasurable sensations from unpleasant ones.

After the ego has developed, the reality principle arises and it can now differentiate between internal and external stimuli, a crucial step in coping with the demands of reality and managing sensations of pleasure and pain. He then adds that the “oceanic feeling” is a remaining feeling that once existed, specifically in our early days, a connection with the outside world that the ego did not distinguish and that still somehow persists when the ego has evolved. He makes an analogy with the city of Rome, and how despite modern advancements, the past still persist alongside what's new. He acknowledges the limitations of this analogy but it somehow proves that the mind seems to preserve earlier stages alongside its final forms.

Again, this is why I am perplexed as to why he didn't go deeper into the sublime and its relationship to nature, but I'm inclined to believe it's because this is something that neither psychoanalysis nor science can explain. 

On top of that, he adds to his claim that religious needs likely stem from the infant's helplessness and the longing for paternal protection in the face of life's uncertainties, since the ego during childhood does not really understand the outside world and needs protection from it, as he claims in his book, “A Future of an Illusion.”

His claim says that because life is difficult and full of disappointments, people require auxiliary constructions. He categorizes these constructions as deflections which can shed light on misery, such as art or the creation of something. Other categories are the substitute satisfactions which alleviate misery and the intoxicating substances which make us insensitive to misery and pain. He places religion as an intoxicating substance that makes us insensitive to reality. If you read through what he means, it will become apparent that he compares it to alcohol or drugs in the sense that they disconnect us from the outside world and make us insensitive to it.

Finally, he acknowledges the difficulty of working with these abstract concepts, and explores the fact that activities such as Yoga produce similar sensations or regressions to primordial ego states. 

To put it another way, he argues that activities that require us to focus our attention on our bodies and surroundings generate similar feelings to this religious or oceanic feeling, which can be traced back to the feeling of unity that the ego perceives in its initial states. When we experience these sensations, it is as if the ego gains back its connection to nature and the external world after it has separated itself from it, finding its way back to unity, but Freud does not explore these concepts further, despite the fact that I believe they are quite mystical, interesting and worth exploring.

Defense Mechanisms and the Pursuit of Happiness 

Another idea that arises is the pursuit of happiness. According to Freud, religion is an attempt to answer life's purpose, leading humanity to believe that what people truly want is happiness, and that the way to achieve it is to avoid pain and seek pleasure.

However, Freud claims that this pursuit has limitations. He argues that it is constrained by our constitution, external forces, and interpersonal relationships, and even goes so far as to say that the world was designed to work against it. 

With this in mind, Freud describes various defense mechanisms that people employ in order to protect themselves from pain and suffering. These include voluntary isolation, which can be described as the pursuit of quietness; intoxication, which affects our sensitivity to the outside world; and the controlling of instinctual impulses, which seeks to master the internal sources of our needs, like in the case of meditation or Yoga, and that achieve a sense of quietness and withdrawal from the world.

Moreover, he explains that the concept of controlling our impulses is merely our ego subjecting itself to the reality principle. It is the fact that the ego needs to understand that the external world it's different from him. This brings us to his concept of sublimation as another source of coping with pain. However, this one is special.

The concept of sublimation is the idea that one can channel instinctual impulses to activities that complement the external world, or in other words, that do not generate frustration from it. He believes that instinctual impulses can be channeled into physical or intellectual activities. He is basically saying that sexual desire, or instinctual energy in general, is repressed and transformed into work that benefits the community, which is an interesting concept, but in my opinion, it is heavily influenced by the context in which it was written. 

He does, however, acknowledge that this is not something that everyone can aspire to, and I believe it was more common in the past. Intellectuals or people who dedicated their lives to thinking were less likely to marry or have an active sexual life in general. Immanuel Kant and Isaac Newton are two examples of this, which leads me to believe that energy channeling is real. Buddhism and their practices aimed at cultivating and redirecting sexual energy, often for spiritual or meditative purposes, can also help to explain this.

Following that, he investigates the use of illusions as another defense mechanism. He claims that people can find happiness through illusions and imagination. The goal of these illusions is to grant wishes that are difficult to fulfill in reality. One example is satisfaction through art, but he claims that this isn't strong enough to cope with reality, which brings him back to religion, and how the fact that it is a shared illusion makes it difficult to recognize as such.

This leads him to the ways in which humans seek happiness directly, and one of them is centered around love, in general, seeking satisfaction in loving and being loved. He argues that this is the total opposite, because rather than seeking withdrawal from the outside world, we cling to it to obtain happiness, which makes man vulnerable, since the outside world is uncertain. 

Moreover, another way man seeks happiness is through beauty or aesthetic enjoyment. He argues that beauty's appeal seems deeply rooted in our sexual instincts, although its nature and origin remain largely unexplained. This might explain why we always aim for better things and how when we attain them we feel more satisfied with our lives.

Finally, he acknowledges that the pursuit of happiness, as dictated by the pleasure principle, appears to be impossible in its entirety. People either seek to avoid pain through isolation, sublimation, and so on, or they seek direct pleasure, but no single path ever provides complete fulfillment, despite the fact that it is instinctual to strive for it. He claims that happiness is a personal issue that cannot be solved by a universal rule. Nothing applies the same way to everyone, which is why sublimation isn't applicable to everyone. The man who is more erotic will seek pleasure, the narcissistic who is inclined to be self-sufficient will seek satisfaction from his work and so on.

As a result, he claims that religion limits individual choice by imposing a path to happiness that is not suitable for everyone. It represses individuals and causes them to be dissatisfied and neurotic in a psychological sense, and I will argue that the same applies to any imposed paths that any type of civilization may provide.

What Is Civilization?

After identifying the sources of suffering, Freud admits that there isn't much we can do about external forces and our constitution. These are things that we simply accept and move on with our lives. 

However, the third source, that of communal living, can be a source of frustration and dissatisfaction because we believe there is a way to ensure protection and benefit for each one of us.

He begins his investigation by talking about the discovery trips and how they came into contact with primitive people. He claims that Europeans used to believe that primitives were simply living a simpler life, one with fewer desires and that seemed impossible in their eyes. 

Later research revealed, however, that people become neurotic because they cannot stand or tolerate the demands that society places on them, and it was deduced from this that reducing these demands would increase or restore happiness. In other words, it is a claim that civilization itself may be to blame for human misery, which, in my opinion, is a very intriguing and thought-provoking idea.

This brings him to focus on the nature of civilization, which is, once again, the protection of man from nature and from each other. He claims that tools were the first act of civilization and that they improved man's physical abilities. These tools transcended human perception, transforming man into what Freud refers to as a "prosthetics god" capable of creation, leading him to assert that, despite achieving previously unattainable goals, man is dissatisfied with his "god-like" state, and will probably continue to be despite more advancements.

Another aspect of civilization he points out is that it strives for beauty, despite the fact that it is useless, in order to effectively use resources for human benefit. This can be demonstrated by the use of decorations, flower pots, and other aesthetic elements.

This aspect of beauty is linked to the desire for cleanliness and order. Anything dirty is considered incompatible with civilization, and this includes maintaining cleanliness in the human body. 

This cleanliness aspect is linked to order, and Freud sees this as an attempt of man to imitate the order that the universe has. He sees this order as a type of compulsion to repeat. Just as celestial regularities are repetitive and predictable, human beings seek to replicate such patterns in their lives.

Furthermore, he mentions man's high activities, such as scientific, artistic, and intellectual achievements, and how these give rise to human ideals, some of which are illusions, such as religion, but nonetheless represent a high level of civilization.

Finally, and most importantly, he emphasizes the rules of social relationships once more. He emphasizes that without these rules, relationships would be dictated by individuals' impulses, particularly those who are stronger or have more power.

This is where the concept of sublimation comes back. He mentions that in order for civilization to function, members of the community restrain their satisfactions in order to avoid the dominance of stronger individuals. As a result, we contribute to the community by sacrificing some of our instincts, which could then be channeled through other activities that benefit society, such as work.

This is interesting because Freud emphasizes the inherent need for freedom represented by this. It creates an insatiable desire to be free, which can cause some revolt, yet it is also necessary for society to exist. He is pointing out why many people believe there is injustice, despite the fact that these injustices are necessary for society to exist in the first place. 

In other words, hostility toward civilization, according to Freud, stems from the suppression of instincts, which all civilizations have to deal with. This is similar to Thomas Hobbes’s' claim that what is right or wrong is completely determined by "the state of nature." Not because humans are naturally aggressive toward one another, but because people do not have natural restrictions or limitations. These restrictions are designed when people come into a community to provide stability and protection from one another.

Love, Monogamy and Sex Life

In this section of the book, Freud discusses the creation of monogamy and families. He argues that, as people evolved, the discovery of working together for a better life was essential, and that families likely emerged due to a need for support and protection. 

Moreover, monogamy became necessary. Freud believes that because of the constraints of civilization, genital satisfaction did not come naturally, and that this gave rise to males wanting to keep their females who did not want to be separated from their children, creating a kind of mutual necessity, which is kind of an interesting analysis. Monogamy's emergence eventually led to the spread of love and necessity in civilization. Men required sex, and women required proximity to their children and their men in order to receive protection. In other words, it all became a necessity.

This brings him to his previous claim that says that when man makes himself dependent on the external world, he exposes himself to suffering, which is one of the reasons for dissatisfaction and unhappiness that arises with the emergence of love and necessity in civilization, particularly through monogamy. 

Following this, Freud claims that in order to avoid this dissatisfaction, man created the concept of directing love to everyone rather than just those who deserve it. This concept can be further understood through religion and how it imposes that we love everyone, representing the highest position that man can achieve. 

According to Freud, this claim is impossible to achieve because love that does not discriminate loses its own value. If we impose this on people, they must be willing to make sacrifices. If we love someone, they must have earned it in some way. If a stranger cannot attract someone's love on his own, it will be difficult for this person to love him. Someone's love for another person is valuable and a reflection of their preferences. It would be unfair to place a stranger on par with the people who deserve our love.

Furthermore, as we can see, love and necessity, as well as other types of love, such as friendships, became an integral part of civilization. However, this resulted in conflicts. According to Freud, the goal of civilization to bring people together frequently clashes with the nature of families, which have a tendency to isolate themselves from larger communities, resulting in a conflict between the two ways of life. 

Another issue that emerged was women's opposition to society. Women, who initially contributed to civilization through their love of family and sexual life, began to oppose it as it became increasingly dominated by men. It instilled frustration and a hostile attitude toward civilization in women, which is consistent with Freud's premise that civilization suppresses desires for the sake of society

This leads him to talk about sexual taboos, and how they impose restrictions on sexual life through laws and cultural 'unspoken' rules. These restrictions are intended to regulate sexual behavior, sometimes going so far as to limit sexual relationships to heterosexual and monogamous bonds. 

These restrictions and laws ignore the differences in human sexual constitutions and limit everyone to a single type of sexual life, which is similar to Freud's earlier claim that religion imposes a single path on everyone despite inherent differences. This leads Freud to claim that society does not discriminate heterosexual monogamy because it only tolerates it in order to propagate the human race.

As we can see, Freud claims that sexual repression exists in society and that monogamous relationships helped communities while also contradicting societal needs. In love relationships, the intense love that embodies the essence of Eros draws people away from their surroundings because they find contentment in each other. This is good for civilization, but it is insufficient. Societies, according to Freud, require strong connections within a community through a variety of means besides just romantic relationships.

Aggressiveness and the Death Instinct 

As previously stated, Freud believes that humans are inherently aggressive. Individuals will exploit, use people, seize others' possessions, humiliate, and cause pain if they are not restrained, all for the sake of survival and self-interest, going beyond self-defense.

To demonstrate his point, Freud points out all of history's atrocities, including wars and revolts. In response to these atrocities, he claims that civilizations work hard to control these aggressive instincts through a variety of methods, some of which we have discussed, such as love in all its forms, sexual restriction, and sublimation.

Furthermore, his claim about aggressiveness is explored further by contrasting it with the communist claim that private property makes people aggressive. According to this claim, man is a good neighbor who has been corrupted by the institution of private property. 

However, Freud claims that he cannot say whether the abolition of private property would be beneficial, but he can claim that aggressiveness is not limited to property ownership and extends to other aspects of life, such as relationships and power differences.

This brings us to the point where Freud introduces us to Eros and Thanatos, which we discussed earlier. In order to introduce these concepts, he quotes the philosopher Schiller, who said, "Hunger and love are what moves the world." He goes on to say that hunger represents the instincts to preserve the individual, whereas love represents the power that strives after objects with the goal of preserving the species. 

With this in mind, he initially claimed that there are ego-instincts, which are instincts for self-preservation, and object-instincts, or "libido," which are outward instincts that are confronted by the ego and vice versa. 

However, Freud later notices something different about the nature of a sadistic instinct. He realizes that it stands out due to its aim being far from loving and its attachment to ego instincts, despite its lack of a loving purpose.

This leads him to introduce the concept of narcissism, which emphasizes that the ego has no separation with the libido, serving as its original home. This means that the libido goes towards objects and comes back to its original position in the ego. This comprehension enabled him to better understand traumatic neuroses and other problems, but it endangered the concept of the libido itself, which prompted him to align the libido with instinctual energy, as proposed previously by Jung.

The groundbreaking idea, however, is the concept of the death instinct, which opposes the life-preserving aspect of Eros. He developed this hypothesis after realizing that there is an innate need to repeat when it comes to any instinctual desire. The death instinct seeks to dissolve living units and return them to an inorganic state. He says that the two instincts function in opposing ways, which explains why we find opposite acts in life's phenomena.

In addition to this, he argues that it is difficult for us to see this death instinct because it is linked to our life instincts. He believes that a portion of the death instinct could be channeled into the outside world, manifesting as aggression and destructiveness. This diversion allows the instinct of destruction to serve Eros by directing destructive tendencies toward external objects rather than self-destruction, and if this innate tendency of death is not redirected outwards, it becomes repressed and increases self-destruction. 

Moreover, he acknowledges how difficult it is to accept this theory and that it can primarily serve as a theoretical viewpoint. He observes that while this death instinct can be clearly seen in sadism and masochism, it is rarely seen in other aspects of life, owing to the difficulty in accepting that there can be inherent evil tendencies in our world. The truth is that the death instinct always escapes; it exists in the background and is only revealed when Eros betrays its presence. This happens in sadism, where the death instinct twists and simultaneously satisfies the erotic aim. 

Following this, Freud's perspective helps in understanding humans' inherent aggression and original instinctual disposition. It reinforces his belief that aggression is the greatest impediment to civilization, because societies use the power of Eros, the life instinct, to unite individuals, families, races, and nations into a unified mankind. 

However, the death instinct, or Thanatos, which exists alongside Eros, hinders this by causing hostility among individuals and opposing the unity of any civilization. Dialectical thinking is exactly that: opposing forces that are always present and irreconcilable because they are part of the same unity that conforms life. 

Indeed, some philosophers, such as Slavoj Žižek, have argued that the Hegelian dialectic lacked Freud's death instinct. 

According to Hegel, life is made up of opposites that contribute to unity, but he ignored the fact that one of them is driven by a desire for self-destruction. He claimed that the only way to reach a resolution or conclusion is to acknowledge the opposing forces that comprise life, and that this can be accomplished through reconciliation. Žižek's point of view criticizes Hegel's optimism about the possibility of synthesis and reconciliation by introducing Freud's psychoanalytic theories into the realm of philosophy and arguing that the reconciliation does not fully address the darker aspects of human psychology. He argues that these darker aspects are essential in understanding the contradictions within everything and addressing them, rather than simply seeking reconciliation. He challenges the idea that synthesis and reconciliation alone can resolve the inherent complexities and darker facets of human psychology and societal structures.

Civilization and the SuperEgo

We have arrived at the final section of this book, in which Freud attempts to answer the following question: What methods does society use to control aggression?

With this in mind, we can begin by recalling what we discussed at the very beginning. The id's impulses, or aggression in this case, are projected back into the individual, that is, they are sent back to the ego, which processes the impulse through the superego. Because the superego is suppressed by the external world, it is forced to make a decision and redirects the action back and against the ego. According to Freud, this is the death instinct, which acts either outwardly or inwardly, exemplifying the eternal struggle between Eros and Thanatos.

Moreover, the superego's tension produces a sense of guilt in the individual, and this manifests itself as self-punishment. In other words, civilization has created an internalized mechanism known as ethics that weakens aggression and disarms individuals. A person feels bad or guilty when he or she is aware that something wrong has been done; however, the sense of guilt manifests itself even before we have done anything. It limits our actions, which would otherwise follow their instinctual and natural course.

To put it another way, guilt manifests itself in two ways: fear of an external authority and fear of the internalized super-ego. Renunciation of instinct is initially motivated by a fear of losing love or being punished. However, regardless of renunciation, the establishment of the superego produces a permanent internal unhappiness, resulting in a perpetual conflict between instinctual desires and the demands of the superego. 

To better understand this process, we can see it in chronological order: first, renunciation appears due to fear of external aggression by an authority, followed by the development of an internal authority and renunciation due to fear of the internalized conscience created by the superego. Bad intentions are associated with bad actions, leading to feelings of guilt and a need for punishment. 

According to Freud, what is bad for the ego isn't necessarily bad; after all, the ego only seeks its own pleasure and benefit, so there is always some external influence at work whenever we do something that is considered "wrong." 

This leads us to his main point. Freud claims that civilization oppresses people to the point of dissatisfaction, and that it can go so far as to create mental illness or psychological disorders. He argues that as civilization progresses from family to broader societal forms, the conflict caused by ambivalence intensifies the sense of guilt, reinforcing the claim of the eternal struggle between love and death instincts that are inherent in human nature and deeply integrated into the fabric of civilization.

In other words, Freud emphasizes that the superego places demands on the ego that it is not naturally capable of tolerating; not that we should all be killing each other, but that there are certain impulses that we repress for the sake of community fulfillment that eventually lead to unhappy and repressed individuals.

Furthermore, now that we understand Freud's claims, we may believe that he used to think that we are all desperate for sex, which is due, in part, to the context in which he wrote his claims. However, if we interpret what he says here as the idea that individuals repress themselves in order to function in community, everything makes more sense. 

In the end, “Civilization and Its Discontents” comes to a sad but insightful conclusion. Freud's observations make us wonder whether achieving harmony is a realistic goal, while also indirectly reinforcing and echoing certain aspects of liberalism, suggesting that individualism may hold potential solutions to some societal challenges. The truth is that understanding human nature is difficult; Freud even recognizes the theoretical aspect of his claims. Nonetheless, we can get close to understanding it, and experiment until we find something that works for us. 

At the end of the book, Freud contemplates the future of civilization and expresses concern about humanity's ability to regulate its inherent aggression and self-destructive impulses. He wonders on the balance between destructive instinctive forces and constructive forces inside human society, implying the potential implications of failing to reconcile these clashing tendencies. An invitation to reflect on whether humanity will ever achieve the long-desired harmony they’ve been dreaming about.

Sources:

• Freud, S. (2010). The Future of an Illusion. Martino Fine Books.

• Freud, S. (2018). Civilization and its Discontents. ‎ CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.

• Zizek, S. (2013). Less Than Nothing: Hegel And The Shadow Of Dialectical Materialism. Verso; Reprint edition.

Beyond Thought.

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Man needs to go away from the world he has created for himself and, in a sense, return to what we call Earth. - Beyond Thought

This is the final episode of Hannah Arendt's Human Condition, and we will look at the final chapter of the book, "The Vita Activa and the Modern Age."

That being said, in order to fully understand the content, we must first have read or listened to the previous two episodes of this book, which can be found on our YouTube channel or on Substack if reading is preferred. 

This last chapter of the book will touch on a lot of history. Hannah points out the human condition's transformation during the last two thousand years and wonders if it is in risk of changing.

But, before we go any further, we need to remember what the vita activa is and where it stands now. The term is essentially the polar opposite of the vita contemplativa, and it is composed of labor, work and action.

Furthermore, Hannah's investigation begins with these two concepts and points out that there was a shift from contemplation to action as the ultimate concept in the modern age. More importantly, she investigates not only the inversion from contemplation to action, but also the inversion within the vita activa itself, from work as the homo faber to labor as the animal laborans. Transforming life as the ultimate end rather than as means.

Highlights:

• World alienation refers to a disconnect from the immediate, concrete components of our surroundings, such as the shared human world and societal connections, while earth alienation refers to a disconnect from the tangible and natural aspects of the Earth, often as a result of scientific and technological advancements.

• Hannah argues that modernity is concerned with self-experience rather than true engagement with the world, leading to world alienation rather than self-alienation as claimed by Marx. 

• Galileo's invention of the telescope marked the beginning of earth alienation. The invention started to challenge the adequacy of human senses to comprehend reality, leaving us with a universe known primarily through instruments. This is emphasized further by the emergence of Cartesian Philosophy, which argues that we can doubt everything except our own existence.

• We have replaced common experience ideas with rational scientific ideas. Our external reality gets saved only insofar as it can be reduced to a mathematical order. Rather than understanding reality through science, we are now claiming that something only exists if we can prove it through rational universal laws. The desire for certainty in science is a never-ending chase where man encounters nothing but himself. This self alienated man from earth and turn him inwards into introspection.

• Man has moved beyond understanding himself in the world by turning inward, comprehending the world logically, adapting the world based on his creations, which are founded on his logical theories, and thereby remaking the physical world according to his mind in order to make sense of it. This disconnects mankind from the physical reality that exists outside of their minds.

• The scientific revolution transformed contemplation and thinking into making and fabricating. Man could only know what he makes. This elevated the homo faber to the maximum level of active life, resulting in a blend of making and knowing, eventually leading to an emphasis on processes rather than ideas or things.

• The animal laborans replaced the homo faber mainly due to the homo faber's obsession with introspection and making processes, which stemmed from his distrust of senses and observation and eventually separated them from the real tangible world, as well as the influence of Christian Philosophy and its obsession with preserving and respecting life. Life on Earth may not be the eternal life that Christianity promised, but it is still a life, and without it, there is no eternal life.

• Hannah's key concern is that all of the aspects that make up humanity, primarily work, labor, and action, are getting blurred and flattened out to be simply about the survival of the species through labor. Humanity is becoming imprisoned in their own human-made frameworks and procedures, distrusting their senses and putting all their reliance in their own inventions, particularly their machines, more than anything else. This hinders human action and the ability to risk, which is inherent in human action, as well as the loss of the potential to create things that outlive us rather than things that become part of a cyclical process and get left behind.

• Hannah claims that anything new or “unpredictable,” which is the nature of action, is seen as risky and therefore against the preservation of life and happiness.

Now, let’s delve deeper and get to the conclusion of this book.

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World Alienation

Hannah’s exploration of the inversions from vita contemplativa to vita activa start with the notion of earth and world alienation, and in order to understand these, we must first make a distinction between the modern age and the modern world, and in between world and earth alienation.

The modern world is associated with the political and social landscape that emerged in the twentieth century with the first atomic explosion. On the other hand, the modern age, which lasted from the 17th to the early 20th centuries, saw significant changes in science, and introduced the notion of “world and earth alienation.”

In this sense, world alienation refers to a disconnect from the immediate, concrete components of our surroundings, such as the shared human world and societal connections, while earth alienation refers to a disconnect from the tangible and natural aspects of the Earth, often as a result of scientific and technological advancements.

Hannah argues, in other words, that in the modern age, we began to see everything from a different perspective, one that is outside of the human experience.

Following this, the most important events that marked this alienation were the discovery of America, the Reformation with its impact on wealth accumulation and individual expropriation, and the invention of the telescope by Galileo that led to a new scientific perspective.

Moreover, all these inventions and discoveries, as claimed by Hannah, had a tremendous impact. The discovery of America, with its exploration of Earth's vastness, gradually gave way to a shrinking of space, eliminating the significance of distance in human lives and accelerating life. 

Following this, Hannah adds that the Reformation played a role in the expropriation of ecclesiastical and monastic possessions, as Max Weber explains in his book The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism. This, in turn, triggered a two-fold process of individual expropriation and social wealth accumulation. She claims that the Reformation caused a similar type of alienation as the one caused by distance and space. Weber called this "inner worldly asceticism," and it refers to a set of values and behaviors associated with a disciplined, worldly, and rational approach to economic and worldly affairs that had a significant impact on the development of a specific mindset conducive to the emergence of capitalism.

Now, in order to reinforce the concept of world alienation, Hannah adds the "economic miracle" that took place in Germany after World War II. As is often the case, post-war scenarios result in an economic boom in which, despite the ruins and challenges, the economy is able to rebuild itself remarkably quickly, resulting in a faster rate of wealth accumulation.

Moreover, this example demonstrates Hannah's point that durability and conservation are hell and ruin for capitalism because they hinder the turnover process. Destruction-led post-war movements have always provided a stimulus for growth. The example shows how destroying and rebuilding leads to economic expansion, which is the hallmark of our current waste economy. 

Following that, contrary to popular belief, Hannah believes that the loss of faith in the Church that took place after the Reformation was not a success in focusing man's attention on the tangible and external aspects of life. It drew humanity inward, directing their attention and concerns away from the outside world and toward themselves, which we'll get into more detail about in a moment.

However, with this concept of the outside world, we can make a distinction in between Marx’s self-alienation and world alienation. Hannah argues that modernity is concerned with self-experience rather than true engagement with the world, leading to world alienation rather than self-alienation as claimed by Marx. 

Furthermore, Hannah emphasizes once more that the expropriation that has now led to capitalism is in fact linked to world alienation. Expropriation, or the act of depriving certain groups of their place in the world, resulted in the accumulation of wealth as well as the possibility of transforming it into labor. 

What's more, expropriation increased productivity, which is highly praised in the modern world. The plot, however, twists when we look into its origins. Hannah claims that the increase in productivity is due to the release of "labor power," which has essentially become people's built-in ability to perform productive tasks.

This ability, like the natural forces that guide processes like procreation and labor, generates an extra surplus beyond immediate life needs. As individuals became motivated by life's necessities, liberated "labor power" became a central force driving productivity, and this dynamic began to play out even before the Industrial Revolution.  

To put it another way, the necessity imposed by expropriation stimulated human labor, laying the groundwork for capitalism's current continuous cycle of wealth accumulation, and increased productivity.

This is where Hannah argues that the process of wealth accumulation, which is stimulated by the life process and thus stimulates human life back, is only possible if the world and humanity's worldliness are sacrificed, thereby giving rise to world alienation.

World alienation is synonymous with a capitalist regime, it disconnects individuals from the world through capital accumulation. 

This world alienation took place in stages, beginning with expropriation, in which people were deprived of property that provided security and protection. The second stage of this alienation happened when society replaced the family as the subject of the life process. Family membership was replaced by social classes, which replaced the natural solidarity that existed in the family era, with social solidarity. 

In other words, as society became the focal point, the traditional roles played by family memberships were replaced by social classes. That is, rather than identifying primarily with their family, individuals began to seek their place and identity within specific social classes. 

Finally, the last stage happened with the collapse of the nation-state system, global economic and geographic shifts, and the emergence of humanity as a globally connected entity. 

Moreover, the important part of all this is that the process of world alienation, initiated by expropriation, evolved to the point where collective ownership became difficult because it clashed with individual and private interests.

The Discovery of the Archimedean Point: Earth Alienation

As mentioned before, Galileo's invention of the telescope marked the beginning of something entirely new and the beginning of earth alienation, which is not the same as world alienation. The change from the world to the self is represented by the shrinkage of the world and expropriation, whereas earth alienation, as claimed by Hannah, starts with Galileo's discovery.

This discovery made the secrets of the universe accessible to human cognition, and enhanced earthbound creatures' sense perception. It opened a world of speculation, uncertainties and imagination that was never achieved before.

However, in many ways, this is not a successful story for Hannah. The rise of natural sciences not only brought exponential human knowledge and power, it can also be blamed for an increase in human despair and modern nihilism, which emerges from the challenge of arriving at a shared truth. The new astrophysical worldview started to challenge the adequacy of human senses to comprehend reality, leaving us with a universe known primarily through instruments.

Furthermore, this is emphasized further by the emergence of Cartesian Philosophy, which developed after Galileo's discovery and which is based on doubt. Descartes wanted to know what things he could know for certain, and came to the conclusion that he could doubt everything except his own existence - "I think, therefore I am." 

Now, the important part of this is that humanity believes that science leads them to objective truth, but in reality they only encounter themselves. This, in turn, fosters doubt and a sense of alienation from not only the world but the earth itself, because we rely on instruments to see our reality.

Following this, Hannah argues that mathematics, particularly modern algebra, played a pivotal role in earth alienation. It helped us break free from our limited perspective on Earth and allowed us to formulate universal laws that go beyond our terrestrial experiences. 

Moreover, and most importantly, mathematics emerged as the main science of modernity. It was no longer seen as a means of introducing ourselves to ideal forms and appearances, as Plato's view on mathematics was. Instead, it evolved into a science centered on the structure of the human mind. This means that mathematics is no longer primarily concerned with representing the physical world, but rather with comprehending the patterns within the mind itself. 

To put it another way, we have replaced common experience ideas with rational scientific ideas. Phenomena, that is our external reality, gets saved only insofar as it can be reduced to a mathematical order. Rather than understanding reality through science, we are now claiming that something only exists if we can prove it through rational universal laws. The desire for certainty in science is a never-ending chase where man encounters nothing but himself.

This is the Archimedean Point, an analogy used by Hannah to describe how modern science has moved beyond the earth and into the universal. It is a phrase attributed to the Greek mathematician Archimedes, who claimed that with a long enough level and the proper placement of the fulcrum, he could move the earth.

The Archimedean Point is where the fulcrum of that lever would be - somewhere outside the earth itself.

We can think of ourselves as being external to earth, as an outside part of ourselves, and thus see it as just another body rather than a part of who we are. We can alienate ourselves from Earth because we can now think about it from afar.

Universal Versus Natural Science and the Cartesian Doubt

So far, we understand that natural sciences have evolved to be a reliable instrument, to the point where we believe that universal science is more real than the real phenomena that we experience in our world.

Following this, we know that we now live in a world deeply influenced by science and technology, a world full of rational laws rather than terrestrial or "natural" ones. The world we live in is characterized by perspectives that look at nature from a universal exterior standpoint, granting humans mastery over nature.

However, this new scientific way of life has a dual force. On one hand, there is a significant increase in destructive power, with the ability to potentially destroy all organic life on Earth, and converting Earth into a humanly made place. On the other hand, there is a newfound creative power, enabling the production of elements not found in nature and even the potential to create or recreate life. 

Furthermore, Hannah argues that this new ability to produce the unthinkable has the potential to allow humans to carry out what previous generations perceived to be nature's greatest secret: that is, to create what was previously thought to be the exclusive domain of God's creation. 

To put it another way, science has evolved from its original objective of understanding the world to the objective of remaking it, going beyond what is considered natural.

Now, the important thing to remember here is that Hannah claims that natural sciences, which led to universal science, made us lose confidence in our senses. We now rely on man-made processes to understand what is going on around us.

On the one hand, to understand the world, we look to science, biology, chemistry, and so on. On the other hand, to understand humanity, we look to economics, psychology, and sociology. For Hannah, a loss of the senses and appearance is a loss of truth.

Following this, as previously said, Descartes's philosophy marked this significant shift in thinking. It not only introduced a radical form of doubt that questioned the senses and perception, but also a focus on the self. 

According to Hannah, if the only things I can know for certain are my own thoughts, “I think, therefore I am,” then I can know nothing truthful about the outside world, and thus nothing about reality. All I know is the self, the internal; we end up separating ourselves from external reality. Technology and science have, therefore, won over the mind and the senses.

Finally, with Descartes's conclusion that the processes that occur in man have a certainty of their own, we can say that they themselves can become the objects of investigation in introspection.

Introspection, Thought and the Loss of Common Sense

Remember the Archimedean Point? The idea of moving beyond the earth and into the universal? The fact that we can think of ourselves as being external to earth, and thus see it as just another body rather than a part of who we are?

With this understanding, after the Cartesian Doubt, Hannah argues that Descartes relocated the Archimedean Point to man himself and made humanity extremely internalized.

In other words, he transformed reality into a mathematical reality that comes from within rather than an apparent reality that comes from the outside world. As Hannah explicitly claims in her book, “Modern philosophy has made sure in introspection that man concerns himself only with himself.”

Now, this is a difficult claim to digest and comprehend, and I would argue that this isn't a book that rejects science, but rather a proposal to make us understand the limitations of seeing the world exclusively through mathematical truths and human-made instruments. The claim is that science studies the world as it appears through our instruments, and as it lives in a logical mathematical universe rather than the world as it really shows itself to us.

This brings us back to algebra, where we can better understand what she means by it. Hannah argues that Cartesian reason is based on the assumption that the mind can only know what it has produced and, in some ways, retains within itself. The highest ideal is thus logic or mathematics, but not mathematics as it exists outside of my mind, which is geometry, but algebra, which is internal mathematics conformed to abstraction and symbols.

All of this abstraction, introspection, and internalization of the world leads Hannah to quote Alfred North Whitehead, a scientist, mathematician, and philosopher, who claims that with the scientific revolution and modern philosophy, we have lost common sense, which is the sense that helps us understand the world we live in and places us in a common world. The modern age's introspection and internalization caused people to share just the structure of their minds, rather than the world in front of them.

To that end, Hannah's claim is that the things we have in common, most notably the structure of our minds, are things we can claim as "truths" but aren't necessarily truths. This is because the mind disconnects from reality and only "senses" itself. It is, in other words, a shared world between men, because the only thing they have in common is the structure of their minds, which transforms the world into a man-made symbolic reality.

To put it another way, man has moved beyond understanding himself in the world by turning inward, comprehending the world logically, adapting the world based on his creations, which are founded on his logical theories, and thereby remaking the physical world according to his mind in order to make sense of it. This alienates humanity from the tangible reality that exists outside of their minds.

This reality, which is created by the power of our minds and results from the placement of the Archimedean point into ourselves, causes humanity to lose contact with what is tangible reality on Earth. It blinds them to the fact that they live on Earth and art part of it. 

Now, we might wonder why Hannah is so concerned about the remaking of the Earth. 

To understand this, and Hannah Arendt in general, we must look at her through the lens of existentialism. She is concerned about the threat that science and technology pose to the human condition, which is defined by labor, work, and action, and how this will eventually transform this condition to the point where it will transform who we are as humans.

Following on from this, the problem with science and technology is that it reduces reality to thought, to the point where we must examine reality through the same theories that thought created, leaving the senses out of the equation. 

As a consequence, every question man attempts to answer must be approached mathematically. His reality begins to transform into something incomprehensible through his senses because it transcends sensory creation. Consequently, he loses sight of the fact that he forms part of Earth and the immediate environment, simply because human experience fails to align with mathematical and scientific reality, leading man into the prison of his own mind.

The Reversal of Contemplation and Action and the Loss of Philosophy

Hannah argues that one of the consequences of the scientific revolution and the modern age in general is the shift in the hierarchy between the vita contemplativa and the vita activa.

As we recall from our first newsletter on the Human Condition, Aristotle described three types of lives: the life of the laborer, which was concerned with bodily pleasures, the life of the citizen, or bios politikos, which was concerned with the polis, and the vita contemplativa, which was concerned with seeking the truth in the form of inquiry and observation. The first two categories of life were active, while the last one held a higher position than the active ones.

However, as mentioned earlier, the modern age has diminished the significance of contemplation. This shift has brought about new challenges: not only is there a clear reversal, but also a general blurring of distinctions among labor, work, and action, which are integral components of vita activa. As we've discussed, the modern age has devalued work and action, elevating labor as the primary activity within the vita activa.

Now, the fact that "doing" became more important resulted in a close relationship between the pursuit of knowledge and practical experimentation and action. Instead of solely valuing contemplation as the route to truth, there was a newfound emphasis on 'making’ and the active exploration and manipulation of the world to gain knowledge. 

This is related to what we previously discussed, where the senses and immediate observation became less reliable. Nothing could be less trustworthy than simple observation. To be certain, one had to make sure, and to know, one had to do.

In other words, Hannah is pointing out here, the loss of philosophy in the modern age. Galileo’s discovery brought the idea that man cannot know objective truth, and that he can only know what he makes himself. 

Following this, philosophy in the seventeenth century began to be distinguished by a shift toward introspection in order to explore the processes of the senses and the mind. Much of modern philosophy is concerned with cognition and psychology, specifically how the mind perceives and processes sensory information. Philosophers such as Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, who fully understood this introspective approach, looked into their own thoughts, emotions, and inner experiences with the same seriousness and bravery that scientists experimented with the external world.

This introspective turn influenced their philosophical inquiries, leading to insights deeply rooted in their subjective experiences and internal reflections.

Furthermore, all of this shift in philosophy reduced its influence in comparison to earlier times. Philosophers began to struggle to fit scientific principles into broader interpretations of human knowledge as philosophy began to 'lag' behind science. Philosophical ventures either focused on science theories that scientists did not necessarily need or aligned themselves with the current intellectual state of mind.

In any case, Hannah argues that the most important aspect of all of this is that philosophy suffered more from modernity than any other field in history. The observation and exploration of the external world through philosophical inquiry were gradually replaced by science and its man-made methods, to the point where philosophy began to align and focus on the inner aspects of the human mind. The modern era called into question philosophy's role in shaping human understanding.

The Victory of the Homo Faber

After the reversal of the contemplative to the active, one of the aspects of the active life that rises first above the rest was the life of making, that is, the life of the homo faber. This happened naturally, because it was an instrument, and hence man as a toolmaker, that eventually led to modernity and the consequent emphasis on the creation of more tools and instruments. 

However, Hannah argues that all this goes beyond the simple creation of tools. The creation and use of tools allowed humans to manipulate their environment, engage in complex tasks, and expand their understanding of the world. When humans conduct experiments, they're not merely using tools but actively engaging in a process of making and fabricating, that is, they get involved in some sort of process, situation or condition.

These processes, Hannah claims, which stem from the insistence on making, began to become more ends than means.

In other words, the process has become more important than the products or tools themselves. The reason for this shift is that the scientist was 'making' in order to know, not in order to produce things, with the products serving as mere side effects, just as Galileo had made the telescope in order to understand.

Furthermore, Hannah claims that the use of experiments to gain knowledge stems from the belief that humans can only truly understand what they have created. This led to the idea that even things not directly created by humans could be comprehended by replicating the processes through which they came into existence, eventually shifting the perspective in science from asking traditional questions about the 'what' or 'why' to more of a 'how' things came into being, which can only be answered through the replication of processes through experimentation. 

To put it another way, experiments can mimic natural processes, as if humans were creating natural phenomena; and, while this method did not directly envision the extent to which humans "made" nature in the early modern age, it was founded on the concept of understanding nature from a creator's perspective.

Finally, by elevating the homo faber to the highest level of active life, we created a blend of making and knowing, which indicates that the pursuit of knowledge involves a process similar to "building a world" in the image of our experiments, leading to the idea of the homo faber as both the remaker and destroyer of nature.

This fusion of making and knowing led to an emphasis on processes and not ideas or things, eventually becoming the guide for the making and fabricating activities of the homo faber. 

The Defeat of the Homo Faber and the Emergence of the Principle of Happiness

As we discussed, Galileo’s discovery caused a notable change in the way people thought. The importance of contemplation, that is of actual thinking, reduced significantly, and there was a greater focus on fabrication and processes.

All this characterized the modern age as marked by attitudes typical of the homo faber. This includes a strong emphasis on processes which are internal to him, the belief in tools, productivity, efficiency, and the idea that everything can be solved or explained based on utility. 

This shift in mindset had wide-reaching consequences. In natural sciences, efforts aimed at creating order from the perceived disorder in nature became prevalent. In economics, productivity became the ultimate standard. Even in philosophy, utility became a dominant principle in explaining human behavior and motivation, leading men to become the measure of all things. 

In fact, one important point to note is that homo faber's attempt to remake the world in order to understand it, which eventually created a world of mathematics and logic that separated him from the real world, led to philosophy's attempt at reconciliation, which can be seen in Hegel's system and his attempt to unify spirit, that is, the man-made world, with tangible reality.

This brings us to Hannah's important point that any attempt to create theories of human behavior, such as economics or sociology, has resulted in the creation of experimental frameworks. 

Consequently, people are frequently reduced to calculated and predictable patterns, which facilitates the establishment of laws and governance based on them. Within these frameworks, this process effectively limits human perception to only rational beings, ignoring the inherent complexity and irrationality of human behavior, which can be further explained by Hannah’s concept of action.

Now, going back to the rise of the homo faber, what Hannah starts wondering after all this is how the esteem for him was quickly replaced by the elevation of laboring as the highest activity of the vita activa. She argues that this happened less dramatically than the reversal of contemplation and action in general.

To understand how it happened, we can go back to comprehending that there was an emphasis from the thing itself to how it's actually made, which brought negative and positive things.

On the positive side, as we all know, this led to incredible inventions and scientific advancements. On the negative side, it brought a focus on the process of making things, which made the permanent measures that used to guide the making of things to lose their importance or clarity. 

These fixed or permanent standards were essentially the usefulness of an object and whether anything could be judged as either good or bad. Hannah argues that all this shift impacted the values people held. The focus moved from the usefulness of things to the process of making them. This also affected how people measured value. Instead of focusing on the usefulness of an object, they started valuing it based on what it helped produce or create.

Now, this is where things start to get interesting. First, as discussed, the notion that humans could only know what they’ve created, which then was challenged and replaced by the principle that emphasized the process rather than the product, did not align with homo faber's needs and ideas, causing the concept of utility, which was initially crucial for homo faber's worldview, to be replaced by the concept of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." This meant that the value of things became less concerned with their utility and more concerned with the happiness and avoidance of pain they provided in their creation or use.

In other words, this newer happiness principle emerged primarily as a result of homo faber's obsession with introspection and making processes, which stemmed from his distrust of senses and observation and eventually separated them from the real tangible world. 

The 'process' obsession separated man from useful and permanent standards, which had always served as guides for his fabrication process prior to the modern age.

Man began to see himself as part of nature's process, a participant in progress, a piece of a long process of unfolding that will eventually be left behind.

The placement of happiness as the highest value in the modern age will lead us to the only value that we know share, namely happiness, which can be translated as the placement of life as the highest good. It emphasizes life as the most important aspect of humanity and does not distinguish us from other living beings.

According to Hannah, keeping people alive is not the only thing that makes us human, and it leaves no room for the other aspects of the human condition, reducing humanity to the promotion of individual life and survival.

Life as the Highest Good and the Victory of the Animal Laborans

We're almost done with the book, and we can see where this is all going. Hannah is essentially pointing out a reversal and how humanity has been reduced to its most basic aspect, survival. 

However, Hannah remains curious as to why or how life was elevated to the highest value of the human condition, and why the stability of work was substituted by labor. 

To that end, she claims that this is mainly due to the influence of Christianity in Western society. She argues that Christianity, above all, promotes the sacredness and potential immortality of individual life, emphasizing life in the world but only as a living being, thereby prioritizing survival as humanity's primary concern.

This shift had profound implications. While ancient societies often regarded laboring activity with contempt, as previously seen in the Greeks, Christianity emphasized the sanctity of life, diminishing the disdain towards labor. The Christian faith introduced the concept that life on Earth is the initial stage of eternal life and the preservation of the soul, making life itself the highest good. This, again, is different from ancient societies, where the cosmos, nature and the state were of great importance.

However, Hannah brings up an important point. Despite Christianity's long tradition of the vita contemplativa, in which people seek closeness to God through meditation and prayer. Christianity also influenced how people viewed labor in society. While the Christian faith did not expressly praise labor, it did emphasize the sanctity and value of life. Because of this emphasis on the sacredness of life, sustaining it became critical. Labor, particularly the effort required for survival or the "laboring metabolism of man with nature," was not particularly praised but was regarded as significant due to its relationship with the preservation of life itself.

To put it another way, even though Christianity had a history of valuing the contemplative life, influenced by Greek philosophy and the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, it indirectly shaped how people saw labor. Instead of directly praising labor as it did with contemplation, Christianity acknowledged the significance of work because it was tied to preserving and respecting life. Life on earth may not be the eternal life that Christianity promised, but it is still a life, and without it, there is no eternal life.

Following this, modern life has never questioned what Christianity brought to humanity. It continues to operate under the premise that individual life, rather than the world, is the highest good.

The priority of life over everything else is real, and it can be seen in our modern age laboring society - the society of jobholders.

Only when the vita activa had lost its points of reference in the vita contemplativa could it become active life in the full sense of the word, and only because this active life remained bound to life as its only point of reference could life as such, the laboring metabolism of man with nature, become active and unfold its entire fertility.

Furthermore, and this might be controversial if the reader is not religious, she argues that the loss of faith, or secularization, which refers to the decline of religious influence and the rise of a non-religious worldview, which stem from skepticism and doubting everything until proven certain, played a role in eroding the belief in immortality or the certainty of an afterlife.

As a consequence, individual life lost its perceived immortality, returning to a mortal state similar to ancient times. The world also became less stable and reliable compared to the Christian era when there was a belief in an immortal afterlife. With the loss of certainty in a future world beyond this life, humans were left questioning the reality and meaning of the world they live.

Additionally, this is where I'd like to add why there are so many "how to find meaning in life" stories, tutorials, and even books. Humans crave meaning in their lives, and religion provided this function with the afterlife in the Middle Ages or ancient times.

However, most of the time in the modern age, meaning is found individually through the process of laboring. Hannah argues that this is why there has been an increase in ideologies and people latching onto big movements or figures with high meaningful causes, in order to fill the gap of meaning that religious faith used to occupy in people's lives.

Following this, Hannah claims that the shift from a focus on a potential afterlife to a more uncertain existence in the present, didn't necessarily make the modern man gain a deeper connection to the world they lived in, as we already discussed. Instead, it made men turn inward and become introspective, grappling with his own thoughts, processes, desires, and urges.

This obsession with processes eventually led to the transformation of human societies from emphasizing individual self-interest to a collective, socialized existence, as observed through Marx's ideas. However, this did not really solve the problem of introspection and individuality. 

According to Hannah, the reason the problem was not solved is because, despite Marx's attempt to change the view of classic economics (mainly that all human actions are motivated by self-interest), by emphasizing the societal forces that govern classes and direct society, he nonetheless emphasized a natural force, the life process itself, as the driving force behind all human activities. Individual life merged into the species' broader life process, with labor becoming crucial for ensuring one's own and the species’ survival.

This focus on the life process leads Hannah to lament the loss of depth and richness in human experiences. The other aspects of the human condition, mainly, work and action became reduced to labor. They both started to be understood in terms of making and fabricating, and in general, seen as another form of laboring and as ways to keep us alive, rather than important aspects of human existence. This made humanity lose the capacity to act and to create permanent and useful things with the help of the homo faber’s work.

This brings us to the part when Hannah focuses on the modern world's advancements in relieving life's struggles. Higher human activities, such as thoughts, art, work, and action, are suddenly rendered useless and regarded as secondary. Thought becomes merely a means of reckoning with consequences, the "what would happen if I did this if I did that," and we therefore provide the ability to think deeply to machines that we believe can perform better than ourselves. 

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, making and fabricating begin to be regarded as something we do for a living. The emergence of a jobholder society submerged individual life in the overall life process of the species, leaving individuals with only one choice, whether or not to participate in the automatic functioning of society, leading to a passive and conformist mode of behavior.  

To illustrate her theory, she claims that there are warning indications in modern society that can cause man to resemble the animal species from which humans believe they evolved. She gives an example in which she explores the idea that human behaviors, when viewed from a distance, may look as simply processes rather than actual actions. This is due to the fact that society has become a process in and of itself, with no freedom or choice. Everyone's lives are fairly predictable, and our life paths are already laid out for us. All we have to do is become one with the processes we created. We have evolved into a big data society that not only predicts but also strives to improve human behavior.

This concept of improving human behavior is critical. The more we feed our systems with predictable behavior and information, the more flawless the processes get, and hence the closer we get to losing our ability to act. Hannah, as we know, values action, particularly our ability to act, change, and take risks, all of which are necessary for the human condition.

Moreover, if we can recall, the concept of immortality is crucial to this book. Immortality, for Hannah, is the sense in which humans can create a world that outlives them. For her, the only living being that can strive for this is humanity, and this only happens in the form of work, art and action.

If the only thing we try is to keep people alive, by placing life as the highest good, we lose our ability to take risks. Anything new or “unpredictable,” which is the nature of action, is seen as risky and therefore against the preservation of life and happiness.

Lastly, she claims that the only three people who can escape the automatic life process are artists, scientists, and thinkers. Most of us spend our lives working jobs that, while they are work in the homo faber sense, or action, are still things we do for the sake of living. The important claim is that very few people make things that last, that very few of us have the ability or desire to make something that outlives us, because most of us are busy with staying alive and contributing to the biological process of life within society. 

In that sense, despite the fact that most artists work for a living, they are often the only ones who can create things that outlive them and are permanent. Similarly, scientists are the only ones who create new processes and release them into the world, thereby changing it forever.

Finally, thinkers have the ability to disrupt society's interests by injecting plurality into society with new ways of thinking and acting that differ from the dominant way of thinking of a current society, despite the fact that thinking has become primarily labor, which is why it has been lost over time. 

Ultimately, this book is, as we can see, highly relevant. Hannah focuses on what makes humanity, primarily through the human condition, which is made of the plurality of the vita activa in the form of contemplation, action, work, and labor.

Her concern is that all of the things that make up humanity are becoming blurred and flattened out to be only about survival and labor to the point that there is no room for change. Humanity is becoming imprisoned in their own human-made constructs and processes, distrusting their senses and giving all their trust to their own inventions, particularly their machines, more than anything else. The goal is not to reverse or destroy our innovations, but to be aware of the situation we have put ourselves into. Humanity must reclaim its ability to act and think without concern for survival. To become more fascinated with things that outlive them rather than just things that keep them alive; and to bring back its passion for the outside real world rather than focusing solely on himself and his man-made internal processes.

Man needs to go away from the world he has created for himself and, in a sense, return to what we call Earth. - Beyond Thought

Sources:

• Arendt, H. The Human Condition (2018th ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Beyond Thought.

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Today, we'll look at Louis Althusser's book 'On Ideology,' especially his essay 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,' which is the first chapter.

This work, after ‘The German Ideology’ and other texts, is one of the most influential texts in the field of ideology and has had a significant impact on intellectuals such as Žižek, Foucault, and Derrida.

Highlights:

• Althusser emphasizes the continuous reproduction of the conditions of production, including the means of production and labor power, crucial for the functioning of a society's economic systems.

• Althusser highlights the significance of skilled and capable labor power, which is sustained through wages and the education system, reinforcing submission to the established order’s laws and existing power structures.

• Althusser defines the State from a Marxist perspective as a repressive apparatus used by the ruling class to establish control and maintain surplus value extraction, utilizing means such as police, prisons, and the military to suppress disagreement and maintain authority.

• Althusser develops the concept of Ideological State Apparatuses as opposed to Repressive State Apparatuses. He adds that ISAs, which include institutions such as religious, educational, family, legal, political, and cultural apparatuses, serve as significant outlets for propagating values and beliefs throughout society.

• Althusser emphasizes the importance of ISAs in sustaining dominant ideologies and aiding the reproduction of production relations, emphasizing that ISAs interact with repressive apparatuses and play an important role in shaping ideas, values, and worldviews.

• Althusser claims that ideology has a material existence, emphasizing the effect of ideas and beliefs inside ideological frameworks on human behaviors and actions, as well as their link with material practices and rituals.

• Althusser introduces the concept of interpellation, illustrating how individuals are constituted as subjects within any ideology, emphasizing the role of recognition and misrecognition in shaping consciousness and belief.

• Althusser points out how ideology imposes "obviousnesses" as undeniable truths, and influences individuals to accept these truths as self-evident.

• Althusser claims that ideology's eternal nature continuously interpellates individuals as subjects throughout history, making them subjects even before birth. This is demonstrated by the social and cultural rituals surrounding the anticipation of a child's identity within the family's ideological framework.

Now, without any further delay, let's get started!

On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production, Reproduction of the Means of Production and Reproduction of Labor-Power

As we progress through Althusser's work, one crucial theme that emerges is the notion of the continuous reproduction of the conditions of production. 

How do societies ensure the reproduction of the fundamental elements necessary for the functioning of their economic systems? 

He begins his text by saying that it is clear that every social formation must reproduce the conditions of its production at the same time as it produces. This means that it must reproduce the means of production, as well as the reproduction of labor power, in order to keep the production process within a society.

In further detail, Althusser points out the significance of the reproduction of the means of production. This process encompasses the replacement of raw materials, buildings, and machines necessary for sustaining the production process. He stresses that this process cannot be controlled by individual firms, as the interconnectedness of production involves a chain of suppliers and producers at various levels. The process creates a complex web of production and reproduction forms that Althusser refers to as an “endless chain,” where the demand for means of production is met by the supply from other producers, creating a cyclical process of continual reproduction.

What’s more, Althusser emphasizes the reproduction of labor power as an essential component in the production process. He argues that labor power must be capable and skilled to be integrated into the complex system of production. The reproduction of labor power is ensured through the provision of wages, which allow workers to meet their basic needs and reproduce themselves as labor power.

Moreover, the development of skills necessary for different roles within the production process is a vital aspect of labor power reproduction.

With this in mind, he asks: "How is the reproduction of these diversified labor-power skills, provided for in a capitalist regime?"

And the answer is: through the capitalist education system, as well as other instances and institutions.

Now, all of this may seem obvious, but recall that the key question on this thesis was: How can we secure the ongoing reproduction of production conditions?

That is, how do we assure that individuals continue to work the system?

As mentioned earlier, this is provided by education. Children learn a variety of things at school, including not only how to read and write, but also "rules" of good behavior, morality, civic and professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical division of labor and, ultimately, the rules of the order established by class domination.

In other words, Althusser is saying here that we must not only teach people skills, but also secure the reproduction of submission to the established order's laws by teaching them how to behave and act, that is, by instilling a particular worldview that reinforces the existing power structures.

Infrastructure and Superstructure 

Althusser has already given a brief explanation of the reproduction of the means of production on the one hand, and of labor power on the other, but he has yet to address the reproduction of the relations of production. And to that end, he asks another question: what is a society? 

To begin to answer this question, Althusser makes a distinction between the Hegelian “totality”, which we had already discussed in this newsletter before, and the Marxian “social whole.” 

Moreover, he argues that the Marxian definition of the "social whole" revolves around the idea that the structure of society can be metaphorically likened to a building, with an economic base forming its foundation and a superstructure representing the various ideological, political, and cultural institutions. This metaphor helps us in understanding how the stability and existence of the upper floors of the superstructure are reliant on the firm support of the economic base.

Additionally, Althusser uses this metaphor to emphasize the concept of "determination in the last instance,” which stresses that the economic base fundamentally shapes and determines the functioning of the entire society. This implies that the underlying economic conditions, such as the mode of production, resource distribution, and ownership relations, have a definite impact on the broader social structure. 

However, while the economic base holds primary importance, it's crucial to acknowledge that the superstructure retains a certain level of autonomy. This means that while the superstructure is fundamentally shaped by the economic base, it also possesses a degree of independent agency, allowing it to exert influence and impact on the base. 

The State and the Repressive and Ideological Apparatuses 

Althusser claims that the metaphor of the structure has limitations, primarily because it is simply that: a metaphor. Having stated that, he believes it is crucial to go beyond it, not by rejecting the traditional metaphor but surpassing it. He suggests a shift in thinking about the essence and nature of the superstructure through the lens of reproduction, so that we can understand the delicate connections between practice, production, and reproduction more clearly.

To further elaborate this, he starts by describing the nature of the State through a Marxist perspective. He argues that through this lens, the State is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus. In other words, the State is perceived primarily as a tool utilized by the ruling class to perpetuate their control over the working class and facilitate the extraction of surplus value, which is fundamental to capitalist exploitation and reproduction.

As a result, in Marxist terms, the State is the State Apparatus, and it includes not only specialized repressive institutions like the police and prisons, but also the military, which is used as a supplementary repressive force when the police and other specialized agencies are insufficient to put down disagreement or protests. This term also includes the head of the state, the government, and the administrative institutions.

With this in mind, Althusser introduces the Marxist-Leninist perspective, which is a political and socioeconomic framework that combines Marxist principles with Vladimir Lenin's ideas and interpretations in the Soviet Union, to illustrate a specific interpretation of the State and help emphasize its oppressive and coercive nature. 

Furthermore, by referring to this perspective, he is able to emphasize the idea that the State primarily serves the interests of the ruling class and serves as a tool for sustaining their rule over the working class. In other words, by including this perspective into his text, Althusser strengthens his argument about the repressive and exploitative nature of the State.

Now, Althusser argues that the theory of the State is still limited, because it is still descriptive. 

However, he further adds that this is how great scientific discoveries begin, with a “descriptive theory.” He describes this phase as a transitional one that further develops into an actual theory.

Moreover, he claims that it is transitional because the name "descriptive theory" is a contradiction. A descriptive theory indicates the unavoidable start of the theory-building process; its descriptive form needs further elaboration that goes beyond description.

With this in mind, the descriptive theory of the State is correct since it describes what happened in many instances of repression and exploitation throughout history, but it does not provide us with a clear definition of the State, i.e, a scientific theory of the State. To address this problem, Althusser proposes expanding the classical definition of the State in order to overcome its limitations.

But first, he points out an important difference between State power, which is the primary goal of the political class struggle, and the State Apparatus, which is the institutional apparatus and institutions through which State power is carried out. This distinction is significant because the State Apparatus can withstand substantial political shifts or revolutions, demonstrating its ability to thrive in the face of shifting State power.

Furthermore, he adds that these distinctions and concepts are already embedded within the Marxist theory of the state, which asserts that the Marxist classics know that the state essentially acts as an oppressive apparatus. 

Following that, the theory already indicates that there is a clear distinction between state power and state apparatus. Thereby indicating that the goal of the class struggle is primarily the acquisition and exercise of state power, with various classes or class alliances utilizing the state apparatus to serve their respective class interests; and finally, the theory indicates that the proletariat must seize state power, in order to eliminate the existing ruling class state apparatus and eventually start a revolutionary process that leads to the abolition of the State itself.

However, he argues that, as previously said, the theory remains descriptive. This is due to the fact that, while it has intricate and differential elements, its functioning and implications need additional theoretical development.

This is when Althusser's contribution begins to take shape. He argues that in order to advance the Marxist theory of the state, we must distinguish not just between state power and state apparatus, but also another reality that is obviously on the side of the repressive state apparatus but should not be mistaken with it. He refers to these as the Ideological State Apparatuses.

Now, he is insistent that these Ideological State Apparatuses must not be mistaken by the Repressive ones. While the repressive state apparatuses, such as the police and the army, generally act through methods that involve violence, the ideological ones, or ISAs for short, are a collection of organizations that act on the ideological front. These apparatuses include institutions such as the religious apparatus, educational apparatus, family apparatus, legal apparatus, political apparatus, communications, and cultural apparatus.

As we can see, there are a lot more Ideological Apparatuses than repressive ones. However, this isn’t immediately visible. The reason for this, he claims, is that the Ideological ones are predominantly private. Churches, families, some schools, most newspapers, cultural ventures, etc., are part of the private domain, and are therefore less evident.

Moreover, Althusser points out that we should not get caught up in whether these Ideological State Apparatuses are public or private according to legal definitions, because these classifications are simply bourgeois law constructs that apply primarily in domains where bourgeois law exercises authority. The important thing, he argues, is that, despite the fact that many of them are private, they still act as powerful channels for spreading values and beliefs throughout society. 

In other words, their impact on society shouldn't be underestimated just because they operate outside the public domain.

This brings us back to the Repressive Apparatuses and Ideological Apparatuses. As said before, the Repressive Apparatuses use violence, while the ISAs use ideology. However, he claims that these two types of apparatus interact with one another.

For instance, the military and police rely on shared values and beliefs to maintain internal cohesion and an external image. As a result, they do not only function through repression and physical force. 

The Ideological State Apparatuses, on the other hand, operate primarily through ideology, shaping beliefs and values, but they also employ repression as a secondary tool in a more subtle symbolic manner. For example, Althusser argues that schools, churches, and cultural apparatuses use various forms of punishment, expulsion, and censorship to maintain discipline and control over their members.

This relationship, he claims, is critical for us to understand. Because, while the State Power can more directly enforce its authority through laws and regulations in the Repressive State Apparatuses, its control over the ISAs is more subtle and operates through the dissemination of their ruling ideology; this is significant because it becomes the backbone that shapes the functioning and guides the operations of the State.

Furthermore, the Ideological State Apparatuses become not only platforms for promoting the ruling ideology but also as arenas for contestation and conflict between social classes. Althusser suggests that unlike the Repressive State Apparatus, where the dominant class can more easily assert its authority, the ISAs offer more intricate spaces where the ruling ideology encounters resistance from the exploited classes.

In other words, Althusser points out that the exploited classes within the ISAs may take an active role in challenging the dominant ruling ideology. They can use internal contradictions and inconsistencies within the ruling ideology to challenge its dominance. In this context, the exploited classes may seek positions of authority and influence within the ISAs in order to erode the ruling class's control and promote their own interests.

This is something we see a lot in schools nowadays. There has been a shift in worldview; the educational system has not yet changed for obvious reasons, but the Internet and, more broadly, external cultural influences have influenced the way many young people think today. They not only prefer not to work a 9 to 5, but they also prefer more sustainable lifestyles that involve consuming less; we can say that many of them do not want to follow the traditional family path. In other words, ideology evolves as a result of inconsistencies and contradictions, which, as Althusser points out, naturally evolve into another worldview, another ideology. 

Another way Althusser proves how powerful ISAs are, is by referring to Lenin once more. He points out that Lenin had a big concern to revolutionize the educational Ideological State Apparatus, in order to make it possible for the Soviet proletariat, who had seized State power, to secure the future of the dictatorship.

On the Reproduction of the Relations of Production

With a comprehensive understanding of all the distinctions we just discussed, Althusser raises his most important question once more: How is the reproduction of the relations of production ensured? The answer, largely, lies in the protective function of the legal-political and ideological superstructure.

Moreover, the State, with its repressive capabilities, acts as a shield for ideological systems. Althusser argues that these structures play a crucial role in upholding the beliefs of the ruling class. They foster a sense of cohesion between the repressive functions of the State and the various ideological systems in operation. This dynamic interaction between the State, its repressive functions, and ideological systems, contributes to the persistence and perpetuation of existing power structures over time.

Following this, Althusser moves away from the present and looks into the past to examine how ISAs functioned in earlier social formations. For example, during the feudal era, the main ISA was the Church, which provided a variety of functions, including educational and cultural ones, which are now represented by numerous ISAs rather than just one. 

This dominance of the Church, he argues, led to intense ideological struggles from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, starting with the first shocks of the Reformation, which was an anti-clerical and anti-religious struggle. 

In addition to this, Althusser emphasizes that the French Revolution accomplished more than just the transfer of State power from feudal aristocracy to a merchant capitalist economy. It also effectively targeted the number-one Ideological State Apparatus of the time: the Church.

Furthermore, he mentions that this did not happen without its complexities. During the nineteenth century, the struggle between the landed aristocracy and the emerging industrial capitalism was crucial in establishing the capitalist's control over functions previously carried out by the Church, particularly through schools.

By doing so, the bourgeoisie aimed to secure not just its own political power, but also the ideological domination required for the reproduction of capitalist production relations. As a result, Althusser claims that in capitalist societies, the educational apparatus emerged as the dominant ISA after the struggle against the previous dominant apparatus. 

Now, Althusser further elaborates on how all the Ideological State Apparatuses contribute in different ways to the reproduction of the relations of production. The political apparatus promotes political ideologies, the communications apparatus disseminates nationalism and liberalism, and the religious apparatus reinforces certain moral values. 

However, he stresses again that, despite the apparent silence of its impact, the educational system performs the most significant role in this symphony of ideological forces. This silence, he claims, hides the educational apparatus's enormous impact in shaping the ruling class's dominant ideology and maintaining capitalist production relations, effectively replacing the Church. 

On Ideology

Althusser claims that “ideology” isn’t a term that he came up with. The term itself was invented by Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, and their contemporaries, who primarily associated it with the theory of ideas. However, Althusser notes that when Marx later adopted the term, he gave it a different meaning, referring to it as the system of ideas and representations that dominate an individual's or a social group's mind.

He points out that Marx's earlier works indicate his involvement in an ideological political struggle that pushed him to confront the reality of ideology and dive further into its understanding. Despite this, Althusser observes a contradiction. Although everything seemed to point Marx in the direction of developing an ideology theory, particularly in "The German Ideology" and "Capital," these works do not clearly represent a fully formed Marxist theory of ideology. As a result, Althusser begins his study on ideology by outlining this idea.

First, he begins by highlighting the need for a theory that encompasses ideology in its general form rather than focusing only on specific, individual ideologies, as he believes all ideologies ultimately reflect class positions. Althusser underscores the importance of considering ideologies within the context of social formations, which are shaped by the history of modes of production and the class struggles that unfold within them.

Furthermore, he highlights an apparent paradox coming from Marx's claim in The German Ideology: “Ideology has no history.”

According to Althusser, ideology is considered in this sense as a pure illusion, a creation of the mind detached from material reality. It is compared to a dream, an imaginative construction made out of the “day's residues” and tangible historical processes. 

In brief, the idea of ideology as perceived by Marx is presented as a construction of various ideas and beliefs that are not firmly grounded in material reality. He portrays it as a collection of fragments that lack a solid foundation. Marx sees ideology as a kind of illusion, disconnected from the actual historical events and processes that shape societies. He considers it to be hollow and lacking in substance when compared to the real concrete history of people engaged in tangible activities. 

Furthermore, because its history is outside of it, where the only existing history is the history of concrete individuals, ideology lacks its own history in The German Ideology. In other words, while ideologies may draw on historical events, they do not have an existence independent of the concrete historical realities they reflect.

Now, after outlining this theory, he proposes something different. He argues that while he does not oppose The German Ideology or its interpretations, his perspective is "radically different" from these. He proposes that ideologies do have a history of their own, although this history is ultimately determined by the class struggle. 

However, he also argues that ideology, in general, does not have a history, not in a negative sense, but in a positive sense. This means that it possesses a characteristic that makes it not subject to change over time, essentially making it exist outside of history, or “non-historical” in nature. He refers to this quality as “omni-historical,” which implies that the structure and functioning of ideology remain constant throughout what we typically understand as historical events. In this context, he aligns this idea with the definition of history provided in the Communist Manifesto, which highlights the history of class struggles and societies.

Althusser then illustrates his point by using the theoretical framework of Sigmund Freud's conception of the dream. He draws a parallel between the proposition that ideology has no history and Freud's proposition that the unconscious is eternal, implying that both share the fundamental characteristic of being unaffected by historical changes. He claims that the comparison is not arbitrary, but rather theoretically necessary, because the two propositions are organically linked.

Building on this analogy, Althusser claims that ideology, like the unconscious, can be considered eternal, implying that it exists beyond the limitations of temporal history. This analogy serves as a theoretical foundation for Althusser's proposal of a general theory of ideology, similar to how Freud presented a comprehensive theory of the unconscious.

Ideology is a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence 

On this section, Althusser starts setting up the stages for his exploration of the structure and function of ideology by presenting two theses, one negative and the other positive.

The first thesis he introduces is that ideology represents the imaginary relationship that individuals have to their actual material conditions of existence. 

Furthermore, he illustrates how various forms of ideology, such as religious and political ideologies, can be perceived as "worldviews'” that are primarily composed of imaginary elements and do not accurately reflect the tangible reality. However, he claims that although these ideologies are not direct representations of reality, they do contain allusions to it. 

He then introduces two different answers to the question of why individuals need this imaginary representation of their real conditions of existence. The first one is derived from the eighteenth century, and attributes this phenomenon to the manipulation of a small group of cynical individuals, such as Priests, who fabricate false representations to maintain their domination and exploitation over others. The second answer, originating from Feuerbach and adopted by Marx, delves deeper into the concept of material alienation, suggesting that individuals create an alienated representation of their conditions of existence because these conditions themselves are alienating.

Althusser then emphasizes that the essence of all these interpretations relies on the presupposed idea that what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology is the real conditions of existence of individuals. 

However, he argues that what individuals represent in ideology is not their actual, tangible conditions of existence, but primarily their relation to those conditions of existence. He claims that this relationship forms the core of every ideological representation of the real world, constituting the fundamental cause that explains the imaginary distortion within these representations. 

With this understanding, Althusser shifts the focus from the cause of the imaginary distortion of real relations in ideology to a new question: Why is the representation given to individuals of their relation to the social relations governing their conditions of existence an imaginary one?

He proposes that rephrasing this key question leads to an exploration of the nature of this imaginary conception, essentially causing an investigation into why individuals perceive their relationship to the social relations that structure their lives through an imaginary lens.

In addition to this, he emphasizes that approaching the question in this way rules out simplistic explanations that attribute the creation of ideological distortion to specific groups or individuals who intentionally manipulate information to their advantage. As well as rejecting the idea that the imaginary representation is the result of an alienated nature of the real world. 

Moving forward, the second thesis he presents is that ideology has a material existence. 

According to him, the 'ideas' or representations within ideology possess a material, as opposed to spiritual, existence. This perspective is consistent with his Marxist philosophical approach, focusing on a perspective in line with materialism, which prioritizes material conditions and the physical realm over spiritual or idealistic aspects, distinguishing itself from idealism.

To move forward with this proposition, Althusser invites us to remember his argument on the Ideological State Apparatuses and their practices. He goes on to add that, while these apparatuses do not take the same form as the material existence of physical objects, they do focus on the implementation of a worldview through practices, and so their existence is material in the same way that tangible objects are.

In other words, they have a tangible impact on society.

Furthermore, he argues that individuals who exist within ideologies live in a predetermined perception of the world shaped by their imaginary distortion, which is dependent on their imaginary relationship to their conditions of existence. He points out that this distortion is ultimately connected to the relations of production and class relations within society. He argues that ideology represents an imaginary relation to these real relations.

He then adds that this imaginary relation has a material existence. This means that the ideas and beliefs individuals hold within an ideology have a tangible and material impact on their lives, even if they are not physical in the same sense as concrete objects. 

To put it another way, Althusser claims that people within ideologies see the world through the lens of their own interpretations. Their perspectives are influenced by their circumstances and relationships, as well as how they perceive their status in society. He argues that this distorted view is closely linked to how society operates and how people are classified into different social classes. These beliefs, while not physically tangible, have physical consequences. In other words, people's beliefs can influence how they live and interact. 

Ideology = an imaginary relation to real relations

Moreover, he provides some examples on how this works. For instance, the actions and behavior of a person who believes in god, impacts society in certain ways. This person might attend religious services, pray, confess, and participate in religious rituals. The same applies to someone who believes in justice, they may adhere to legal regulations, engage in protests, and support legal reform. In other words, he argues that an individual's material behavior follows naturally from their ideological beliefs.

In addition to this, ideology always causes people to align their actions with their beliefs. If they fail to do so, they are considered inconsistent, cynical, or malicious. This indicates that a person's behaviors should reflect their professed beliefs, according to any ideology. The rituals or practices inside ideological institutions establish and preserve the link between beliefs and actions, indicating how ideologies are embedded in everyday material practices.

He then goes on to explain that with everything that has been said, we can reorganize the conceptual schema of ideology and accept the disappearance of the term "ideas" as a result of recognizing their material inscription within practices and rituals. 

This gives rise to the remaining concepts: “subject, consciousness, belief, and actions,” as well as new terminology like “practices, rituals, and ideological apparatus.”

Furthermore, he clarifies the relationship between ideology and the subject, emphasizing how the subject's actions are influenced by a system made up of ideology, material practices, and rituals. He develops two interconnected theses from this: first, that practice does not exist unless it is mediated by and contained inside an ideology, and second, that there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subjects.

Ideology Interpellates Individuals as Subjects 

This is where Althusser presents his concept of Interpellation, which is a very important contribution that explains how people accept certain roles and values. He argues that the notion of the subject serves as the foundational category in all forms of ideology, regardless of their specific historical or regional context. He claims that the category of the subject operates to “constitute” concrete individuals as subjects within the framework of ideology. Therefore, ideology functions as the process by which individuals are shaped and constituted as subjects, and it manifests in the material forms of this functioning.

Moreover, he gives a good example in his book while he writes. He states that both the writer, that is him, and the reader, that is us, are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects. Meaning that, the author and the reader of his book both live ‘spontaneously’ or ‘naturally’ in ideology.

In other words, he argues that humans naturally exist within and are shaped by ideological constructs.

Additionally, Althusser introduces the idea that when an author writes a scientific discourse, like the one he is making, they become absent as a 'subject' from their own writing. In other words, the process of producing scientific knowledge is not only determined by the author's personal output or beliefs. Instead, it is shaped by a broader set of ideological factors that influence the way knowledge is produced, communicated, and received. In other words, science is influenced by ideology.

This brings us to his argument regarding the subject's "obviousness" within ideology. He claims that it is a peculiarity of ideology that it imposes 'obviousnesses' as irrefutable truths, leading us to regard them as self-evident without realizing their ideological purposes. 

Furthermore, Althusser highlights that the process of ideological recognition is an essential function of ideology, which operates in two distinct ways: through recognition and misrecognition.

For instance, he discusses how we recognize a friend behind a closed door when they respond to our query with “It's me.” He also mentions the act of recognizing someone on the street by greeting them and shaking their hand. These examples serve to demonstrate how the rituals of ideological recognition operate in our daily interactions, reinforcing the notion of ourselves as distinct, recognizable, and irreplaceable subjects.

Moreover, he acknowledges that the very act of recognizing ourselves as subjects and participating in these ideological rituals provides us with a 'consciousness' of our participation in ideological recognition. However, this recognition does not give us a scientific understanding of the mechanism underlying this recognition, and this is what he is attaining to decipher. 

To move forward with this, he formulates this proposition: “All ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects through the functioning of the category of the subject.” He distinguishes between concrete individuals and concrete subjects, highlighting that concrete subjects exist insofar as they are supported by concrete individuals.

Now, to further understand this concept, Althusser uses the metaphor of a person being called upon in the street to demonstrate how ideology 'recruits' or 'transforms' individuals into subjects through the process of interpellation. He demonstrates how even a basic act, such as someone responding to their name being called, can be interpreted as a type of ideological recognition, because the individual perceives themselves as the intended subject of the call.

In other words, interpellation refers to the process through which individuals are addressed or called upon by ideological systems, such as the state or societal institutions, to assume particular subject positions.

He then points out the paradoxical nature of ideology, where individuals often believe themselves to be outside of ideology while simultaneously existing within it. He argues that the practical denial of the ideological character of ideology itself is one of the effects of ideology.

To put it another way, ideology never says,“I am ideological.”

Furthermore, he concludes by claiming that it is only possible to recognize one's immersion in ideology from a standpoint outside of it, specifically from a position of scientific knowledge. He argues that it is rare for individuals to acknowledge their own ideological positioning, and that it is more often that the accusation of being in ideology is directed at others rather than oneself. 

To conclude, he claims that ideology operates in such a way that it constantly interpellates individuals as subjects since ideology is eternal. In fact, he claims that because ideology is eternal, it is more accurate to argue that it has continuously declared individuals as subjects throughout history. This means that ideology has always declared individuals as subjects, leading us to the conclusion that individuals have always been subjects from the very beginning. Individuals, in other words, are both themselves and something more abstract.

To illustrate this, Althusser mentions a Freudian concept that explains that individuals are essentially 'abstract' in relation to the subjects they already are. He draws attention to the social and cultural rituals that surround the anticipation of a child's birth. He argues that an unborn child is already expected to assume a specific identity or role within a family's ideological framework, and that this ensures that the child is assigned a specific identity before birth, making each individual a subject even before they come into the world.

An Example: The Christian Religious Ideology 

One of the best ways to explain the structure of ideology is through religion, and that is because it is now mostly perceived as ideological. 

Now, in order to be able to continue with this part of the book, it is necessary to mention the following Christian discourse that Althusser writes in his book to begin his analysis: 

“I address myself to you, a human individual called Peter, in order to tell you that God exists and that you are answerable to Him. It adds: God addresses himself to you through my voice. It says: this is who you are: you are Peter! This is your origin, you were created by God for all eternity, although you were born in the 1920th year of Our Lord! This is your place in the world! This is what you must do! By these means, if you observe the ‘law of love’ you will be saved, you, Peter, and will become part of the Glorious Body of Christ! Etc..”

As we can see, this excerpt shows that Christian ideology operates by interpellating individuals as subjects who are answerable to God. It also highlights the fact that individuals have a predetermined place in the world and a particular role to fulfill, all under the guidance of God's commandments. 

Moreover, one important aspect of Christian, or nearly any religious ideology in general, is the notion of an Absolute Other Subject, in this case, God. This Subject, with a capital "S," is fundamental to religious interpellation, because it functions as the ultimate authority and source of guidance for individuals. 

Additionally, Althusser points out that God's interaction with individuals, particularly figures like Moses, serves as an illustration of the interaction between the Subject and the subjects. The interpellated subjects recognize themselves as subjects subjected to the authority of God, and they demonstrate this recognition through their obedience to his commandments. 

In other words, as he writes in his book, "God is thus the Subject, and Moses and the innumerable subjects of God's people, are the Subject's interlocutors: his mirrors, his reflections. Were not men made in the image of God?" 

Another point worth mentioning is that when God sends his son to Earth, there is a paradoxical nature of the son being both a subject and the Subject. This reveals the relationship between the Subject and the subjects, and it emphasizes the ultimate goal of the subjects, as proven by the Resurrection of Christ, to re-enter the divine realm and become one with the Absolute Subject.

Now, what is significant about this religious ideology example is that it highlights the fact that every ideology has some sort of mirroring structure. This means that all ideologies operate by interpellating individuals as subjects in the name of an Absolute Subject. The concept of the mirror signifies that the ideology duplicates the image of the Absolute Subject, placing it at the center, and interpellating a multitude of individuals around it. 

Moreover, Althusser argues that this process of reflection allows individuals to contemplate their own identity in connection to the Absolute one, giving them a sense of assurance that their existence is relevant within this ideological system. 

He concludes by saying that every ideology works first through a process of interpellation, which, again, means calling individuals by their names and addressing them as subjects within a particular ideological framework. 

Then, once individuals have been interpellated as subjects, they are subjected to the authority of an Absolute Subject, which holds a central position in the ideological framework. This means that the subject adheres to the beliefs, values, and commandments dictated by this Absolute Subject. 

Following this subjection to the Absolute Subject, individuals recognize not only the authority of it but also their own position and the one of other subjects, which solidifies the collective identity within an ideological structure. 

Ultimately, the entire ideological structure provides an absolute guarantee that the beliefs and practices it propagates are valid and legitimate, assuring individuals that things will go well as long as they recognize and conform to the ideology's principles. 

To put it another way, ideology creates a quadruple system in which individuals are interpellated as subjects and are subjected to the authority of an Absolute Subject. Individuals recognize one another as subjects and are given an absolute guarantee that conforming to the ideology will ensure their well-being. 

However, the question, or the mystery, that Althusser points out is the ambiguity of the term "subject." He claims that the term implies both a sense of free subjectivity, capable of independent action and responsibility, as well as a subjected or submissive being, obedient to a higher authority and devoid of personal autonomy except the ability to accept subordination. He observes that individuals successfully "work by themselves" within an ideological system by carrying out the ideology's principles, which have been internalized through the interpellation process.

In Christian ideology, for example, the phrase “Amen” functions as a testament to the necessity of the ideology itself. It signifies that certain things must be a certain way for the established order to be maintained.

Furthermore, it indicates the indispensable role of ideology in shaping the consciousness and behavior of individuals in a society. It implies that the reproduction of the existing social and economic relations must be ensured continuously, not just in the overarching structures of society but also in the everyday attitudes and actions of individuals.

Lastly, the most important reflection of this book is that Althusser points out the deep impact of the mirror recognition mechanism of the Subject and the individuals interpellated as subjects in the perpetuation of power relations and economic structures. His observations draw attention to the underlying reality within ideological mechanisms, and how they are frequently overlooked as a result of the ideology's misrecognition which essentially keeps the reproduction of the currently existing and future power dynamics.

With all this, we can now begin to introspect and examine the ideologies that underpin our beliefs and actions. We can start to observe critically the systems that govern our lives, and achieve a deeper understanding of the forces at play within our society. 

Is it possible to live a life that transcends ideology? Is it possible to live a life free of repressive and divisive ideologies? One that is more in line with the realities we experience? Or are we imprisoned in systems that appear unescapable?

Sources:

• Althusser, L. (2). On Ideology. Verso.

Beyond Thought.

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“The labor of our body and the working of our hands” - John Locke

As we saw in the previous newsletter, Hannah Arendt believes that there are significant differences between labor and work. In this newsletter we will see why she believes they should be distinguished, as well as her views on why action has been lost and why it should be reintroduced into the public realm.

Highlights:

• Labor is praised in the modern age, whereas in the past, labor was the meanest.

• All human activities that arise out of necessity are bound to the recurring cycle of nature - laboring has a never ending cycle. 

• Leisure for the animal laborans, as understood by Hannah, is consumption. The labor power that is no longer required is not spent on higher-level activities such as learning, creating or pursuing political ends. 

• A labor society is a consumer society since all human activities are reduced to life's necessities. In other words, all activities are considered labor, and those that do not contribute to the biological process of laboring through labor or consumption are seen as "playful" and unproductive.

• Work gives us objects that make possible interaction, like a table, a chair, a hammer, a story, a work of art, etc. For instance, what distinguishes a pair of shoes from a consumer good, is that, technically, these do not spoil unless I wear them. Used or unused they will remain in the world unless they are destroyed. 

• Man in so far as he is homo faber, instrumentalizes, which implies a degradation of nature, of all things into means. 

• In our modern age, we exclude the political man, that is, the man who acts and speaks. In other terms, the public realm for the homo faber is the exchange market, where he can show the products of his hands and receive the esteem which is due to him, and where he is no longer a citizen but a product of exchange.

• Hannah argues that the human artifice may only become a home for mortal men if the things he creates are not simply consumable or made for a utilitarian reason.

• Acting and speaking form the concept of the emergence of something new, an this is key to Hannah's way of thinking, because she believes that we are only human if we can initiate things.

• Acting is by nature unexpected, uncontrollable and anonymous. We cannot control the outcomes of our actions, since once they are in the public realm, they get into contact with other people. We think we write our own stories, but the what we do is always told and interpreted differently when it comes into contact with the rest of the world.

• The absence of action and speech causes us to be locked in a process from which we are unable to escape and therefore become free. Or, in her words, we become unable to act, which by definition implies to be able to do something without knowing the outcomes. It is, in other words, freedom, the ability to escape automatic processes.

• It is the power to act, create, and start fresh that gives humanity the ability to intervene in the course of history and bring about new possibilities. This faculty of action, derived from the fact that humans are born and capable of initiating change, is what distinguishes us from the passive processes of nature.

Now, let’s delve deeper and begin with her views on labor.

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Labor

Hannah begins her chapter on labor with language, and how in European languages there are two unrelated words for what we now come to think of as the same activity. 

For example, in French, we have “travailler” and “ouvreur,” and in German, “arbeiten” and “werken,” where the equivalent of “labor”means pain and struggle. 

Furthermore, she argues that Locke’s quote “The labor of our body and the working of our hands,” clearly represents the ancient’s distinction between craftsmen and those who, like slaves, use their bodies to meet the necessities of life. This distinction between 'labor' and 'work' has a long history, where 'labor' typically represents the action or process of working, and 'work' denotes the result of that effort. 

However, despite their grammatical differences, the words were used interchangeably in practice. Hannah argues that this is because, even in ancient times, people had a strong desire to be free of the necessities of life and there was a pressure from the polis to engage in political activities.

Following this, the city-state in Greece, in the late fifth century, began classifying occupations based on the amount of effort required. This was a concept reinforced by Aristotle's view that occupations which were physically demanding were considered the meanest. This is why, in ancient Greece, the institution of slavery was not perceived as a means of obtaining cheap labor or exploitation for profit but rather as an attempt to exclude labor from the conditions of human life. The Greeks believed that what humans shared with other forms of animal life was not considered fully human, which helps explain their theory regarding the non-human nature of the slave. 

What’s more, according to Aristotle, a slave was not human simply because he lacked the ability to decide, foresee, and choose, which translates to being subject by necessity.

In other words, as said in our previous newsletter, labor meant to be enslaved by necessity, and because men were dominated by these necessities, they could only be free through the domination of those whom they subjected to necessity by force. 

Let us now move on to the modern age, when Hannah points out that labor is now praised. She claims that labor is glorified as the source of all value, and those who labor are elevated to a position historically reserved for those who worked, i.e., what the homo faber does, creating work that contributes to the world beyond survival, as opposed to the animal laborans, who engages in activities that meet their immediate biological needs.

Moreover, the modern age came with new distinctions, such as productive vs. unproductive labor, skilled vs. unskilled work, and manual vs. intellectual labor.

What’s more, among these distinctions, productive vs. unproductive labor was considered the most fundamental, and both Adam Smith and Karl Marx based their economic theories on it.

To put it simply, Hannah points out that Marx and Smith agreed that unproductive labor is less valuable because it does not enrich society and leaves nothing for its consumption. 

Following this, the concept of “labor power” emerged as a pivotal idea in Marx's thinking. Labor power is the inherent capacity of human labor to produce results; and unlike the products of work, which are tangible objects, labor power focuses predominantly on ensuring its own reproduction. This takes nothing into account but the life process of mankind, and within this frame of reference everything becomes an object of consumption.

In this view, all laboring is “productive,” and the earlier distinction between the performance of “menial tasks” that leave no trace, and the production of things durable enough to be accumulated, loses its validity.

To put it another way, here we completely lost the line between work and labor. Everything is a result of the labor power and functions of the life process.

Now, with this we can clearly see how there was a disdain for labor in ancient times, and how in the modern age there is some reverence for it. 

Moreover, as said previously, Hannah puts a lot of emphasis on language and how it makes us understand the world in certain ways. Language creates discrepancies between it as the "objective" code that we use to describe the world and the subjective theories we rely on to comprehend it. She argues that language and our fundamental human experiences teach us that the things we interact with in the world are of different natures and are produced by different activities.

Following this, while labor is associated with the production of essential goods necessary for survival, work involves creating enduring objects that contribute to the stability and endurance of the world. Hannah stresses out that the things created by labor are objects of consumption that appear and disappear and do not give permanence to this world. 

Additionally, distinguished from consumer goods and use objects that create endurance, there are the products of action and speech, which constitute the world of human affairs and relationships. Hannah argues that these lack not only tangibility but durability. They really depend on the presence of people, so we can testify to their existence. 

Furthermore, this makes acting and speaking products that do not “produce” anything, and that in order for them to become part of the world, need to be remembered, transformed as it were, into things that contribute to the stability of the human world, which often outlast the lives of their creators. 

Now, as we can assume by now, the least durable objects are those needed for the life process itself. But this does not necessarily mean that these objects are literally objects that can be biologically processed, like food.

Consequently, the objects that are “useful” for man, that is, that they are necessary for life, are generally of short duration. If they aren’t consumed by use, they perish and decay, just like food does. So, although there are objects that are man-made, the products of labor are produced and consumed, in accordance with the cyclical movements of nature.

To further understand this, we need to understand that humanity is limited by a beginning and an end, in a sense. Biological life works with objects appearing and disappearing from existence. In the human world, objects manifest themselves as growth and decay, birth and death. All this means is that the biological process of man and the process of growth and decay in this world share the characteristic of being part of the cyclical movements of nature, and therefore, end up being repetitive.

To put it another way, all human activities that arise out of necessity are bound to the recurring cycle of nature - laboring has a never ending cycle. 

To further explain this, Hannah makes a critique on Karl Marx by stating that when he said that “labor is man’s metabolism with nature,” he clearly indicated that labor and consumption are connected, and that they both contribute to the never-ending cycle of biological life. This cycle needs to be maintained by consumption, and the activity that provides the means to it, as we can know now, is laboring. 

Additionally, she points out an apparent paradox created by Marx, where he glorified labor as the defining human activity and yet envisioned a future society liberated from the necessity of it. He defined humanity as an animal laborans, leaving man with the alternative between productive slavery and unproductive freedom.

To put it another way, Hannah perceives Marx as a scientist more than a philosopher. He saw the world as a series of processes that eventually became automatic. These processes take human activity, and human volition out of the equation. They place humanity on a path where it cannot do anything, or as we will further see, it cannot act.

Now, things will start to be even more interesting. Hannah argues that John Locke discovered that labor is the source of all property. It followed its course when Adam Smith said that labor was the source of wealth and found its climax in Marx’s system of labor, where labor became the source of all productivity and the expression of what it means to be human. 

Remember when Locke said that labor created short lived things?

In order to solve the problem of “short duration” he introduced the concept of money. This idea further developed into the concept of property, wealth, and human essence. The products of labor had to stay long enough for them to become “valuable,” to the point that they either become property or simply products that can be further exchanged for something else.

Now, all of this will make more sense later on when we discuss action, but the process of growth, wealth and acquisition, started to be key for political theorists. They started to see these processes as natural, they began to be understood as part of the life process itself. Labor and its unending process that progresses automatically in accordance with life and merges itself with property, wealth and acquisition, started to leave willful decisions and human meaning out of the equation.

To put it another way, all this led to basically confusing labor with work, because of the introduction of the concepts of wealth and property into the equation. 

To further continue, we must remember from our previous newsletter, the concept of property, and how it not only separates individuals from the communal sphere but also acts as a means of connection within society. It offers a sense of security and protection from the outside world while simultaneously bridging the gap between private labor and the public realm. 

With this it follows the concept of Marx, where he says that when individuals stop acting as such, and instead act as members of a species, the collective life process of the “socialized men” follows its own necessity, that is, it follows the automatic process of increasing abundance of goods needed by them.

Furthermore, Hannah claims that this process outlined by Marx resonates with Darwin's theory of the origins of mankind, both operating under inherent natural laws. As labor and the economy progress along this trajectory, they follow a predefined pattern guided by the principles of wealth accumulation, gradually disassociating from individual concerns and culminating in the emergence of a societal realm that transcends the boundaries of both private and political spheres.

However, Hannah argues that neither the abundance of goods nor the shortening of time spent in laboring are likely to establish a common world. The process associated with the body and labor remains despite the technology, which further developed the idea of hobbies, which as we know, are ways for individuals to find time away from the demands of labor and the communal domain, providing a personal outlet within the broader context of a socialized community.

Now, we are getting close to finishing the concept of labor, but before that, we must start connecting it with work.

As we saw, labor was considered the lowest activity of life and became the highest in our modern age.

This leads us to the question about technology and, in general, tools, and how, although they have made laboring easier, they have not completely eliminated the necessity of labor from human life. 

To understand this we can recall that in ancient times, we could clearly see the fact that life is essentially subject to necessity, to the point that we could see slaves and connect life to slavery and struggle. But, in modern times, this direct connection no longer exists, which makes it challenging, and less vivid, to recognize and remember the idea that laboring is part of life, and in doing so, we risk losing the idea of freedom.

In other words, for Hannah, if you live a life free of necessity you are not free. It is certainly a claim that is hard to digest, but essentially, if necessity does not exist then the impulse to become free ceases to exist.  In a sense, she says that freedom would be meaningless, that there is only freedom if there is an impulse to free ourselves from something, in this case, necessity.

Furthermore, the tools that ease labor are products of work, not labor. They are integral parts of the world of practical objects, but with the rise of work as labor we created a world where we treat every object as if it were a consumer good. The Industrial Revolution transformed every workmanship with labor, and the result is that the things that are meant to be used are now meant to be consumed as rapidly as they can so that they can continue the endless process of laboring.

Additionally, Hannah raises questions about the division of labor. She argues that when we maximize the efficiency of the division of labor we can create an enormous number of things, which, in combination with tools, creates abundance that eventually leads to more consumption, since the process of laboring needs the process to restart, or, if we want to use other words, the economy needs to keep moving.

The important thing Hannah is trying to tell us here is that tools lose their quality of use because they end up being objects that form part of the laboring process that is a cycle. Tools become objects of consumption, and the reason is that they’ve become abundant. This transforms them into consumer goods that are thrown into the never ending cycle of man’s metabolism with nature. They cease to just be used and need to be replaced, decay or disappear so that the process can continue to evolve.

Now, before we finish this part, we must start and finish by saying that for Hannah, as we previously discussed, a world without labor would make men spend their free time consuming. 

In other words, leisure for the animal laborans, as understood by Hannah, is consumption. The labor power that is no longer required is not spent on higher-level activities such as learning, creating or pursuing political ends. 

Moreover, this is where the origins of the term leisure come into play. Leisure for the Greeks meant "scholé," which basically meant scholar, that is, it signified time spent on education, political and religious endeavors; as opposed to the modern leisure definition, which basically means spending time regenerating ourselves from the struggle of labor through consumption and hedonism.

In concluding the chapter on labor, it is crucial to recognize that, in Hannah’s views, a labor society is a consumer society since all human activities are reduced to life's necessities. In other words, all activities are considered labor, and those that do not contribute to the biological process of laboring through labor or consumption are seen as "playful" and unproductive.

Freedom, in this context, is equated with being “playful,” while anything beyond the pursuit of livelihood is relegated to the status of a mere “hobby.” The question she urges us to consider is whether automation, theoretically reducing human labor, might actually escalate consumption, given that humanity, which is now categorized as animal laborans, would consequently have more time for themselves.

Additionally, Hannah makes the point that the establishment of labor classes was unquestionably a step towards a world free of violence, as it was in ancient Greece.

However, she adds, it still calls into question freedom, because no violence can match the natural force that necessity compels.

Work

We know so far that “work” is the creation of “the human artifice,” that does not decay, but rather gets used up. What’s more, this durability gives objectivity and stability to human life by taking it away from the cycles of nature.  

In other words, work gives us objects that make possible interaction, like a table, a chair, a hammer, a story, a work of art, etc. For instance, what distinguishes a pair of shoes from a consumer good, is that, technically, these do not spoil unless I wear them. Used or unused they will remain in the world unless they are destroyed. 

Furthermore, work, which is performed by the homo faber, consists in changing things, that is on reification. The material necessary for work is not simply given, there is an element of violation of nature implied into it. In other terms, the homo faber is a destroyer of nature.

This contrasts with the animal laborans, who supports life and is part of the natural cycle. In other words, it is still a servant of nature, whereas the homo faber sees himself as the ruler and master of the world.

Following this, Hannah points out something very important. She says that fabrication, that is, work, is performed under the guidance of a model that comes from outside our minds, and that these guidelines precede the work process itself. 

This is similar to what Plato said about the world of forms, and how there are communal needs and models that drive work and are outside of ourselves. It is a bit hard to grasp but basically, for instance, we created knives simply because there was a communal need for them and the model came out from ideas and forms that were existing prior to the existence of that knife. These ideas are eternal and go beyond the duration of the objects themselves.

This contrasts with the animal laborans, which technically does not understand the products it makes and must rely on external instructions.

One other important distinction of work from labor is that it multiplies. As opposed to labor which repeats itself out of necessity. Labor is a means to obtain a living and it therefore repeats into infinity, whereas work can multiply itself because it possesses a relatively stable existence in the world. This stable existence is, again, the idea, the model that remains after the end of the fabrication process. 

Now, the tools that lighten the burden and mechanize the labor of the animal laborans, are designed and invented by the homo faber, as well as the machines. 

With this in mind, Hannah makes an important distinction between tools and machines. She says that tools are the tools of workmanship, and that work is still the servant of the hands in this scenario. In the case of machines, however, the opposite happens: we become servants to the machines and adapt our body to their mechanical movement. In other terms, we become conditioned by our very own creations. 

To demonstrate this, Hannah claims that machinery or technology go through stages. She starts with the steam engine and how this form of technology seeks to mimic natural processes. Secondly, we have electricity that, rather than reproducing or mimicking nature, unchains new processes.

These electrical processes that are our own creations, eventually lead to the creation of automation where fabrication is a continuous process. We call automatic all courses of movement which are self-moving and therefore outside of willful and purposeful interference.

The main point Hannah wants to make here is that machines, by the time of her writing, were evolving to become an extension of human biology. And if we come back to the present, we can certainly see this happening. We can see how machines now perform tasks that were just humanly performed before, like in the case of artificial intelligence. But we don't need to go that far to understand that when it comes to labor, we have relied on and trusted machines much more than we would trust a task done by a human.

Furthermore, automation leads us to think less about what we're doing; they become new processes that eventually produce different results. Consider the case of a robot teacher, a robot that is entirely automated and educates children. The question is, how will these children's thinking evolve? They would be taught in ways that would be vastly different from a child taught by a human teacher. As a result, they would raise their future children differently, to the point where we have fully changed the way humanity thinks and acts.

If you recall, Hannah discusses at the beginning of the book how we have established processes that we no longer understand but on which we rely. Automation created a world in which we no longer see ourselves as beings that can decide what happens, everything is a process that moves by itself. We forget that we have control over the things we create.

What's more, the fundamental issue in this situation comes from the belief that tools and technology are created to make human life easier and labor less painful. In other words, their usage is limited to animal laborans, but the reality is that the homo faber created tools to build and stabilize the world, not just to assist in the human process.

Now, all this chapter of work might make the reader think, so far, that the homo faber is better than the animal laborans, but this isn’t the case.

Hannah argues that for the homo faber, everything they do is a means to an end, to the point that nothing becomes an end, at least not as long as the objects they've created remain objects of use. When everything is valued in terms of usefulness, things can only show how valuable they are by becoming means, either for a living or, in the case of markets, for an exchange purpose.

Furthermore, the problem with this is that we build an infinite chain of means. Utilitarianism renders everything meaningless, because meaning demands things to be more fixed and long-lasting.

In short, the homo faber is incapable of understanding meaning in the same way that the animal laborans is incapable of understanding instrumentality.

Following this, Hannah argues that escaping the trap of meaninglessness needs a shift away from objectivity, prioritizing the elevation of humanity as the ultimate purpose. Nonetheless, she highlights that even this perspective has its limitations.

For instance, Immanuel Kant emphasized the importance of treating every human as an end in themselves. He tried to prevent the instrumentalization of individuals by advocating for the recognition of human dignity. Despite this, Hannah argues that this stance doesn't entirely eliminate the objectification of the world. Instead, it still permits the dominance of nature and all other facets of existence to serve human desires and needs.

In simpler terms, man in so far as he is homo faber, instrumentalizes, which implies a degradation of nature, of all things into means. 

Now, to proceed, we should recall the public realm. 

In ancient times, the public realm was primarily centered around the agora, which was a marketplace yet at the same time it was a gathering space for social interactions and discussions. The marketplace in antiquity, therefore, had a broader function beyond mere commercial transactions, incorporating elements of social and political discourse.

On the other hand, in our modern age, while the marketplace continued to exist, the focus shifted towards valuing productive labor and the concept of productivity. 

As a result, the public realm became more focused on the exhibition and exchange of goods. This shift dismissed the importance of political engagement and discourse in the public realm, emphasizing the promotion of products and the recognition of the labor involved.

Consequently, in our modern age, we exclude the political man, that is, the man who acts and speaks.

In other terms, the public realm for the homo faber is the exchange market, where he can show the products of his hands and receive the esteem which is due to him, and where he is no longer a citizen but a product of exchange.

Furthermore, Hannah argues that isolation is necessary for individual workmanship. It allows the development of ideas and creation of products with a high level of skill, uniqueness and excellence.

However, in the modern age, mastery is threatened by the emergence of the social realm, where people want to participate in the work process. This shift diminished the value of privacy and isolation, resulting in a breakdown of traditional concepts of competence and excellence. It also shifted the emphasis from individual craftsmanship to a more collaborative approach, which frequently requires teamwork and the division of labor. Additionally, all of this led to the commodification of labor and the evaluation of individuals based on the quality of their products.

The rise of the exchange market, as mentioned earlier, becomes a pivotal point in this transition. Notably, it must exist before the manufacturing process, leading to the production of exchange objects rather than “use” objects. This represents a significant transformation in the nature of production, where durability, once a measure of an object's utility, now becomes a measure of its potential for future exchange.

To conclude this part, Hannah stresses the concept of value. She argues that the concept is not an inherent quality of a product itself but rather emerges in public within the market. It is rooted in the relational aspect of exchange between various members of society, where goods are constantly being evaluated and traded based on their perceived worth in comparison to other commodities.

Value is the quality a thing can never possess in privacy but acquires automatically the moment it appears in public.

Finally, Hannah criticizes Karl Marx's concept of "use value." She argues that Marx's attention was mostly on the utilitarian role of commodities in individuals' consumption patterns in a commercial society. Marx, she claims, failed to emphasize the underlying, objective value of the commodities themselves. Hannah argues that by emphasizing the functional component of commodities, Marx's perspective ignores the broader social and relational context that determines the true value of these products. As a result, the commodities are not recognized as instruments, diminishing their intrinsic or socially determined value.

Now, we are almost done with the work part of the book, but to conclude, we must talk about the permanence of the world.

Hannah argues that the human artifice creates a reliable home for men, and that inside this artifice there are objects that, despite their lack of utility, are unique. They are not exchangeable, and if they become, they can only be arbitrarily valued. Of course, Hannah is referring to art here, which is the most intensely worldly of all tangible things; it lasts and is almost unaffected by natural processes. It creates stability in the world where everything else is consumed or used. 

Moreover, this means that work reaches its highest potential when creating this permanence through art. It provides some level of immortality that transcends time.

Now, Hannah argues that the source of art is thought rather than feelings and emotions. This may appear contradictory, but she believes that feelings should be translated into thinking. She says that art should go through the stage of thought. This is because in order to think, we need privacy, that is, to be outside of the social realm, where opinions exist, and thus, feelings arise.

This implies that art is a process of transfiguration, it turns feelings, despite them being unpleasant, into meaningful and lasting things, and it does so, by the process of thought. 

Hannah concludes this chapter by arguing that the human artifice may only become a home for mortal men if the things he creates are not simply consumable or made for a utilitarian reason. Art is useless in a utilitarian sense; in an exchange market, it becomes a commodity that must serve a purpose and be consumed. Artists thus strive to create 'useful' and 'consumable' art rather than actual art, which is, by definition, useless but meaningful and permanent. This gradually leads to humanity producing less and less art, to the point where there are no new creations in this world.

Action

We are finally on to the most important part of the book, and also, probably the most challenging to grasp.

To begin the chapter, we can start by saying that for Hannah a world without speech and action is a death world. But what exactly does that mean? 

Let’s start with the basic conditions of action and speech. Hannah argues that human plurality needs equality and distinction. First, equality is necessary because if men were not equal they could not understand each other and those who came before them nor foresee the needs of those who will come after them. 

On the other hand, distinction is crucial because it is necessary to differentiate one human being from another. If this did not exist, action would not be necessary.

Furthermore, she argues that otherness is the characteristic of being different from everything else. In medieval philosophy, otherness is considered one of the fundamental qualities of all existence. It is the reason why we perceive things as distinct from one another. 

In contrast to otherness, human distinctness refers to what sets us apart as living beings. All organic beings have variations and distinctions, even within the same species. Human distinctiveness is the capacity to express this uniqueness and communicate it to others, and speech and action are the ways in which humans express their uniqueness and distinguish themselves. 

But what precisely is uniqueness? It is basically all of our unique experiences, knowledge, and everything else that distinguishes me from another individual.

Moreover, Hannah argues that speaking and acting are equivalent to having a second birth, because to act is to initiate and to set something in motion; it is to begin something new and be free. In its simplest form, it is unexpected, just like the origin of anything, and thus it appears to us in the guise of a miracle.

This concept of the emergence of something new is key to Hannah's way of thinking, because she believes that we are only human if we can initiate things.

Following that, Hannah claims that action and speech are intrinsically connected. She emphasizes that action, which represents the beginning and actualization of one's existence, is connected with speech, which represents the manifestation of one's distinctness among equals. She highlights the importance of speech as a way of self-identification, in which one's words and actions indirectly reflect one's identity. Without speech, action loses its revelatory quality, and action without a recognizable actor, that is, without a “who” is incomprehensible and meaningless.

Now, the identity, the disclosure of “who,” is in contradiction with “what” somebody is, and that is because once we insert ourselves into the public world through action and speech, we cannot control how others perceive us. The moment we want to say who somebody is, our vocabulary limits us and makes us say what he is, with the result that his specific uniqueness escapes our perception.

This means that it is impossible to establish an individual's essence as it manifests itself in public through action and speech, and therefore we enter a world of interest.

Furthermore, a world of interest, which literally means "being in between," is the physical place among people in which our essence is expressed through stories, and therefore, there are always stories being told about ourselves that, again, we cannot control. This reality is known as the "web" of human relationships, and it is as real as the objective world of tools and things. 

This uncontrollable aspect of the outcome of my actions and speech prevents them from achieving their goal. When I act or speak, I expect something to happen, but because we act and speak in the public world, and therefore our actions are interpreted by other human beings, our own actions and speech never become the true authors or producers of our life stories.

In fact, Hannah argues that Plato understood quite well that human actions and events might not be entirely under our control. He thought that our actions might be guided by some invisible force, like puppets controlled by a puppeteer behind a curtain. Plato used this idea to explain that the happenings in the world are not entirely created by people but might be influenced by some unseen force. 

Moreover, his concept of an invisible force guiding events is similar to what we now call "Providence" or the economic concept of the "invisible hand” by Adam Smith, which are ideas used by some philosophers and thinkers to explain how things happen in the world even though they seem beyond human control.

However, despite not having control over the stories that are made, there is always a "hero," who embodies the courage implicit in the determination to act and speak, and to insert oneself into the world. This courage is found in the act of exposing oneself, regardless of the repercussions. Thus, the "hero" in this context does not necessarily possess heroic qualities, but rather embodies the courage to engage with the world regardless of the outcomes.

Moreover, this idea of acting can be further explained and exemplified with the art of drama. We can really understand it when we know that drama means “to act,” which literally indicates that playing actually is an imitation of acting. This means that the manifestation of action and speech in art can only be conveyed through imitation, and therefore, the theater is a political art form that is uniquely capable of representing the political realm of human life through art.

Now, unlike fabrication, action cannot occur in isolation. It requires the presence and interaction of others. She contrasts this with the misconception of a "strong man" who stands alone, asserting that genuine strength in the realm of human affairs comes from collaboration and shared endeavor rather than isolated power.

With that in mind, Hannah draws attention to the distinction between the Greek and Latin verbs archein, which means to begin and set in motion, and agere, that means to finish or bear the results. This distinction makes us understand that it is often the leader who initiates an action, even if we often think that the leader is who controls it. 

Furthermore, the key point is that no one, not even the leader, has control over the repercussions of their actions. This makes action dangerous since it is boundless, unpredictable, and irreversible. Once we act, there will be reactions and unanticipated outcomes that we will be unable to reverse.

In addition to this, Hannah argues that action is largely anonymous, primarily due to the limited control individuals have over the outcomes of their actions. What’s more, the outcomes themselves are often the culmination of the collaborative efforts of various individuals, who may not even be aware of their contribution to a specific result. This means that the complex interplay of various factors ultimately shapes the final outcome, often beyond the direct influence of any single individual. 

This is why, as the Greeks put it, moderation is the highest virtue. It teaches us that we cannot control our actions and, as a result, we learn to act with humility.

Lastly, due to the unpredictability of action, Hannah argues that the full meaning of our actions can only be revealed when the action has ended and it has transformed into history. In other words, action reveals itself to the historian or storyteller, who, surprisingly, always knows better than the participants.

Now, let’s stop for a second and ask ourselves one question: Why is Hannah giving us a full explanation of what action is? 

The answer to this is mainly that what concerned her was that the private realm and the public realm became interconnected, as we discussed in our latest newsletter. This blurred the boundaries that once delineated them. This blurring, she argued, led to the rise of what she calls the "social realm," that is characterized by conformity and an emphasis on material well-being over genuine political engagement. 

Furthermore, Hannah's analysis of action highlights her concern about the destruction of the public sphere and the resulting loss of true political engagement and meaningful discourse. She believed that the social realm would eventually harm the fabric of democratic societies, as genuine action and speech were replaced by conformity and rhetoric, compromising the fundamental nature of human freedom and collective self-determination.

In other words, the absence of action and speech causes us to be locked in a process from which we are unable to escape and therefore become free. Or, in her words, we became unable to act, which by definition implies to be able to do something without knowing the outcomes. It is, in other words, freedom, the ability to escape automatic processes, which will be a key notion in the book's last chapter on the vita activa.

Now, returning to action, Hannah focuses on solutions by comparing different communities as well as looking at our current age. 

The first is “the Greek solution,” which, as we have been discussing, serves as a model for understanding the importance of the public realm and political action. Hannah argues that the Greeks saw action as a means of self-expression, driven by the desire to distinguish oneself from others. The idea of self-disclosure and the pursuit of individual recognition played a crucial role in their understanding of political engagement.

This means that, for the Greeks, the act of creating laws was not considered a political activity but rather a precursor, much like building a city wall before any political activity could start. Laws were seen as structures that facilitated subsequent actions within the public realm.

Moreover, the Greeks perceived acting and making as distinct concepts. While acting was viewed as an uncertain and boundless process, making was seen as a more reliable and tangible endeavor. This distinction is important because it reveals how the Greeks prioritized tangible results over the unpredictability of human action.

In addition to this, the Greeks' approach to the foundation of the polis was aimed to provide a permanent platform for individuals to express themselves and reach 'immortal fame.' This served as a remedy for the transitory nature of actions and the potential for human greatness to be forgotten without a means of preservation. 

In other words, in my view, we can tell that the Greeks embraced competition. However, Hannah mentions this because competition, which by nature isn’t private, shapes the collective life of a community. Competition, in other terms, serves as a catalyst for the exchange of ideas, the cultivation of excellence, and the development of a dynamic and participatory public sphere. It fosters a sense of shared responsibility and involvement, encouraging individuals to contribute their unique perspectives and talents for the betterment of the community. 

Now, this argument may appear to reinforce the current framework within capitalism. Consequently, it is crucial to note that Hannah does not directly criticize capitalism, and there is no proof that she was entirely opposed to it. Her ideas frequently focus on the negative effects of an unrestricted pursuit of wealth and material gain, which she considered may destroy essential components of human life. Her work, in general, emphasizes the significance of striking a balance between economic activity and the development of a public realm in order to secure the preservation of human freedom and political participation.

To continue our exploration of what constitutes action, Hannah elaborates on her concept of the "space of appearance," which is a metaphorical stage that develops when individuals meet to act and speak in public. This space of appearance is crucial for the exercise of power, which she distinguishes from mere strength. While an individual might have strength in isolation, power is inherently interdependent, arising from the collective ability of organized action and speech in the public realm. It is a delicate and dynamic force that can materialize and evaporate in an instant, depending on how the individuals involved communicate and collaborate.

Furthermore, under certain situations, the combination of speech and action can yield power, emphasizing the critical role of human connection and communication in the formation and maintenance of meaningful political organizations. Her analysis focuses on the importance of power in the context of a common public realm where people engage in discourse and cooperative activities.

She does, however, warns against unchecked power, particularly in the context of totalitarianism and tyranny. She argues that uncontrolled power can break the balance between authority and freedom within democratic systems. For her, power within the public space is not about domination, but rather the potential for collective agency and meaningful engagement. 

Following this, Hannah has some arguments about the isolation that labor creates. As discussed earlier, work involves the production of tangible goods and is connected to the public realm. On the other hand, laboring is more isolated and primarily concerned with the necessity of sustaining one's life.

Furthermore, while workmanship allows for a form of togetherness through the combination of different skills and callings, laboring tends to bring people together in a labor environment where individual identity and awareness can be lost.

In other terms, Hannah argues that laboring together makes us share the biological rhythm of labor, and thus ends up creating a sense of unity. However, this unity tends to erase individual identities, leading to conformity.

This conformity creates sameness, and Hannah points out that this leads to a lack of plurality that is essential for human interaction and the creation of a real public realm. She argues that in a consumer society, individuals might be perceived as being more similar than different, implying that social distinctions are often superficial and tied to consumerist values rather than the skills and qualities of the producers.

Moreover, the historical context of laboring is not complete without recognizing the significance of the labor movement and its rebellions throughout history. Hannah's observations align with the broader historical narrative of laborers and enslaved individuals challenging oppressive systems through collective action and rebellion. From ancient slave rebellions to the labor movements of the Industrial Revolution, these examples illustrate the struggle for freedom, better working conditions, and fundamental human rights.

With this in mind, Hannah points out that the workers today are no longer outside of society; they are its members, and they are jobholders like everybody else. The political significance of the labor movement is now the same as that of any other pressure group. The time is past when, as for nearly a hundred years, it could represent the population as a whole and not just a group of people.

In other words, she is emphasizing the reality that the Western world's most developed economies have "succeeded" in transforming the entire population into a society of laborers, completely eroding the public realm and the other aspects of the human condition.

Now, the next point she wants to make about action is its complexities. As we know now, action is unpredictable, but it is essential for the public realm to work. However, there has always been a  desire to find an escape from the complexities of this. 

Consequently, Hannah contrasts the concepts of "action" and "rule," where "action" refers to the unpredictable and collective nature of human affairs, and "rule" is seen as an attempt to establish stability and order by concentrating power in the hands of a single individual or a select few.

To put it another way, Hannah argues that throughout history there have been attempts to find an alternative to the complexities of the public realm. This often involves the concentration of power in a single ruler, which results in the banishment of citizens from active participation in public affairs. Basically, the pursuit of such forms of government, from monarchy to tyranny, is seen by Hannah as an effort to avoid the challenges of collective decision-making and action.

Moreover, Plato's division between thought and action can be linked to this avoidance in the public realm due to its unpredictability and potential for chaos. Plato's vision of the public realm arose from the household system, in which the master dictates to slaves who execute commands without fully understanding them, outlining his desire to make a clear boundary between those who possess knowledge and those who do not. 

Furthermore, she claims that this framework eventually disregards the fundamental purpose of action in the public realm, limiting citizens' active participation in political concerns.

In fact, the current world echoes this Platonic idea in the predominance of bureaucracy and technocracy, as well as the growing belief that authority should be entrusted to professionals with specialized expertise and understanding of complex structures. This preference for knowledge over action in governance can be seen as an extension of Plato's desire to build a system in which rulership is firmly founded in cognition rather than the inherent complications of human interaction.

On top of that, Plato's Utopian concept of an ideal state, built on the principles of an expertly crafted political system, resonates with subsequent theories of domination that seek to establish structures in which ruling is separated from the unpredictability of human action. Plato's political philosophy has had an enduring influence because of his attempt to replace the uncertainties of human affairs with a system guided by predetermined knowledge and guidelines, attempting to create a realm in which governance is perceived as an act of measured precision rather than dynamic engagement with the complexities of public life.

This focus on societal structures led to the gradual acceptance of violence as a means to an end. Additionally, the modern era's emphasis on the importance of making and fabrication promoted acceptance of violence as a necessary mechanism for change.

In short, Hannah emphasizes the persistent human desire to avoid the uncertainties and risks inherent in the realm of action by substituting them with more predictable and tangible categories of human artifice, and how these tangible systems gave rise to the acceptance of violence in order to justify the means to an end.

Now, we can get from all this so far that the attempts to manipulate and control human action have ultimately failed to eliminate the essential nature of human agency. In other words, despite efforts to shape human affairs according to predetermined plans, the unpredictability and uncertainty inherent in human action persist and will always do. 

Following this idea of the uncertainty of human actions, Hannah expands on it by demonstrating how modern society has changed its connection with labor and nature.

Labor, according to her, has become a process, and humanity's contact with nature has shifted from passive observation to active manipulation, with scientists striving to make natural processes fit to human-designed patterns.

This natural process manipulation has resulted in significant developments in human potential. Humans are now able to harness natural energies that would otherwise be inaccessible, eventually resulting in the creation of new processes that would not exist in the absence of human intervention. 

However, this manipulation has increased uncertainty because the results of these activities are essentially unexpected. So, Hannah is trying to tell us here that action, even when it comes to our own human created processes, is by nature unpredictable and cannot be controlled.

In further reflections on the implications of human action, Hannah highlights the conventional understanding of sovereignty and freedom, drawing insights from the teachings of Stoicism. She critiques the notion that sovereignty is linked to a sense of self-sufficiency and dominance, often portraying the pursuit of freedom as an effort to surpass the limitations posed by the existence of multiple individuals within a society.

In simpler terms, she claims that pursuing full sovereignty, that is, self-rule, at the expense of human relationships, fosters an illusory sense of freedom, weakening the genuine complexities of human experience. Hannah emphasizes that Epicureanism’s illusory happiness and Stoicism’s illusory freedom rely on ignoring the realities of human experiences. These illusions, she claims, are strong manifestations of the human imagination that can only be sustained by denying the genuine complexity of human relationships and tangible interactions with both joy and suffering.

In other words, she sees Stoicism and Epicureanism as mechanisms to cope with the perils of action in the public realm.

This leads us to her views on forgiveness and, in general, her views on Jesus of Nazareth. What I like about Hannah is that she isn’t a socialist, nor a conservative, her views are mixed and clearly transcended traditional political labels.

With this in mind, Hannah presents forgiveness as a crucial aspect of human interaction, capable of, in a sense, undoing the consequences of past actions. She contrasts it with vengeance, which perpetuates a cycle of harm and sets oneself in the same position of the person who’s done wrong. 

On the other hand, forgiveness breaks this cycle and allows for new beginnings to take place. Forgiveness, for Hannah, is an act in itself that is essential, since action itself is unpredictable and boundless; we simply do not know the outcomes of our actions. She further adds that forgiving is like liberating someone from the responsibility of having done something wrong. 

Now, it is crucial to understand that she is not justifying malicious acts. If someone acts with the aim to cause harm and ends up doing so, they do not deserve forgiveness. She is referring to those who act in such a way that their actions unintentionally lead to evil, which is by nature a quality of action. 

In fact, she says that forgiveness needs a sincere change of heart, and that some evil acts aren’t even punishable just simply because they aren’t forgivable. In other words, to punish an evil crime, like the Holocaust, for instance, would be, in a sense, to forgive it.

Going back to her argument, in order to support it, she references the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, emphasizing his lessons on forgiveness as a way to release individuals from the consequences of their actions and to break the cycle of harm. According to her, his teachings emphasize the transformative nature of forgiveness as a liberating act.

Now, why does she seem to be giving us a morality lesson by talking so much about forgiveness?

The reason for this is that forgiveness enables us to act politically and scientifically. It allows us to take action, despite the risks of causing harm. Because it is in the nature of action that it will produce unforeseen results. For her, we must be willing to forgive if an action causes harm, taking into account the intentions with which it was initiated. Beginnings cannot occur if forgiveness is not practiced, simply because we attempt to avoid harm. Without forgiveness, we lock mankind into processes, since nothing could be better than what we already know is certain.

To conclude our newsletter and to finalize the chapter on action, Hannah argues that forgiveness, perhaps because of its religious context, has always been seen as unrealistic in the public realm. 

However, the act of making promises has been known throughout our tradition, as it serves as a means to counter the unpredictability inherent in human nature and the uncertainties within a community of individuals who possess equal capacities to act. 

With this in mind, Hannah argues that promises inside politics serve to inject predictability into the broader unpredictability and unreliability of human actions. She warns, however, that if the ability to make promises is abused to include the totality of the future, its usefulness decreases, since promises can be unfulfilled due to the unpredictability of action. This creates disillusioned individuals and, ultimately, weakens the democratic foundations of a society, leading to a loss of faith in the political institutions and leaders.

To conclude this, Hannah reminds us that morality is not merely a collection of traditions but rather a set of moral precepts that arise from the will to live and interact with others. These precepts, such as forgiveness and keeping promises, act as control mechanisms within the realm of human action, enabling the initiation of new and continuous processes.

Moreover, the most important aspect of all this is that natality, that is, the act of birth, has the capacity to initiate new beginnings. This is a fundamental and miraculous aspect of human existence. The message from Hannah is that this idea signifies that without the ability to begin something new, that is, the ability to act, human life would be trapped in a never-ending cycle of processes, decay and deterioration.

To put it another way, it is the power to act, create, and start fresh that gives humanity the ability to intervene in the course of history and bring about new possibilities. This faculty of action, derived from the fact that humans are born and capable of initiating change, is what distinguishes us from the passive processes of nature, and it is the most important message of her book.

Finally, this is all for this newsletter, and I am still missing the last chapter of the book, which will be released in an upcoming newsletter. But for now, let’s conclude this with a question.

Why do we need to see everything in life as a process that is determined? When it is in the nature of humanity that miracles can arise from the unpredictability of our actions.

Beginnings may cause harm, but they can also give rise to new and life-changing transformations.

Sources:

• Arendt, H. The Human Condition (2018th ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Beyond Thought.

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Highlights:

• Hannah mentions three fundamental aspects of the vita activa that define human existence: labor, work and action.

• Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, that is, survival. Work, on the other hand, is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence, and it creates the “artificial world,” the things in this world that do not decay and are not bound to the vital necessities of life. 

• Action is the only activity that happens between men without any intermediary of things or matter, and it is the highest realization of the vita activa.

• "Vita activa" and "bios politikos" were essentially synonymous, both referring to a way of life centered around activities required to establish and maintain a public and political realm, but now, the term vita activa lost its political and public meaning and came to denote any type of active engagement. In other words, all activities were now considered needs of existence.

• Action and collective existence led to an early translation of Aristotle's concept of the "political animal" as a "social animal." This translation blurred the boundaries between the political and social realms and eventually led to the loss of the original Greek idea of politics.

• The Greeks regarded the natural interaction among beings as a common characteristic of the animal kingdom. Human social interaction was perceived as a limitation imposed by biological needs, common to both humans and other forms of animal life.

• For the ancient Greeks the only two things that were truly political and important were action and speech. 

• The Greeks clearly distinguished between their private and public lives. In modernity, these two realms are entangled in the form of the social sphere, where “political economy” becomes collective families that should be taken care of by a nation itself. This is a contradiction in Greek thought, since nothing related to survival could be translated into the polis. Survival and necessity were non-political.

• Conformism is the foundation of modern economics, which assumes that men do not act with regard for one another and operate just for self-interest and the desire to obtain more. Modern economics can only function if men are social beings with predictable behavioral tendencies. It aims at reducing complex human behavior to predictable patterns.

• Hannah makes the distinction between wealth and property that existed in the ancient times, and how it is often seen as the same in our modern world. In ancient times, property wasn't simply owning physical assets, it was deeply connected with an individual's role in society and their sense of belonging to a community. Wealth, on the other hand, was often measured by the number of laborers one owned. These laborers could potentially free you from the necessities of life. This means that wealth was about having control over the means to sustain oneself, and not about the accumulation of excess as we have today.

• Society's intrusion into the private realm took various forms, including expropriation, where property was taken away, and a gradual erosion of the private realm appeared. While socialism or communism might seem to offer solutions by redistributing resources, these ideologies, even when their aim is to provide resources more equitably, can transform the issue into a social concern. This transformation often prompts criticism of capitalism as well since it places property at the center of wealth accumulation rather than viewing it primarily as a necessity for individuals.

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Hannah Arendt was a political philosopher known for her studies on totalitarianism, action, work and labor. 

Today we will focus on her work The Human Condition, which I would like to divide in two or three parts since it is a very lengthy book that requires a significant amount of time to explain and grasp.

To begin, Hannah starts her text with the description of the launch of Sputnik in 1997. She refers to it as a trump of human technology but she also emphasizes how by realizing this dream we have shaped our own condition, making us beings that are no longer bound to earth and defined by it.

Now, Hannah says that the human artifice of the world separates human existence from all mere animal environments, but life itself is outside of the artificial world. She argues that the aim to achieve an artificial man that goes beyond human existence, is undeniably possible. However, the question must be if we want to use all our scientific knowledge to achieve this, and that the real question should be a political one, rather than a question answered by scientists. 

All these achievements in natural sciences are a crisis for Hannah. She argues that the “truths” from science and technological advancement can become meaningless to us because they can become inexpressible in speech and thought. For Hannah, speech and thought are very important, because they are the ways to express and when we try to go beyond our earthbound creature nature, we may be unable to understand, that is, to think and speak about the things which nevertheless we are able to do. 

To put it another way, our brains, which constitute the physical part of our thoughts, would not be able to follow what we do, so that from now on, we would become dependent on the artificial machines to do our thinking and speaking. Making us creatures at the mercy of every gadget that we have created.

The important part of all this is that Hannah wants us to understand that through technology we can alter the world and environment we live in, and because that environment and that world conditions us, the technology we employ, in a sense, also conditions us and we aren't always aware of how that plays out.

Moreover, she emphasizes that speech is what makes mankind a political being. If we were to adapt ourselves to technology, we would arrive at a stage where speech is meaningless. The ideas and concepts can begin to be so complex that we are unable to transfer them back to speech. 

For instance, think about our current technologies; how blockchain technology, the algorithms, AI, and even basically the economy becomes so complex that it is almost impossible to communicate between human beings about what is going on.

In a sense, our environment surpasses human intelligence, making us dependent on machines to communicate. This is a very important issue for Hannah, since men can only make sense of his world only to the extent that it can be spoken about.

Moving forward, Hannah talks about automation and how, from the time of writing, it would liberate humans from the burden of labor and necessity, and therefore, put the human condition at stake.

However, and this topic of labor will be further discussed in this newsletter, Hannah emphasizes that in the modern age we have a glorification of labor that has resulted in the transformation of the whole society. We have become a society of laborers which is about to be liberated from the burden of labor, creating a society that doesn’t know any other higher or meaningful activities for the sake for which this freedom would deserve to be won.

Now, this will all make sense in some minutes when we discuss the difference between labor and work, as well as what action is for her. But, in the meantime, for Hannah, nothing can be worse than a society of laborers getting liberated from labor, because it means putting their very definition at stake.

The Human Condition

Hannah starts this chapter by mentioning three fundamental aspects of the vita activa that define human existence: labor, work and action.

She refers to labor as the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, that is, survival. Work, on the other hand, is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence. It creates the “artificial world,” the things in this world that do not decay and are not bound to the vital necessities of life. 

Finally, action for Hannah is the only activity that happens between men without any intermediary of things or matter, and it is the highest realization of the vita activa.

Now, all these three categories constitute, again, human existence, which is defined by natality, death and mortality. Labor is the survival of the individual and the species. Work constitutes the permanence and durability of our mortality in this world. And action creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history. 

Furthermore, Hannah claims that the human condition involves being constantly conditioned by our environment, both human made and natural. This is very important, because the human condition isn’t the same as human nature. 

In fact, Hannah stresses that the problem with defining human nature is that it is unanswerable in both its psychological and philosophical sense, and the reason for this is that we cannot determine our own very nature the same way we do for other things. In other words, if we do have some nature, then surely only an external entity with consciousness can determine it. 

Moving forward, Hannah mentions the term vita activa and how it has evolved through time. She argues that the term is very old and that it grew out of a specific historical event: the trial of Socrates.

This trial is very important for history and mankind because it marks the end of some harmony, namely the harmony between the philosopher and the polis. Socrates was accused of impiety, that is, of disrespecting the gods of Athens, and corrupting the youth of the city with his philosophical ideas. 

In other words, the conflict between Socrates and the city-state is a critical episode in the history of political thought. It underscores the tension between individual philosophical inquiry and the demands of the political community, which attempted conformity and adherence to its religious norms.

Moreover, in the context of the Socrates' trial, the term vita activa, or bios politikos, takes on a specific meaning. Aristotle distinguished three ways of life, bioi which is one that men could choose in freedom without being constrained to the necessities of life. It excluded all labor, which, as we will learn soon, was the way of life of a slave.

The other ways of life were considered good, unnecessary and not merely useful, but beautiful. He describes that there was a life devoted to the pleasures, a life devoted to the matters of the polis, and the life of a philosopher, devoted to contemplation and the inquiry of everything around them.

Furthermore, it is important to note, at this point, that Hannah argues that the term "vita activa" in medieval philosophy served as the standard translation for the Aristotelian concept of "bios politikos." This translation retained its original meaning: a life devoted to public-political matters. 

To put it another way, "vita activa" and "bios politikos" were essentially synonymous, both referring to a way of life centered around activities required to establish and maintain a public and political realm.

Now, Hannah pays particular attention to the meaning and roots of words, as well as how they evolve over time, transforming our perception of things and, as a result, our worldviews. After the old city-state vanished, the term vita activa lost its political and public meaning and came to denote any type of active engagement in the things of this world. In other words, all activities were now considered needs of existence, leaving contemplation as the only true way of living.

Moreover, this meant that the men of thought and the men of action began to take different paths. One of the discoveries made by philosophers is that there are higher activities that men could do that did not involve the polis. For example, the differences between immortality and eternity.

Immortality, in the context of Greek understanding, represents the idea of enduring in time, enjoying a deathless life on Earth within the cyclical rhythms of nature. It is a concept deeply rooted in the Greek belief system, where nature was perceived as immortal, and the Olympian gods were perceived as eternal beings. 

With this in mind, the main concern for them was the mortality of humanity while being surrounded by immortal, but not eternal things like nature, and, in general, the cosmos itself. However, mortals have some potential greatness, and it lies in their capacity to create enduring works, deeds and words, so that through them mortality can find its place within a cosmos full of immortality.

This means that, for the Greeks, those who prefer mortal things and are content with the pleasures nature gives them, live and die like animals, leaving this world like mortals without any trace of immortality behind. 

Furthermore, Hannah claims that the distinction between the eternal and the immortal influenced the philosophical perspectives of the time. Philosophers debated whether pursuing immortality by worldly achievements and activities was pointless in the face of the eternal, which could only be experienced through contemplation. The collapse of the ancient city-state and the development of Christianity, which offered the promise of everlasting individual life, may have affected this shift in mentality, making immortality less relevant. 

In other words, the important pursuit of immortality through works, deeds, and words has declined with time.

Ultimately, the main point is that Hannah emphasizes the ongoing tension between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, with the latter connected with the experience of the eternal, as opposed to the pursuit of immortality.

The Public and Private Realm

The "vita activa," which refers to human life as it involves actively doing things, emphasizes that all human activities are closely tied to the world of human-made things and other people, so, it never transcends. 

In other words, human life, when we are actively engaged in doing something, always takes place within a world shaped by both people and the things they create. This world provides the setting for our actions and activities. For example, the objects we use, the land we cultivate, and the social organizations we establish are all part of this world. 

Furthermore, all of our actions are influenced by the fact that we live together with others, but it is specifically "action" that sets us apart. Unlike labor, which doesn't necessarily require the presence of others, action is unique to humans and depends on the constant presence of other people. In other words, it’s something we can only fully grasp in a social context.

This deep link between action and collective existence led to an early translation of Aristotle's concept of the "political animal" as a "social animal." This translation, first found in Seneca and later acknowledged by Thomas Aquinas, emphasized the link between being political and being social, blurring the boundaries between the political and social realms and eventually leading to the loss of the original Greek idea of politics.

In addition to this, Hannah claims that the term "social" itself has Roman origins and lacks a direct equivalent in Greek thought. In Latin, the word "societas" had a more limited political meaning, signifying alliances formed for specific purposes. In other words, it indicated a form of collective action with specific objectives.

Furthermore, Aristotle's original Greek perspective on social and political life was complex. He, like other Greek thinkers such as Plato, recognized the importance of human interaction and social bonds. 

However, they did not perceive this natural interaction as a uniquely political characteristic. Instead, it was regarded as a common characteristic of the animal kingdom. Human social interaction was perceived as a limitation imposed by biological needs, common to both humans and other forms of animal life.

To put it simply, Hannah wants us to understand that translation caused a shift in perception that eventually blurred the lines between the social and the political. The term “social” itself evolved, from one linked with specific political alliances to one signifying a universal human condition. 

Moving forward, the Greeks believed that the way people organized themselves politically in a city-state was very different from their family life. They saw these as two separate things. So, a person had their private life at home with their family, and then they had another kind of life outside of it as members of the city-state. They called this second life, “bios politikos.”

With this in mind, ancient Greeks believed that only two things were truly political and important: action and speech. Everything else, like daily tasks, were considered less important.

All this meant that political life, meaning your life outside of your private one, was shaped by your ability to speak well. The right words, at the right time, were not just about conveying information but were seen as a form of action itself.

However, with time, action and speech became separate things in the city-state. Speech became more important, not as a way of responding to things but as a way to convince others. To be “political” meant that everything was solved through speech and not through forcing or using violence.

This is where things get interesting. In ancient Greece, violence and in general, forcing individuals by commands, were pre-political ways to deal with people that did not belong to the polis, that is, slaves and barbarians, which were part of the private life, that is, the household, and not part of the political one. This also meant that slaves did not have the faculty of speech just like a member of the city-state.

Furthermore, when comparing power dynamics between a family with those within the political realm, the great mistake in translating the Greek term "political" into the Latin word "social" becomes evident. 

Even a tyrant's power was viewed as less "perfect" in Greece and throughout ancient times than the power of a household head. This was not because the household heads balanced the city's ruler, but because total and unquestioned power belonged to either the head of the home or the political realm. These two were just not the same.

Following this, we can see how the Greeks clearly distinguished between their private and public lives. Hannah further refers to our present era and how the political and social have become even more entangled in modernity.

Modernity, for Hannah, is characterized by the emergence of the social realm, which is neither public nor private. She argues that this has made us have a harder time differentiating between the private and the public, between activities related to the common, and those related to survival.

All this confusion makes us see people, and in general, communities, as entities that should be taken care of by a nation itself. She refers to this as the “social economy,” which is essentially a collective of families that are economically organized and are called a “society,” and their political form of organization is called “political economy.”

This is extremely important in her critique of modernity, because it is essentially a contradiction in Greek thought. Nothing that was related to survival could be translated into the polis, that is, the political realm, since survival is a non-political affair that belongs to the private realm of the household.

To begin to grasp this concept, we can start by saying that the city-state respected the boundaries of each citizen's property, not necessarily because they valued private property as we do today, but because owning a house was a requirement for participating in the city-state's activities. Even philosophers like Plato, who proposed radical ideas like the elimination of private property, still spoke with respect about the boundaries between properties and the protector of these boundaries. 

Following that, the main characteristic of the household was that people lived together out of necessity. The household was the realm of survival, and it required the company of people to provide for the needs of the species, like food and shelter. 

This meant that the only realm of freedom was political, and the only way to fully engage in it was to first master the necessities of life at home.

What’s more, as we all know, the way these necessities were being met was by using force and violence on slaves in order to justify this mastery. As a result, violence was permitted in the household. 

All this led to the polis being a realm where everyone was equal and where the household was the center of inequality. Equality was not justice, as in modern times, it was the very essence of freedom, it meant being free from the inequality present in rulership and to move in a realm where neither rule nor being ruled existed. 

This is why, according to Aristotle, "the good life" is only possible when you have mastered the necessities of life. It was good to the extent that you liberated yourself from the biological life process by mastering these necessities, that is, by being freed from labor, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living organisms for their own survival. 

This was very important in ancient Greece, where no activity that was necessary for the necessities of life, that is, of making a living, was permitted to enter into the public realm.

Now, the problem with modernity is that in contrast with the ancient times where "privacy" was a lack of participation in the public realm and where living an entirely private life was not considered human, modernity’s privacy is different. It is not primarily seen as a state of deprivation but rather as a sphere of intimacy and individualism.

Furthermore, Hannah’s insights help us in understanding this transformation. She points out that Jean-Jacques Rousseau played a significant role in exploring and defining the concept of intimacy. 

Rousseau's rebellion was aimed at society, with its rules and expectations, and how it had intruded upon the innermost regions of the human heart. He recognized the struggles faced by the modern individual, torn between the desire to conform to societal norms and the imperative to preserve personal autonomy.

In other words, he understood the tension that arises when individuals strive to preserve their authenticity in a world that demands conformity in order to achieve equality.

In modernity, the concept of privacy continues to evolve. It comprises a diverse range of personal experiences and interactions that were mostly unknown in earlier periods of human history. Modern privacy is distinguished by its ability to safeguard the private aspects of life, allowing for autonomy and self-expression within a social framework.

All of this means that the problem of modernity lies in the radical redefinition of privacy, which has shifted from a state of deprivation in ancient times to a domain of intimacy and individualism. As well as the definition of "equality," which encompasses the public rather than the private realm and redefines it from “family" to corresponding social groups that must conform to certain society regulations.

Moving forward, this conformism discourages individual action, since conformity aims to "normalize" individuals, discouraging spontaneous actions.

The emergence of mass society, or the social realm, signifies that social groups have been absorbed into a single overarching society, similar to how family units were absorbed earlier. This implies that society now encompasses and controls all members of a community with equal strength.

This control is due to the victory of society in the public realm, making distinction and difference private matters. Modern equality is different from the equality seen in ancient times, as we already discussed. In modern society, equality comes from conformity, where behavior replaces individual action as the primary mode of human interaction.

This conformism is the foundation of modern economics, which assumes that men do not act with regard for one another and operate just for self-interest and the desire to obtain more. Modern economics can only function if men are social beings with predictable behavioral tendencies. It aims at reducing complex human behavior to predictable patterns.

This assumption allows economics to become a scientific discipline, where statistics are used to predict patterns, which, in a sense, are useful when dealing with large numbers that require approximations. 

However, as the population increases, the public realm of society takes prominence over the political one. The ancient Greeks understood that their city-state's emphasis on action and speech could only exist if the population remained small. Because of conformism and automatism in human affairs, large populations tend to tilt towards despotism. 

Again, the challenge is that the more people who are subject to conformism, the less likely they are to tolerate unconventional behaviors and ideas, which are by definition, part of the complexity and diversity of human behavior.

Furthermore, if this wasn’t enough, Hannah claims that the clearest indication that society constitutes the public organization of the life process itself, is the fact that the social realm has transformed all communities into laborers. In other words, everyone has become that one activity necessary to sustain their lives. Modern society is the form of mutual dependence for the sake of life, where the activities connected to survival are permitted to appear in public.

This organizational principle of labor in the public realm gave rise to the division of labor, where one activity is divided in innumerable minute manipulations, which is different from specialization. 

Now, remember that Hannah pays special attention to the meaning of words. With this in mind, she first says that “public” signifies that everything in the public realm can be observed and heard by everyone, and hence “appearance,” a shared common world, constitutes “reality.” 

Moreover, she mentions that the passions of the heart, the intimate and private, are lost, unless we share them and make them appear in the public sphere. With this, she mentions that pain is highly private and almost impossible to communicate or transform into a public appearance. Pain is perhaps the only experience which we are unable to translate into the public sphere. It is, in other words, removed from the world of things that it cannot have any appearance at all. 

This means that those things that cannot be in the presence of others are considered irrelevant, and automatically become a private matter. This ironically makes aspects of life that are considered irrelevant by the public realm have an extraordinary and infectious charm in the private. 

One example Hannah gives of this is the French concept of "petit bonheur,” that refers to finding happiness and contentment in small insignificant things within one's own private space, like personal belongings. This focus on the small things signifies a shift away from the once great and glorious public realm. In a world dominated by rapid industrialization and the constant creation of new objects, the appreciation of small, enduring, and humane elements is portrayed as a form of beauty.

Second, she states that the "public" represents the world that all people share, as opposed to private ownership. She argues that what makes modern societies so difficult to manage is not the immense number of people, but the fact that the world they live in has lost its ability to unite them. That is exactly what Christianity, notably the works of Saint Augustine, aimed to achieve. The philosophy attempted to provide a bond for people who had lost their connection to the common world.

Now, Hannah touches on the topic of mortality again, claiming that the public realm and common world require permanence. The world must transcend the lifespans of individuals and be planned to endure for generations. Without this, there can be no politics or common world. 

This, again, leads us to Hannah’s observation that in the modern age, there's a significant loss of authentic concern with immortality. This loss contributes to the decline of the public realm in contemporary society, as people are no longer concerned with the idea of leaving a lasting mark in society, and if there is, it is mostly driven by vanity.

This vanity, which is characteristic of modern society, was expressed by Adam Smith who mentioned that public admiration and monetary reward are of the same nature. This reduces admiration to something that can be consumed much like food fulfills hunger. However, this perspective implies that the reality of an individual's needs is determined by the urgency of those needs, which are subjective.

In Hannah’s analysis, this subjective evaluation of needs is contrasted with the objective reality of the public realm. She argues that public admiration cannot replace the shared space where different perspectives come together to create a common world. The public realm’s vitality and endurance depend on the ability of individuals to see sameness among diversity, where everyone is engaged with the same object. This diversity of perspectives, rather than the conformity of mass society, is what sustains the public realm.

However, when the commonality of objects is no longer discerned, when it can only be seen under one aspect and it is allowed to present itself from only one perspective, the common world disintegrates. 

Furthermore, Hannah warns that this destruction can happen in conditions of radical isolation, as in tyrannies, or in mass society, where individuals behave as though they were members of one family, adopting singular perspectives. 

In both cases, the public realm is undermined, and individuals become imprisoned in their subjectivity, unable to relate or engage in shared experiences.

All this means that the loss of concern for immortality reflects not just a change in personal priorities but also a shift in societal values, where the pursuit of subjective needs and vanity overshadow the importance of a common world.

One very important point Hannah makes is the distinction between wealth and property that existed in the ancient times, and how it is often seen as the same in our modern world. 

In ancient times, property wasn't simply a matter of owning physical assets like land or real estate; it was deeply connected with an individual's role in society and their sense of belonging to a larger community. Property, as we already discussed, meant having a place in the world, a position within a community that constituted the public realm. 

In this context, property wasn't just about ownership; it was also about one's identity and status within society. Wealth, on the other hand, was often measured by the number of laborers or slaves one owned. These laborers could potentially free you from the necessities of life, allowing you to engage in other pursuits. 

This means that wealth was about having control over the means to sustain oneself, and not about the accumulation of excess resources in financial terms as we have today.

Now, as we see, as society emerged, property started to shift from being a personal matter to a public concern. It began to serve the accumulation of wealth rather than contributing to your personal identity. 

The shift which occurred with the development of the social realm, enabled property-owner organizations to demand the protection of their wealth, but not to gain access to the public realm, but to accumulate even more wealth.

This change marked the emergence of the concept of "common wealth" that came from activities that were previously exclusive to individuals or families. That is, wealth passed to be a public concern, in the sense that it was now threatening the stability of private possessions as it spread into the public sphere.

This change created a paradox, since even though wealth became more of a public concern, it still, in some sense, remained private. 

For instance, one of the ways we can see this paradox is that the government changed its roles. In earlier times, governments primarily served kings or rulers, while property was owned by subjects. 

However, as common wealth became a more prominent concept, governments started to play a role in protecting the interests of property owners. In other words, the government started to be responsible for protecting people's wealth, since the only thing that people have in common now is their private interests. 

The shift also changed how property was perceived. Initially, property was seen as something fixed in the world. But with this change, property became more linked to the individuals themselves, particularly in terms of their ability to work, which is often referred to as "labor-power."

To fully comprehend Hannah's points in this context, it's crucial to grasp the distinctions between the public and the private realms and recognize that the concept of the "social" is a modern development. 

She emphasizes that the four walls of one's private property serve as a dependable refuge from the public sphere. Privacy not only protects individuals from the events of the public world but also protects them from its very public nature. Privacy, in this sense, is fundamental for achieving depth and meaning in one's existence, and it is essential to differentiate it from wealth.

To put it differently, society's intrusion into privacy took various forms, including expropriation, where property was taken away, and a gradual erosion of the private realm appeared. While socialism or communism might seem to offer solutions by redistributing resources, these ideologies, even when their aim is to provide resources more equitably, can transform the issue into a social concern. This transformation often prompts criticism of capitalism as well since it places property at the center of wealth accumulation rather than viewing it primarily as a necessity for individuals.

Finally, to conclude this part of the book. Hannah touches the topic of “goodness.” She argues that the concept itself is strictly private. This is because once a good act becomes public, it loses its character of goodness, that is, of being done for nothing for goodness’ sake. Something good in the public realm is seen as an act of solidarity or charity, but never as an act that is good on its own. 

This concept of goodness is mainly religious, and comes from the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. He believed that no man can be truly good, and that only God can be.

The main point of this part of the chapter is that goodness is a non-human concept, because the genuinely good act is forgotten instantly, as it never forms part of the public world.

One good political way to understand this is with Machiavelli, who argued that both goodness and badness must remain hidden, as they can disrupt the common world. He claimed that “badness” destroys, and “goodness” corrupts on its own terms and carries its own corruption wherever it goes. 

This corruption is mainly rooted in the belief of excessive adherence to moral principles, which while virtuous in personal life, can be detrimental in the public realm.

This last analysis on goodness is just an invitation from Hannah that raises questions on how political communities determine which activities of the vita activa should be shown in public and which should remain private.

This leads us to the end of this discussion where we talked about the first two chapters of the book, as well as the introduction. In the following newsletter, we will talk about the concepts of labor, work, and action as they relate to Hannah's understanding of the human condition. But, for the time being, the categories of public and private can help us in understanding the roots of her thoughts, which will eventually help us understand the distinction between labor, work, and action.

Sources:

• Arendt, H. The Human Condition (2018th ed.). University of Chicago Press.

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“We feel free because we lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom.” - Slavoj Žižek

Highlights:

• Žižek describes the 20th century as the stage of the "passion for the real." He claims that people in this century became really interested in experiencing reality directly, without any filters or anticipated plans.

• We perceive “the Real” as a nightmare because it is very real, and fictionalizing it allows us to better understand and cope with certain aspects of true reality.

• The United States of America, during the 9/11 attacks, was given the opportunity to reflect on the kind of world they were living in and the one they had built as the world's most powerful country. Nonetheless, they chose to reaffirm their traditional ideological beliefs, and have absolutely no feelings of responsibility or guilt towards the impoverished Third World that was forced to participate in global capitalism.

• Happiness is just a category of mere Being, and, as such, it is confused, indeterminate and inconsistent.

• Happiness it's not necessarily about fully understanding and embracing all our desires, but rather about existing in a state where desires, including those beyond mere pleasure, remain somewhat unresolved.

• Knowing too much leads to feelings of unhappiness. As a result, "blessed ignorance" can occasionally lead to a better sense of fulfillment or happiness.

• During an election, people might choose a candidate despite doubts about their integrity, simply because they consider the alternative worse. This paradox shows that campaigns against corruption or issues within democracy often get co-opted by far-right populist movements. To put it another way, democracy is just an illusion and we should be conscious of the inherent imperfection and vulnerability of it.

• Žižek claims that unconventional ideas should be considered in order for real transformation to happen. We need risk and dramatic action without worrying about all the possible outcomes.

• Individualism and its idea on "focusing just on ourselves,” makes social reality continue its course without some real understanding. This means that for true fulfillment in any kind of relationship, including communities, we all need a third point to focus on.

• Žižek mentions the concept of the Homo sacer, which represents the distinction between individuals who are part of the legal system and those who are not. It is a Roman law figure that was used to describe a person who was outlawed and may be killed by anybody, but must not be sacrificed in a ritual of faith. In other words, it represents the line between humanity and the symbolic order.

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Žižek is a sophisticated thinker who, if we had to categorize him, we may read as a structuralist.  However, he is more than just that, his methodology has influences from Marxism, Hegelianism, post-structuralism, and psychoanalysis. All this makes him a complex thinker that requires readers to have some background in certain topics in order to really grasp his ideas.

That being said; today we'll talk about one of his short books, "Welcome to the Desert of the Real," which is work that may be considered outdated since it discusses the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack.

Nonetheless, it is a book worth discussing, at least on the surface, and I will try to make it as simple as possible for everyone to understand the symbolic meaning of important political reactions and events that have influenced the world we live in today.

But, before we begin, I should say that I will omit some parts of the book that may appear repetitive or are simply more examples of the same idea. This will generally make the content less lengthy and more to the point. Those familiar with Žižek will understand what I mean; each chapter has an overall message, yet he goes off on tangents and illustrates the same topic from multiple perspectives.

Now, without further delay, let’s begin with a joke. But not just any joke; this is a joke that sets the stage for what Žižek will talk about in his book, namely how communication can be manipulated under certain conditions:

“A German worker gets a job in Siberia; aware of how all mail will be read by the censors, he tells his friends: 'Let's establish a code: if a letter you get from me is written in ordinary blue ink, it's true; if it's written in red ink, it's false.

After a month, his friends get the first letter, written in blue ink: 'Everything is wonderful here: the shops are full, food is abundant, apartments are large and properly heated, cinemas show films from the West, there are many beautiful girls ready for an allair-the only thing you can't get is red ink. 

The structure here is more refined than it might appear: although the worker is unable to signal that what he is saying is a lie in the prearranged way, he nonetheless succeeds in getting his message across - how? By inscribing the very reference to the code into the encoded message, as one of its elements. 

Of course, this is the standard problem of self-reference: since the letter is written in blue, is its entire content therefore not true? The answer is that the very fact that the lack of red ink is mentioned, signals that it should have been written in red ink. The nice point is that this mention of the lack of red ink produces the effect of truth independently of its own literal truth: even if red ink really was available, the lie that it is unavailable is the only way to get the true message across in this specific condition of censorship.”

This joke shows a very effective critique of ideology. Not only in authoritarian extreme circumstances like this one, but also in a general libertarian way of life. We can say we have every freedom we want, but when we lack the "red ink," we nevertheless "feel free," simply because we lack the vocabulary to express our unfreedom.

Passion for the Real: Traverse the Fantasy

Žižek describes the twentieth century as the stage of the "passion for the real." He claims that people in this century became really interested in experiencing reality directly, without any filters or anticipated plans. This was different from the 19th century when people focused on big ideas and projects for the future. The 20th century was more about wanting to experience the actual thing itself, even if it was intense and extreme, rather than just talking about it or planning for it.

Moreover, there are several examples of this in the chapter but one of them talks about Bertolt Brecht, a famous playwright, who in July 1953, while he was on his way from his home to the theater, saw Soviet tanks heading to a street. 

These tanks were being sent to stop a  rebellion. But instead of being scared or angry, Brecht did something surprising: he waved at the tanks as they passed by.

Later that day, Brecht wrote in his diary that this moment made him feel like he wanted to join the Communist Party, even though he had never been a member before. This might seem strange because the tanks were being used to put down a rebellion, and the situation was violent and harsh. 

However, the situation shows the paradox of the "passion for the real," as it is its polar opposite, a total spectacle. And one of the most famous examples of this century is the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

To start making sense of this, let's imagine the act of cutting ourselves with a knife. This act, according to Žižek, is a desperate attempt to return to reality. It is a pathological phenomenon that attempts to return to some level of normality in order to avoid a breakdown. However, as we can all guess, it concludes in a spectacle, a symbol of destruction.

Now, the way our lives revolve around human made events, concepts and even products, can blur the lines in between what is real and what is fake. This does not mean that we cannot literally make a critical observation and know what is real and fake, but the way human made objects lack genuine substance of reality can start to play with our minds.

In other words, our world has become unreal and devoid of substance as a result of its infatuation with materialism. One way to see this is that, even after tremendous events such as terrorist attacks, the reality being seen through the television does not represent the reality of the situation. It becomes almost like a spectacle, similar to the special effects in movies. 

In the case of the terrorist attacks, people felt motivated to view the footage again and again, feeling a strange satisfaction despite the tragic nature of the event.

This feeling is described by Žižek as "jouissance," which is a kind of excessive pleasure that, even in the face of tragedy, illustrates the powerful and complex ways in which human emotions and responses can work. It is a realm where pain and pleasure are indistinguishable from one another.

This means that it is when we saw these towers collapsing on the television that we became aware of the falsity of “reality TV shows”: even if these shows are for real people acting on them. Žižek provides an example of this with the movie "The Truman Show,” where the main character gradually realizes that his life is a 24-hour TV show. 

Moreover, this film illustrates a sense of unreality in our modern society. The idea is that our hyper consumerist culture creates a kind of "hyperreality" where things seem real but lack true substance. Again, one example is that even after major events like the World Trade Center collapse, the media shows a very different view of the situation, creating a sense of unreality even in our daily lives. 

The media's way of showing such events keeps a distance between the viewers and the victims, creating a sense of separation from the real situation. This ties back to the idea that even real-life events can take on a staged or unreal quality due to media manipulation.

This brings us to the conclusion that Hollywood has an immense control over ideology and the lines it creates between reality and fiction. The September 11 attacks were not entirely unexpected because similar scenarios had been shown in movies; and our exposure to such fantasies in films influences our expectations and responses to actual real events. Hence the way we react to them, and how we experience jouissance when exposed to them.

In other words, the real events are merely fantasy shattered into reality.

Now, the question Žižek seeks to answer is this:

Why in the middle of well-being, are we haunted by nightmarish visions and catastrophes?

The answer is that in the middle of a state of "feeling good," we look for catastrophes because it is a way of resisting reality. This perspective aligns with a postmodern view that suggests 'reality' is a symbolic creation that we misinterpret as an independent and concrete entity.

However, Žižek argues that, from a psychoanalytic standpoint, there is an opposite view. Instead of mistaking reality for fiction, we should avoid mistaking fiction for reality. In this way, some aspects of our experiences that we consider fictional might actually contain actual reality, but we handle or process these aspects by transforming them into fiction.

To put it another way, in our daily lives, we are submerged in a reality that is sustained by fantasies, which is our ideology; these fantasies contribute to our constructed perception of reality. This immersion is disrupted by symptoms that act as witnesses to the fact that another suppressed level of our mind resists total immersion in this fantasy. 

As a result, we always "traverse the fantasy," meaning that we identify with the fantasy, particularly the one that generates excess and resists our complete immersion in the constructed reality.

All this means that the return of the Real is not simply a return to an authentic existence, but rather a traumatic and excessive experience that is difficult to integrate into our perception of reality. 

In other words, the Real itself is often seen as an uncomfortable, terrifying apparition. However, from a psychoanalytic perspective, this discomfort might arise from the fact that some elements of reality need to be fictionalized to be comprehended and accepted.

In a nutshell, it is a nightmare because it is very real, and fictionalizing the Real allows us to better understand and cope with certain aspects of true reality.

Now, we can clearly see how fictionalizing reality is a coping mechanism. Žižek argues that, from a psychoanalytic perspective, forgetting historical traumas is not straightforward. Traumas that individuals are not ready or able to remember continue to haunt them more powerfully. This paradoxically means that in order to genuinely forget an event, we must first find the strength to remember it properly.

In other words, the opposite of existence is not nonexistence, but insistence. What doesn't exist still causes influence, persistently striving for existence.  

Furthermore, Žižek uses Benjamin's perspective to demonstrate how modern revolutionary goals might be regarded as revisiting or even redeeming previous failed attempts at revolution. This suggests current actions are not isolated events; they contain traces of past struggles and unresolved goals, giving fresh life to previously unsuccessful attempts.

These are known as symptoms, and they are just defenses that insist and persist in historical experience.

Moving forward, Žižek delves into the concept of the symbolic hidden rules within systems of power. He illustrates this by examining the ways in which institutions, such as the Catholic Church and even the Nazi regime, operate with hidden laws. 

The first example is the Catholic Church and the establishment of the Opus Dei, an organization that functions under an unwritten set of norms characterized by unquestioning loyalty to the Pope and a commitment to promoting the Church's interests. This group embodies a form of authority that defies conventional legality, operating by its own standards.

For instance, Žižek explores the Church's handling of the widespread sexual abuse cases involving priests.  He claims that these incidents show a counterculture within the Church that operates under its own set of hidden standards and overlaps with the Opus Dei level. The Church's refusal to cooperate with legal authorities and insistence on treating the situation as an internal matter demonstrate the operation of hidden principles that prioritize the institution's preservation.

Moreover, another example of the same concept is Žižek’s analysis of the Nazi regime. He focuses particularly on a speech by Hitler where he openly addresses the mass killing of Jews as a proud historical act. This acknowledgement of brutality demonstrates how the Nazis manipulated power through a similar dynamic of hidden rules, acknowledging and even celebrating the "dirty work" done for the advancement of their ideology.

Finally, all these examples illustrate a broader point about the dynamics of power and ideology. Žižek contrasts the reactionary and progressive approaches to confronting the Real, which represents the underlying truth or antagonism that disrupts the symbolic order. 

The "reactionary" approach involves embracing the hidden and darker aspects of the Law, power, and authority. This means accepting the less favorable sides of these forces. On the other hand, the "progressive" approach revolves around confronting the true reality, including the antagonisms that are often overlooked by ideologies.

Žižek challenges the usual understanding of the "Real." He argues that it's not merely a frightening truth concealed beneath symbolic layers. Instead, he argues that the Real includes symbolic creations or specters that shape how we perceive the world around us.

For instance, consider Nazi ideology. They used the notion of the Jews as a specter, a symbolic representation of a hidden conflict. By portraying the Jews as a perceived threat, the Nazis rallied society together against this common enemy. This helped them create a sense of unity, even though it was based on an underlying conflict or antagonism.

This is where we can introduce the concept of "Homo sacer," which represents the distinction between individuals who are part of the legal system and those who are not. It is a Roman law figure that was used to describe a person who was outlawed and may be killed by anybody, but must not be sacrificed in a ritual of faith. In other words, it represents the line between humanity and the symbolic order. The border between who is protected by the law and who is vulnerable without legal repercussions. 

Terrorism: The West and the Clash of Civilizations

When September 11 happened, people started thinking a lot about Islam and Arab culture, trying to understand it better and desiring to see Islam as a great spiritual force rather than as a threat. 

However, Žižek argues that trying to understand these cultures doesn't really help us understand why those attacks happened. Additionally, Islam has historically been more tolerant towards other religions than Christianity, which can help us to change the modern perspective of Islam as inherently intolerant towards other cultures.

With this in mind, Žižek claims that the response to the September 11 attacks, like the US attacking Afghanistan, is a kind of action that might even be more about showing off power than actually making things better. 

Because, why would it be a good idea to fight against a country that nobody cares about and that barely has anything to be destroyed?

Moreover, Žižek shows how wars were fought with soldiers on the ground before, but now they are transcending to something different. People can control attacks from computers far away, like if they were in a video game. And this is similar to how terrorists act, in hidden and secret ways. This creates a new notion of an "invisible" war, where attacks could be anything but actual weapon attacks. 

This new kind of war changes how we understand conflict, and makes us enter into a state of paranoia, where it's hard to identify who the real enemy is. This can lead to conspiracy theories and widespread fear among people.

Moving forward, Žižek talks about this clash of civilizations from a philosophical perspective by referencing Nietzsche and Hegel. He argues that this clash is between passive nihilism, represented by consumerist societies in the West, and active nihilism, manifested in radical movements. This distinction is used to shed light on the different motivations and sacrifices made by these groups. 

For example, in the West, we are the Nietzschean Last Men, immersed in daily pleasures, while the Muslims are willing to risk all, fighting even to the point of self-destruction.

One example is the traumatic impacts that we see in the West. For instance, when the stock exchange was closed for four days and then reopened the next Monday, it was viewed as the ultimate proof that everything was back to normal.

This shows how, despite the perception of the West as exploitative masters, they are, above all, servants. They cling to pleasures to the point of being unable to risk their own lives.

Now, in the months following the attacks, something very interesting happened. A unique phenomenon between a traumatic event and a symbolic impact arose. Americans experienced pride more than ever, but Žižek emphasizes that there was nothing “innocent” about this reaction. 

According to him, what actually happened was ideological interference, in which they fully assumed the symbolic mandate that comes after a big trauma. Because, after a painful event like 9/11, what could be more natural than seeking comfort in the innocence of a strong ideological identification like nationalism? 

To put it another way, the United States of America was given the opportunity to reflect on the kind of world they were living in and the one they had built as the world's most powerful country. 

Nonetheless, they chose to reaffirm their traditional ideological beliefs, and have absolutely no feelings of responsibility or guilt towards the impoverished Third World that was forced to participate in global capitalism.

This leads to the conclusion that Žižek invites us to reflect the political dimension of terrorism and understand that treating terrorists as mere criminals misses the larger political context. He argues that terrorism is a phenomenon within the capitalist universe and that the struggle against it is not necessarily the true struggle.

Happiness After September 11

In psychoanalysis the betrayal of desire is called happiness. Žižek argues that happiness is a complex and somewhat elusive state of being, often characterized by a balance of certain conditions. 

To illustrate this, he uses the context of life in Czechoslovakia during the late 1970s and 1980s.

During this time he noted that people's basic material needs were met, but not in excess. Sometimes shortages happened, which actually helped people appreciate the availability of goods when they were present.

Furthermore, the ruling party was held responsible for anything that went wrong, which allowed people to avoid feeling personally responsible for problems. And last, people were allowed to dream about and occasionally visit a more consumer-focused society, which was not too far away but distant enough to maintain the sense of a better life.

But nowadays this balance has been disturbed. By what exactly? By nothing more than desire. This emotion drives people to seek more than what they have, which eventually leads to changes in the full system they live in. As a result, many people are actually less happy.

Happiness then is just a category of mere Being, and, as such, it is confused, indeterminate and inconsistent. 

In addition to this, Žižek claims that the concept of "happily ever after" is a Christianized version of the pagan concept of "the goal of life is to be happy." He goes on to say that people like Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, have had a lot of success preaching the gospel of happiness all over the world, and that it's no surprise that he got the most response in the United States, where the ultimate empire of the "pursuit" of happiness resides.

Now, if we delve deeper, the relationship between happiness and the pleasure principle becomes apparent. The pleasure principle, a foundational concept in psychoanalysis, says that individuals instinctively seek pleasure and avoid pain. 

However, happiness is vulnerable to disruption when there is an insistence on something more than the natural pursuit of pleasure. 

This means that true happiness is connected to the subject's inability or reluctance to fully confront the consequences of these deeper desires. In other words, people suppress certain desires because they fear the outcomes or implications. This avoidance can create a sense of inconsistency in their desires.

To illustrate this concept, consider scenarios in daily life. People regularly find themselves "pretending" that they desire things they don't really desire. This desire mask operates as a defense mechanism, protecting individuals from future disappointment, and ironically, striving for these surface desires serves to lessen the potential pain of not getting what they truly desire. 

This highlights an important truth: happiness it's not necessarily about fully understanding and embracing all our desires, but rather about existing in a state where desires, including those beyond mere pleasure, remain somewhat unresolved.

Moving forward, this is exactly what happens in political scenarios. According to Žižek, the Left, for example, continually insists on things that they know the capitalist system cannot provide. For example, full employment, the welfare state, and so forth. He claims that the issue is not that these demands cannot be met, but that individuals who make them do not truly want them to be realized.

This situation creates a state where people, politicians in this case, can continue to desire things that they do not really want, while at the same time, enjoy their current privileged position. 

Now, another claim Žižek makes on happiness is that knowledge makes us unhappy, and I cannot agree more. We are all aware that the more we learn about something, the more we want to control and the more disappointed we get. 

With this in mind, Jacques Lacan said that the attitude of human beings is that of “I do not want to know about it,” which contradicts the core curiosity in humans. This means that every new discovery humanity makes has to be bought by a painful struggle against our innate propensities. In short, too much knowledge can lead to complicated feelings and unexpected changes in how we see things.

However, Žižek argues that sometimes when we know someone we trust knows something, even if we do not know what they know, it can bring a sense of discomfort. 

For instance, there is an example of a genetic disease in a family. One member of this family decides to take the test to know if they have the disease or not. After reflecting, they decide to take the test and authorize another person they trust to test them and not tell them the result. 

This would result in an unexpected death if the result was positive. The problem with this, Žižek argues, is that the person knows that the other person knows the truth about the illness, and this changes the way they see the situation, since it creates further anguish because you know that they know something important about you.

This helps us understand a perplexing part of knowing things and how it is more than just learning new information. When you discover that someone else knew something important but kept it a secret, the entire scenario changes. This can be even more frightening than merely knowing the new information.

Moving forward, Žižek redirects this to society: Would the ultimate fantasy of happiness be that of an institution doing things to us without our knowledge?

This connects to the topic of knowing the other knows. People would be unaware of what is going on behind the scenes if the institutions secretly know information about them and take dramatic steps based on that knowledge. 

This shows how distrust and discomfort are compounded on a societal level in a totalitarian system. People would constantly be afraid that someone else knows things about them that they aren't aware of, and that their life could be manipulated without their knowledge or consent. This lack of transparency and control over their own life reflects the discomfort experienced when realizing someone holds important knowledge about them. 

As a result, we can conclude that "blessed ignorance" can occasionally lead to a better sense of fulfillment or happiness.

On that note, Žižek makes the claim that in Hollywood we can really see some “blessed ignorance” in play. For instance, in movies like "The Land Before Time," which is a popular children's show by Steven Spielberg, there is a message of embracing diversity and differences among individuals. 

In this message, Žižek argues that there is a comforting narrative that encourages people to focus on understanding each other's differences rather than trying to understand the potential conflicts or underlying issues that could arise from those differences. 

Now, I should point out that Žižek can appear to be on either end of the spectrum at times. And that's because he rarely is. His job is to encourage us to consider both sides of the issue and to be more critical of how we think. In other words, he is urging us to recognize that this approach of embracing diversity may cause us to overlook a deeper reality – that there are antagonisms, conflicts, and tensions inherent in society.

Following this, another concept of happiness and ideology is mentioned. Žižek argues that in our post-ideological world, we often perform symbolic roles without fully embracing them or being conscious about them.

For instance, he uses the film "Shrek" to illustrate how ideology functions in popular culture. He points out that even though the film uses humorous elements, such as Fiona turning out to be an ugly ogre and a dragon turning out to be nice, it still transmits the same classic fairy tale story underneath. The film's creative twists and contemporary references serve to adapt the story for a "postmodern" period while retaining the same narrative.

According to Žižek, these types of stories hinder the formation of new narratives that challenge the present ideological framework. He claims that making fun of our beliefs while continuing to practice them is a form of subversion, because it actually just reinforces them.

Another critique he makes is how society links certain characteristics to concrete conclusions. For example, he argues that mass choreography, like parades, or strong discipline in general, are often labeled as having proto-Fascist characteristics. 

However, Žižek stresses that we must understand that these performances aren't inherently fascist. Same goes for any kind of strong language that might remind someone of the hateful language used in anti-Semitic writings by the Nazis.

Furthermore, he points out that none of the "Proto-fascist" characteristics are inherently fascist, and that it all depends on whether or not we take into account the historical events that give rise to certain words or terms.

This means that if we look at Nazism from a standard analysis, that is, looking for the term's origins and influences, we will find elements that are "proto-Fascist" even before Nazism emerged. A Nietzschean genealogy, on the other hand, would see the rupture that led to the rise of Nazism as a unique historical event. 

In this view, the elements themselves aren't inherently fascist; they become fascist through how they're put together. In other words, it's the labeling and articulation that make elements fascist. 

What Žižek is doing here is warning us about the dangers of simplistically connecting certain elements or attitudes with fascism without analyzing the complexities of their origins and development. That holds true for any other term we might use to describe a scenario. Sometimes things appear to be something they are not. 

Now, as we already saw, Žižek argues that the meaning of a concept isn't solely inherent within itself; rather, its significance depends on how it's used and connected to other ideas. This also applies to democracy, which is often regarded as a fundamental concept. 

However, Žižek asks us to reconsider how we treat democracy. The concept in our modern world is often seen as a way to temporarily suppress social conflicts during elections. The social hierarchy is momentarily set aside, and the focus becomes the number of people who support a certain idea. 

This leads to a temporary reduction of tension. However, Žižek gives some examples to show the issues that democracy gives to our societies. When people need to make decisions, they are often faced with choices where all options seem problematic. 

For instance, during an election, people might choose a candidate despite doubts about their integrity, simply because they consider the alternative worse. This paradox shows that campaigns against corruption or issues within democracy often get co-opted by far-right populist movements.

To put it another way, democracy is just an illusion and we should be conscious of the inherent imperfection and vulnerability of it. 

Finally, Žižek claims that unconventional ideas should be considered in order for real transformation to happen. We need risk and dramatic action without worrying about all the possible outcomes. Like Napoleon used to say: "On attaque et puis on verra," which translates to "we attack, and then we'll see." That is, when faced with uncertainty and complexity, taking an active step forward without knowing all of the implications can be the most effective way to bring about meaningful change.

This perspective on change has been captured in other cultures as well. In Russian, for example, there is the expression "awos or na awos," which translates as "on our luck." This notion expresses the feeling that when taking a risky and dramatic step, there is hope that things will turn out well despite the uncertainties, representing a combination of bold action and confidence in the future.

In conclusion, just as we are encouraged as individuals to push ourselves outside of our comfort zones and think outside the box in order for meaningful change to happen, we should do the same as a society. 

Because, in the end, if we want something different, something that really changes things for the better, we must take drastic steps into the unknown.

The Homo Sacer

Žižek claims that sometimes we get so caught up in certain beliefs or causes that we end up doing things that go against those very beliefs. 

For example, let's say there are people who strongly oppose religion, thinking it's oppressive. They might start fighting against that religion to protect freedom.

However, in their fight against it, they might end up losing their own freedom because they become so focused on their cause. So, the irony is that their efforts to protect freedom lead to them sacrificing their own freedom.

This same scenario happened in the West when trying to fight against terrorism.

Furthermore, Žižek argues that something similar happens nowadays with subjectivity and individualism. People believe that instead of trying to change big things in the world, we should focus on changing ourselves in personal ways. 

In other words, privacy itself becomes a totally objectivized and commodified sphere. From taking spiritual enlightenment, all the way to following the latest trends and engaging in yoga or body-building.

However, this approach has its problems. What we really need nowadays in order to break out of the constraints of this alienated commodification is to invent a new collectivity.

In other words, in order to have an intense and rewarding relationship in the private sphere, such as how a couple attempts to look into each other's eyes, forgetting about the world around them in order to make their bond stronger. The reality is that for this bond to become strong like that, they need a third point, a cause for which both are fighting, and in which they are both engaged. 

We all know that common objectives and aspirations are essential in a relationship. Žižek argues that the same thing happens in society. Staying in the private sphere does not help in bringing about real transformation. By focusing just on ourselves, the social reality continues its course without some real understanding.

This means that for true fulfillment in any kind of relationship, including communities, we all need a third point to focus on.

To put it another way, the global subjectivity we experience today does not make objectivity go away, rather it makes subjectivity itself disappear while the social reality continues its course unattended.

Furthermore, Žižek says that in the West, there are a lot of books about disappearing completely and reinventing oneself, which reflect the Western focus on self-discovery and self-improvement. He then contrasts this with Zen Buddhism and how the philosophy aims to empty the mind and rejects the idea of a fixed "self,” or of finding oneself. 

This suggests that Zen is more about emptying oneself and accepting that there is no inner truth to be found. It contrasts with the West in that there is no inner substance and no inner journey. Where the essence is pure faith, duty, and even community fidelity.  

With this idea in mind, Žižek returns to the subject of risk. He stresses once more that true life involves going beyond survival and finding an excess, something worth risking one's life for.

To illustrate this, Žižek asks this question: 

What if the suicide bomber on the point of blowing himself up was in a sense “more alive,” than the American soldier engaged in war in front of a computer screen hundreds of miles away? Isn't the ultimate aim of his compulsive ritual to prevent the “thing” from happening - this “thing” being the excess of life itself? Is it not the catastrophe he fears, the fact that something will really happen to him?

In other words, this shows that being truly alive involves a strong desire to live combined with a fearless attitude towards dying. That is, the fear of introducing a radical imbalance into the social structure. And the truth that we are truly alive only when we are willing to take a chance. This applies for everything, including politics.

Moving forward, Žižek touches on the topic of the Homo Sacer again, but this time explains it. As we already briefly explained, the concept refers to people who are alive but are not part of the political community. 

Žižek uses several examples to show how this idea plays out in real life. One of these examples is some prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, where they are not treated the same as regular citizens. They do not have the same rights or benefits. It is as though they're stuck in a sort of limbo, they are not technically criminals, but are also not fully integrated into society.

Moreover, Žižek's point is that this idea of Homo Sacer is becoming more relevant in today's world. The way conflicts and politics are unfolding is different now. Traditional wars between countries are happening less often. Instead, there are conflicts involving groups of people who don't fit completely into categories like soldiers or criminals. These conflicts challenge human rights and often lead to situations where some people are pushed to the sidelines.

This Homo Sacer dynamic becomes crucial in understanding the changing nature of politics and rights. It encourages us to look at the distinction between human rights that should extend to all individuals, even those on the margins of society, and the more particular rights of citizens within a defined political community.

However, Žižek goes a step further and provides a more extreme perspective. He suggests that maybe we all start in a position of exclusion, where our basic status is that of objects controlled by large political systems, or biopolitics, as he refers to it. 

According to this perspective, the rights associated with citizenship are not basic rights but are given to us as a secondary gesture, slowly created by the very same political systems we are immersed in. 

Now, Žižek delves deep into the background of the Homo Sacer, connecting it to thinkers such as Adorno and Foucault. In this context, Homo Sacer is an essential component to unlocking the complex relationship between human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, as well as something known as "biopower," which refers to the ways in which political authorities exert control over people's lives, bodies, and health for the benefit of society.

Moreover, returning to the main point, Homo Sacer invites us to consider whether our ideas of human rights and democracy sometimes mask the true nature of control mechanisms inherent in biopower. 

Could these dynamics, represented by the horrific concentration camps of the previous century, be operating under the mask of democratic governance? Is our current desire for political freedom really a mask for the collapse of personal autonomy in a world ruled by late capitalism?

For example, consider today's society, where the line between politics and daily life appears to be blurring. Control and management of daily life are becoming increasingly important in this world, nearly to the point of being the primary focus. Totalitarian phenomena are not simply deviations from the ideals of the Enlightenment; they hint to the "truth" behind these principles. 

Could these seemingly opposing ideas be founded in the same problem, namely the suppression or exclusion of something very troubling?

To understand this, imagine a world in which we think we have freedom but we are actually controlled by a hidden system. The film "The Matrix'' is an excellent example of this. A world in which humans are trapped in a simulated reality, supplying energy to the Matrix against their will. 

But why does this mechanism need our energy? Why didn’t it get the energy from elsewhere?

The answer is that it isn’t just about power; it's about desire. Just like how humans desire things, this system, metaphorically depicted as the "Matrix," craves something too. It needs constant human jouissance. And when we wake up to the “reality” we are actually just realizing the fantasy that sustains it - our own selves.

Now, on the topic of society structures. Some thinkers, like Agamben, challenge us to study the very concept of democracy. They say that Agamben's concept of Homo Sacer shouldn't just be part of a project to redefine exclusion. Instead, it should open up the conversation so that even excluded voices can be heard in public discourse. 

This idea aligns with Judith Butler's reading of Antigone, a character from Greek mythology, who stands for those without a clear social status, so we can rethink the boundaries that define inclusion and exclusion.

Moreover, Žižek argues that Hegel and Lacan get into this context. They analyze conflict and how it relates to the structure of society. Hegel sees a split between different elements like state and family, while Lacan emphasizes how certain figures, like Antigone, represent the limits of established norms.

However, Judith Butler, doesn't fully side with either of these views. They argue that Antigone isn't just a radical outsider but also someone aiming to reshape the norms from within. This shift isn't purely theoretical; it's about challenging how society is organized and seeking change in specific conditions.

In other words, Butler's key point here is that we shouldn't simply see these conflicts as black and white choices. Instead, we should consider the possibility of reimagining societal norms, especially when it comes to defining roles, boundaries, and even the rules that shape how we live together.

Now, Žižek really emphasizes the concept of the Homo Sacer and its exclusions, and gives us several examples. Another exploration of this concept comes with how it relates to torture. Especially after the attack of 9/11. 

With this in mind, he mentions one discussion in an article by Jonathan Alter, titled "Time to Think about Torture," which explores the idea that extreme circumstances might need extreme measures, even if those measures seem ethically unacceptable. Žižek asks questions of the logic of using the urgency of a situation to justify torture, pointing out the risk of this justification leading to further unethical practices.

Interestingly, Žižek argues that simply bringing up torture as a legitimate issue for debate is more detrimental than openly promoting it. 

This is because bringing up the subject of torture softly changes the boundaries of what is acceptable. Making the ethical implications of normalizing torture for short-term gains a concern, because it eventually opens the way to broader acceptance of torture in other contexts, eroding human rights.

Furthermore, Žižek highlights how “states of emergency” can alter human rights or basic needs in the name of national security. This happened after 9/11 and he argues the paradoxical nature of how a state of war can be declared while daily life continues, blurring the distinction between states of war and peace. This perspective introduces a new paradigm where a state of peace itself can coexist with a state of emergency.

With this in mind, Žižek explores the interplay between two types of emergencies: the contemporary "liberal-totalitarian emergency of the war on terrorism" and the authentic revolutionary state of emergency that has historical roots.

He highlights how the declaration of a state of emergency often serves as a desperate strategy by state institutions to counteract genuine unrest and the return to a regular and normal life. This is similar to other times in history when conservative regimes declared states of emergency to supress rebellions, which ironically intensified the true emergency they were attempting to address.

Moving forward, Žižek introduces the notion of the "enemy" and its construction through imagination and conceptualization. He argues that enemy recognition is performative, and requires the construction of concrete features that render the enemy recognizable and worthy of struggle. 

This explains why the Jews were the enemy by excellence. Politics needs an image of a recognizable enemy in order to sustain itself and provide a focal point. In short, enemy recognition is always a performative procedure that constructs the enemy's “true face.” This connects with the idea of the third focal point that we discussed above.

To illustrate this, after the collapse of the Communist states there was a lack of a clear enemy figure, leading to confusion and inefficiency. However, this lack of a central image changed with the events of September 11, which allowed the construction of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda as the new enemy figures, and this same phenomenon continues to build its way up to other faces with time. 

Finally, Žižek concludes by discussing the metaphorical universalization of the term "terror." He argues that there are instances where the notion of terror is elevated to symbolize broader societal issues. He points out how campaigns linked drug use to supporting terrorism, exemplifying how "terror" becomes a hidden universal equivalent for various social problems.

After this, Žižek talks about Palestinians and how they are often treated as Homo sacers by the Israeli people, yet at the same time as neighbors. 

I'm skipping this last chapter because it mostly discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provides critical deep insights into its underlying complexities and obstacles. 

But briefly, Žižek mentions the pervasive reality of daily humiliations that the Palestinians endured, and how they were often treated like disobedient children who require discipline and punishment to be brought back to a normal life. He further points out how they were daily being attacked while simultaneously being expected to crack down on their attacks.

In other words, the Palestinian people were humiliated on a daily basis by being attacked and then being ask to peacefully accept these attacks, because if they defend themselves and fight back, they are labeled as terrorists. He argues that this contradiction weakened their authority and ability to keep peace because they were expected to endure attacks while also silencing those behind them.

In short, if we want to delve more into Žižek's understanding of this topic, we can turn to the book's last chapter for some insightful analysis. But, overall, there isn’t anything else to cover from there.

To conclude, I believe this book provides an in-depth analysis of historical events and allows us to gain a deeper understanding of them. Žižek's psychoanalytic background gives him a unique perspective on human psychology and its symbolic consequences for reality. Humanity frequently acts in ways that appear to be something we can read as concrete, but are actually manifestations of repressed desires. It's fascinating to see how concepts from human psychology may be applied to large societal structures and how this eventually translates to the construction of our “objective” reality.

I've always believed that it is a healthy practice to look at things from different perspectives and try to figure out why they are the way they are. Welcome to the desert of the Real.

Sources:

• Žižek, S. (2002). Welcome to the Desert of the Real. Verso: First Edition.

Beyond Thought.

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In our last newsletter we started discussing “Hegel and Modern Society” by Charles Taylor, and went through the explanation he provided in the book to understand Hegelian thought. This is the second part of this discussion. So, if you haven’t checked out the first part yet, you may do so right here.

The first part is necessary for understanding the second one. You can also listen to the audio on my YouTube channel.

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Without further delay, let’s get right into it!

Highlights:

• Industrialization and technological progress have solidified Enlightenment ideas in modern societies, shaping them according to efficiency and utilitarian evaluations.

• Modern civilization reflects a romanticized private life alongside rationalized public life, leading to tensions and calls for reintegration of Romanticism. The expressive side of humanity.

• Hegel's view seeks to reconcile autonomy and unity by embodying Geist in the State as the collective embodiment of society's spirit, norms, and culture. The State is more than just a government; it encompasses institutions, norms, culture, and the ethical line of society.

• Geist, similar to Rousseau's concept of the “will,” finds realization through the State, with Hegel emphasizing the importance of collective identity.

• Alienation and lack of identification with communities leads to attempts to restore purpose and identity, often through ideologies like Marxism or nationalism.

• Unlike Marx's perspective, Hegel sees historical progress and the emergence of a rational state as a gradual, cultural, and spiritual evolution rather than a pre-planned formula.

• “Sittlichkeit” is a term from Hegel's philosophy that refers to the ethical and social order of a community or society. It encompasses the norms, customs, institutions, and shared values that shape the collective identity and behavior of individuals within that community.

• The modern individual's identity is centered around being a producer, reflecting the current "Sittlichkeit" embedded in institutions and practices. This identity is driven by growth, control over nature, and productivity. As long as this identity persists, societal structures and institutions will remain unchanged.

• Hegel's philosophy remains relevant due to his exploration of how societies can maintain harmony through emotional attachment to community and institutions. Hegel believed that without this attachment, people might feel disconnected, leading to alienation that could harm civilizations.

• Karl Marx tried to redefine the concept of expressive fulfillment by emphasizing the transformative power of human labor and creativity. However, Marx's focus on practical change and the absence of a comprehensive philosophical framework led to issues in his theories, such as unrealistic notions of freedom and simplification of complex societal transitions. Hence the name, dialectical materialism.

• Hegel's view of language as a means to bring clarity to consciousness and his connection of language with different stages of development remain relevant in understanding human consciousness, and hence the development of the understanding of the unspoken dimensions of humanity.

The State and our Modern Society

Hegel's philosophy is still significant today, even if some aspects of his ontology about Geist are refutable.

As we already know, Hegel's roots come from an attempt to reconcile the need for radical autonomy and the desire for expressive unity with nature and society.

Furthermore, despite Romanticism's protests and attempts to merge the expressive and autonomous currents of thought, industrialization and technological progress have, in a sense, established the Enlightenment idea of man in our current societies.

Industrial civilization, for instance, extensively dominates nature, and its primary institutions enforce reorganization of society and human existence for the purpose of efficiency and greater production. Utilitarian evaluation, which measures alternative ways of life by their effectiveness in providing benefits, has been embedded in these practices and organizations. And social relations and practices, like nature, have been increasingly objectified.

On top of this, modern civilization has acquired a romantic view on its private life, along with rationalization in its public life. All of this rationalization of institutions caused worldwide protests to reintroduce Romanticism into public life. Fascism, for example, has Romantic roots. It incorporates radical autonomy and expressive unity goals for the purpose of a “generic man.”

Finally, because of all these tensions, Hegel is relevant today, since he wanted to reconcile radical autonomy with expressive unity without compromising reason.

Now, we have explained the basis of Hegelian thought in our previous newsletter, and we can now understand that the subject requires an object and that Geist must be embodied into a material form in order to recognize itself. 

As a result, the principle of embodiment clearly requires that Geist creates an adequate representation in human life in order to have self-awareness. Making the State the true manifestation of Geist, which is the necessary embodiment. 

On that note, it is important to say that the State in Hegel's view is much more than just the government. For him the State goes beyond the government and includes other institutions, social norms, culture, and the ethical line of society. 

To put it another way, the State is the entity that embodies the collective spirit and rationality of a society. 

But, how can we start making sense of the State as having an unified expression that represents Geist?

To understand this we can start with Rousseau. He was probably the first to talk about “the will” as a crucial principle of the State. He argued that “will” represents the collective will of the entire community, which reflects the common good and the common interest of the people as a whole. 

Furthermore, Hegel had a similar notion. He argued that the State was the central institution through which Geist was realized. Hence Geist could be interpreted as “the will” for Hegel, although he never referred to it this way, and there were aspects of it that were different.

For instance, one important aspect that distinguishes these two concepts is the fact that for Rousseau, as well as for Kant, morality and politics aim to have a society of individuals seeking individual happiness in their own way, despite them claiming they are not.

Now, as previously pointed out, this may appear contradictory, because Kant, for example, was opposed to individuals seeking individual happiness.

However, Taylor develops an argument that shows Kantian ethics to be fundamentally similar to the concept of individual happiness, or, in better terms, to utilitarianism.

To fully understand this, we must first grasp Kantian ethics, which attempted to reconcile negative freedoms under a universal law. The absence of external constraints or interference on an individual's behavior is referred to as negative freedom. 

Furthermore, in this sense, Kant's morality and political theory tend to lean on utilitarian ideas, viewing society as a collection of individuals pursuing their own happiness while, at the same time, having the challenge of finding ways to reconcile negative freedom by harmonizing individual wills.

This, in a way, changes everything for Hegel, the notion of freedom for him was different. He saw freedom as the idea that was intrinsically from the nature of the will itself, and thus valid for everyone.

In other words, radical freedom for Hegel comes not from denying all particularity but from recognizing the link between individuals as part of a larger life. And hence “the will” becomes free when it follows its own thought or reason, which is not only that of man alone but of Geist which shapes the universe.

In other words, the problem, according to Hegel, is that Kant's and Rousseau's theories are founded on the notion of radical autonomy, which asserts that freedom requires breaking away from all external influences and determining one's actions solely based on individual will.

Now, all this might sound like we are stuck on:

“Yes, I understand that “the will,” or in Hegelian terms, Geist, is the embodiment of the subject, and this embodiment is the State, and the State should reflect the subject, and Geist, which is embodied in the State should allow us to see the link between individuals as part of a larger life.”

But, how do we know we are following Geist and not individual wills?

First, Hegel points out that Kant's moral theory is based on a formal notion of reason and focuses on individual ethics, leading to a lack of concrete content in moral obligations.

Moreover, he introduces the concept of Sittlichkeit, which is a set of moral obligations that sustain a society. It is an important concept for Hegel since it rejoins what already exists and reaches completion in the community. 

One significant feature of this concept  is that there is no gap between what should be and what is. This is the opposite of Moralitat, which holds that I have an obligation to fulfill something that does not exist. As a result, Moralitat is an obligation that I carry not as a member of a large community life, but as an individual with rational will.

All of this qualifies Kantian ethics as Moralitat. He presents moral obligation as an individual one, which contradicts its own nature, because man is a part of a wider existence. 

This leads to the conclusion that the Hegelian Absolute Idea demands human involvement in a larger life in society, which results in morality, which is how we interact with one another in community, and reaches its highest point in Sittlichkeit. 

This was last seen, as discussed in our latest newsletter, in Greek societies; where men saw community life as the essence and significance of their existence, and where people were able to act as individuals while also finding meaning in the State and what it represented.

Sittlichkeit and Alienation

We may see now why Hegelian philosophy has been considered morally harmful. This idea of Geist being embodied in the State can have Fascist consequences, sacrificing individuals for a goal that is difficult to agree upon.

However, it is important to study further this concept of the society and its relation to each individual, to avoid any reinterpretation.

Hegel uses some terms to express this relation individuals have with their society, and one of them is “substance.” The main point is that individuals exist and find their essence in the community they belong to, and the norms and practices of the community form the basis of their own identity. 

Furthermore, we can see here how the concept of Sittlichkeit is implied in this concept of substance. The substance is the individual's essence, and it provides a goal, yet at the same time, it already exists.

Now, since the identity is embodied in the State, something called alienation may happen when individuals no longer feel connected to or find meaning in the community's norms and practices. 

This is Hegel's most vital and relevant proposition for today's civilizations. Because when this happens, people stop feeling connected to the State, which leads to individualism and a shift in focus from public to private experiences and values.

This transition calls into question the community's integrity and shared norms, potentially leading to the breakdown of the collective identity, and hence to civilization.

So, what is Hegel trying to tell us with this thesis of the primacy of Sittlichkeit ?

First, with this he is telling us that human fulfillment is only possible through the participation in the public life of a community, not through only alienated individuals.

Second, the community must encompass the entire self-sufficient human reality. In other words, the State should express our most important norms. And thirdly, the ideas expressed by the State should express the ontological structure of everything. In other words, our reality.

As a result, all of these notions in Sittlichkeit form the Absolute Idea, and man must transcend alienation not only privately, but as a communal identity in order to fully reach the Absolute.

This leads to the conclusion that the Absolute Idea needs this synthesis of individuality and Sittlichkeit, and that, for Hegel, the purpose of human history is to realize this synthesis.

Differentiation and Absolute Freedom

We can start this part by asking this question: How do we restore the freedom of the individual with Sittlichkeit?

But before, let's delve into the concept of absolute freedom and its relationship with the idea of the general will.

First, absolute freedom is the notion that individuals should have complete and unrestricted liberty to shape their lives without external constraints. It advocates for each person's rational will to govern every aspect of their existence, including societal structures and institutions.

The general will, on the other hand, proposes that a rational society should be governed by laws and decisions that benefit all members, not just certain individuals or groups. It seeks to transcend individual desires and aims to derive decisions from rationality itself, fostering the common good.

Now, to recall a bit about our previous newsletter, Hegel sees the general will as an attempt to base morality on reason and avoid utilitarianism, which is a concept developed by Kant and Rousseau. 

However, Hegel argued that the general will, despite trying to avoid individual happiness, remains like utilitarianism, since it cannot see finite beings as being connected to a larger form of life.

Furthermore, Hegel warns that the aspiration for absolute freedom can lead to destructive consequences, since pursuing it without acknowledging societal structures or differentiated roles can result in the destruction of existing institutions and social order due to its lack of a clear plan to build a new structure.

To put it another way, Hegel's main point is that he believes that all societies require differentiation, which means the existence of different social groups, roles, and structures. He argues that absolute freedom cannot exist in the absence of differentiation.

So, what does this mean? Can we maybe start to believe that Hegel did not believe in unrestricted freedom?

Hegel’s argument begins by emphasizing the need for universal and total participation in the society of absolute freedom. This implies that every member should have a say in all decisions that shape a community. This contrasts with models, such as neoliberalism, where specific sub-groups or individuals make decisions.

Moreover, this means that the society of absolute freedom rejects both traditional society models and neoliberal models. It refuses to accept structures that are beyond human decision and rejects any form of authority. Instead, it insists on the exercise of rational human will in deciding every aspect of society, guided by reason and without relying on external constraints.

Now, if we think about it, absolute freedom resembles neoliberalism in one dimension. The only difference is their concept of the rational will. In neoliberalism, which is our current reality, it is expressed in the decisions of individuals, and on the other, it is expressed by the decisions of the whole, or in better terms, the general will.

As a result, under neoliberalism, individuals have no actual voice or control over the total outcome.

All this means, as we can already imply, that we must have homogeneity among citizens in order to reach absolute freedom. Since this is the only way we can avoid any differentiation that might affect the decision-making process. 

This leads us to the conclusion that the desire for general will, as expressed by Rousseau and even Kant, cannot be realized through representative institutions.

Hegel's point is that modern civilizations cannot be like the ancient Greek polis since societies back then were homogeneous by nature, and slaves performed many of the essential functions. 

In addition to this, the individualism of modern societies did not exist. Making differentiation unavoidable in Hegel’s eyes. 

Modern man is not only a citizen, but also thinks of himself as a man. Which implies that not all men can dedicate themselves to public life, and hence to the whole.

Furthermore, Taylor provides an interesting approach to this where people balance both private occupations and full participation in the state's affairs, like it happens in Thomas More's Utopia, for instance. 

However, Hegel rejects this possibility for two reasons. First, he says that true accomplishment comes from giving yourself fully to something, which also means giving up other things.

Second, Hegel's philosophical concept of the "Idea", needs that different groups of society find embodiment in separate groups. In other words, a fully developed state will have different groups representing the various aspects of the Absolute Idea. 

This finally explains why Hegel did not believe in absolute freedom as it is currently defined. He believed in the importance of social differentiation in order to construct the overall concept or the Absolute Idea.

The Modern Society

So, why are we interested in Hegel nowadays?

In the past, traditional societies were structured around clear differentiation like royalty, aristocracy, etc. This differentiation was justified as a reflection of the order of things. They were giving each person an identification with the society they lived in, and making them part of the whole. Where everyone contributed in their own way to the community.

However, with the rise of modern subjectivity and the rejection of these hierarchical conceptions, societies came to be seen, not for what they were expressing, but as instruments for fulfilling human needs, purposes and desires. This modern perspective, exemplified by utilitarianism, aims to study society scientifically and optimize its structures for human happiness.

The point is that modern societies, as argued by Hegel, do not provide a basis for a man’s identification with their community. They aim to achieve homogeneity and equality, as a way to fulfill the aspiration for absolute freedom.

Furthermore, achieving absolute freedom faces difficulties due to all the differentiation in modern society. Modern society struggles to reconcile these differences with the ideal of universal and total participation. This dilemma leads to alienation among certain groups who feel marginalized by the predominant homogenization.

As a result, for Hegel, absolute freedom needs homogeneity, and it is difficult to achieve given the inherent differences in society.

Now, something very curious happens among modern societies. We can see that, despite the rise of utilitarian thinking, current societies have not entirely abandoned their traditional outlooks. They look for ideologies like Marxism, anarchism, or even nationalism, to seek a sense of identity and belonging. 

To put it another way, the concept of "absolute freedom" emerges as an attempt to address this lack in modern political theory. It represents the desire for individuals to identify with their society when they feel that it is a product of their creative and moral will. The utilitarian perspective provides an inadequate basis for individuals to identify with their society. The emphasis on individual satisfaction and interest does not fully address the desire for a sense of purpose, meaning, and connection to a broader community. 

In modern society, people often feel alienated and lack a strong identification with their communities. Some advocate for programs aimed at eliminating poverty, assimilating marginalized groups, and promoting inclusivity. Others propose, as said before, absolute freedom, seeking a society where everyone participates fully in decisions.

However, both solutions have limitations. The pursuit of absolute freedom can lead to homogenization, eroding unique identities, and causing national identity to become the primary focus. The emphasis on identity can be taken too far by the drive of militant or even totalitarian ideologies. 

Furthermore, Hegel always stresses that the tight unity of the Greek city cannot be recaptured because of the principle of individual freedom that we developed.

This leads to the conclusion that modern societies face the dilemma of achieving absolute freedom, preserving individual freedom, and creating a sense of purpose that becomes embedded in the society in which individuals live. Finding a balance that preserves diversity and identity while encouraging participation and inclusivity remains a significant challenge for our societies.

The Owl of Minerva: Meaningful Changes Emerge

The idea of a significant sense of purpose in a community seems relevant today. 

How many of us do not feel alienated by the purposes of the institutions that represent us? 

It might have been that in between the 40s and 70s, more people felt deeply connected to and identified with their institutions. This sentiment is evident in the way people passionately pursued achievements, with corporate jobs reaching their peak during this era. The pursuit of a stable career and a comfortable lifestyle became emblematic of the American Dream, for instance. Consumption, too, was viewed as a natural consequence of this progress, as families embraced the culture embedded on their societies, seeking to enjoy the fruits of their labor.

However, when we contrast this with the present, an increased sense of alienation has become palpable. Our current times are characterized by a growing detachment from traditional institutions and values. Many from the younger generations no longer feel the same compulsion to conform or to belong to the established norms of society.

Now, as we have said, Hegel was against homogenization, because it can be taken too far for the sake of national identity. This means that we cannot entirely blame him for what happened some years after his death.

Furthermore, Hegel's concept of the “Owl of Minerva,” is a notion that refers to the understanding of  historical events that come only after they have occurred. It suggests that human beings can only understand the true significance and meaning of past events once they have unfolded and become part of history.

For instance, in the context of Hegel's critique of the French Revolution, he argues that the drive for absolute freedom, which seeks to destroy existing institutions and structures without providing a positive alternative, leads to a negative spiral of destruction.

This destruction is emblematic of the aspiration to absolute freedom, which lacks a coherent and rational foundation. The revolutionaries' pursuit of absolute freedom, according to Hegel, culminated in the Terror, where they tried to eliminate any opposition under the guise of defending the general will.

Moreover, Hegel can be contrasted with Karl Marx, who believed that the proletariat, once conscious of its historical role and the nature of its actions, can bring about the desired social change. 

On the other hand, Hegel sees history and the actions of human beings as a complex movement unfolding without a full understanding of its implications at the time. Only after the historical process has played out can human beings understand the true significance of events.

In addition to this, one important concept that we should highlight is that Hegel knew that even if humans were to know the correct formula for an ideal state ahead of time, it couldn't simply be imposed on society. The reason for this is that the foundation of a rational state involves a deeper process of cultural and spiritual development within individuals and the collective. In other words, people must identify themselves with the realized public life, but this identification cannot be forced; it must evolve over time.

Moreover, he argued that establishing a constitution and then implementing it is essentially an Enlightenment idea led by reason that completely ignores mankind's identity.

This brings us back to where I said that we can see already an increased sense of alienation. In other words, collective consciousness is evolving and constantly changing.

This makes us conclude that Hegel believed that human progress and historical development would lead to the emergence of a rational state. This state would be characterized by the combination of individual freedom and uniqueness with the moral and ethical order known as Sittlichkeit, which was present in the ancient world. People would be able to identify with this state and find their freedom within it, as it reflects their shared values and moral principles. 

Humanity’s Collective Identity

The modern man has created a new identity: that of a producer. This identity is our current Sittlichkeit, since it is more than just an idea in our minds. It is a concept embedded in our institutions and daily practices. 

This implies that as long as humans identify as producers, their society and institutions will remain unchanged. The producer's identity is focused on growth and control over nature, and alienation occurs when this identity starts to fade away, which is something we are seeing more and more of as time goes on.

Now, as we can infer by now, Hegel thought that civilizations needed a meaningful structure for individuals. He asked how free societies can remain harmonious when people willingly engage in them. He thought that people should be emotionally devoted to their community and its institutions; otherwise, they would feel disconnected, which he referred to as “alienation,” and this, in turn, may harm any civilization. 

To see this clearly, consider any small community and how they constantly establish a sense of common purpose that motivates people to participate in everything related to the group. For instance, we can think of a small group that identifies with a specific type of music, and how that music and the connection each member has with it unites everyone and consequently links them to a higher sense of purpose. 

Furthermore, Taylor argues that Hegel’s proposed solution of building a society based on an Absolute Idea doesn't work in our world today because our societies have changed a lot since then, and the challenges we face are different from what Hegel thought. So, while his ideas are useful, we need to find new ways to address the problems we face. 

For instance, we face various challenges in our societies, and one major issue comes from the division caused by modern industrial societies, where a significant wealth gap exists between the rich and the poor. 

Interestingly, though, Hegel anticipated these problems and understood how they could lead to feelings of alienation among individuals. He believed that a new rational state, based on the Idea, could effectively manage this economic disparity. However, as Taylor points out, this particular idea may not be suitable for addressing the complexities of our present reality.

Nevertheless, I am of the idea that, just as we have historically conceived the concept of humans as producers, it is likely that further concepts will continue to evolve as our consciousness develops.

For example, in my discussion of "Four Futures," I explore Fraser's view on socialism, which proposes a different conception of humanity—one that perceives humans as extensions of nature, working to enhance it, rather than being perceived as a threat to it.

Additionally, Hegel's analysis of destructive forces in society remains highly relevant today. The pursuit of freedom and equality, which Hegel identified as powerful drivers, has significantly influenced the shaping of our modern societies. 

However, there is another aspect to consider: these very forces have also led to homogenization, which is the process of eroding traditional community bonds and cultural identities. In other words, as societies strive for individual freedom and equality, some unique aspects of communities and their identities can be diminished or lost, leading to a more homogenous cultural landscape.

This leads to the conclusion that Hegel's ideas indeed provide valuable insights into the challenges we confront in our world. Nevertheless, as consciousness evolves and societies continue to change, it becomes essential to develop new, adaptive solutions to address the problems we face. These solutions should take into account the growing wealth disparity, environmental concerns, and the importance of preserving diverse cultural identities and strong communal bonds. 

But why is Hegelian thought so lost today?

As we may now infer, the Romantic spirit has long been in opposition to modern society. The conception of man, and its progressive transformation of nature, has been seen as the most prestigious achievement, which is the Enlightenment's definition of man. We can see this in every single innovation humanity creates.

Additionally, the continuous transformation of our industrial society and the search for a higher individual standard of life has made the Hegelian Idea almost irrelevant. 

However, the Romantic spirit and its expressivist protest continues to resonate today, as many individuals sense a profound disconnection in modern civilization. The desire for expressive fulfillment, freedom, and free expression remains strong, leading to periodic outbursts of dissatisfaction and unhappiness.

Furthermore, this tension between the expressive identity and the modern world has historically led to movements like Fascism and encouraged protests against the established order, as individuals seek a sense of unity and fulfillment that seems impossible within the limitations of modernity.

Karl Marx and The Attempt of Expressive Unity

As we can see now, the malaise around modern identity is everywhere. We all think of ourselves as individuals with certain desires and goals, and think of our societies as an area of production and exchange, designed to fulfill desires and needs. However, we all sense some inadequacy which has its roots in the Romantic movement.

In fact, one figure that reinvented the expressive fulfillment and changed its focus into man himself was Karl Marx. Influenced by the radical Enlightenment's emphasis on social justice and human emancipation, Marx combined it with the expressivist tradition of self-fulfillment through creative expression. His theory highlighted the transformative power of human labor, considering it the means by which individuals could shape their world and realize their true selves.

However, Marx also observed that in capitalist societies, alienation happened when individuals' creative expressions were separated from them. In such a system, workers' labor and its products became commodities owned and controlled by others, leading to a loss of freedom and a sense of dissatisfaction.

The difference between Hegel and Marx is that for Marx, man creates himself and for Hegel man is in a process of reconciliation, which is achieved by recognizing the embodiment of Geist, which is always there.

As we can see, Marx has some problems. The main one is that from the beginning, Marx’s position was a synthesis of the Enlightenment, which sees man as capable of objectifying nature. He envisioned communism as a union of humanism and naturalism, where man achieves expressive fulfillment by dominating nature and shaping it.

Secondly, another problem with Marx is that he did not apply the concept of "Aufheben” to his writings, which means that at important times in history, the usual rules and explanations of things can change. And this can make it hard to understand certain notions by using our current ways of understanding things. 

This led Marx to focus on being practical when explaining how communism emerges as a revolution against capitalism. He wanted to explain things in a way that could guide people's actions and bring about real change. 

However, there was a philosophical aspect that he didn't fully address, and that is that what he wanted required much more than just a sudden change. It required solving complex philosophical issues that he did not express in the right way.

In other words, to truly explain the process of transitioning from one society's rules to another's, we would need to go beyond what traditional Enlightenment science can explain. 

This perspective affected the whole communist movement, including Lenin and later Soviet leaders. They all held a simplistic view of how to manage a communist society without thinking deeply about its complexities. 

Finally, the last problem with Marx is that his early views, as argued by Taylor, are unrealistic. He saw freedom as something without any restrictions. This leaves man without a situation and without anything to be overcome. And that is something that some Marxists have no answers to. This doesn't match the reality of how societies work and can lead to destructive actions in trying to achieve it. 

Situating the Concept of Freedom

Now we can see that the modern concept of freedom is linked with Marx and Hegel. The concept revolves around the idea of self-dependence, meaning that it is achieved by overcoming obstacles and external influences. It contrasts with earlier concepts that related freedom to harmony or balance. 

This self-dependent idea of freedom has been central to various forms of modern thinking, from classical liberalism to Marxism. But it has also encountered a dilemma:

If complete freedom means the elimination of all situations, tasks, and constraints, then it results in an empty, purposeless state.

This brings us back to Hegel and how he wanted to solve this problem by giving man a situation, without abandoning the notion of rational will. He tried to connect freedom with the idea of a cosmic spirit that generates its own articulations out of itself. However, his system is now inconceivable due to an increase in rationality and science that inevitably led to Marx's materialism.

After Marx, freedom has been redefined, corrected, reinvented, and in some sense, even dismissed. Schopenhauer, for instance, had the pessimistic view that human freedom, meaning the instinctual nature of man, is incompatible with rational freedom. He argued that real freedom involved breaking free from the suffering caused by our desires and wants, which he called “the will.”

Furthermore, Kierkegaard offered another definition, where he believed that true liberation from the despair Schopenhauer defines in his work can only come by connecting with an external Power, such as God.

In contrast, Nietzsche argued that radical freedom can lead to an emptiness that causes nihilism, which is the philosophical idea that denies or rejects traditional values, beliefs, and meaning in life. 

The modern notion of freedom is thus under threat from two sides. On one hand, there is despair about the realization of freedom. On the other, the ultimate emptiness of self-dependent freedom seems to lead to nihilism. 

This means that modern philosophy has been trying to recover a conception of free activity which has a response to a situation, mainly the virtue of our condition as natural and social beings, or in virtue of some inescapable vocation of purpose. 

Sounds familiar, doesn’t it?

The increasing significance of the problem of situating freedom may be linked to changes in political and social environments. People naturally perceive themselves as self-sufficient individuals pursuing their personal goals in modern societies where nature and social structures push towards individual utility.

However, these perspectives often don't ask serious questions about the nature of freedom or its relationship with the external world. One perspective treats nature as an object to be controlled while the other aligns freedom with natural desires.

Moreover, when societies face challenges or disruptions, such as recessions or depressions, and aspirations for radical freedom emerge, the concept of an independent self comes into question.

Moving forward to the twentieth century, philosophy focused on placing subjectivity within nature. But, perhaps, the most significant development of the century is the development of meaning theories and the entire philosophy of language, and how it began to be understood as more than just a tool for describing things in the world, but as a means of achieving self-awareness and full consciousness.

In other words, language started to be seen as an outlet for consciousness, which raised questions about its relationship to other types of awareness and activities in our lives. This perspective challenged the concept that the basic linguistic activity is describing things, and it started to be seen as a means of understanding meaning - our "form of life." 

This is where we can see Hegel coming back into the picture. Hegel's philosophy can be linked to a certain perspective on language and consciousness. There are basically two ways of understanding language's role in our awareness: one focuses on language as a means of expressing our thoughts; the other sees language as a system of signs primarily for referring to things. 

Hegel belongs to the first approach, where language helps us bring our thoughts to clarity. He believed that through language, our unclear initial consciousness becomes part of a conceptual necessity. This perspective is rooted in Hegel's idea that the fundamental reality is the Concept or the Absolute Idea, and conceptual thought ultimately finds clear necessity.

This is the key of Hegel’s embodiment, which situates subjectivity in life, nature, and social practices. He saw language and symbols as vehicles of awareness, each corresponding to different stages like art, religion, and philosophy.

However, as time passed, Hegel's ideas began to fade. The emphasis on descriptive conceptual thinking gained popularity, emphasizing its independence from implicit understanding.

This aligns with those who view language in a purely descriptive manner, relevant for scientific discourse, and one of our examples was Karl Marx, who had the problem of  trying to explain a concept that required a different level of understanding, or in other words, different language, another level of consciousness; and decided to aim to a more practical way of explaining his ideas, just like any mechanistic Enlightenment notion.

Meanwhile, those trying to connect language to unreflective experiences see explicit thought as linked to implicit understanding. In essence, the departure from Hegel's ontology raises questions about the relationship between linguistic consciousness and unreflective experiences. 

This leads us to the conclusion that, while language limits our collective consciousness, mankind nonetheless relies on conceptual necessity.

As a result, Hegel is still significant today as a way to understand that humanity needs to explore the unspoken aspects of human experience in order to achieve a conceptual necessity that leads to a harmonious and non-alienated way of life for all.

Nonetheless, our awareness has developed, and we may require new methods, instruments, and unexplored ways of thought to make his concepts relevant to the rest of the world. I encourage everyone to think on what has been discussed in the last two newsletters and to believe in the power of philosophy. Because after all, it is the development of our own self-awareness as human beings.

Sources:

• Taylor, C. (2015). Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge Philosophy Classics.

Beyond Thought.

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The more I read and study Hegel's philosophy, the more I believe it is relevant today.

However, I lacked the necessary skills and vocabulary to articulate this significance. That said, philosopher Charles Taylor provides one of the greatest explanations of Hegel's fundamentals and how they apply to current societies. 

Taylor leaves out Hegel's logic and phenomenology, focusing exclusively on his philosophy of history and politics, which are more than enough to produce a good thesis for his purposes.

I enjoyed this book, and discussing it deserves to be done in parts. Let's start with Hegel's synthesis, his general philosophy, and how it came to be. And we'll talk about its current significance in a future newsletter.

Highlights:

• Hegel's philosophy emerged as a response to two historical movements: the Enlightenment (emphasizing reason and individual rights) and Romanticism (focused on emotions and nature).

• Hegel's synthesis aimed at reconciling freedom vs. nature and individual vs. society. He believed that as human development progressed, these oppositions would become more evident, but would eventually reach a point of reconciliation.

• The subject and its embodiment represent the conflict between human rationality and our natural impulses, with the goal of achieving self-awareness and harmony. Hegel explored the inner struggle between our rational thinking and our natural desires, aiming to achieve self-awareness and balance.

• Humanity has an inherent need for rationality and self-expression. For Hegel, man is a self-defining subject, and it needs to express in order to define itself.

• Hegel states that reason struggles as the subject and its embodiment, or in simple words, his self-expression, “progress.” In other words, it means that reason struggles to realize itself in its own embodiment. 

• Ancient Greece is an example of a society in perfect harmony with nature and the highest human expressive form, but in order for reason to develop to a greater level of clarity, this type of society had to die. Hegel seeks to achieve this unification while retaining the benefits of rational consciousness.

• The process of reconciliation involves understanding the relationship between different stages and realizing that contradictions are essential for the development of man’s self-consciousness.

• Hegel talks about identity and opposition as being interconnected. To reconcile oppositions is to recognize that each term in a dichotomy is not just opposed to, but also essentially connected to its opposite. In other words, the basic relationship of opposition and identity is interconnected. Each opposition comes from an earlier state of identity, which in turn leads to opposition. Hegel thinks that the true nature of reality cannot be grasped by a simple "either/or" perspective, but rather through a dialectical mode of thinking that recognizes the relationship of identity and difference.

• Hegel’s “Geist” is both a life force and a cultural expression, revealing and defining who we are as individuals and as part of a community.

• "Geist" must be embodied in order to manifest itself. Consciousness requires an object, and the subject must be placed against an object. "Geist" is thus humanity's collective self-expression, manifesting itself in our cultural forms, philosophy, language, and, most crucially, the State.

• Hegel tries to show the contradiction or ontological conflict in finite things, which is an important part of his ontological vision. He strives to demonstrate our categorial notions' inability to fully characterize reality, while arguing that these concepts must nonetheless have some use in the real world. As a result, the contradiction exists within reality itself.

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The Hegelian Roots

Hegel’s synthesis was a reaction to his present. He lived during the transition period between Romanticism and the Enlightenment. 

For those who do not know what these two currents are. The Enlightenment is basically a movement that emphasized reason, science, individual rights, and skepticism towards traditional authority. 

Thinkers of this trend wanted to apply reason and rationality to all aspects of human life, including politics, ethics, and social institutions. 

All these movements have always been reactions to past trends. The Enlightenment is a reaction to the superstition, blind faith and dogma that religion created in the past. However, the Enlightenment also produced a reaction, and this is the Romantic stage. 

Romanticism emerged as a reaction against the Enlightenment. It emphasized emotion, nature, and a fascination with the mystical and supernatural. Romantic thinkers and artists strived to explore and express the deeper realms of human experience and emotion. 

All of these reactions influenced Hegel, as well as other philosophers such as Herder, another German philosopher who was responsible for developing a new concept of man as an expressive object. This idea centered on man as the subject of egoistic desires, for whom society and its environment supplied just the means to fulfillment. 

This is known as "expressivism," and it is heavily influenced by the Romantic period. The idea was to demonstrate that man finds the most fulfillment in expressive activities. As a result, art was seen as the pinnacle of human fulfillment during the Romantic period. 

But there is a catch. Humanity lives in community, and they are part of a culture that is always nourished by the totality of it. In other words, the community is an expressive unity, and thinking of it as only a tool for individual purposes and goals, as was observed during the Enlightenment, is inaccurate.

Furthermore, Herder believed that “Volk,” which could be described as a cultural identity, sustains its members; and that they can only isolate themselves from it at the cost of great impoverishment. This might sound like nationalism, and this is correct. Herder was the founder of modern nationalism, but he was also against extreme modern expressive individualism. 

To add to this, expressivism also reinvented man’s relationship with nature, and saw man as mind and body in an expressive unity. However, since man is in a constant relationship with nature, this relationship should be seen in expressive terms. Hence, seeing the universe as a tool for potential human use is inadequate for its fulfillment. Man, therefore, has to recover communion with nature.

Now, there was a powerful reaction to the objectification of the Enlightenment thought, and it has to do with moral freedom. 

This reaction said that if man was to be seen as an objectified piece, then his motivations would have to be explained by cause and effect, similar to how we would explain events in the physical world. Their motivations and actions would have to be seen as determined by external factors and internal processes, just like any other natural phenomenon. This is a bit of what Spinozism is all about. 

However, from a standpoint of radical moral freedom this is unacceptable. Moral freedom has to mean that we are free to choose against desires and act according to what it's morally correct. This view also rejects the utilitarian version of morality that says that what is morally right is determined by what makes us happy and hence by desires.

Now, for those of you who have been following my posts, this is basically Immanuel Kant's perspective of morality, which you can read or listen to in my post about The Critique of Practical Reason. But to briefly explain, he wanted to look at morality as separated from the motivations of happiness and pleasure, and he thought that moral principles could be determined by reason alone.

This Kantian notion described freedom in contrast to inclination and desire, and it is evident how Kant recognized man's struggle with this. He knew that, despite being in man's nature, inclination would have to be suppressed in order for it to align with reason and so with moral law. This caused a dilemma in his doctrine.

Now, going back to the expressive theory, its main point is the idea of freedom as the fulfillment of man, which is precisely freedom of self-determination and hence not independent from external factors. 

These two points of view clearly clash. Radical freedom is only possible if we disrupt nature, and the radical free subject is in constant opposition to it. As a result, Hegel saw the French Revolution as a reaction to this conflict.

The hope was that men could reconcile these opposing notions of radical freedom and expressive unity. 

Moreover, Hegel belonged to Herder's successors in the 1790s, who were attempting to reconcile these two movements; and one of the best ways to see this problem is through history and looking at ancient regimes. The Greeks are the main ancient regime mentioned by Hegel. Ancient Greece is the ideal example of a civilization in perfect harmony with nature and the highest human expressive form.

Sadly, though, for the development of reason to grow to a higher state of clarity, this form of society had to die. This sacrifice was naturally inevitable and necessary to develop man to his fullest self-consciousness state.

I had talked a bit about Hegel’s philosophy of history in a previous post. But here we want to clearly understand what Hegel was all about. The main idea is that history is a spiral, where we return not to our starting point but to a higher variant of unity. 

This unity happens when the sides of thought, reason, and morality, as well as desire and sensibility, come together. As well as the contradiction between self-consciousness and community, and self-conscious freedom and communion in nature.

This is essentially the barrier between Spinozism and the Kantian subject.

Furthermore, Hegel believed that this unity was only possible if we ceased to see nature as blind forces that can never fuse with the rational and autonomous man. And that in order for our interactions with nature to be harmonious, we would need to establish a relationship with some spiritual force.

Now, this might sound mystical, but let me explain. 

First, if we wanted to reconcile the aspiration for radical freedom and expressive unity with nature. In other words, if we wanted man to be at one with nature while also being a self-determining subject. Man would need to see their inherent inclination as one of morality and freedom. Then, because man is a part of a larger whole, he would need to gravitate towards a spiritual goal in order to take on a form that can coexist with subjective freedom. 

In other words, if man wants to be a spiritual being without being opposed to nature in its attempt to interchange and coexist with it, then the relationship must be a communion in which man enters into a relation with a spiritual force.

This spiritual force idea might sound like Pantheism. And to briefly explain what this is, let's take the example of Pandora from the movie "Avatar." The Na'vi, the people of Pandora, have a strong spiritual bond with the environment and the spiritual force they worship. Pantheism is the concept that the universe, or nature as a whole, is divine and sacred, and this belief manifests in the character of this spiritual force in the film. This force is regarded by the Na'vi as the guiding spiritual force that unites all living beings on Pandora in a harmonious unity.

However, Hegel specifically argued that this kind of view could not provide a foundation for radical autonomy and expressive unity. Because being in total communion with nature would imply just submitting to the current of existence and abandoning self-determination. 

In addition to this, he claimed that what man needs is to see himself not merely as a part of the universe, but as a reflection of the whole. Where the creative life of nature and the creative life of thought come into one, which was the basis of Schelling’s philosophy, another German philosopher.

But what exactly does this mean?

To understand this we need to understand that reason has been seen as the highest achievement in humanity. However, we know that by doing that, we lose communion with nature, as we achieve a high level of autonomy. Hence in order for radical autonomy to be saved, we would need to change the idea that human consciousness does not just reflect the order of nature, but completes it. Man achieves fulfillment in a form of life which is also an expression of his self-awareness. Because remember man needs to achieve a communion with radical autonomy and expressive unity. 

However, this expression doesn’t exist in a transcendent realm beyond man like it does in religion. If it will it would imply that man subordinates his being to a higher force. Rather this spiritual expression reaches its self-awareness in man. Man thus ceases to see himself just as an individual, but also as the vehicle of a cosmic force, and hence achieves unity with nature and the fullest autonomous self-expression. 

Now, if all this is sounding complex to you, bear with me. This cosmic idea of unity was what the Romantics wanted to express but weren’t able to, and Schelling came over to define it. After this, Hegel continued on the concept. 

This concept of Spirit or “Geist” as Hegel calls it is often what this force is all about. But it isn’t anything related to theism or some higher external force, it is a spirit that only can manifest itself through humanity. Hegel saw this concept as a way where man comes to himself in the end and when he sees himself as the vehicle of a larger concept, rather than just a mere autonomous and individual subject.

But how can Hegel have this very Romantic idea of the spiritual being? Wasn’t he reacting to the Romantic movement? 

In fact, what makes him different from the Romantics is that he believed that in order to achieve this unity we would need to use reason. Which is the opposite of what the Romantics thought. They were opposed to over analyzing and synthesizing everything in reality.

All this means that for Hegel, rational understanding and clear thinking were essential for self-determining freedom. If one were to rely only on intuition or creativity without rational clarity, it would result in losing autonomy and returning to an undifferentiated unity. 

Furthermore, the Romantics' concept of endless creativity was also criticized by Hegel. He called this idea "bad infinity" because it failed to achieve a complete union between autonomy and the expression of subjectivity and nature. To add to this, he also criticized the Romantics' excessive focus on self-expression, which leads to a sense of loss and separation from the world.

This leads us to the conclusion that Hegel's philosophy aimed to find a balance between reason and creativity, providing a rational framework for understanding the world while acknowledging the dynamic and interconnected nature of reality. In other words, for him, reason is the highest mode of thought that puts all these contradictions back in movement and into a unity.

The Embodied Subject: Understanding Hegel’s Dialectical Concept of Opposition and Contradiction in Man

Now that we understand Hegel's synthesis, we can see how he wanted to reconcile the opposites in human experience, such as freedom vs. nature, individual vs. society, and finite vs. infinite, and how he believed that these opposites could be brought together in harmony through a process of understanding.

According to Hegel, as human development progresses, these oppositions become more pronounced, but eventually, they reach a point of reconciliation. This does not mean that we go back to a primitive state without differences. Instead, it's about retaining the benefits of these differences, like rational consciousness and freedom, while also achieving unity with nature and society.

But the main question is: How do we reconcile these oppositions that are in fact oppositions by the mere fact that they are in relation to each other?

As we discussed earlier, man only achieves self-consciousness and rational autonomy by separating himself from nature, society and fate. Hegel knew this very well and this is why he was against any attempt to return to a primitive form of life. 

Moreover, Hegel's solution to reconciling these oppositions is to recognize that each term in a dichotomy is not just opposed to, but also essentially connected to its opposite. In other words, the basic relationship of opposition and identity is interconnected. They cannot be separated because they would cease to exist. 

This indicates that the relationship between these oppositions is circular. Each opposition comes from an earlier state of identity, which in turn leads to opposition. Hegel thinks that the true nature of reality cannot be grasped by a simple "either/or" perspective, but rather through a dialectical mode of thinking that recognizes the relationship of identity and difference.

Now in order to understand how this circular function works, we need to consider Hegel’s idea of “Geist” or cosmic spirit. But first, let’s explain the concept of the subject.

First, it is important to know that Hegel breaks the dualistic mindset that was so prominent in philosophy since Descartes. Which is basically the belief that mind and body, that is, consciousness and physical matter, are fundamentally different entities. 

Furthermore, his definition of the subject is based on the expressive theory derived from Aristotelian terminology. 

In these terms, man was seen as a subject who was realizing a certain form while simultaneously having another dimension in which the subject himself saw an expression of who he is. In other words, we can think of this as the process of self-realization, which implies that the term is anti-dualistic, because mind and matter are interconnected. Making Hegel a philosopher who believed in the path of the self-defining subject.

Now, Dualism was the concept of seeing everything in reality as mechanical. Descartes, for example, would see animals as simply complex machines. However, animals can be aware of their surroundings and themselves. Making all living things natural agents capable of development. 

With this in mind, Hegel expands on the idea that humans are more than merely natural agents or rational living beings. Rather, he argued that they must be seen as something more, and that implied they had to be seen on different principles. This is because humans have a higher level of consciousness that sets them apart. This consciousness, however, creates an internal conflict between their natural instincts and their rational thoughts.

Moreover, overtime humans have the capacity to develop their rationality and strive for a higher level of consciousness. This process involves overcoming the natural inclinations and impulses of their living bodies. Through this struggle Hegel believed that humans can achieve a higher state of unity where their rationality and their embodiment are in harmony. But, as seen earlier, humans only achieve self-sufficiency of rational thought by separating themselves from nature, opposing their own selves to life and hence to be in constant opposition with themselves.

Now, in order for man's consciousness to develop by opposing itself, it must pass through what Hegel refers to as the “hierarchy of modes of thought,” which states that as man develops his rational self-awareness, so do his modes of expression of that self-consciousness.

The majority of these modes are found in language, art, religion, and philosophy, and they are essentially just ways of expression that must evolve as consciousness advances to higher levels of self-consciousness. These modes are also vehicles for understanding “Geist” for Hegel, but they all happen at various stages. 

This is where Hegel states that reason struggles as the subject and its embodiment, or in simple words, his self-expression, “progress.” And to put it another way, it means that:

Reason merely struggles to realize itself in its own embodiment. 

Human history is thus the climb up or the unity of different cultural forms. Man struggles with his impulses and gives shape to his reality by embodying it in its culture which expresses rationality and freedom. 

This is where it all starts to make sense. The thinking subject, or man, in other words, can only exist in an embodied form. This means that human consciousness is intimately connected to a living body. However, this embodiment comes with a natural inclination or impulse that drives individuals towards unreflective unity within themselves and with nature.

Moreover, despite this inclination, the subject's rationality seeks clarity and self-awareness. The human mind has to struggle against the pull of natural instincts to achieve rationality fully. This creates an interesting dynamic where the embodiment seems to be both an ally and an opponent to the subject.

This, according to Hegel, explains that this complexity arises from the subject being characterized not just by the existence of his embodiment but also by its aspirations towards reason and freedom. These aspirations might initially clash with the conditions of existence imposed by the embodiment.

This inner complexity allows the subject to relate to itself and others. It creates a sphere of inner conflict, and sometimes even contradiction. Hegel argues that the subject's struggle with these contrasting aspects leads to two essential relations: identity and opposition.

On one hand, identity is based on the unchanging conditions of the subject's existence within the embodiment. The other relation, opposition, arises from the subject's evolving aspirations and realization of rationality over time. Thus while identity and opposition might seem separate, they are linked in a temporal pattern. The subject starts with an original identity, but as rationality grows, opposition emerges due to the conflict between reason and natural inclinations.

This leads us to the concept of reconciliation where the subject understands and integrates the opposition into a higher unity. This process involves transforming both the subject's rationality and its embodiment. The subject recognizes that nature itself is part of a rational plan, and it aligns with this larger reason, resulting in a harmonious unity that, remember, doesn’t equal the primitive form, since it preserves the consciousness of division which was a necessary stage in the development of reason.

The Absolute as Subject

Now that we understand what I would say is the most difficult part of this thesis provided by Charles Taylor. We can ask ourselves how this knowledge of the subject and its embodiment translates to “Geist.” 

As we saw earlier, the resolution of opposition in man is a higher unity, which is essentially the plan of “Geist.” 

Following this, the “Absolute” for Hegel is the subject, which is that thing that manifests itself in all reality. This is the equivalent of “substance” for Baruch Spinoza, which is essentially that only thing that encompasses all reality. 

Now if readers or listeners aren’t familiar with Spinoza or the concept of “substance,” you can check out my post on Spinozism. But to briefly explain, for Spinoza, God is the universe itself, meaning that God isn’t external to reality; or in other words, God isn’t the creator, the universe itself is God and substance is that matter that encompasses every single thing in the universe, hence making it “God” itself, which is essentially Pantheism. 

This leads us to understand Hegel’s “Absolute” as basically the equivalent of substance for Spinoza. This is because, as we have learned, “Geist” cannot exist without being embodied, making it impossible to exist outside of the universe: rather the universe is his embodiment. This means that the universe itself is the embodiment of “Geist,” just as our bodies are the embodiment of our own selves.

Furthermore, Hegel's idea of “Geist is both a life force and a cultural expression, revealing and defining who we are as individuals and as part of a community. Hence, according to Hegel, the universe is structured in a way that reflects Geist's aim to attain rational self-awareness; Geist achieves this aim by embodying itself in finite spirits capable of self-awareness and expression. 

This means that Geist must be embodied in order to manifest itself. Consciousness requires an object, and the subject must be placed against an object.

Readers who are familiar with Kant's transcendental arguments will understand this. This is due to the fact that the foundation is essentially the same. Kant's first Critique attempted to restore the distinction between subjective and objective within experience, as well as how we might distinguish them from the "things in themselves" that we do not have access to. In other words, Kant claimed that objective experience was necessary.

Furthermore, Hegel also agreed with something similar. He argued that consciousness is only possible when the subject is placed against an object.

However, to be set against an object is to be limited, therefore if "cosmic spirit" or "Geist" is to achieve full consciousness, it can only be through finite spirits. Beings capable of expressive actions, that is, of employing an external medium through which meaning is expressed. As a result, Geist needs rational beings. 

And it follows that for the realization of Geist to happen, it needs the development of cultures. As we have already seen, man must evolve. Cultural forms and modes of consciousness evolve over time to make up human history, which is the process of self-awareness. 

What is then for Geist to come to rational self-awareness? 

Let's see if we can get some logic in here. Geist must be embodied since it is the structure of the universe. This means that it must be objectified.

As a result, for Geist to recognize itself, awareness must exist, and the only way for this to take place is through finite beings capable of awareness.

Geist then reaches its ultimate self-expression when we become totally self-aware. Geist is a subject embodiment, which implies it is self-expression manifested on an object. Geist, in other words, is our expressive identity. That's why Geist requires finite beings with reasoning capabilities. Geist thus transforms humans into perfect expressions of itself. 

Now you may be wondering: Wasn't reason the most important thing for Hegel?

And the answer is, yes. Geist's only starting point is rational necessity. Its freedom comes from following its essence, which is the necessity of a concept. 

In other words, Hegel's idea is that the world is created by Geist according to a conceptual necessity, leading to an argument that is not just about proving that the world exists, but also showing that it must exist in a certain way, following a plan or design dictated by Geist itself. Hence we are dealing here with a conceptual limit and an ontological necessity. 

Conflict and Contradiction

Now, how does all this relate to the plan of Geist?

To remember, we saw that Hegel’s concept of God was different from traditional views of God as separate and independent from the world. Meaning that he was against theism.

Furthermore, Hegel's vision of the world was purposeful and designed, but rather than being designed by an external God, God creates the conditions for his own existence eternally. This means that God's existence cannot be separated from the existence of the world, and that the world is necessary for the realization of Geist.

This concept places Hegel's philosophy in a narrow space between traditional theism and some form of pantheism, making it challenging to grasp fully. 

Now, all this idea of God as a self imposed being, can help us understand identity and difference.

As we saw earlier, the human subject is prey to an inner conflict, in which the conditions of its existence are at odds with its essential goal. And we also know that the Absolute, which is the plan of Geist, has the same conflict. Since it needs to be embodied in external, finite beings living in a world of finite material things. 

This means that the Absolute must also go through a cycle in which it suffers division in order to return to unity and realize its goal of self-knowledge and self-awareness. And this isn’t another story separated from that one of man, it is the same but from a wider perspective. Since man is the vehicle of Geist.

All of this implies that Geist cannot exist separately from the world, as well as his own opposition. Because the world represents dispersion, some unconsciousness that Geist must transcend in order to be itself and achieve its aim.

This is where Hegel's challenging phrase:

"Geist exists only by negating its own negation.”

Begins to make sense to us. Geist is the result of a process of self-loss and return.

In other words, when viewed impartially, contradiction is fatal, but when viewed as a whole, it is enlightening. This is because, when seen in this light, contradiction reconciles with the notion of identity. 

Dialectical Ways 

We can see now how Hegel, as claimed by Charles Taylor, wanted to reconcile the dualistic ideas of his time. How, in short, he wanted to unite rational autonomy with the fullest expressive unity with nature.

From this it follows that his system that reconciles major oppositions by reason itself, had to be demonstrated, and he did so throughout all his books.

He starts with the hierarchy of being; tracing the hierarchical structure of being in nature. He goes from the most elementary and abstract concepts of nature, such as space, time, matter, and motion, and then progresses to more complex phenomena like organic life, the development of living organisms and, ultimately, to the development of Spirit in human history. 

Furthermore, another demonstration, which can be considered prior to the previous one, focuses on studying the categories through which we think of the world. This is the task of his book “Logic,” where he argues that by analyzing categories we find inherent contradictions, leading us to the ultimate concept of the Idea, and hence a complete full circle.

However, the third demonstration can be seen in Hegel's "Phenomenology,” which is an introduction to his main system. It starts with basic notions of consciousness and reveals their inherent contradictions, leading to the understanding of self-knowing Geist or absolute knowledge.

The key point is that we should start with the forms of consciousness, realizing that the most basic form cannot stand on its own, that it has inner contradictions, and that it must give way to a higher form that eventually leads to full understanding.

Furthermore, to really see these contradictions we need to accept the world as embodiment, and as an expression of Geist. In other words, we should see the dependence of each piece on the whole.

This entire movement, rather than being a method, is a descriptive movement, or, to put it another way, a dialectical movement. And how it works is that the focus is on the things themselves rather than how we reason about them.

Now, he separated his dialectics into ontological and historical categories. 

The ontological one focuses on categorical ideas, beginning with fundamental ones like "being," "quality," "essence," and so on, and probing their contradictions when applied to reality. And the historical entails interpreting historical transitions and societal developments by attributing purposes to human actions. In other words, Hegel tries to demonstrate that historical forms of life have underlying goals that lead to contradictions and conflicts. 

However, there is a problem with the historical form. Taylor argues, and I tend to agree, that ontological dialectics start from a well-defined concept and proceed logically, but historical dialectics lack a definite starting point. The purposes of human actions are not self-authenticating and require external validation and interpretation of historical events.

All of this could be refuted by claiming that Hegel argued that his strict dialectics, such as the Logic, provide unquestionable starting points for historical dialectics. And this is generally why he spent so much time in the Logic.

In this book, Hegel tries to show the contradiction or ontological conflict in finite things, which is an important part of his ontological vision. He strives to demonstrate our categorial notions' inability to fully characterize reality, while arguing that these concepts must nonetheless have some use in the real world. As a result, the contradiction exists within reality itself.

His system's overall conclusions are based on these strict dialectics, which can be used as certain premises for interpreting events in history. However, the interpretive aspect of historical dialectics can lead some to believe that Hegel's system is an expression of belief and faith rather than a demonstration. And this is one of his system's major flaws…

Sources:

• Taylor, C. (2015). Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge Philosophy Classics.

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Before we start with the overview, here are today’s highlights:

• Frase identifies automation and environmental degradation as key issues that will shape the future. Automation brings the fear of mass unemployment and wealth concentration, while environmental degradation threatens the availability of resources.

• Frase presents four potential future scenarios: communism, rentism, socialism, and exterminism.

• Communism envisions a society of abundance and equality, where scarcity is no longer a problem and people experience genuine freedom. However, it needs a shift in mindset and reevaluation of work's meaning and social worth.

• Rentism describes a society of hierarchy and abundance, where a small elite class owns and controls wealth and resources. Intellectual property rights and the control of information play a significant role in sustaining this power dynamic.

• Socialism explores a future of equality and scarcity, where resources are limited but managed through democratic planning and a focus on waste reduction. It needs a fundamental change in mindset, recognizing the interdependence between humanity and the environment.

• Exterminism represents a future of hierarchy and scarcity, where resources are limited, and a wealthy elite seeks to eliminate or suppress the impoverished masses to protect their wealth and power. This extreme scenario involves militarized control, suppression of protests, and potentially genocidal actions.

Now, let’s delve deeper into it!

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Today, I'd like you to close your eyes for a second and imagine yourself on a busy street. Feel the rhythm of footsteps hammering on the floor as people rush to work, the blaring of car horns, and the humming of voices as they merge into this orchestra of urban life. In the center of this scene, we find ourselves caught in a familiar dance, chasing objectives and pursuing achievement within the constraints of capitalism.

However, underneath all this, there is a communal desire for something better. We see it in the exhausted eyes of people who work tirelessly to make ends meet, in their desire for a greater sense of purpose beyond the pursuit of wealth. We feel it in the disturbing awareness of environmental disaster as our world cries out for air beneath the weight of unlimited materialism.

In previous newsletters, we discussed capitalism, and with Mark Fisher, we discussed topics ranging from critical theory to more Marxist theory with the help of David Harvey. However, we don't need to learn theory or economics to recognize that we could do better: nonetheless, all this theory helps us in translating our thoughts into more concrete ideas and concepts.

That being said, today is not about theory or analytical concepts. Today is all about speculation. With the help of social sciences and speculative fiction, we will delve into Peter's Frase book "Four Futures," and learn about all of the possibilities beyond capitalism, which, as we have previously seen, has intrinsic contradictions that will inevitably lead to its destruction.

Speculative fiction offers a unique and valuable perspective on society, making it an effective tool for social analysis and critique.

Furthermore, by presenting fictional societies, speculative fiction serves as a mirror to our own reality, challenging us to consider social frameworks, power dynamics, and the implications of human actions. Its narratives give an outlet for evaluating many points of view and challenging established norms, developing a deeper knowledge of social issues.

Now, Frase starts the book by describing key points that will be discussed throughout the book and serve as the foundation for all of the speculative possibilities he provides. 

The first is automation and the second is environmental degradation. Climate change is the fear of not having enough resources and a habitable environment for human life, while automation is the fear of having too much production without the need for human workers. In other words, he argues that we are facing a dual crisis of scarcity and abundance simultaneously. 

Moreover, as we saw in the post about The Madness of Economic Reason, automation, which is driven by labor-saving forces, creates an inherent contradiction in the capitalist system. It has the potential to improve quality of life for all, but it also raises concerns about mass unemployment and the concentration of wealth among the elite, because at the end of the day, who owns the robots, owns the world.

Now, you may be thinking that, as machines take over current jobs, new opportunities will emerge. Some people, though, believe that this time will be different.

When there were economic downturns in the past, the recovery was not particularly strong and many people struggled with low wages and unemployment. Companies were not interested in deploying machines and robots to replace human workers at the time because unemployed and low-wage individuals were available and cheaper to hire. However, when salaries began to rise and it became more difficult to find workers, companies began to turn to new technology and automation. Again, since it costs nothing and increases profits.

On the bright side, though, the topic of automation leads to reducing the number of working hours, which has been a topic of discussion for a long time. However, despite the tremendous increase in productivity in the past years, we still work long hours. 

The increase in productivity that leads to a reduction of working hours, can reduce living costs and make societies have more time for other pursuits. There are already many jobs today that don't contribute to the well-being of society but only exist to make money for others, like collecting student loans or engaging in risky financial speculation.

In the end, the lack of jobs is not primarily due to technology, but rather to a shortage of people with enough cash to purchase goods and services. Traditional solutions to these problems involve the government acting in creating demand and jobs. However, these measures simply boost demand, which leads to inflation, and ultimately, as we all know, people are unable to afford the consumption essential for capitalism to function.

Now, as mentioned earlier, automation is only one piece of the narrative; Frase also discusses the climate crisis. Environmental degradation is a major threat to capitalism and human civilization. While there is a scientific consensus on human-caused climate change, others deny its existence for business motives. The question is not whether climate change is happening, but who will endure its consequences as resource wars rise. 

Furthermore, a handful of wealthy people may continue to pollute while everyone else suffers, and while not all capitalists believe in climate change, relying just on the free market for solutions is misleading. Green technology, for example, typically favors the wealthy, but global solutions are frequently overlooked. 

Now that we know what Frase focuses on in the book, we can discuss his visions, which are divided into four categories: abundance, scarcity, equality, and hierarchy, giving us four possible combinations.

Communism: Equality and Abundance

Let us begin with the most optimistic future vision. However, we must first state that communism, as Karl Marx envisioned it, was a society of abundance in which scarcity was no longer a problem and people experienced genuine freedom.

With this in mind, Frase mentions Player Piano, a novel that shows a civilization in which machines have taken over labor, liberating humans from it. The majority of individuals are economically redundant yet have comfortable lifestyles. What’s more, the author sees this situation as a terror rather than an accomplishment; since, in an automated world, he says, life loses its meaning, leading to apathy and despair.

The meaning of life gets diminished by the idea of paid work that, as claimed by Frase, is rooted in patriarchal views. The novel simply reflects a confusion between socially prestigious work and paid work. It dismisses the significance and potential of labor for reasons other than monetary gain as a source of meaning.

With the idea of meaning without work, Frase argues that in order for communism to succeed, we must overcome this way of thinking. People have to understand that, even if they dislike their occupations, they frequently rely on them for identity and social worth without realizing it. As a result, many people find it difficult to imagine a future beyond work because they see it as one of idleness and decline.

Now, in regards to freedom, Karl Marx distinguished between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. 

The realm of necessity refers to the fundamental requirement of meeting our needs and sustaining life through physical labor. According to him, this realm exists in all social formations and modes of production, including socialism. What sets socialism apart from capitalism is that in socialism, production is planned in a rational and democratic manner, rather than being subject to the irrationality of the free market.

This social progress, in which all needs are rationalized socially, is merely a precondition for Marx's realm of freedom. That is, the growth of human energy, which he considers as a natural and valuable component of mankind, and which only develops once basic necessities have been met. 

In other words, people can't experience actual freedom while working for a living. Until we free ourselves from the realm of necessity, doing what we love will no longer be an excuse for being exploited, but will become a state of existence. In fact, Marx's point is that he imagined a day when we would be able to remove ourselves from the sphere of necessity and experience true freedom.

This is significant because it completely changes the meaning of work beyond social status, identity, and monetary gain, and it is the first step towards real transformation.

This indicates that in order for communism to flourish, we would need to go through a fundamental political shift, as it is foolish to expect that the wealthy will voluntarily abandon power. This implies that, in order for a transformation to occur over time, we must first develop ways for individuals to exist independently of wage labor. And then the rest, as claimed by Frase, will eventually follow by circumstances that force institutions to change how things are made. 

For instance, we all have seen how technology pushes politics to change the way things work, like, for example, how artificial intelligence came to change intellectual property rights.

All this brings us to the decommodification of work as the first step towards this stage, since it creates a situation in which you can procure your basic needs without having to take a job and without having to satisfy any bureaucratic condition, to the extent that you get these things simply as a right for being a citizen rather than in return for doing something your labor has been commodified.

A proposal of this type is the universal basic income, which proposes giving everyone a certain amount of money regardless of whether or not they work. There has been a lot of debate about this, but Frase brings out one essential point:

“The basic income, rather than forcing individuals to abandon paid labor, will distort the productivity that drives capitalism. In other words, having access to universal needs raises the wage rate of unattractive and unrewarding jobs, which is usually the opposite of what occurs within capitalism.

People will embrace fulfilling professions even if they are paid less than the expected salary, and this will, in turn, stimulate innovation even more than before.”

Furthermore, because businesses will realize that labor is no longer cheap, unwanted work will need to be automated. And, on the other hand, desirable labor will eventually turn to zero, since everyone would be eager to do it for free because their basic needs are being met. In the long run, individuals will rely less on money for income since the things they want and need will no longer require money to be acquired. 

But money and work are just one part of the equation, the most interesting question about a communist society comes when considering status competitions after removing the organizing force of the capital relation.

Frase exemplifies this idea with a novel called “Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom,” which takes place in a post-scarcity world where society operates without an overarching hierarchy. 

However, immaterial goods like reputation and esteem among peers remain inherently scarce. The book explores the accumulation of "Whuffie," which is a virtual brownie that represents the goodwill you accumulated by others; or in other words,  the reputation.

This reputation in the form of “Whuffle” captures the true essence of money, where being respected is needed even without monetary ways of measuring it. Which means that conflicts may still emerge.

Ultimately, the communist vision is not perfect. However, it is a society in which there is no struggle to procure resources and not everything comes down to money, giving people the possibility to experience genuine freedom. 

Rentism: Hierarchy and Abundance

The first possible future envisioned an egalitarian society with abundance, but what would happen if the capitalist profit-making mindset didn’t cease to exist?

What would happen is that those in positions of power and wealth will continue to have a motive to maintain a system in which others serve them, even if it is technically redundant.

This type of society has an abundance of wealth and resources, but a small elite class owns and controls them all. This higher class holds power not only by owning and controlling the means of production, but also by owning and regulating access to services, goods, and intellectual property.

In other words, the wealthy will increasingly need to control information in order to keep control over the economy.

Now, it is crucial to note that Peter Frase wrote this book in 2016, therefore if what follows seems familiar to some of you, we may conclude that reality surpasses fiction.

To begin, we are all familiar with the term "rent," which traditionally refers to payments made to property owners. However, in a modern economy, rent can be created from anything, allowing owners to benefit passively from ownership without actively generating or producing anything. This has long been a source of concern for proponents of capitalism.

Furthermore, intellectual property rights play an important role in sustaining this power dynamic. Intellectual property ownership extends beyond the usual concept of property, allowing rights holders to regulate how others employ copies of their ideas.

Now, a society that places a high value on intellectual property, needs new rules that restrict people from freely replicating products, and it would be necessary to enforce licensing fees and copyright laws to maintain profits.

This means that, according to Frase, certain jobs would still remain, such as innovative products for replication, marketing, regulation, and protecting intellectual property rights. However, maintaining full employment in a rentist economy can become difficult, since they are all vulnerable to automation and labor-saving technologies.

The innovation will not only result in people being unemployed, but it will also expand the list of goods that can be copied over time. On the other hand, the money people have to spend will not grow quickly enough to sustain the production; making advertising a vital role in maintaining the system's fabricated scarcity. 

As with everything under capitalism, some solutions to this problem may arise, such as wealth redistribution through taxation or a guaranteed income, but these may face opposition from the wealthy. Because, as we all know, no one likes it when things are taken away from them, such as exorbitant fees or high taxes.

All this makes rentism intrinsically fragile and transitory, since the nature of it will eventually cause people to question the state of affairs.

Will ideology win? or are people going to start asking why the wealth of knowledge and culture is being restricted when other worlds are possible beyond the regime of artificial scarcity.

Socialism: Equality and Scarcity

We have already seen two potential futures based on abundance. However, we must consider the potential of scarcity; a world in which resources are limited. 

For this, Frase mentions a novel called "Pacific Edge," that offers a utopian vision of a postcapitalist and ecological society. The story takes place in Los Angeles and follows people's efforts to transform the urban landscape into something greener and cleaner.

It is a future where people work together to rebuild their relationship with nature as an egalitarian society.

In this situation, the society has transcended capitalism, at least in mindset, and has become a more socialist and ecologically sensitive system. It is a world defined by both abundance and scarcity, in which production is liberated alongside increased planning and management of the inputs of production. The need to control labor cease to exist, but the need to manage scarcity becomes very important. Making a certain kind of authority critical to sustain the system. 

Moreover, the most important aspect of this society is that it focuses on recognizing and managing the waste produced by human civilization, rather than trying to separate it from nature. It focuses more on managing consumption rather than production; having as an assumption that production can be automated, and the challenge lies in managing the resources that support it.

Now, the challenging part of this system is values. People’s values become essential to the shaping of a society that changes their relationship with nature. It needs a complete awareness of the scarcity that capitalism creates, and the issues that can arise economically and environmentally when resources such as oil reserves get exhausted. 

In other words, it needs a complete turn around, where technology and innovation are used to preserve the environment, rather than to consume it.

Frase mentions an example of this, where he invites us to stop seeing ecology as the science to preserve unchanging nature, at least not while also trying to keep human societies. He argues that socialism needs a completely different mindset where we no longer see ourselves as a plague on nature, but as an extension of it. Using our innovations to manage better and care for our environment. 

An example of this is the “RoboBees,” that are being developed at Harvard. These robotic insects mimic real ones, and help to the reproduction of plants all over the world. It fills human created holes and regenerates our ecosystems.

Now, going back to the mindset, we all  know how often these things are commented on in the media, from right-wing politicians denying the existence of climate change since it contradicts their interests; to left-wing politicians who only tend to resign to a negative reality. The issue is that we should focus on taking action and constructing a better world, but again values and interests get in the way.

Another problem that arises from this type of society is the failure of similar systems in the past. 

It is important to note that systems that get imposed without a significant change in mindset and a lack of sufficient power to execute planning can lead to a disaster where people resist the system that is just trying to make things better in the first place. We can learn about the seven moments that David Harvey talks about in his book “Capital, Marx and the Madness of Economic Reason.”

Now, as said earlier, in a world of scarce resources, coordination is essential to prevent unsustainable use of the Earth's resources. Democratic planning is needed to achieve this. Which brings us to the  importance of distinguishing between democratic planning and a complete non-market economy. A socialist economy could employ rational planning while still incorporating market exchange, money, and prices. Prices would serve as mechanisms to turn planned production targets into economic realities.

Moreover, Frase mentions a situation in which everyone receives a wage as a human right, rather than in exchange for labor. This wage grants individuals to only a limited quantity of resources. 

Additionally, although market trades could continue to exist, they would be entirely voluntary. People would have the option to engage in the exchange of different consumption permits based on their preferences, but such trades would be motivated by personal choices rather than the desperate need to survive.

Finally, the biggest difficulty with this system is that it does not entirely eliminate an authority, as communism does. It strictly needs to have stable consumption levels, which may lead to conflicts over resources. Despite this, this form of society will have progressed beyond capitalism into a more real democratic system.

Exterminism: Hierarchy and Scarcity

“The future is already here; it's just unevenly distributed." - William Gibson, science fiction writer.

Finally, we need to discuss a world where the capitalist ideology doesn’t cease to exist, and where resources are scarce, making communism a reality, but only for a few.

One movie that reflects this reality is “Elysium,”where a privileged elite has relocated to a space station. In this space station, the small elite enjoys eternal comfort and leisure, made possible by advanced medical technology. Meanwhile, the rest of humanity resides in an overcrowded and polluted world, governed by robotic police forces. 

Furthermore, the film reveals the political economy of this space station. The wealthy inhabitants of it do not appear to be economically dependent on Earth. While there is a factory on Earth managed by an elite, it appears to produce weapons and robots primarily for population control. People on Earth are seen as residents of a concentration camp rather than the workers they once were.

Now, going back to reality, the wealthiest individuals, often referred to as the "one percent," already live in a world that resembles Elysium in some ways. Their daily lives are least affected by financial concerns, and they can afford anything they want because their wealth far exceeds the cost of basic needs.

The goal, though, is that one day we will be able to accomplish something similar for everyone. However, if resources and energy become scarce, it will be hard for everyone to enjoy that standard way of living.

Furthermore, the danger posed by production automation in a hierarchical and resource-constrained environment is that it is economically redundant in the eyes of the rich elite. This renders capitalism as we know it obsolete, because in a capitalist system, workers and capitalists rely on and need one another in order to maintain the system through the commodification of labor and consumption.

In addition to this, the existence of a poor and unnecessary population poses a threat to the ruling class, as they fear expropriation. As a result, different courses of action may be taken, such as limited resource redistribution through social welfare programs. However, this solution may reintroduce scarcity for the rich and potentially lead to increasing demands from the masses, once again raising the possibility of expropriation.

This fear of expropriation combined with the financial capabilities of the rich elite will inevitably lead to them looking for ways to isolate themselves from the rest of society. These people with wealth can restrict the movements of people, products and services by creating enclosed zones, which can be either gated areas, private islands, ghettos, jails or anything with a strict barrier and high control. 

On that note, even if these claims seem exaggerated, we all know how wealthy people can buy islands and do anything to protect themselves from as much as possible. Vivos, a company that builds radiation-proof luxury bunkers, is one example of this. These bunkers serve as an underground escape in the event of an apocalypse. The desire for these isolated spaces reflects the fear of the rich being targeted by the masses.

Now, however, this type of isolation is also an unstable situation because the masses pose a constant threat. The possibility of them breaking the barriers and restrictions exists as long as they exist. In the absence of a necessity for mass labor, the rich may fight a genocidal war against the people who don't have.

This extreme possibility is known as "exterminism," and it might seem unattainable, yet historical atrocities and current political trends show that such degrees of brutality are not impossible.

All of this brutality defines "exterminism," a society in which the ruling class strives to eliminate the impoverished masses. Again, Frase admits it sounds impossible. However, history demonstrates that anytime there is power, there is an innate need and desire to protect the wealth that power holds. 

Militarized police enforcement threatens not only minor-crime victims, but also political mobilization and protests. Protests are violently suppressed all around the world, not only in authoritarian states. The use of fatal force against protestors has become common, and it can be used without hesitation in cases of fear or expropriation.

Finally, these four scenarios are speculations based on probable outcomes, but in the end, it all boils down to a shift in perception and conflicts with the rich elite who are resistant to change. 

However, even if perceptions and conflicts are on the way to significant change, we all know that climate change and automation will continue to evolve until they reach a tipping point that demands a paradigm shift in how societies operate and share wealth and resources. 

Some of the outcomes we saw are extremely beneficial while others are not. For example, the path to a world of abundance and equality is filled with challenges. Because, if mindsets do not change, violent confiscation of wealth from those in power may become necessary. This, however, assumes that we will continue to have abundance, which seems unlikely if things continue as they are. 

Another crucial point to note is that we do not have to select between these four possible futures. They all represent a specific point in time. Exterminism can evolve into socialism, while rentism can evolve into communism.

Furthermore, some futures are more difficult to sustain than others and may be reversed. For example, socialism is under strain because increased shared material raises the desire for some groups to establish themselves as the favored elite and change the system into an exterminist one. 

Similarly, communism is always vulnerable to counterrevolution if people are able to reestablish artificial scarcity and create a new rentist elite, as in rentism.

I truly enjoyed reading this book because it combines my interests in science fiction, sociology, politics, and even philosophy. It is a fantastic attempt that lets us think about alternatives and is well supported by actual analysis. 

I truly think that our societies are ultimately products of our imagination and creativity, and that the force of speculative fiction can inspire us to build on possibilities in order to find the best solutions to our current challenges.

However, we are all aware of the strength of ideology and how it prevents us from achieving meaningful change. Time will tell which of the outcomes happens first, but for the time being, all we can do is be aware of our beliefs and the reasons we hold them, while also learning as much as we can and broadening our worldviews to envision new possibilities.

Sources:

• Frase, P. (2016). Four Futures: Life After Capitalism. Verso.

Beyond Thought.

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I attempted to read Karl Marx's "Das Kapital" a year ago and, unsurprisingly, just did not have the time and experience to engage with the material. The book is very long and academic, with mathematics almost everywhere, and it uses a rigorous and analytical approach. However, while looking for companion books, I stumbled upon David Harvey, who, in my opinion, deserves credit for making Marxist theory understandable.

David has written multiple books, just a few of which were meant to explain Marx's ideas. I started reading "Companion to Marx's Capital" a few months ago and still return to it once in a while. Today, though, I'd like to focus just on "Marx, Capital, and the Madness of Economic Reason," which, in my opinion, is the ideal book for introducing oneself to Marx and his challenging concepts without losing sight of the big picture.

Before we go into detail, here are some highlights:

• The most important thing to understand capital is to see it as “value in motion,” since it travels through different stages at different rates and ultimately returns to where it started.

• Marx believed in two types of value: use value and exchange value.

• Marx defines value in a social form, and describes it as “socially necessary labor time.” This means the time and effort someone spends producing goods and services for others. 

• During the process of commodity production, the worker always reaches a point where they have created the value equivalent to the cost of their labor power and transferred the value of the means of production into the new commodity. However, the worker continues to work beyond that point creating surplus value, which is the root of money profit.

• Capital goes through three stages: valorization (in which its value increases), realization (where capital becomes a commodity and is sold in the market in order to be transformed back into capital), and distribution (the process by which surplus value is allocated among various sectors).

• The financial system plays an important role in distributing surplus and guiding the reinvestment of money as capital. However, Marx claims that these complicated interactions within the distribution stage can become speculative at times. This implies that value can be extracted from the economy and circulated as money in markets where no actual value is created.

• Marx considers value in relation to anti-value, or the negation of value. At its best debt represents anti-value, and it circulates as interest-bearing capital throughout the credit system. Other types of anti-value exist, such as the oppositions that emerge as a result of the market's concept of commodification, which restricts access to basic needs and, over time, prevents us from procuring them. This gives rise to another type of anti-value as well as a political challenge to the capital realization process.

• Marx uses space and time to refer to the need of capital to create the global market. This intrinsic urge to expand creates conflicts in which capital benefits from geographical concentration but faces the issue of balancing the benefits of concentration with the need for expansion for growth.

• Marx recognized that value could not be the same everywhere. Value laws change according to geography, and a lack of awareness of this results in richer countries exploiting poorer ones. 

• Capitalism faces a contradiction because it wants to minimize the amount of time workers spend on labor to maximize profit. However, it still relies on labor time as the sole measure and source of wealth. 

• Interest-bearing capital is a contradiction. Anti-value forces capitalists and individuals to focus on future value production, which must always rise exponentially to meet interest payments. It forces capitalists to fully use the anti-value or face devaluation.

• Capital's preferred method of enslavement is debt peonage because it does not forgive but insists on redemption through future value creation. The relationship of the state and the financial sector guarantees capital survival while alienating entire communities from power and influence.

Now, let’s delve deeper into it!

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Capital as Value in Motion: How Das Kapital is divided

Karl Marx worked hard to understand how capitalism works and to grasp the complexity of how capital transforms as it moves through the many phases of the economy.

What I like about David Harvey is that he discovered a method to visualize the complex method of capital by comparing it to the water cycle. This is by far the best way to explain it, because capital does the same thing: it travels through different stages at different rates and ultimately returns to where it started, at least, in some respects.

This brings us to Marx's crucial claim where he wants us to understand capital as "value in motion." 

To begin to understand this concept, we must know that Marx believed in two types of value: use value and exchange value. Use value refers to how people can use objects without the necessity for a market. That is, if someone needs a jacket to keep them warm in the winter, it may not have an exchange value without a market, but it does have a use value, which is to keep you warm. 

Furthermore, Marx defines value in a social form, and describes it as “socially necessary labor time.” This means the time and effort someone spends producing goods and services for others. This value is not something physical we can see or touch, but is, nonetheless, a necessary social construct for the economy to function.

This leads us to money, and how it is used to make value more tangible. Money acts as a representation of value in a social form, and it helps us measure and exchange goods based on how much they are worth.

Now, if we consider capital to be “value in motion", we may wonder how, where, and why it moves and transforms into other forms.

To respond to this question, it is important to note that not all money is capital. Capital is just the portion of money used to buy labor and means of production. The ability to work, provided by workers who sell their labor, is referred to as labor power, and the means of production include raw materials, machinery, and resources.

When money is exchanged for these two components, capital enters an important phase in which it transforms from money to commodities. 

On that note, one important thing about this process is that it has contradictions. With technological advancements, the amount of labor required to produce each object decreases. However, if the overall production of goods does not increase sufficiently, there may be a decline in the total value created. 

For example, if productivity doubles, one must produce and sell twice the number of objects to preserve the same overall value.

On top of that, during the process of commodity production, the worker always reaches a point where they have created the value equivalent to the cost of their labor power and transferred the value of the means of production into the new commodity. However, the worker continues to work beyond the point where their labor power has been covered, making these additional hours of work create surplus value, which is the root of money profit.

This is the stage of the process in which capital undergoes valorization, and hence increases in value. By extending the working day beyond the point of labor power recovery, dead capital (constant capital) is given new life, while labor power is used to produce absolute surplus value. 

After goods have been created, including any surplus, they are sold on the market. This is the point at which the value of the things is converted back into money. However, for this transition to happen, individuals must want or need the commodities and be able to pay for them. These conditions do not happen by themselves, but are influenced by the history of creating desires.

Marx refers to this transition as the point of “realization,” and it is important for the flow of value to be sustained, but it can be challenging because production and realization must align. If nobody wants a particular thing, no matter how much labor went into making it, it won't have any value.

On that point, one key contradiction is that workers, who are important as consumers in buying goods, face limitations in their ability to sell their own labor power. Capitalism often keeps their wages low, restricting their purchase power and making it difficult for them to participate fully in the market as consumers.

Another contradiction arises from the fact that during periods of intense capitalist production, there can be an excess of goods produced, leading to overproduction. This happens because the limit on the use of productive powers is not just the creation of value but also the ability to sell and realize that value in the market.

Furthermore, the realization of the value of goods and the surplus value generated from them is not restricted by the overall consumer needs of society but rather by the consumer needs of a society where the majority of people are poor and likely to remain like that. The effective demand from the working class is crucial for maintaining balance in the market. However, this demand is constantly threatened by the same system.

Now, once values have transformed from commodities back into money through sales on the market, the money, or in better terms the surplus value, is distributed among various participants. This part of the process is called distribution.

The process begins with workers receiving their part in the form of wages. Secondly, once workers receive their wages and the government claims its part, the remaining value is divided among different individuals. Individual capitalists earn a percentage based on their invested capital. Rents benefit property owners, including landowners and intellectual property rights holders. Merchant capitalists (those who sell commodities directly to consumers) and bankers also make money and play a crucial part in the economy by facilitating the conversion of money back into money capital. This step completes the capital cycle and allows it to flow back into the valorization process, at least in some sense.

One important thing to note is that the financial sector is not just a passive recipient of surplus value but actively supports the flow of money through interest-bearing capital.

The financial sector's dual role influences capital dynamics. It separates ownership from management, with stockholders seeking a return on investment while management organizes surplus value production. This separation might result in separate streams of capital moving in opposing directions.

Finally, the debt created by interest-bearing capital is crucial because it creates an incentive to keep capital in circulation. Debt repayment is important for future value generation, and failure to do so almost always ends in a major crisis in the capital flow system.

With all of this, it is clear that the capital system has multiple incentives and driving factors that contribute to keeping value in motion, but not without the risks, contradictions, and challenges that Marx elaborates on in his work.

Money as the Representation of Value

As we saw, Karl Marx thought that value is a social representation. It is immaterial yet objective, as we cannot simply perceive something as having intrinsic value. As a result, it is a social relationship that requires objective representation, and hence money cannot be linked to the value it represents. 

According to Marx, the economic concept of value is unique to modern economies and represents the most abstract expression of capital and its production.  

Furthermore, both money and credit in a capitalist mode of production have distinctive qualities that ensure the continuous movement of capital. The need to maintain continuity brings together the categories of money, credit, and value within a specific historical configuration.

In the first chapter of Capital, Marx examines pre-capitalist societies to show how categories are embedded in historical contexts. He contrasts the forced labor of feudalism and patriarchal rural industry of peasant families to highlight the characteristics of capitalism. 

For instance, he notes how Feudal modes of production were primarily focused on subsistence and local exchange, rather than by the pursuit of profit. 

After he has taken us through the process of deconstructing capitalism by analyzing the past, Marx invites us to imagine an association of free individuals who collectively work with commonly held means of production, exercising their various forms of labor power with full self-awareness as a unified labor force. He further claims that in this unalienated environment, the social relations between individual producers and their labor and products become transparent and simplified, both in production and distribution. 

Moreover, in this type of scenario, there is no “hidden hand” of the market or laws of motion that restrict our freedoms, nor is there any dictation by the state. 

Clearly, then, this scenario highlights money as a classic example of a fetishism, in which we attach social power to it, both over ourselves and others. Marx also pointed out the conflict between capitalism's socialized nature of production and private appropriation of surplus value. He argued that capitalism's emphasis on collective labor contradicts with private ownership of the means of production, resulting in conflicts and tensions within the system.

Furthermore, now that we know that value is a social relation for Marx, we can talk about how he found himself in disagreement with Proudhon, a prominent figure among French politicians. 

Proudhon and his followers questioned why capitalists and the working class were both poor when leading economists, such as David Ricardo, claimed that economic value was exclusively produced by labor.

Furthermore, Proudhon argued that the problem was the representation of labor value in the market and the irrationality of money and market exchange. He then proposed alternative ways of measuring labor value and setting prices, such as coins representing actual hours of labor, and alternative monetary systems.

However, Marx strongly disagreed with these ideas, arguing that Proudhon failed to grasp the social relations that define value. He argued, as we saw, that, under capitalism, it is socially necessary labor time, not actual labor time, that matters. The concept of "socially necessary" implies the existence of a hidden hand to which both capitalists and workers are subject. 

This is where Marx says he agrees with Adam Smith's concept of the "hidden hand" of the market - the one that pushes the free market through competition. However, he goes on to say that this hand is unquestionably the one of labor exploited by capital, secured by private property, and determined by commodity exchange in price-fixing markets; which inevitably leads to the degradation of workers in the process of capital accumulation.

Additionally, Marx warns that reforms to the monetary system alone cannot address the fundamental contradictions in the money relation and the capitalist mode of production. He argued that the ultimate solution lies in the total abolition of exchange value, which implies the abolition of value as socially necessary labor time.

Finally, Marx discusses the financial system and how, as previously said, it plays an important role in distributing surplus and guiding the reinvestment of money as capital. He maintains, however, that these complicated interactions within the distribution stage can become speculative at times. Making the circulation of interest-bearing capital a profit-generating process that does not immediately contribute to the valorization and realization processes.

Without a doubt then, from Marx's perspective of money capital, the processes of making a profit, known as valorization and realization, are seen as inconveniences. If money capital could increase itself without going through these processes, it would prefer to do so. 

Anti-Value: Devaluation

In Marx's work "Capital," he argues that for something to have value, it must be useful. If something is useless, the labor put into it does not count as valuable labor. 

Furthermore, Marx sees value in relation to anti-value, which is the negation or loss of value. This contradiction arises in the act of exchange, where it must be redeemed in order for value creation to continue, and it exists because when we exchange a commodity, it must have a use value for the buyer and a non-use value for the seller. 

To begin to understand this concept of anti-value, we must grasp the necessity for capital to be in continuous motion; that any pause or slowing in this motion results in a loss of value, and that this motion can only be recovered when the capital restarts its movement. If different types of capital, such as manufacturing, waiting to be sold, or circulating as a commodity, are not actively engaging in the circulation process, they might be essentially depreciated. 

Now, as some of us may know, the possibility of a general devaluation of capital, can lead to a crisis. Therefore, the realization of value depends on buyers and sellers in the market. Thus, while labor is crucial in the production process, consumer choice plays a significant role in realization. 

This is where manipulations come handy. Buyers have the freedom to choose what to consume, technically, and may resist market manipulations.

For instance, we all know the marketing that manipulates desires, and we all know the movements of resistance to these manipulations. This opposition comes from the market's concept of commodification, which restricts access to essential needs and, over time, prevents us from procuring them. This gives rise to another type of anti-value as well as a political challenge to the capital realization process.

Now, another form of anti-value under capitalism is debt. At its best debt represents anti-value, and it circulates within the credit system as interest-bearing capital.

As we have seen, capital must flow or it will stagnate. Capitalists cannot have capital lying around collecting dust, so money saved is dead money. The credit system allows stored money to generate interest, which is a way capital regains motion. However, capitalists can also borrow money and repay loans in installments. This is anti-value in the form of debt, and it circulates as interest capital in the system. It causes capital to move even when the actual value in production has different turnover times.

With this, Marx shows how debt is used to keep money in circulation and ensure continuous value production. However, if future value production is not sufficient to repay the debt, it can lead to crises and financial problems, making debt a burden on individuals, companies, and even countries.

This burden made Karl Marx see the financial system as the ultimate expression of capitalism's fetishistic attitude, and says that crises are the most apparent manifestations of anti-value. Instead of being considered as opportunities to better grasp capitalism's issues, crises are viewed as accomplishments in which the system simply regenerates and reborns. One of these anti-value manifestations is the forced monetary depreciation of exchange values.

Finally, it is important to note that the presence of one type of value negation does not fundamentally imply the presence of other types of value negation. During the 2008 housing crisis in the United States, for instance, the depreciation of housing exchange values resulted in a considerable stock of housing use values that could be acquired at low rates by private equity firms and individuals with sufficient money to do so.

Prices without Values

As some of us may infer, prices do not represent values, at least not under capitalism.

In a system where money speaks, gains win, which means that people focus on making money even if it means speculating on the pricing of things like art and currencies that have no real value. This implies that value can be extracted from the economy and circulated as money in markets where no actual value is created.

This situation can lead to investors making mistakes, since the price of something doesn't reflect its true value. For example, if property markets provide the highest returns, capitalists will invest in them rather than in productive activities. This unreasonable behavior has the potential to harm the economy's general functioning and lead to stagnation.

On the account of making profit, Marx discusses the "free gifts" of nature and how capital appropriates them for profit. Metals, minerals, and coal are examples of natural resources. Capital can use these things without paying, but they may acquire a cost if someone claims ownership and charges rent for them. This applies to land, cultural objects, household work, and even worker skills that most of the time are acquired after the worker has been hired. 

For instance, in the current economic system, there is a growing trend of exploiting the value created by knowledge and creative work. While knowledge has become an important part of the economy, it doesn't always have a clear value.  

Furthermore, Marx argues that as society develops and knowledge expands, it becomes possible to incorporate it into systems of production. With this we can become more productive and, ultimately, reduce the amount of time and effort needed to produce goods and services.

The main point of Marx is not that knowledge should make us work less in general, but rather that it should make our work more efficient. With knowledge we can produce the same or even greater output with less labor input. This increased productivity can potentially lead to shorter work hours or allow for more time and resources to be allocated to other pursuits. 

However, he was aware of the capitalist system’s exploitation of labor and the potential displacement of workers due to technological advancements. He argued that as knowledge becomes incorporated into fixed capital it can make certain types of labor less valuable, leading to inequality and challenges for workers.

Now, on the subject of knowledge, Marx showed special concern for imagination and creativity, and how capital limits it by transforming its worth.

There is a good example of this in the book, where John Milton, the author of Paradise Lost, did not create value when he wrote his novel; it did so only after it was printed and sold as a commodity. In other words, by the time the book was commodified and sold in the market it acquired value and surplus value. Additionally, after books have been printed, first editions, or even the original book itself, acquired an astronomical price. 

This, in short, shows us how "productive" refers to the creation of surplus value, which is the extra value generated beyond the cost of production. This creates confusion because the products of creative intellectual labor, like unique books, seem exceptional and their price seems to increase due to factors like reputation, which are not directly related to the labor involved. This is just an example of the contradiction of value and its monetary expression.

Now, this is where we talk about the claim that most Marxists make, which is the concern that as productivity increases, the volume of physical goods in circulation may rise while the production of value and surplus value diminishes or even disappears. This could lead to the collapse of capitalism, and it happens as a result of capitalism's persistent preference for labor-saving innovations.

Now, we say value is diminished because, in the context of capitalism, value is generated mainly by human labor. When automation replaces human labor, the value of the objects produced may fall since they are no longer filled with the direct contribution of human effort. This, in turn, has the potential to have an impact on the entire social production of value and surplus value.

Furthermore, declining social production of value and surplus value could increase the gap between commodity physical production and pricing. As more things are created through automation, manufacturing costs may fall; yet, if consumer purchasing power falls due to fewer work opportunities, there may be a discrepancy between the two.

Finally, just as capitalism has an impact on knowledge, it also affects other "free gifts" of nature such as history and culture. Tourism, for example, creates value and surplus value by capitalizing on natural parks and natural scenery. 

With all these, we can conclude that capital faces major contradictions. One arises from the search for relative surplus value, which focuses on labor-saving technological changes that reduce the labor force available for value extraction. The other one is the tendency for capital to invest in areas that produce no value or surplus value, driven solely by the pursuit of monetary profit. 

This leads us to the conclusion that understanding the complexity of the money-value relationship is critical for understanding the challenges of capital formation.

The Question of Technology

Marx believed that under capitalism, there is a strong drive for technological changes to increase profits. Competition among capitalists leads to the adoption of better technologies to lower production costs and gain an advantage in the market. This process results in higher productivity and a decrease in the value of individual goods, resulting in more surplus value for the capitalist.

However, although machines help in raising productivity, Marx argued that they themselves do not produce value. He claims that the value comes from living labor, not from past labor embodied in machines, since it's the labor who created them. 

This leads to the claim that capitalists often mistakenly believe that machines create value and act upon this belief. This fetishism of technology, according to Marx, is widespread and can lead to the belief that technology can solve all social and economic problems. Putting us in an echo chamber of belief where we think that technological advancements alone drive historical change. 

Now, contrary to popular belief, Marx believed that history is more than only the history of class struggle. He argued that different moments interact with each other and affect how we see the world. 

For example, many mental concepts we have now, have become apparent because of our ability to see more, such as through telescopes. As a result, one's perspective on the world expands.

This means that while technological progress and its relationship with social relations in capitalism have played a significant role in shaping history, they are not the only factors. Marx's analysis encompasses seven elements like technology, social relations, modes of production, mental conceptions, daily life and institutional frameworks. All these aspects interact and evolve together within the capitalist system but most of the time at different speeds or directions.

Consequently, technology in the form of money leads nowhere, without transforming the other moments. The Internet, for example, can promise different things, but when it is co-opted by the mentality of exploitation and accumulation, it just leads to the same end, what we need is more of the other moments or forms of actions.

A clear example of this is climate change, and the difficulty it has because it requires drastic changes in all seven moments. This leads to fixes like green capitalism that clearly reflect an imbalance in mental conceptions or social relations when compared with other moments.

It is important to say, however, that Marx does not provide a fixed formula for how these moments will bring about a change. He argues that revolution is an ongoing process of movements across all these different aspects. 

This explains the failure of the Soviet Union, and how it ignored the intersection of all these moments, forcing communism by productive force solely. 

Other examples include, institutionalists emphasizing institutional changes, economic determinists focusing on new technologies, socialists and anarchists accentuating class struggle, and cultural theorists studying transformations in everyday life. Marx's approach, on the other hand, considers all of these conditions to be interconnected and interdependent in order for fundamental transformation to emerge.

Now, the reason Marx emphasizes technology a lot, is because he knew that technology itself becomes a business. When new technologies emerge, they naturally seek new markets and contribute to the centralization of capital.

For example, in Marx’s time, the steam engine created multiple applications within the fields of transportation, and even the factories that created the engines themselves. 

Furthermore, a surprising statement in the book that reaffirms the fetishism with technology is that John Stuart Mill, a political economist, questioned if previous inventions had genuinely reduced the amount of work for humans. As to what Marx responded, “No,” since capitalists use machinery to take more profit from labor rather than to lighten the workload of workers.

This brings us to the conclusion that capitalism faces a contradiction because it wants to minimize the amount of time workers spend on labor to maximize profit. However, it still relies on labor time as the sole measure and source of wealth. On one hand, capitalism seeks to harness the powers of science, nature, social cooperation, and interaction to create wealth independently of labor time. On the other hand, it wants to use labor time as a measure to control and limit the social forces generated by these advancements within the boundaries necessary to maintain the existing value of goods and services.

The Space and Time of Value

The concept of space and time may appear to be quite philosophical and scientific, but it is in the nature of capital to establish the world market, which means it generates its own space.

However, physical constraints such as distance and transportation difficulties, as well as time constraints, must be solved in order to attain a fast-paced global market.

With this in mind, Marx talks about how the dialectical movement of space and time that capital creates for its own needs and purposes, ultimately becomes antagonistic. 

To explain this is going to be tough, but I will attempt to do it the best I can.

To begin with, in capitalism, there is a fundamental contradiction regarding the spatial dynamics of capital. On one hand, capital needs to be concentrated in specific locations to take advantage of resources, labor, and infrastructure for its growth and accumulation. 

On the other hand, capitalism also requires expansion and the ability to move capital across large distances to access new markets and investment opportunities. 

So, while capital benefits from spatial concentration, it also faces the challenge of balancing the advantages of concentration with the necessity of expansion.

Now, in order for Marx to study the dynamics of capital, he tried to present the world of trade as a single nation, claiming that capital is established everywhere and has power over all industries.

However, he found it difficult to do this study since he witnessed the rise of companies in first-world countries, such as the United Kingdom, seeking cheaper materials for their operations. This prompted them to expand, but only by colonial means.  

As a result, this increased division of labor, with one region of the world serving as a supplier to the industrialized countries. This development and colonization provide new demands and fields for industry while also worsening inequality in wealth distribution. One example of this can be the trade agreements between Mexico and the United States.

This leads to the conclusion that capitalism's contradictions and the uneven distribution of wealth drive it to constantly search for geographical expansion as a means to resolve its internal conflicts. 

Regarding time, Marx, as previously said, defines value as socially necessary labor time on the global market. While surplus value is one thing, the division of the working day that maximizes surplus value is a battle fought on a daily basis as capital steals as much extra labor time as it can.

This causes Marx to perceive capital as a spiral rather than a circle, and to arrive at different human perspectives on space and time. He suggested that we either utilize a universal, fixed temporal and spatial frame to establish order or recognize that there are several ways to conceptualize time and space, which leads to inconsistencies that must be accepted and resolved.

To understand this deeply, we first need to understand the different relations of space and time. 

The first concept is absolute space-time, which refers to a specific physical space and a set and defined span of time. It can be represented by using the time of the working day or the time of the lease of a land, for example. Marx refers to this as concrete labor because it constitutes a tangible and measurable kind of temporal and geographical connection within capitalist production.

The second concept is relative space-time, which is the space and time of relative surplus value, or variable productivity or intensity of different parts of the working day. As an example, consider someone who rents land and wants to maximize profits but is unable to cultivate fruits since labor is scarce and the area is too remote from all resources. If a highway is built in the middle of the lease, the tenant will be able to swap from grain meals to fresh fruits.

However, because fruit trees take eight years to mature, planting fruit trees under the terms of the lease would be illogical. In this concept differential transport costs and distances are taken into account.

The third and most difficult concept is relational space-time. David illustrates this with home valuation and how each upgrade to a property affects the monetary value of the houses around it. The position of the house in relative space and time is used to value it, but the ultimate result is just an idea of the highest and best use of it. When there is a crisis and markets collapse, all we can do is make assumptions on the asset's value. This suggests that these values are influenced by expectations, anticipations and sentiment in general.

Clearly, with this, we can see how time plays a central role in Marx's critique of political economy. He argues that use value and exchange value, as well as concrete labor (specific work) and abstract labor (general labor), clash because they all have different time frames. 

All of this brings Marx to ask questions about production and circulation times. He noted that, for example, while planting crops, it may take a few hours to finish the labor, but several years for the crops to grow. Capital has difficulty organizing various turn-over times.  

Now, this leads us to the concept of fixed capital, which answers questions such as:

How do machines transfer their value into the goods they produce? 

To begin, let's imagine a business owner who buys a machine to make their workers more productive. This machine adds value because it helps workers produce more goods. However, if everyone else also buys the same machine, the advantage is lost. The business owner needs to recover the money invested in the machine over its lifetime. One simple way to do this is by subtracting a portion of the machine's value each year. 

For example, if the machine lasts for ten years, one-tenth of its value is considered as part of the goods produced each year. After ten years, the business owner should have saved enough money to buy a new machine and start the process again.

However, there's a problem. Newer and better machines are constantly being developed with advancements in technology. This means the existing machines can become less valuable and less competitive. The value of a new machine is not the same as the old one that has been used for some time. The lifespan of a machine is no longer only determined by physical factors because the introduction of better machines might lead to the early retirement of the existing ones.

There are three ways to understand how fixed capital moves in the economy. The first is by subtracting a fixed portion of the machine's value each year based on its average lifespan. The second is by considering that the cost of replacing the machine may vary during its lifespan. The third way involves continuously changing the value of the machine based on how useful it is in creating profit and competing with other businesses. In this case, the lifespan of the machine depends on how well it creates value and profit, not just the amount of labor that went into making it.

This brings interest-bearing capital back into the picture. Where capitalists borrow money and repay its value, including interest, over time. This introduces the circulation of interest-bearing capital and intersects with the circulation of value through fixed capital use.

Now, Marx argues that the formation of fixed capital is closely related to the production of surplus products, which creates conditions conducive to its accumulation. As fixed capital increases in scale, more surplus labor and capital can be absorbed, allowing for the construction of infrastructure. This allows us to distinguish between production and consumption investments. 

In any instance, interest-bearing capital is a contradiction. It is anti-value that forces capitalists and individuals to focus on future value creation, which must always rise in order to meet interest payments. It forces capitalists to employ the anti-value fully or face devaluation. Fixed capital ties you to specific ways, times, and places of accomplishing things in the future. The future becomes entangled with the past, and capital loses flexibility while desperately needing it.

The Production of Value Regimes

Marx recognized that value could not be the same everywhere. Value laws change according to geography, and a lack of awareness of this, results in richer countries exploiting poorer ones.

This means that the trade of regional values ends up subsidizing and boosting the other country's economy. High-value-producing areas, such as Mexico, sustain high-productivity areas, such as the United States. This is why certain countries, like Japan, choose to subsidize capital over labor-intensive kinds of production.

Now, according to Marx, the only way we can have an adequate representation of money is through a world market, since it is the only way that it acquires its universal form.

To explain this, let's imagine we have a city. Over time, a specific type of money is created to represent the average amount of time and effort put into producing things in that city. This money represents the value of goods and is based on the idea of how much work is needed to make them. This can happen in different cities too, where each city has its own way of measuring value.

Furthermore, capitalism, which is the system of making and trading goods, wants to go beyond just one city. It wants to break the limits of trading between different areas with their own value systems. It wants to create a global market where goods can be exchanged universally. To do this, universal money needs to be established. 

Historically, this role was fulfilled by gold, which was considered valuable all around the world. However, nowadays there are challenges with using a single currency like the US dollar as the global reserve currency. The US economy represents a certain level of productivity, but it's not guaranteed that everyone will always accept the US dollar as the standard for measuring value. If the productivity of other countries surpasses that of the United States, then people may question the value of the US dollar. This means there isn't a stable foundation for a universal equivalent of value. The value of currencies can change unpredictably, leading to the evolution of different systems of measuring value in different parts of the world.

Now, as we know, capitalism expands to create the world market. As a result, the convergence of different value systems increased, both at regional and global levels. 

The convergence of different values has been created by a continuous effort to reduce barriers to trade. Transportation costs have fallen, and political barriers like tariffs and regulations have been reduced through initiatives like the World Trade Organization. These efforts suggest that the differences between regional value systems are disappearing, and we are moving closer to a globally unified system of value. 

Now, attempts to create trade agreements like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership reflect the desire of certain countries, particularly the United States, to establish a specific value system that protects their market share. These agreements are not true free trade arrangements but rather agreements among advanced economies aiming to exclude others.

Furthermore, as spatial barriers have diminished, other forms of monopoly have gained importance. Large corporations with significant market power have been a prominent feature of capitalism, and the breakdown of spatial barriers has shifted the focus from national to global perspectives on corporate power. The rise of foreign competition and the establishment of companies in other countries has challenged national monopolies. Few examples of this can be the current monopolistic players like Google and Facebook that have emerged along with their efforts to control intellectual property rights globally.

Finally, Marx argues that competition naturally leads to monopolies, as only the best firms survive when exposed to competition. This happens because capital seeks productivity and scale, which eventually leads to growth by merging or acquiring the small businesses with which it competes.  

Clearly then, the importance of different value regimes is undeniable, and in Marx's time, crises often happened due to issues with balance of payments, which refers to the difference between a country's exports and imports.

For example, England, as the leading creditor country, experienced a crisis caused by a negative balance of payments, which led to a drain of gold reserves.

However, nowadays, such crises are not typically resolved by shipping away gold. Instead, they are often addressed through loans from institutions, but this usually comes at the cost of imposing severe austerity measures on the population. Without the gold standard, the world now relies on human manipulation to prevent catastrophic outcomes in global financial markets.

With all this we now know that defining regional value regimes is difficult. NAFTA may work well in combining US productivity with Mexican low-cost labor, but that doesn't mean that Chinese manufacturing methods and African materials can coexist with a Mexican product sold and advertised in the US. 

We can see now how the nature of capital is to homogenize incompatible pieces in order to establish the global market and maintain its demand for endless growth.

The Madness of Economic Reason

“The madness of economic reason gets disguised by fetish forms in which money appears to have the magical power of making more money without cease” - David Harvey

The Madness of Economic Reason is just David's account of the system's absurdity.

To illustrate the concept, we can start with Hegel's concept of "bad infinity," which is a philosophical concept that describes an infinite progression without a definite end and is associated with the idea of endlessness that exceeds human comprehension, just as it occurs in capitalism.

Ironically, economists have never confronted capitalism's "bad infinity," which merely results in perpetual compound growth, devaluation, and disaster. Instead, they believe that capitalism has led to an increase in wealth and that crises are just the result of miscalculations. Every argument economists make against a crisis is a contradiction, and the desire to persuade oneself of the nonexistence of contradictions is an indication of a devoted wish for the contradictions not to exist. 

The flow of money credit and the anti-value The Madness of Economic Reason generates becomes a black hole in which actual value vanishes in the name of debt redemption. Banks lend to one another and eventually require funds from central banks. Banks lend to governments in exchange for the state's ability to tax the population. Everything is fictional capital created within the credit system to lend to the state, creating an infinite claim for future value generation that will never end.

Furthermore, this drives asset speculation, causing rents and other values to skyrocket to previously inconceivable levels. Making every type of individual borrow even if they know that the anti-value will harm them afterwards.

Now, the drive of unlimited accumulation is not limited to the world of credit and money; it also affects the production of goods and services.

There are a lot of examples of countries using urbanization and construction projects as a means to solve economic problems and absorb all the surplus capital and labor. These projects involve massive investments in housing, infrastructure, and urban development. 

In China, for instance, the government launched a program of investment in the built environment, which included the construction of housing and other infrastructure. This helped absorb surplus labor and stimulate economic growth. Similarly, the United States implemented similar measures after World War II to absorb the increase in productive capacity and create jobs for returning veterans.

However, these large-scale construction projects often require the creation of new credit to sustain them, which in turn, creates a global economy that relies on mirage, where the creation of value becomes increasingly disconnected from real production.

Now, one thing to note is that Marx does not think the global market is bad; he simply sees it as the only way for capital to escape devaluation. It is created out of desperation rather than a need or a revolutionary idea. The problem with this is that it doesn’t have a limit.

Furthermore, Marx also mentions mass migratory movements as a result of spatial reconstruction. These changes generate various political stresses and responses, like the anti-immigrant movements, the resurgence of nationalist sentiments, and, on a more positive note, the acceptance of multiculturalism as a potential future.

All these contradictions are everywhere in Marx’s work, and David in his book "Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism," identifies three contradictions that pose a threat to capitalism's survival. One of the contradictions that we haven’t talked about yet is universal alienation. 

There are different types of alienation in Marx's work; however, David highlights the alienation from the valorization stage, in which the worker is alienated from the means of production. Capital does everything it can to make it seem like what it creates only has meaning because of capital. Even our bodies get certain meaning only when capital moves them by productive forces. 

Furthermore, alienation is everywhere, from alienating individuals from one another through competitiveness, which hinders solidarity, to even what we desire and think we need. Consumption must be incentivized to generate demand, which is manufactured through influence over imposed lifestyle choices. 

For example, we are all familiar with the American Dream, or the Golden Age of America, in which individuals were surrounded by the idea of a hedonistic way of life and an infinite pursuit of satisfactions and desires. This happens because, as we all know, capital must grow and accelerate in order to avoid stagnation, and it must do so by raising consumption at the same or faster rate.

Finally, debt peonage becomes capital's favorite way of enslavement because it does not forgive but insists on redemption through future value creation. The relationship of the state and the financial sector ensures capital survival and alienates entire populations from power and influence. Money's corrupting and alienating power, particularly in the form of interest, is part of the problem. But again, only part of the big trouble we experience in this world we live in…

Sources:

• Harvey, D. (2019). Marx, Capital, and The Madness of Economic Reason. Oxford University Press.

• Harvey, D. (2018). A Companion To Marx's Capital: The Complete Edition. Verso; Illustrated Edition.

Beyond Thought.

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“It's easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.” - Mark Fisher

This is how Mark Fisher begins Capitalist Realism with an immensely profound and devastating truth that is hard to admit. 

But, before we go into detail, here are some highlights:

• The term "Capitalist Realism" refers to society's inability to imagine alternatives to capitalism, accepting the current political and economic system as the sole viable option.

• Capitalism transforms objects into commodities, fostering a culture of consumption and spectacle for the sole purpose of profit.

• Nihilism is so deeply embedded in our culture that even "anti-capitalism" is viewed as a useless act that creates cynicism and disarms those who may be motivated to organize against it. In other words, anti-capitalism encourages people to accept the system.

• Capitalism produces more of the same, preventing the creation of real new experiences.

• While fascism and Stalinism need propaganda to survive, capitalism can function without anyone making a case for it. This is because capitalism is widely regarded as post-ideological.

• Capitalist realism sees mental health as a natural fact rather than a political issue. 

• Late capitalism promotes hyper bureaucracy, emphasizing appearances and symbols over actual achievements. 

• The "big Other" is a collective fiction or symbolic structure that underlies social reality; it is an invisible phenomenon that is represented by individuals and institutions, and it's constantly shaped by public relations and propaganda. 

• Postmodernism overlaps with capitalist realism because of the crisis caused by the decline of trust in the "big Other" and its impact on traditional ways of seeing the world. Fisher argues that viewing ourselves as having transcended the necessity of the big Other unavoidably supports capitalist realism, since we limit our ability to envision alternatives.

• Post-Fordism has a decentralized nature and unpredictable work environment that increases mental distress.

• Selfish capitalism's competitive and aspirational nature contributes to unrealistic expectations and pressures, affecting mental well-being.

• Neoconservatism and neoliberalism are two distinct ideologies. However, in the realm of capitalist realism, the market becomes the primary arena for making decisions. As a result, the coexistence of opposing ideologies without significant critique or transformation hinders the creation of true alternatives. 

• Fisher argues that the media in capitalism reflects the permissive and hedonistic society of postmodernity, in which we emphasize desire and pleasure. This leads to parents viewing their duty as a failure if they impede their children's right to enjoy themselves.

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But, without any more delay, let's dive right in!

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To begin his book, Fisher describes the main idea of his work by comparing it to the film Children of Men by Alfonso Cuarón, which takes place in a dystopian future where humanity is confronted with infertility, leaving no hope for the future.

Furthermore, Fisher says that the film gives a sense of despair and a lack of hope for change. The massive infertility and the absence of children symbolize a cultural stagnation and a loss of potential for progress. 

With this, Fisher claims that the film reflects the difficulty of imagining alternatives to capitalism because no one knows how the current society came to be; all they know is that it is what they have and there is nothing they can do about it. 

Moreover, the film implements crisis-response measures such as authoritarian regulations and the closure of public places, which, according to Fisher, it's something that can be observed in our modern society under capitalism, where systems have been put in place to deal with the consequences of the system. Some of these measures include the authoritarian measures implemented after 9/11 and the 2008 banking crisis. In these scenarios, the state, which is intended to be less involved under capitalism, takes over to handle its own problems with measures that it regards as impossible to set aside even after years have gone.

All of this is what Fisher refers to as "Capitalist Realism," a state of mind that society has within capitalism in which we see no potential of change and nothing can be reverted or improved. A state of mind in which all we can do is accept the current political and economic way of organizing the world.

Now, according to Fisher, the infertility issue might be considered a metaphor for our late capitalism. 

As previously said, infertility represents a loss for progress, and hence a loss of something new, which, according to Fisher, is extremely characteristic of capitalism. 

This brings us to his claim about history and culture, and how capitalism absorbs everything. According to Fisher, capitalism produces more of what already exists, leaving us with nothing new or exciting to experience. Furthermore, once culture can no longer be viewed through a new lens, it is no longer culture and is instead given monetary value and stored as an artifact of the past, such as in a museum; this transforms capitalism into a system that transforms objects into commodities, fostering a culture of consumption and spectacle for the sole purpose of profit.

But, according to Fisher, this idea of having nothing new is a sign of something. 

To explain this, Fisher mentions Francis Fukuyama, an American conservative politician who wrote a book that suggests that the end of history happened with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the victory of capital liberalism. Fukuyama used his enthusiasm for Hegelian dialectics to reach the conclusion that liberalism is ultimately the Absolute Idea that Hegel envisioned.

However, Fisher disagrees with Fukuyama, and says that even if the idea came to be rejected, it still tends to be the default way we think about capitalism on a subconscious level. In addition to this, he argues that Fukuyama's concept of the end of history reflects a Nietzschean influence, which according to Fisher's interpretation of Nietzsche's "Last Man,” reflects a sense of disengagement and spectatorship. 

Now, I will briefly mention some Nietzschean concepts in order to explain what he means by the “Last Man.” The majority of people are more familiar with Nietzsche's concept of the Übermensch, which is a type of humanity powered by the pursuit of self-realization. The “Last Man” concept, on the other hand, shows a condition in which mankind is primarily concerned with avoiding suffering and chasing pleasures, which, in turn, reduces engagement in life and turns humans into just spectators.

This explains Fisher's belief that Fukuyama's work is fundamentally Nietzschean. The assumption that capital liberalism is the end of history reflects our actual reality, in which people have become passive consumers and spectators rather than active participants in shaping their own lives and society. In other words, we have become blind to the system, mindlessly following it and failing to see any alternatives of living.

Lastly, at the end of the first chapter, Fisher discusses Kurt Cobain and how he perceived this new commodification in society. 

According to Fisher, Cobain is a good example of a response against the dominant capitalist system in which everything, including culture, is commodified. Fisher says that Cobain marks a critical point at which the cultural phenomenon of grunge was predetermined to become a mainstream media product even before it was born. In other words, what was meant to be new became a spectacle and a commodity, and despite Cobain's attempts, his acts and image were quickly co-opted by the mainstream music industry, media, and consumer culture. It is a capitalist paradox in which acts of subversion and resistance are ultimately assimilated and commodified by the very system they seek to challenge.

Protesting or Going Against the System Just Reinforces It

To start the second chapter, we need to understand the nihilism that lives within capitalism. This idea that anything is meaningless, and that even our attempts to rebel against the system become useless since all our actions are somehow determined to have a certain outcome that was repeated before, and will therefore, repeat itself.

Furthermore, this nihilism is so deeply embedded in our culture that even "anti-capitalism" is viewed as a useless act that creates cynicism and disarms those who may be motivated to organize against it. In other words, anti-capitalism encourages people to accept the system.

To explain this, Fisher uses the film Wall-E, in which capitalism's consumerist culture has finally destroyed Earth and humanity has become overweight and dependent on their screens while they live elsewhere in space. Moreover, the film, more than making the consumer an spectator, invites them to interact with the movie and realize the terror that capitalism is creating.

On top of that, this film rather than creating what it intends, gives a sense of “interpassivity,” in which the viewer consumes the content without feeling guilty. To put it another way, despite the film being leftist, the fact that a company is doing the job for us and coming up with solutions makes us passive. It causes us to watch the film without feeling terrible about not doing anything about it.

This leads to the claim Fisher makes that, while fascism and Stalinism need propaganda to survive, capitalism can function without anyone making a case for it. This is because capitalism is widely regarded as post-ideological; nevertheless, according to Slavoj Žižek, capitalism has the ideology of cynicism, in which people do not believe in ideology and the mere act of ignoring it creates an unconscious fantasy that shapes our reality. 

For instance, Žižek explains that even though we know capitalism is wrong, we nonetheless participate in it. We know money is only a piece of paper or numbers on a screen, but we continue to act as if it has some value.

Finally, Fisher uses the Live Aid 1985 benefit event to illustrate this concept. This was a concert that generated funds for famine help in Ethiopia. With this, Fisher emphasizes that, while this event intended to reduce global inequality and separate ourselves from capitalism's flaws, the very act of relying on consumption and major corporations to achieve these aims promotes capitalist realism.

In other words, philanthropic acts as main solutions to system problems reinforce capitalism as the only sustainable system. Once again, it turns consumers into spectators and makes them a part of an event in which companies profit from the suffering of others and turn it into a global media spectacle. 

Work, Education and Healthcare under Capitalist Realism

After Fisher has taken us through how capitalism has transformed culture and art, he focuses on how it has impacted work, healthcare and education in such a way that it constrains thought and action.

As we have seen, just criticizing capitalism from a moral position, emphasizing its negative consequences and the misery it causes, promotes capitalist realism; hence, Fisher asks, "Where can the challenge come from?"

With this in mind, Fisher argues that one way to destroy capitalist realism is to expose its flaws and contradictions.

However, what appears realistic is not the same as actual reality, because in an ideological reality, everything is defined by the ideology itself, and what appears "natural" becomes unquestionable.

This introduces us to the Lacanian concept of the Real, which illustrates capitalism's unrepresentable and traumatic aspects. Environmental catastrophe is one example of this, which is included into capitalist culture but isn’t fully assimilated due to capitalism's demand for everlasting resource exploitation.

“For Lacan, the Real is what any ‘reality’ must suppress; indeed, reality constitutes itself through just this repression. The Real is an unrepresentable X, a traumatic void that can only be glimpsed in the fractures and inconsistencies in the field of apparent reality. So one strategy against capitalist realism could involve invoking the Real(s) underlying the reality that capitalism presents to us.” - Mark Fisher

Another aspect that Fisher highlights is mental health. Capitalist realism sees mental health as a natural fact rather than a political issue. The rising rates of mental distress in capitalist societies are viewed as an issue that each of us must address, without taking into account the conditions in which people live on a daily basis.

To conclude the chapter, Fisher discusses how bureaucracy persists in capitalist societies, despite claims that neoliberalism would abolish it and that bureaucracy would remain a "relic of unlamented Stalinist past."

Fisher gives the example of how, rather than focusing on educating students, teachers focus on maintaining the appearance of being effective teachers since they are constantly monitored by bureaucracy. Teachers must be perceived as productive, which paradoxically leads to a distorted performance comparison across teachers, because we are comparing the image or representation of a performance, rather than the performance itself.

Another aspect discussed by Fisher is the concept of "reflexive impotence" among students. 

He says that they are generally more disengaged, and that this disengagement is due to a sense of powerlessness under the system, rather than apathy. Students believe they can't change anything, and this, in turn, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

To add to this, Fisher claims that this sense of powerlessness has led to a variety of issues among teenagers, including mental health issues and learning difficulties such as dyslexia, and that this has led to a state of "depressive hedonia" in which teenagers are unable to do anything other than seek pleasure. This idea of being hooked up into phones, computers and social media creates an incapacity to create a coherent narrative, which in turn creates demotivation.

To support this claim, Fisher mentions an analysis from Jameson titled Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in which he emphasizes the concept of the Lacanian schizophrenic, which reduces all experience into pure and unrelated pieces of time. 

This leads to his claim that conditions such as ADHD are disorders of late capitalism, because people cannot be "unwired" from consumer culture inside the system.

Furthermore, he says that our "new ability" to process data in the form of images has rendered us unable to process information in the form of a text, and that as a result, we have lost our ability to read and engage in books.

With this in mind, Fisher says that in late capitalism, individuals who struggle to retain information are illiterate, but they must nevertheless succeed and stick to evaluation standards, resulting in education being a reproduction of a social reality with inconsistencies. One example is how teachers must continually adjust to their students' boredom in order to preserve their interest in learning, while still appearing to be teaching the way they should, because they are constantly supervised by a higher-level manager.

Fordism and Post Fordism

Now we go on to Fisher's explanation of Post Fordism and how it differs from the Fordism of the past. Karl Marx got all of his ideas about alienation from a Fordist society, which was a system defined by rigid organizational structures, loyalty to companies, and a predictable career path consisting mainly of repeated meaningless work.

However, our current reality is a Post-Fordist society, which is far more decentralized and indirectly asks individuals to be more flexible, respond to unforeseen events, and adapt themselves in order to meet market demands, which can be seen as an invisible structure that is deeply embedded in the mind of every individual living in a capitalistic society. 

Furthermore, Fisher claims that the transition to a new Post-Fordist society has had psychological implications. The persistent insecurity and unpredictability of work in this new system has increased mental distress, making capitalism fundamentally bipolar, with the economy swinging between periods of irrational exuberance, such as the bubble thinking we occasionally see, and depressive downturns, which by definition reflect the psychological distress associated with severe economic contractions.

After this, Fisher discusses the concept of the Selfish Capitalist, which comes from another study cited by James. The research shows a correlation between the rise of selfish capitalism and increased rates of mental health issues, such as depression and anxiety. Fisher argues that the competitive and aspirational nature of selfish capitalism leads to unrealistic expectations and pressures, which can negatively affect people's mental well-being. This creates a toxic environment in which people feel constant pressure to achieve wealth and success, regardless of their history or circumstances. 

On this point, I'd like to point out that when Fisher wrote the book, we didn't have social media as we do now, and today, not only is material wealth assumed to be the only way to be considered successful, but also the following and appearance you portray on the internet, which leads to even higher levels of mental distress. 

Postmodern Capitalism and the Big Other

As we said earlier, late capitalism is characterized by claims of being anti-bureaucratic. However, as we already saw, this isn’t the case. 

To make the point, Fisher used the film Office Space to exemplify “hyper individuality” in the workplace. In this movie, employees are asked to wear seven badges or personal tokens to express their individuality and creativity, illustrating how self-expression has become integral to labor in modern societies.

Furthermore, the badges show us a hidden phenomenon since one of the employees is asked why she did not wear more, to which she replies, “Well, if you wanted me to wear 37 pieces, why didn’t you just make 37 the minimum?.” Then the manager replies, “Well, I thought I remembered you saying that you wanted to express yourself.” 

This scene, according to Fisher, shows how doing the minimum isn’t enough, and how it imposes demands on workers without actually expressing it.

In other words, Fisher means that the demands of capitalism are in some ways invisible. People are continuously striving to be more than average to attain success, which drives them to surpass the "unspoken rules" of the workplace in order to reach the top.

This returns us to the idea that neoliberalism tried to remove bureaucracy and move away from the concept of a Stalinist society. The rhetoric of decentralized control has resulted in the flattening of workplace hierarchies, which has boosted worker monitoring since information technology gives top managers wide visibility and, as a result, we get more self-monitoring.

This is what we call "hyper bureaucracy," and it is the result of neoliberalism's initial attempt to eliminate it. It is distinguished by an emphasis on appearance, with capital being more concerned with this than with the work itself. We are constantly striving to create the illusion of good performance rather than achieving the actual goals of the work. Fisher refers to this tendency as "market Stalinism," because it prioritizes symbols of achievement over actual achievement, transforming late capitalism into a system that favors public relations and appearances, similar to how Stalinism prioritized symbols over useful developments.

To give an example, Fisher mentions the propaganda of Stalin's white canal, which was practically used to represent a symbol of accomplishment but was in reality an entirely useless achievement for society.

Furthermore, this gives us the conclusion that effects are meaningless if they are not registered at the level of appearance. Which, as a side note, it's interesting to consider how social media and the way individuals engage with it and real life are so similar. This idea that if you don't show an appearance of your life to others, you're not making it. If you did not register that moment or real accomplishment on an appearance level it did not matter, it was pointless. Which can lead to actually just striving to accomplish the appearance rather than the outcome itself.

Now, all of this has become an end in itself rather than a means of measuring achievement, just as students are geared towards passing tests rather than knowledge itself. Another example is the stock market and how it creates value based mostly on our perception of the company rather than what the company actually accomplishes. 

This leads Fisher to his saying that "all that is solid melts into PR," or public relations, and he goes on to describe how the Lacanian psychoanalytic concept of the "big other" might help us understand this phenomenon. 

First, the "big Other" is a collective fiction or symbolic structure that underlies social reality; it is an invisible phenomenon that is represented by individuals and institutions, and it's constantly shaped by public relations and propaganda. 

For instance, in the case of the white canal example we mentioned, it wasn't Stalin himself who represented the big Other, but rather the Soviet and foreign writers who had to be convinced of the project's greatness, and hence to the media and the appearance the project gives. This phenomenon needs constitutive ignorance, meaning it doesn’t know everything. This allows the public to continue the belief even when individuals are aware of certain flaws.

Now, the distinction between what the big Other officially knows and what individuals know and experience is significant. This gap plays a crucial role in maintaining everyday social reality, since it allows people to believe in and conform to the symbolic structure, even if they personally have knowledge or experiences that contradict it. 

However, when the illusion of the big Other's ignorance can no longer be sustained, hence when people become aware that the big Other is aware of certain flaws or truths, the underlying social reality starts to fade away.

This leads us to Jean-François Lyotard’s claim about Postmodernism, which encompasses the crisis triggered by the decline in belief in the big Other, as it challenges traditional ways of seeing the world. 

With this in mind, Fisher argues that we can see this concept in the context of capitalist realism, and how the belief that we have somehow moved beyond the need for the big Other actually reinforces capitalist realism. 

In other words, by believing that the big Other is no longer relevant, we unintentionally reinforce the power of capitalist ideology and limit our ability to imagine alternative possibilities.

Furthermore, Fisher claims that postmodernism can sometimes be naive in its belief that people in the past genuinely believed in symbols and the stories they represented, when in fact reality worked precisely because of the distinction between what I see and what it signifies.

For example, we treat someone with respect if they have an important title, like a judge, even if we personally know they are corrupt. This shows how symbols, like the judge's title, influence how we perceive and interact with reality.

In fact, this is what the philosopher Baudrillard said in his work, and how the absence of symbolic representations did not result in a direct sense of reality, but rather in a distorted form of reality that he referred to as "hyperreality." One clear example is reality shows like Big Brother, where cameras and the fact that the participants are being subjected to polls affect how they act in the first place. 

To put it another way, the fact that these shows let the audience decide does not submit them to any external authority, but rather makes them part of a system in which their desires and preferences are returned to them as the desires of the "big Other."

Finally, these systems are no longer limited to television; they are everywhere, which brings us back to the topic of post-Fordist bureaucracy, where bureaucratic systems have a tight link with the “big Other.” 

This means that in our late capitalism, where there is no ultimate authority to provide a definitive official version, dealing with bureaucracy becomes frustrating because officials often lack decision-making power, and refer only to decisions already made by the “big Other,” which represents the influential system or entity that shapes our behavior and decisions, including the way reality is perceived and experienced.

The Blurred Line Between Neoliberalism and Neoconservatism: The Nanny State and Personal Responsibility

According to Fisher, capitalism is a reality that is infinitely malleable and able to readapt and change constantly.

To prove his point, Fisher starts by providing an analogy with dreams. He says that when we dream, we forget the gaps and contradictions in our memories, creating a consistent narrative, and how this is similar to how power operates in society, where conflicting ideas can coexist and be manipulated constantly.

With this in mind, capitalist realism blurs the boundaries between political ideologies. It allows conflicting ideas to coexist and be manipulated for the sake of maintaining the capitalist system.

For example, we might think that neoconservatism and neoliberalism are two distinct ideologies. However, in the realm of capitalist realism, the market becomes the primary arena for making decisions, where politicians may take seemingly contradictory positions or make promises that contradict their previous positions in order to appeal to different voter segments while avoiding any fundamental challenges to the current economic system.

As a result, the coexistence of opposing ideologies without significant critique or transformation hinders the creation of true alternatives. 

To go deeper, Fisher points out Wendy Brown's essay "American Nightmare," in which she discusses how neoliberalism's belief in free markets, limited government intervention, and individual self-interest intersects with the neoconservative belief in a strong state authority, traditional values, and the use of military force for national security purposes. Furthermore, Brown claims that, despite their different ideological foundations, these two ideologies ultimately serve to reinforce and weaken democracy.

To prove her point, she gives an example of how these two ideologies converge in their opposition to the welfare state and the concept of a "Nanny State," which is a term used to describe a government that is perceived to be overly involved in its citizens' lives, particularly in terms of regulation and social welfare programs. To put it another way, they both rejected government intervention, viewing it as a threat to individual freedom and personal responsibility.  

Now, Fisher mentions a contradiction within neoliberalism that he sees as important, and that is that despite its opposition to state intervention, it has reinforced the state during moments of crisis, like it did in 2008 during the bank bailouts, in order to fix the problems that capitalism caused.

Furthermore, he claims that the "Nanny State" has a psychological function within a capitalist society since it acts as a scapegoat for failures and flaws allowing people to direct their anger and frustration at the government rather than private companies, which are, by definition, the foundations of capitalism. 

One example Fisher mentions is the UK government being blamed for the issues produced by the 2007 flood, despite the fact that the problems were caused by house builders and the privatization of water companies.

In addition to this, Fisher claims that capitalism’s emphasis on individual responsibility and ethics often fails to address the behavior of corporations or the systemic issues of capitalism. 

To exemplify this, Fisher mentions Campbell Jones' work titled 'The Subject Supposed To Recycle.' In it, Jones explores the widely held assumption that recycling is an unquestionable duty and questions who is expected to fulfill this responsibility.

Moreover, by asking this question, Jones wants to draw attention to the fact that recycling is a socially constructed idea that is commonly accepted as a duty. In other words, recycling is presented as something beyond ideology, implying that it is seen as an unquestionable duty that is simply demanded of everyone.

However, by putting everyone in charge of recycling, the actual responsibility is shifted onto individual consumers, allowing corporations and industries that should bear a significant share of the blame for environmental degradation to avoid responsibility, as is the case with climate change as well.

Finally, this makes capitalism an invisible centerless force that can't be traced back to its foundations, putting the blame on virtually anyone, and therefore separating humans from what they all share, their limited resources.

Marxist SuperNanny, Spinozism and the New Left

Finally, for the last topic of the book, Fisher refers again to Žižek, who exemplifies the failure of the father figure and the crisis of parental authority in modern society by appealing to the TV show "Supernanny,” which is a popular show about how parents struggle to raise their children.

Furthermore, Žižek claims that even if the TV show addresses the issues, the real problem comes from the fact that parents prioritize their children's enjoyment and resist challenging or educating them, which is different from what parenting was in the past, where being a parent was more of a guiding duty. 

With all this, Fisher argues that the TV show reflects the permissive and hedonistic society of postmodernity, in which late capitalism emphasizes desire and pleasure. This leads to parents viewing their duty as a failure if they impede their children's right to enjoy themselves.

After all this, Fisher suggests that the philosopher Spinoza offers valuable insights for understanding a form of paternalism that can exist without the traditional concept of the father.

To begin his claim, Fisher references  Žižek’s book called “Tarrying With the Negative,” which interprets Spinoza’s ideas and aligns them with capitalism. The work says that Spinoza rejects the moral framework based on obligations and instead focuses on an ethic centered around the concept of health. This, according to Žižek, corresponds to the amoral affective engineering of capitalism.

To illustrate this point,  Žižek mentions Spinoza's interpretation of the myth of the Fall. In Spinoza's view, God doesn't punish Adam for eating the apple because it is morally wrong. Instead, God warns Adam not to eat the apple because it will harm him. Žižek sees this as a symbolic termination of the Father function, suggesting that right and wrong are no longer dictated by a paternal authority figure, but are determined by their effects on health.

By taking this perspective, we can understand how Spinoza weakens the foundation of Law, which is based on punishment and rules imposed in a sadistic manner. Spinoza's worldview, according to  Žižek, condemns both the harsh exercise of power and the belief in infinite personal responsibility that is so essential for capitalism to work.

Additionally, Spinozism shows that freedom can only be achieved if we understand the reason for our actions, and if we can set aside “sad passions” that control us.

With this in mind, Fisher claims that in late capitalism people are trapped in addictive and repetitive behaviors influenced by illusions created by media and society, which is the opposite of what Spinoza sees as “true freedom.” 

Furthermore, even if it looks like late capitalism is concerned with health by, for example, banning smoking in public areas. It primarily appeals to a narrow definition of "health," focusing just on "feeling good and looking good," and limiting the whole concept of well-being in terms of mental health and intellectual development. In other words, everything is reduced to an oppressive and elitist view of health.

Now, the interesting part is that all these things are seen as socially relevant and desirable, as if they were part of a regime of consent, but how did this happen?

Fisher mentions an interview with the filmmaker Adam Curtis, where he discusses the influence of television on shaping people's emotions. TV programs guide viewers on how to feel by presenting emotional journeys of characters and suggesting the agreed form of feeling. 

Furthermore, he discusses Curtis' notion that morality has been replaced by feeling, and how all media promotes individualism, where people have become solipsists, which essentially implies that the media has changed people into becoming self-centered. In addition to that, Curtis claims that the internet, rather than expanding people’s minds, often just confirms and enhances people’s beliefs through interconnected like-minded networks.

Finally, even if we believe capitalism innovates, it primarily seeks to avoid risks, limiting innovation and creativity. The rise of consumerism means that the more it grows, the less it risks. This causes short-term profits and instability to lead to stagnation and conservatism rather than stimulating innovation, and so failing to respond to people's demands for the strange and unexpected, which sounds very similar to what we're seeing with all those Disney live-action films.

To conclude the book, Fisher argues that the new left cannot rely on Marxian old ideas, but must instead focus on what neoliberalism cannot provide. It should strive to decrease bureaucracy and provide employees more autonomy rather than managerial control. He also thinks that it is critical to transform mental health problems from medicalized disorders into effective antagonisms aimed against the capitalist system.

Finally, he argues that rather than implementing authoritarian measures when it is too late, we should focus collectively on solving environmental catastrophe and the concept of rationing goods and resources reasonably.

In conclusion, I believe Mark Fisher provided the best explanation for our ideological fantasy, and I have done my best to explain it in such a way that everyone can understand the deep message he had to give. It is critical that we avoid the dichotomy of "if it isn't capitalism, then it's communism," and recognize that the loss of credibility that socialism and communism have currently does not indicate that similar or even different approaches will fail.

The collapse of communism does not automatically mean the goodness and everlasting praise for capitalism. We live in an ideological fantasy, a “reality” that happened accidentally on purpose, and that begs to be transformed. 

Sources:

• Fisher, M. (2008). Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Zero Classics.

Beyond Thought.

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As we can know by now “practical reason” for Kant is our guiding light when it comes to moral decision-making. But we may still have questions about how practical reason works and how people get interested in following ethical rules.

The book “Critique of Practical Reason” is going to help us understand the complexity of this and how it makes us able to establish moral laws that aren’t fueled by inclination or desire.

Before we dive in, here are some highlights:

1. Practical reason is distinct from theoretical reason and focuses on how we affect others through our will.

2. The concept of private happiness cannot serve as a universal practical law as it is subjective and incompatible with creating a harmonious way of life for everyone.

3. Moral laws cannot be deduced from empirical evidence and require intellectual intuition and reasoning.

4. According to Kant, we are driven to follow moral laws by a moral feeling that precedes our actions. Furthermore, he says that our sense of moral law limits and suppresses our desires and inclinations in order for them to conform to the law.

5. Kant distinguishes between pleasure and pain, as well as between good and evil. He claims that the former are essentially ideas that need empirical evidence, and hence cannot serve as moral laws. Furthermore, he says that when we consider something to be good or bad, we must consider it as a possible outcome of our power to make choices, rather than as a thing in itself.

6. Kant introduces the concept of the summum bonum, which refers to the highest good. It is the ultimate goal that combines both moral virtue and happiness.

7. Kant discusses the postulates of practical reason, such as God's existence and the immortality of the soul, and acknowledges that, while these concepts cannot be proven through theoretical reason, they are a practical need that our reason assumes for the fulfilment of the moral law and the realization of the summum bonum.

Now, let’s dive deep into it!

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First, to refresh our minds a bit, let’s recall that ordinary reason, or sometimes called theoretical reason, is the type of reason we use every day for synthesizing information and getting an understanding of the world around us. On the other hand, practical reason is concerned with how we act, and how we behave, that is, on how we affect other objects through our will.

Now, as we may recall from our post on “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Kant outlines a methodology and builds an entire system on how pure reason works; starting from perception, all the way up to how our minds interpret and synthesize information using certain categories of the understanding. 

Similarly, in the case of practical reason, Kant wants a method for explaining how this form of reasoning works. However, as we said in our last post, practical reason cannot be gained through the senses since we need to find a more objective reality that is applicable to all rational beings. This is because if we begin with the senses, we would end up with subjective inclinations and desires, which we do not want when establishing moral laws. As a result, we have to start with principles and concepts and then move on to the senses, which is the opposite of what we do for theoretical reasoning.

Now, you may wonder, how can we derive principles from nothing? To answer this question, Kant believes that if we assume pure reason has a practical purpose, we can infer that it has some practical laws; otherwise, we would simply have maxims, which are subjective desires that apply to everyone separately.

Moreover, we can't create subjective laws; thus, imperatives are objectively valid and maxims are only principles, because they expect a desired effect from a certain act.

What’s more, as we saw in the Groundwork post, conditioned acts cannot be ethically valuable. This also implies that when an effect precedes the act, such as the concept of an object generating pleasure, it might be seen empirical and hence conditional, meaning that it cannot be used as a moral act. This is because pleasure and pain differ from person to person and cannot be determined without evidence from experience. 

Furthermore, Kant emphasizes that if we base an act on how agreeable it is, people will only choose acts based on how much and how great pleasure they will get from them.

On top of that, think about it for a second. In nature there are laws that make a perfect system and ensure that every single organism works in perfect harmony with one another. Similarly, Kant says that the same thing must happen among humans with reason and free will, and that for this we need laws that create a harmonious way of life for everyone.

With this in mind, we can say that using private happiness as a universal practical law because it is universal for all human beings would result in the opposite of harmony, because private happiness is just that, private and subjective among all rational beings, and it would thus destroy the maxim itself and its purpose, which was happiness.

Now, since moral laws can't be deduced from empirical evidence, it means that we cannot really know them at first glance. Rather, we get an idea of them because we know they exist. As a result, we can see that this idea is completely non-empirical; it is something that we are reasoning out. In other words, morality makes us presuppose freedom of choice which means that when we do this we are relying on intellectual intuition. 

Returning to our concept of private happiness, we know that if an action has a material and empirical object of desire, the action becomes merely conditioned and turns into the principle of private happiness. As a result, we can never assume the presence of a specific desire in all rational beings, but we may include the happiness of others, which would mean reducing our own desires to universalize a law, and thereby adapting it to practical reason.

Finally, there is something that Kant needs to say about violating the moral law, and that is the concept of punishment. He claims that punishment should be justified in that way, and that the person who violates the moral law must understand why he is punished. In other words, punishment should not be interpreted as a natural result, but rather as a consequence imposed by the moral law. Which leads us to the idea of the moral feeling.

Why do people care about the Moral Law? Moral Feeling and Motive

Now we can get to the bottom of the question he asked in his book The Groundwork.

How can we determine why people care about following moral laws?

First, Kant argues that in order to see me struggling with mental dissatisfaction as a result of my actions, I must imagine myself as morally good. This means that the concept of morality should be preceded by the idea of satisfaction. That is, a person should be able to experience what Kant refers to as a moral feeling, which presents itself as a sense of respect for the moral law.

Now, one important thing to say is that Kant claimed that the effect of the moral law on us is mainly negative. This is because it restricts and suppresses our desires and inclinations, which can cause us to feel a sense of discomfort.

Moreover, Kant adds that all of our desires and inclinations together make our self-regard, or how we perceive ourselves. This can be either an excessive love for oneself, which can be referred to as selfishness, or being extremely satisfied with oneself, which is known as self-conceit. 

However, according to Kant, pure practical reason only limits selfishness, that is, it acknowledges that we naturally have selfish tendencies but restricts them to align with the moral law. This limited form of self-love is called rational self-love.

For instance, as sensible beings, we are naturally predisposed towards certain desires and our affected self, even though it is unfit for universal laws, wants to prioritize its own desires and make them seem as they are the most important. This inclination can be called self-love, and when it tries to act as a practical principle, it becomes self-conceit.

As a result, the moral law completely excludes the influence of self-love on its practical principle, and when we compare our physical desires to the moral law, we are humbled and diminished in self-conceit. Therefore, for Kant, anything that makes us question our own judgment deserves our respect as a positive and guiding concept.

Now, as said before, when we restrict our inclinations we get a negative feeling that goes against our desires, but in relation to the restrictive principle of pure practical reason, it creates a positive one that comes from our ability to reason, thus making it a feeling that isn’t founded on our experiences but is known beforehand through reasoning. In other words, it is not empirical but a priori, since it is produced by an intellectual force. 

In summary, Kant says that people have a moral incentive to follow the moral law, which provides an interest. This interest is the reason why individuals follow the moral law, which Kant considers to be the highest condition of practical reason. 

To put it another way, this respect for the law is the awareness of voluntarily submitting our will to the law through reason, despite the restrictions it places on our desires. This positive impact, which could be interpreted as self-approval, leads to a practical incentive that is in line with the moral law. Therefore, any action that is objectively practical under this law is considered, according to Kant, a “duty.”

Object of Pure Practical Reason and The Categories of Freedom

As we recall from the Groundwork, Kant claims that we are a part of the world of the senses and the world of noumena, that is, the things in themselves that we do not have access to. 

Additionally, we may remember that the moral law is a part of the noumena, where people are free agents and hence free from the laws of cause and effect. With this in mind, we know that we cannot have any experience of freedom in the case of the world as phenomena, and we can thus assume that we are also members of the world of noumena, that is, the world of the understanding; resulting in no contradiction to the idea of free will and giving it a practical purpose. 

Now, just as Spinoza, Kant thinks that good and bad are merely concepts of the human mind. 

With this it follows that a concept of practical reason is an idea of an object as an effect possible to be produced by freedom. 

In other words, for an object to be considered as practical, it depends on the relationship between our will and the action we take, that is our desires. Therefore, to assess whether something is an object of pure practical reason, we need to figure out whether we can will an action that would make that thing a reality, and thus if it has a moral possibility.

Moreover, this means that the only objects of practical reason are good and evil. The first one is an object desired by reason, and the second is one that must be avoided.

This is a significant claim made by Kant, because, as Spinoza pointed out, we desire more of what benefits us, therefore determining what is good or bad without experience is impossible. As a result, the moral law’s existence is jeopardized, and these concepts paradoxically get meaning only from the moral law itself.

Now, according to Kant, the root cause of these issues comes within language itself.

For instance, in the majority of languages, there seems to be no difference between "good" and "pleasant," or "evil" and "unpleasant." Instead, these concepts often fall together as either good or bad, with no clear distinction.

However, Kant highlights that such concepts do possess clear boundaries. Take German, for example, where "Das Gute" signifies "well" while "das Wohl"translates to "good." This linguistic distinction helps us have a clearer distinction between what is good and what is evil, or between the concepts of joy and pain.

As a result, we know that we desire what brings us joy and avoids pain, leaving good and evil as concepts decided by the law of reason, completely detached from a person's feelings.

Now, this leads to the rise of the method of practical reason, which says that the concept of good and evil should not be determined before the moral law, but only after it. This is because if we were to name something “good” in order to deduce from it a law, this concept would turn at the same time the sole concept determining the principle. Leaving to our criteria whatever something is good or evil based on pleasure or pain. 

In other words, whether we think of anything as good or bad, we need to think of it as a possible result of our ability to make choices. Meaning that since freedom is where the ideas of good and evil originate, they have an indirect relationship to observable reality through this category of causality. 

However, causation through freedom only becomes apparent in the world of appearances when our freedom of choice, supported by practical reason, determines the direction of an action.

In this sense, Kant considers good and evil to be “modi of a single category,” and they are never direct modes of observable reality since they can only be applied to objects that can be understood as the outcome of our freedom to choose, and not as things in themselves.

Now, here comes a part that is very confusing. I had to do more research to see if there was an explanation, and it appears that many scholars are confused. This is because Kant does not provide any additional explanation. Ralf M. Bader, on the other hand, provides a highly insightful viewpoint, which I will use here.

To begin, after Kant guides us to the idea of good and evil, he provides what he refers to as the categories of freedom in the form of a table. These ideas exist independently of physical nature; which recall, are theoretical concepts that we apply to experiences. 

Moreover, these categories determine the will in relation to the ideas of good and evil, and they organize desires and establish practical rules. These categories include quantity, quality, relation, and modality, with some being mathematical categories concerned with practical rules or experience taken apart from any relation in which they exist; and dynamical categories, which address the connections to other things.

Furthermore, a third category results from a unique synthesis of the first two categories, reflecting a requirement for a synthetic unity with three elements: a condition, a conditioned element, and a concept formed by their combination. That being said, there is no further explanation to what he refers to on the table, and I reserve myself from any further explanation.

The Summum Bonum and The Antinomy of Practical Reason

Reason in its two forms has a dialectic. This is because human reason requires the concept of the unconditioned, which refers to something that is not limited or determined by anything else.

Following this, Kant says that this unconditioned thing cannot be found in our experience of the world because our knowledge is based on appearances, which are always limited by our senses. This makes us apply the idea of the “unconditioned” to appearances, creating an illusion of them as “things in themselves.” Which, in turn, becomes apparent when reason conflicts with itself, realizing that it cannot find the unconditioned within the chain of appearances.

This is what Kant refers to as “the antinomy of reason,” and it is resolved when reason seeks to discover a way to escape from it.

Now, we may recall a similar confusion when it comes to theoretical reason and how it gets solved by several claims Kant made, for instance, the conflicting views on determinism, that is of cause and effect, and freedom of choice.

However, to understand the conflict in practical reason, we need to know that there is a clash between the demands of practical reason and the limitations imposed by our desires. 

To start, Kant introduces the concept of the summum bonum, which represents the highest good that practical reason strives to achieve. However, Kant argued that this concept could not be the determining principle itself. Instead, the moral law should be the only determining principle for a pure will. In other words, the moral law separates from specific objects of desire and focuses only on moral principles, leaving the summum bonum as the thing that encompasses the entire object of pure practical reason, but not as the dominant principle determining human actions.

Moreover, Kant claims that this distinction is critical because it prevents misinterpretation of the moral law and assists us in avoiding accepting other objects as determining principles, which would lead to external factors setting our actions, compromising the moral principle itself.

Now, what exactly is the summum bonum? 

Kant starts off by saying that different philosophical schools, such as the Epicureans and Stoics, tried to create the union of virtue and happiness by focusing on either sense or reason as the fundamental notion. However, their attempts to identify happiness and virtue as identical concepts were based on misguided efforts to reconcile two very different concepts.

According to Kant, virtue is considered the supreme condition for all that we find desirable and the foundation of our pursuit of happiness. Thus, virtue is seen as the supreme good. However, this does not mean it is the complete picture that rational beings seek. For that, happiness is also necessary, not only from an individual perspective but also from the viewpoint of reason that values all individuals as ends in themselves.

Therefore, the summum bonum is the combination of virtue and happiness, where virtue is always the supreme good since it has no condition above it;  and happiness, on the other hand, relies on morally right behavior as its condition.

Now, Kant says that when two things are necessarily linked in a concept, their connection can be understood through an analytical or synthetic connection. The first one happens when two elements are seen as logically connected. Meaning that, in this case, being virtuous and seeking happiness are not separate actions but are essentially the same thing. Which will then mean that there is no need for a separate moral principle because pursuing happiness itself becomes the guiding principle for being virtuous.

On the other hand, the second way is through synthetic connection, where virtue is seen as causing happiness, similar to how a cause leads to an effect. In this case, virtue produces happiness as something distinct from the awareness of being virtuous.

Now, Kant emphasizes that the principles of virtue and private happiness are fundamentally different, and their combination poses a challenge. Furthermore, he claims that these two notions cannot have an analytical relation, since they aren't the same thing, but rather they need a synthetic relation. In other words, they need a causal connection by means of actions. 

However, he claims that claiming it as a practical connection of cause and effect leads to something similarly impossible, because if we claim that virtue causes happiness, we are arguing that our will is established by determination, which means that we set our will without the freedom of choice. On the other hand, if we claim that the desire for happiness produces virtue, we are putting the concept of private happiness as a determining principle for the moral law, which, as we now know, is not moral.

Finally, this means that the combination of these two concepts needs a deeper philosophical synthesis in which they are combined and adapted, or, as he would put it, we must make a transcendental deduction, which essentially means that we must establish the justification of the concept of the highest good through a priori principles of cognition.

In other words, we have to assume the combination of these two elements as a natural part of how the mind works without prior experience in the same way that our minds generate the concept of God.

This is the antinomy of practical reason, and it happens when considering the combination of virtue and happiness in the summum bonum, which are two elements that contradict each other.

But how do we deal with this?

First, we can remember that the antinomy of theoretical reason is solved when we see ourselves as acting beings in both the world of senses and the world of noumena. We can see from this that our activities in the world of senses are dictated by natural laws, but our noumenal selves can be guided by a principle that isn't restricted by those laws.

Furthermore, Kant claims that the proposition that a virtuous mind produces happiness isn’t completely false, and it is in fact, only false if we consider it to be a part of the sensible world. 

However, since individuals also exist as noumena in the world of the understanding and possess the moral law as a purely intellectual determining principle, it is possible for moral virtue to be connected to happiness through an intellectual force.

Finally, despite the conflict, this connection leads to the possibility of the summum bonum. But, how exactly do we get this idea of virtue into our world of senses?

First, Kant claims that the sense of duty and obligation from the law doesn't feel the same as pleasure, even though they have similar effects on our desires. This helps us ensure that our actions are motivated by moral growth rather than just doing what feels good.

Furthermore, he says that we have a word that represents a different kind of satisfaction than happiness. This is self-contentment, and it means being satisfied with ourselves and feeling like we don't need anything else. Kant refers to this as negative, because it comes from the absence of wanting or needing anything, and, according to Kant, genuine moral actions should not be motivated by self-contentment or personal happiness. 

On the other hand, he claims that intellectual contentment is not dependent on feelings of pleasure, but rather on a sense of freedom and independence from our inclinations or desires. In other words, this contentment comes from the ability to follow the moral law and act on moral maxims without being persuaded by personal desires, like in the case of self-contentment. 

Therefore, this means that by using our pure practical reason, we can gain a sense of control over our desires, which leads to independence from them. This contentment isn’t like happiness because it doesn't depend on positive feelings or complete independence from desires and wants. Instead, it is similar to bliss because our will is free of the influence of desires.

Following this, Kant claims that morality is the highest good and the primary condition for the summum bonum, while happiness is its second element, but only in the sense that it is dependent on and a necessary result of morality.

From this understanding, we can see that there might be a natural and necessary connection between being aware of our morality and expecting proportional happiness as a result. However, we can’t know or perceive this connection for certain, and we also know that pursuing happiness alone can never lead to true morality, at least according to Kant.

The Immortality of The Soul and The Supreme Being

Now we are going to talk about Kant’s views on religion and immortality of the soul. Which in my opinion, are a bit outdated for the modern reader, but nevertheless, part of his theory.

First, as we can know by now, pure practical reason gives moral laws to every rational being, and that itself includes the Infinite Being, or sometimes referred to as God; which is that presence that is entirely perfect. 

Additionally, this implies that humans have a pure will but are affected by inclinations and desires. As a result, individuals are subjected to imperatives that command objectively and without conditions. 

Now, humans aim to align their actions with a state of pure holiness. To achieve this, they construct the notion of God, which is devoid of personal inclinations or desires. This concept of pure holiness functions as a practical idea, providing guidance for human behavior and serving as a compass to direct their actions towards moral ideals.

Furthermore, Kant argues that in order to achieve the summum bonum, we would need to assume that the soul continues to exist beyond physical death. This is because in order to achieve moral perfection, it is important to define human nature as striving for continuous moral progress. 

As a result, this notion allows us to establish a connection with the concept of God, recognizing its existence beyond the limitations of time. The reason for this lies in the fact that finite rational beings, such as humans, can only progress by continuously ascending from lower to higher levels of moral perfection.

Furthermore, the concept of God is entirely compatible with the moral law because it requires an allocation of the right portion of the highest good. This ultimate good can be realized only through a single intellectual perspective that includes the presence of all rational beings—an idea represented by the concept of God.

However, it is important to note that Kant was aware that these beliefs could not be proven, but he saw them as a necessary assumption based on practical reason.

Now, this leads us to the existence of God as a postulate of practical reason, which briefly says that in order for the summum bonum to be possible, there must be a connection between morality and happiness. However, since humans are not the cause of the world, there is no reason for this connection to exist.

As a result, we believe that God’s existence is a necessary condition for the possibility of the highest good. This is known as the "first cause," and its postulate of the highest good suggests the existence of a Supreme Being who is the cause of nature and the source of all harmony, including virtue and happiness.

Furthermore, as explained earlier, Kant claims that it is morally necessary to believe in the existence of God in order to fulfill our duty to promote the highest good, and he emphasizes that this is not meant to establish a foundation for all moral laws, which I believe is important to point out, but rather to support the pursuit of the highest good in our world. That is, to have a sense of progress so that things can improve ethically.

Finally, I believe I have covered all of the book’s essentials and would like to provide my view.

First of all, Kant is fascinating; I believe it is a clear example of genuinely wanting to prove something that we fundamentally believe to be true, as is sometimes the case with all philosophy. 

However, as we saw in our post "William James's 'The Will to Believe': How Belief Shapes How We Reason," we can get lost in a never-ending search for something that may not exist. 

Furthermore, despite his concerns about empirical evidence and objectivity, I still believe Kant is a rationalist, since he is particularly interested in establishing clear objective norms in the complexities of human psychology and nature. 

Regardless, I find Kant fascinating, and it is amazing to read how he develops an extensive system with concepts and categories, with the goal of guiding humanity towards the construction of a harmonious way of life. What adds to the fascination is Kant's genuine concern regarding the implications these laws may have on our pursuit of happiness—a fundamental aspect that lies at the very core of humanity.

In the end, Kantian ethics is worth studying because it invites us to focus on the intricate details of human behavior and recognize how complex morality can get. It encourages us to understand how difficult it can be to develop laws and to recognize that doing so is not like baking a cake; it needs considerable analysis that may not even get us anywhere because human behavior is complex and subjective.

Nonetheless, his method is an excellent starting point for shaping the moral relativism maze that we sometimes confront in our current world.

Sources:

• M. Bader, R. (n.d.). Kant and the Categories of Freedom. PhilPapers. https://homeweb.unifr.ch/BaderR/Pub/Categories%20of%20freedom%20%28R.%20Bader%29.pdf

• Kant, I. (1804). Critique of Practical Reason. DOVER Philosophical Classics.

• Scruton, R. (2001). Kant: A Very Short Introduction.

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In the last newsletter, we spoke about Kant and his work on the Critique of Pure Reason, and we may have felt that he didn't accomplish or say much.

However, after finishing this book, Kant wrote a number of further works that, while not as ambitious, dive deeper into the principles he outlines in the book, particularly on ethics.

The first book that touches on these ideas is The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. We already saw in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason how he demonstrated that we cannot know if there is a god or a soul, and that all of these things are ideas we cannot understand because mankind interacts only with phenomena, making the noumena inaccessible to us.

Now, the fact that we can have an experience of the truth, or the noumenal realm, as Kant claims, proves its existence. This is because we know we have perception, and we know that our perceptions come from something outside of us.

Humans, according to Kant, are built in the same way. We have a part of ourselves that we cannot reach because when we reflect on ourselves, we do so through our senses or through reason acquired through our sense-based experiences.

What’s more, Kant argues that since it is impossible for us to imagine something without reason, we are not truly free; rather, we are constrained by a predetermined cause, which means that our choices are already determined by past events even when we believe we are making free choices based on reason and deliberation. In other words, when we think about it, our decisions are always influenced by previous actions, which limits our capacity to choose.

The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals touches on these topics, on freedom of choice and actions, on how morality should work, and how starting from the metaphysics we can develop an ethical system that works for all rational beings.

This book is not the final theory on his ethics; he further develops these concepts in his book The Critique of Practical Reason, and even in his later work The Metaphysics of Morals. However, this book touches on some of the most important subjects that form the basis of all his theory.

Before we dive in, here are some highlights:

• Kant claims that logic and metaphysics can coexist. Knowledge that is simply formal is called logic, but knowledge that is limited by ideas of the understanding is called metaphysics. With this, the concept of metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals emerges.

• Kant believes that if anything can be called "good," it is good will, and that it most of the time manifests itself in our world as "happiness," which is contentment with one's state. However, Kant thought it couldn't be the foundation of morality.

• The famous categorical imperative sets its formula of universal law in the following way: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”

• A maxim is a subjective desire. I can claim I believe something is good because it benefits me or makes me feel good, but it does not necessarily imply that it benefits everyone. 

• Kant claims that for an action to be morally valuable, it must be done out of duty rather than inclination or desire.

• An imperative is a command coming from the will, and it can either be hypothetical or categorical. When we do something that is conditioned, meaning that it will give us something, we can call the act hypothetical. 

• The second formulation of the categorical imperative says the following: “All humans subjectively regard themselves as ends in themselves making it an objective practical ground.” Meaning that we should treat people as ends in themselves.

• The third form of the categorical imperative says that once we act on the imperative that we should only do actions which are universal, and that we accept and act on the autonomy of every rational being as an end in itself. We can then agree on the concept that all rational beings must see themselves as part of the Kingdom of Ends.

• “To be free,” for Kant, is to not be affected by outside forces. 

• We have a part of ourselves that we cannot reach because when we reflect on ourselves, we do so through our experiences in the world of phenomena. That shows that we have a noumenal side that is not subject to the laws of cause and effect. As a result, this side of us is consistent with moral law.

Now, let’s dive deep into it!

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The Aim of The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

To start, Kant introduces the Greek approach to philosophy, which involves three distinct areas of study: physics, ethics, and logic. He suggests that these three categories can be further divided into two categories: material and formal. 

Formal knowledge is concerned with logic and our understanding of the physical world, while material knowledge deals with objects and their determination, as well as the laws they are subject to.

Kant identifies logic as a formal science, and ethics and physics as material sciences. Physics is concerned with natural science and the study of the physical world, while ethics explore human behavior and what actions are necessary to be considered “good” in this world.

This means, as we can infer from the Critique of Pure Reason, that material knowledge is empirical in the sense that it is concerned with how things behave within the realm of phenomena; and because it is empirical, it may be founded on experience.

Additionally, natural science sees laws of nature as something known through experience; and ethics consider laws of the human will as they are affected by nature. 

Now comes the fascinating part: Kant wants to add that formal knowledge is divided into two parts. He begins by claiming that logic and metaphysics can coexist. Knowledge that is simply formal is called logic, but knowledge that is limited by ideas of the understanding is called metaphysics. 

With this, the concept of metaphysics of nature and metaphysics of morals emerges. Just as physics and ethics coexist within the realm of material knowledge, the same is true for logic and metaphysics in formal knowledge. The metaphysics of morals is thus the combination of this part of formal knowledge known as metaphysics of morals and the material knowledge of ethics, which together help us solve questions of moral philosophy.

Now, the way Kant wants to prove this theory is that, even if we do not know the noumenal world, we know it exists. We know the noumenal world builds the phenomenal world with a structure that we can perceive with the senses. Based on this, Kant infers that the noumenal world has an organizing principle, similar to the cause and effect relationship in the phenomenal world, and that this principle could allow us to set up moral laws that are not distorted by our perception of the phenomenal world.

Furthermore, Kant understood that if we disconnect too much from our experience, the laws we come up with won't be practical. Therefore, he emphasized finding a balance between using reason to establish laws and testing them in the real world to make sure they work. Additionally, Kant tried to explain how the will - a person's ability to control their behavior - works in the phenomenal world by using reason.

The Good Will, Duty and The Categorical Imperative

So far, we know that "will" for Kant refers to an individual's power to control their behavior. He says that the will lives within the thing itself and manifests itself in the phenomenal world.

Now, Kant believes that if anything can be called "good," it is good will, and that it most of the time manifests itself in our world as "happiness," which is contentment with one's state.

However, Kant has something very important to say about happiness. He thought it couldn't be the foundation of morality. This is because happiness is a feeling of joy, a desire that we manifest in the phenomenal world, and that draws us away from the truth of the will that exists in the thing-in-itself. In other words, happiness is subjective, since it pulls people away from the thing-in-itself and towards their own desires and impulses. As a result, someone working out of a moral law must do so for the sake of doing so, not because it will bring them anything in return.

So, once again, Kant argues that "the good will" is incompatible with happiness, and one of the arguments he uses to support this claim is that organic beings are built in such a way that their organs serve a specific purpose, and the organ that is most suited for that purpose is always the one that is chosen.

For example, if a being with reason and will, such as humans, was meant to be happy, nature would make a poor decision in relying on reason to achieve this goal. Kant then adds that instinct, rather than reason, would be better at guiding acts towards that end. This is due to the fact that instinct would provide a more precise guideline for reaching this goal. And, if you think about it, it's kind of true; instinct gives us an appropriate path to survival and welfare, and hence to a better state.

Moreover, this leaves reason, that extra capacity we have as humans, untouched. In view of this, Kant builds up the idea that reason could be used as “practical reason” to think about what is the good will, and not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. In other words, reason has a practical function: the establishment of a good will.

This brings us to the famous categorical imperative, which is a very important concept in Kant's system, and that sets its formula of universal law in the following way: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”

Now, let's try to translate this from Kantian to regular language so we can understand it better.

First, what is a maxim? A maxim is a subjective desire. I can claim I believe something is good because it benefits me or makes me feel good, but it does not necessarily imply that it benefits everyone. We can see why Kant believed happiness could not be the foundation of morality in this context. Consequently, the categorical imperative tells us not to act on our maxims if they are not universal. That is, if they are not equally good to everyone.

Now, Kant goes on to say that for an action to be morally valuable, it must be done out of duty rather than inclination or desire.

So, what does "duty" mean to Kant?

According to him, “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law.” In other words, it sets aside the influence of inclination for an action, and does not depend on the result we expect from it.

But, is that even possible? How can we tell whether someone is acting for the sake of it?

First, Kant argued that in order to find these types of moral laws, we must engage in an action that has not yet been observed, as we need to start with reason and then move towards the phenomenal world. This process begins with distinguishing between ordinary and practical reason.

Ordinary reason, or theoretical reason, is the one we use every day for cognitive processes of the understanding. Whereas practical reason is more developed and cultivated, and could be interpreted as judgment.

To put it another way, practical reason acts in a more abstract, universal manner rather than being dependent on empirical data or circumstances. This means that it allows humanity to make moral judgments that are not influenced by subjective experiences, and it works as a dialectic to find solutions.

Now, everything in nature has its own set of laws, and everything in nature acts in line with those laws. Humanity is the only being that acts and works in line with its own ideas of laws, rules that stem from their will. That is, "the will" is essentially "practical reason." 

Furthermore, it means the will can choose what is good and necessary, but reason is subject to impulsions and desires, which, of course, are incompatible with objective laws. This means that "the will" almost never agrees with reason, making certain actions seem necessary even when they are not. 

Now, when we get an objective principle that tells us what we need to do, we call it a command of reason, or an imperative, if we want to use the formula. The imperative is thus a command coming from the will, and it can either be hypothetical or categorical.

When we do something that is conditioned, meaning that it will give us something, we can call the act hypothetical. Which are basically acts that are means to an end.

Additionally, when the end is something that can help us achieve something else, we usually refer to it as a skilful or useful hypothetical imperative. Finally, when referring to an act that every rational being seeks by nature, we may refer to an imperative as pragmatic. This means that happiness can be included in this category because it is something that everyone desires, yet it is subjective and depends on experience.

Lastly, as mentioned before, the categorical imperative is an unconditioned act that is not based on any end. These are the kinds of acts that are morally good to Kant, and can be done only if the person that is going to make the act is willing to universalize it.

To give an example, Kant visualizes a situation in his book where he needs to decide whether to lie about keeping a promise. He then realizes that lying might be more convenient for him, but he reflects further and asks himself if he would want his maxim of lying to be a universal law. He realizes that if everyone lies to get out of difficulties, there would be no point in making promises in the first place, so lying cannot be universal. Therefore, he concludes that he must keep his promise, even if it is inconvenient for him, because keeping promises can be seen as universal.

Kant's example shows us that we should always act according to principles that could be universal laws, even if they may be inconvenient for us personally. This highlights the essence of the categorical imperative, which is duty that is not constrained by any conditions. However, it can be challenging to come up with examples on this, so it's essential to reflect carefully on them.

The End In Itself: Principle of Humanity 

We can now move to the second formulation of the categorical imperative, which says the following: “All humans subjectively regard themselves as ends in themselves making it an objective practical ground.” To put it another way, it means that we should see and treat everyone as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. It is to recognize that not only actions, but also people, are ends in themselves.

For example, slavery treated people as mere means to an end, rather than as ends in themselves with inherent worth and autonomy. This is not possible if you follow this principle.

Furthermore, Kant believes that once we accept that everyone should be viewed as an end in themselves, everyone positively tries to further the ends of others as far as they can. He argued that this principle of treating people as ends in themselves can become a practical law that guides our actions in the world, helping us to determine whether our actions are moral or immoral based on whether they respect the dignity and autonomy of others.

The Kingdom of Ends

This brings us here to the third form of the categorical imperative. Kant says that once we act on the imperative that we should only do actions which are universal, and that we accept and act on the autonomy of every rational being as an end in itself. We can then agree on the concept that all rational beings must see themselves as part of the Kingdom of Ends.

Now, the “Kingdom of Ends” is a hypothetical group, in which all human beings participate to create their own laws based on universal validity, putting aside personal interest and seeing each other as ends in themselves. Furthermore, Kant knows that we aren’t God, and that no one will automatically comply with the moral law. This is because no rational being has a direct connection between the phenomenal and the noumenal world, meaning we do not have access to the realization of the moral law at first glance.

This takes us to how he represents moral principles by describing how to understand a maxim, which is evidence of moral law in the world of experience.

First, he says that maxims should only be considered if they are universal laws of nature. Second, we should consider them as matter or content, that is, as an end that leads to the formulation of all merely relative ends. People's choices must be limited by and subordinated to the status of rational beings, which are not chosen as ends but are ends by their very nature and are thus ends in themselves. 

Finally, a complete determination of all maxims via the expression "All maxims ought to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends." In other words, every rational being as an end in himself should be able to see himself as a creator of universal law through his maxims.

In short, these are the forms that the maxims should have in order to establish goodwill.

It is important to mention that Kant believed that for the Kingdom of Ends to work, we would need to make laws through maxims, that is through self-imposed rules. This is because laws must be freely accepted and adopted by each individual. 

This is where the Kingdom of Ends differs from the Kingdom of Nature, where everything operates according to causal laws, and everything that happens is determined by prior causes and conditions. 

Now, as we said, the Kingdom of Ends comes into existence through the categorical imperative, with laws that are equal for all rational beings. However, even if a person were to follow a rule religiously, he cannot count on everybody doing it; despite this the law of “act on maxims only if they are universal laws” remains a command that is categorical. This means that we have a law that is free and independent from personal interests. 

Now, according to Kant, morality consists in the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is through maxims as a possible way of constructing universal law. He then classifies different types of morality depending on their relationship with the autonomy of the will. He starts by mentioning permitted morality, which is an action that can coexist with the autonomy of the will; because, remember, the will is autonomous and has an end itself, as opposed to heteronomous where it would be existing only for the sake of something else. 

After this, he mentions forbidden morality which is one that does not harmonize with the autonomy of the will. Thirdly, holy morality, which is absolutely good and has its maxims in total harmony with the laws of the autonomy of the will. Then, there is obligation, which happens when a will isn't completely good and seeks orders or obligations in order to be good. And lastly, we have duty, which is the objective necessity of an action formed by obligation. In other words, it is a sense of responsibility that comes from recognizing what is objectively necessary to act in accordance with morality.

The Concept of Freedom

You may be wondering now. How, Kant? You claim that in the realm of phenomena, we are conditioned by external causes, yet in order for me to have morality, I would need to be free to choose, that is, I would need to have freedom. And it is only at the end of the book that Kant raises this question. 

How can we tell if morality is more than simply a concept? And, more importantly, does it even exist?

We can conclude from all we have learned that the “will”' is a kind of causality that all rational beings possess, and we also know that will is “practical reason.” We know that in the phenomenal world we have cause and effect, and that in the noumenal world we do not have that. This means that freedom would then be the property of the “will,” which exists in the thing in itself, and that this is how it can work independently of determination by external forces.

This is where Kant says that to be free is to not be affected by outside forces. We know that this isn’t true in the phenomenal world or in the Kingdom of Nature, since everything is connected through cause and effect, but then how can we claim that freedom exists and that it has anything to do with moral laws?

As said earlier, we have a part of ourselves that we cannot reach because when we reflect on ourselves, we do so through our experiences in the world of phenomena. That shows that we have a noumenal side that is not subject to the laws of cause and effect. As a result, this side of us is consistent with moral law, which is the argument he makes here and throughout the Critique of Practical Reason. He essentially wishes to prove that moral law and freedom are linked.

Moreover, Kant wishes to ask why someone would subject himself to a moral law, if there is freedom of choice. He then claims that this "I should" is necessarily an "I will" that applies to all humans. This necessity is expressed as "I should" for beings who, like humans, are affected by sensibility, that is, desires and impulsions, and who do not always act on reason; thus the subjective necessity differs from the objective necessity. However, the only answer he has to the question of why someone would follow a law if he considers himself free is insufficient at this point, the only thing he claims is that freedom wants precisely that, compliance with the moral law.

Now, we know that reason is the bridge in between the noumena, or the intelligible world as Kant calls it, and the phenomena, which can also be called the world of sensibility. We therefore know that reason is in a sense free. This is because if we did not have reason we wouldn’t be able to choose, and we would be determined by cause and effect entirely, this therefore means that reason belongs to the intelligible world. With this, it follows that we know that there must be freedom that comes to us in our phenomenal world, and that as a consequence, brings moral laws with it. We also know that freedom comes from the “will” that exists in the noumenal world, which means that it has its own principles, which are the moral laws that we bring into our world.

What’s more, he also says that if humans were only members of the intelligible world, they would act in perfect harmony with the autonomy of the will, and in the other hand, if they were only members of the sensible world, they would act only according to the laws of nature, that is, by pure determination, which includes instinct, desires, and inclinations. This proves that as humans we are subject to the intelligible world, that is by the idea of freedom, and by that with the autonomy of the will. As a result, we need to look to the noumenal world for laws that can make humanity conform to certain principles.

Kant finishes this book by acknowledging the difficulties of understanding freedom, as well as the impossibility of explaining what makes men interested in moral law. However, he claims that we can infer freedom exists, and he has proved that in this book. In his next text, The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant completes this argument.

To conclude, Kant's moral theory invites us to strive for something greater, something that transcends our specific desires and expresses our shared identity as humans in a world that often seems to prioritize self-interest. It encourages us to think critically about the values we have and the decisions we make, and to always strive to act in accordance with reason and respect for others.

May we all take to heart the lessons of The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, and may they inspire us to lead lives of purpose and compassion, guided by the timeless principles of morality and the enduring values of our shared human experience.

Sources:

• Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. HarperPerennial.

• Kant, I. (1804). Critique of Practical Reason. DOVER Philosophical Classics.

• Scruton, R. (2001). Kant: A Very Short Introduction.

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“…In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience” - Immanuel Kant

Have you ever stopped to wonder about the limits of human knowledge? How much can we really know about the world around us, and what are the boundaries of our understanding? 

These are the questions that Immanuel Kant set out to answer in a revolutionary way.

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is a wild ride through the mysteries of the human mind, a quest to uncover the secrets of how we know what we know. 

Kant dives deep into questions such as: is there anything we can know for sure, without needing to rely on our senses? Can we have objective knowledge? And what are the limits of reason when it comes to understanding the world?

Overall, “The Critique of Pure Reason” can be understood as a critique conducted by reason critiquing its own self.

So, who was Kant?

Immanuel Kant was a student of Christian Wolf, who was a student of Leibniz, a rationalist. Kant, therefore, saw himself as a part of the rationalist tradition. However, once he read David Hume, an empiricist, he realized that something was missing, and tried to reconcile the claims of these two theories.

Rationalists established reason as the sole criteria for truth, originating from René Descartes, who was influenced by his time and attempted to demonstrate that truth cannot be based on theological and superstitious beliefs. The theory seeks to prove that the natural world can be understood and explained by the use of reason alone, and that knowledge obtained this way is more reliable and trustworthy than the one obtained through only sensory experience. 

Mathematics, for instance, is a method of obtaining the principles that govern our world, because these are already there in reason before any experience is applied to them.

On the other hand, David Hume’s empiricism saw all of this with skepticism. His theory rejected a lot of what the rationalists claimed, and argued that senses and experiences are the only ways to gain knowledge of reality. For empiricists, there is nothing in the background that tells you how to perceive the world; instead, humans only perceive things that appear to be frequently the same, giving us a feeling that that event will happen again. 

In other words, empiricists recognized that there are universals about how we experience the world, such as cause and effect, but that they do not come from reason. They are instead generated exclusively from the senses.

Before we get into the details of the book, here are some highlights:

• Kant talks about the concepts of analytic and synthetic judgments, and a priori and a posteriori knowledge.

• Analytic judgments are statements that are true by definition, while synthetic judgments require empirical evidence to be verified.

• A priori knowledge is independent of experience and can be known through reason alone, while posteriori knowledge is dependent on experience and can only be known through observation.

• Kant claimed that we can have judgments that are a priori and synthetic at the same time, which means that they do not repeat the meaning of a concept themselves, but add new knowledge that is not contained within them. 

• Kant distinguished between phenomena and noumena, where phenomena are the objects of our experience, and noumena are the “things in themselves,” or the objects as they exist independently of our experience.

• Kant’s theory of Transcendental Idealism suggests that our minds play an active role in shaping the world we experience, and that human knowledge is made possible by the combination of our senses and our reasoning faculties.

• Space and time are a priori forms of sensibility since they are the ones receiving through perception, and so they are pure intuition. Using our senses, we can determine where something is and how objects change over time. 

• Kant introduced the idea of categories of the understanding, which are basic concepts that our minds actively use to structure information and make it intelligible.

• Kant’s Transcendental Deduction describes how our minds actively synthesize information and impose specific structures, like categories or concepts, on the unprocessed sensory data to make sense of it. It is through this process of information that we are able to develop accurate perceptions and judgments of the world around us.

Now, let’s dive deep into it!

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Understanding Kant's Main Concepts 

After explaining what Kant was into, we can dive into the concepts he talks about in his book. 

We can now answer questions like: How do we make sense of all the chaos that comes from experience? How can we give meaning to each little piece out of a great chaos of information?

The main concepts he talks about are the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and a priori and a posteriori knowledge.

Analytic judgments are statements that are true by definition. For instance, the statement “All squares have four sides” is an analytic judgment because the concept of “four sides” is already contained in the concept of a square. We do not need to say that a square has four sides to prove it has four sides.

In fact, Kant used one particular example in his book, which was, “All bachelors are unmarried.” 

In this case, the definition of “unmarried” is already contained in the concept of “bachelor.” 

This means that, if you understand the meaning of the words “square” and “bachelor,” you will automatically understand that squares have four sides and that bachelors are unmarried, respectively. Without the need of new information.

In contrast, synthetic judgments are statements that are not true by definition, and require empirical evidence to be verified. 

For example, “The cat is sitting on the mat” is a statement that requires empirical evidence to be verified. We can only know that the cat is sitting on the mat by observing the cat and the mat, and not just by observing the cat or the mat independently.

This brings us to Kant’s claim about the different sorts of knowledge. The first is a priori knowledge, which is independent of experience and can be obtained through reason alone.

An example of this is a mathematical truth, such as “2+2=4.” For this, you do not need to observe the world to know that the statement is true. You can simply reason it out using your understanding of math.

On the contrary, posteriori knowledge is dependent on experience and can only be known through observation.

An example could be the statement “The sky is blue.” In this case, we need to see the sky to know that it is blue, and we cannot know the truth of the statement without observation.

Now, you may ask, why do these distinctions matter? 

Well, for Kant, a priori knowledge is special because it allows us to have universal and necessary knowledge. In other words, it gives us access to truths that are true for everyone, everywhere, and at all times. And this, in turn, is the foundation for all of our other knowledge. 

On the other hand, synthetic judgments are important because they allow us to learn new things about the world. They're what gives us new information that we didn't already know, and increase our understanding of the world.

If we connect the dots, we can understand that analytic judgments are a priori knowledge, and synthetic judgments are posteriori knowledge. 

However, Kant claimed that we can have judgments that are a priori and synthetic at the same time. 

This means that we can have judgments that do not repeat the meaning of a concept themselves, and add new knowledge that is not contained within them.

In fact, Kant claimed that much of our knowledge is synthetic. He believed that most of our knowledge combines empirical observation with our innate reasoning faculties, which we will talk about in a second.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism: How our minds shape the world we experience

Kant believed that we do not have access to “things in themselves,” and that all we have access to is to our subjective constructs.

With this in mind, another key aspect of Kant’s theory is his distinction between phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are basically the objects of our experience, and noumena are the “things in themselves,” or in other words, the objects as they exist independently of our experience. 

These concepts form the foundation for Kant’s theory of Transcendental Idealism. That claims that our minds actively shape the world we perceive and give structure to the empirical chaos of the outside world. It is the idea that a mental realm exists prior to empirical reality, and that it has a considerable impact on how the world develops into what we know it to be, as well as establishing the framework within which we can understand the world.

In other words, Kant believed that human knowledge was made possible by the combination of our senses and our reasoning faculties. He thought there are principles of reason and sensibility that are independent of the senses, and that these concepts are meaningless unless applied to experience. 

This means that all data received through the senses is transformed by reason. Demonstrating that pure experience cannot have meaning or form. To put it another way, our world is a subjective creation, and our reality, our objectivity, is dependent on our senses.

We could think about our minds as projectors, and then our world conforms to them. Our minds are then constituted to process information provided by the senses only in a certain manner. Just like a projector can only interpret information in a certain way.

If we then know our minds, we might be able to know what something is going to look like before it’s even projected. In other words, we can know its appearance. This allows us to understand the a priori of the objects we experience, because we understand how they are being constituted by our minds.

To understand how our minds structure the world, we may start by exploring space and time.

I love talking about the vastness of space and time. But, why did Kant bring these concepts up?

The reason for this is that phenomena must be placed in space and time in order for us to perceive it in the first place. If you think about it, we are unable to comprehend anything outside of these concepts.

Space and time are a priori forms of sensibility since they are the ones receiving through perception, and so they are pure intuition. Using our senses, we can determine where something is and how objects change over time. We may grasp the phenomena and make sense of it in this manner. This is the part of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism known as Transcendental Aesthetic. Which is the first step in making sense of the world's chaos. Aesthetic because it indicates the meaning of “sensibility” in Greek, which literally means “sense perception.”

But then, how can we make sense of the information we receive from space and time? How can we make an interpretation of the data coming from perception?

This is when reasoning faculties come into play.

Kant felt that in order to synthesize all the information from the senses, we needed certain a priori concepts. His transcendental argument is that a priori concepts are necessary for the possibility of experience. That we need some concepts that are already in there in our minds to be able to synthesize information, and to be capable of saying, “this,” “that one,” to have universality, and so on.

We have experience: therefore, it means that there are a priori concepts and categories of the understanding prior to experience.

Understanding is judging, and judging needs concepts. Judgments of logic, concepts that could be related to the objects we perceive. 

This is his system’s second idea. He believed that human minds apply basic notions like unity, plurality, totality, reality, negation, limitation, substance, cause-and-effect, reciprocity, possibility, existence, and necessity to synthesize and organize our experiences coming from space and time.

Kant argued that these categories of the understanding are necessary for the human mind to make sense of the world, and that they are not generated from experience, as claimed in his argument. We may learn the words to describe the concepts, but we do not learn the concepts themselves. They are part of the judgments of logic that are built into our minds.

In other words, our minds put certain structures on the world to make sense of it, rather than passively receiving information from it. 

For instance, the category of causation allows us to understand that events have causes and effects, while the category of substance enables us to perceive objects as having a consistent identity over time, despite them changing. Additionally, the category of possibility allows us to understand that life may exist on other planets, despite the absence of concrete evidence.

These categories are applied to any possible object we encounter, even if the application is limited to phenomena, rather than the “thing in itself.” This is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. It is the way we synthesize information, use categories as necessary conditions for experience, and make sense of the chaos that the senses provide us through space and time.

With Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, we can then come to understand that our experiences of the world are not merely the sum of sensory input, but are shaped and mediated by a set of a priori concepts and laws of the understanding; and that these concepts, like the lenses of a camera, allow us to focus our attention and make sense of the world around us in a certain way.

We will never know how the world truly is, but we can embrace and fully learn about it by means of what it seems to be, through our limited human lenses.

We can comprehend the immensity of a landscape or a piece of music by immersing ourselves in it and absorbing every detail while focusing on specific areas of our experience. Synthesizing the information as we perceive it in space and time.

Kant’s philosophy is thus not just about the mechanics of the mind, but it’s also a reminder of the limitations of reason. Kant recognized that our human lenses have limitations, and that we cannot know everything about the universe beyond our experience. Thus, we are limited to knowing our world objectively within the realm of phenomena, and will never have access to how things are in themselves.

This has important implications for the way we approach scientific knowledge, for example. As could be inferred from Kant, science aims to give us a true story about phenomena, but it is limited by the fact that we can only ever observe that phenomena through our human lenses. As a result, for Kant, science can only ever “save the phenomena” - that is, provide us with a description of the way things appear to us - rather than giving us access to things as they are in themselves. This is the opposite of being a scientific realist, who believes that science can provide us with a true story, or in other words, objective knowledge of the world as it really is.

What’s more, Kant’s concept of God is also a complex subject derived from his theory. He concluded that the concept cannot be proven purely by reason, and that it is instead a necessary idea resulting from the limitations of the human mind, like causation, for example. However, he argues that moral law is the result of practical reason, and that this law implies the existence of God as a necessary presupposition. He also maintains that the moral law requires us to see others as ends in themselves, and that the existence of God must exist to ensure this is eventually achieved. In other words, we don’t need religion to make moral laws, but we do need to assume the existence of God, which would be a good topic for another day.

Overall, Kant’s discoveries have profound implications for the study of philosophy, theology, science, and the nature of knowledge itself. Although Kant modified and updated his book several times, the ideas have persisted and continue to influence the way we think about the boundaries of human reason and the nature of our knowledge.

So, can we trust our senses? Can we claim definite objective truth?

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is fairly tough, and I have done my best to simplify it. In future posts, we will discuss his ethics and political theory to go deeper into his ideas.

Sources:

• Kant, I. (1787). Critique of Pure Reason (-2nd ed.). Penguin Classics.

• (n.d.). Kant’s Transcendental Arguments. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/

• (n.d.). Scientific Realism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/

• Scruton, R. (2001). Kant: A Very Short Introduction.

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“Without a shared vision, we run the risk of losing our way and surrendering control over our future.”-Beyond Thought

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How would a perfect society look like?

This question has intrigued philosophers, politicians, and even fiction writers for ages; and Thomas More’s book “Utopia” was one of the most prominent works on the subject, having a huge impact on political philosophy and literature.

As a fan of science fiction, I believe we should discuss this book because, while it is not technically classified as science fiction, it is a fantastic piece of speculative fiction that was used to critique and offer alternatives to situations that occurred during the author’s lifetime and may still be relevant today.

The most interesting part of this book is that it does not have a storyline as we would expect in a novel; rather, it is a narration of the discovery of an island called Utopia, in which Thomas More himself appears as a character.

Utopia is a real island within the story, and the book is mostly an explanation of how it is organized. Raphael Hythloday, a traveler, makes the exciting discovery of this society, which, remember, exists only within the context of the story.

Raphael, a fictional character with strong opinions about society, pulls from his extensive travels to present many criticisms and thoughts about how society functioned during the time the book was written. The arguments he presents tend to have a satirical tone and serve as a vehicle for the author, More, to express himself without fear of repercussions for the ideas presented in the story. In fact, the fictional Thomas More in the novel is extremely critical of the island, putting himself in an appropriate position. As a result, Raphael may be seen as a more accurate representation of the author’s beliefs than his fictional self.

Interesting, but what does Utopia look like? You may ask.

After More takes us through the account of how Utopia was discovered, primarily in the form of a conversation between three men - Thomas, Peter, and Raphael - the author takes us through a detailed description of how “the most civilized nation of the world” works, as claimed by Raphael.

Several aspects of Utopia are discussed in the book, but I’ll focus on the most significant ones that describe the community’s structure, laws, philosophy, and belief system.

But first, here are the highlights:

• Utopia is a community that resembles Plato’s republic, which could be described as a communist society, where money and, in general, a market-based economy is not existent.

• Life in Utopia is well balanced between work and leisure. A typical day for an adult is a workday of six hours only, and then time is used to engage in recreation, further education or personal interests.

• All cities in Utopia are organized and distributed the same way so that everyone can have what they need; if a city has a surplus of people and/or goods, they are moved to another city that has less of these, so that everyone gets their fair portion.

• The way they manage to have all they need with reduced work hours is due to several factors, one of them being that they all wear almost the same type of clothes, with small variations depending on the sex or marital status of the person. The clothes are comfortable and can be used in many different situations, making Utopians less likely to need more clothes. Fashion is kept the same and no one attempts to feel or pretends to be of a higher status.

• Thomas More criticizes his time’s feudal society, which emphasized class distinctions and hierarchical structures. More’s ideal society is one in which everyone works for the common good. This is similar to Karl Marx’s critique of his time’s capitalist system, which focused on private property and the bourgeoisie’s exploitation of the working class. 

• Communal life was not new when Thomas More wrote the book. It was something that monks did in their religious lives. More saw this as ideal, mainly because it contrasted with his reality and the problems that were prominent throughout his lifetime.

• We could think that Thomas was executed for his book, but that isn’t the case. More was executed in 1535 for refusing to recognize Henry VIII as the supreme head of the Church in England, because it implied a rejection of papal supremacy. However, his writings, including “Utopia,” were seen as a threat to the established order and were banned by the Catholic Church for many years.

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Communal Living in Utopia

Utopia is a community that resembles Plato’s Republic, which could be described as a communist society where money and, in general, a market-based economy are nonexistent.

This means that common ownership is a rule, and people share everything, including meals, and goods. In fact, houses have a front door and a back door, both which have swing doors that can be opened easily so anyone can go in and out whenever they need.

All cities in Utopia are organized and distributed the same way so that everyone can have what they need; if a city has a surplus of people and/or goods, they are moved to another city that has less of these, so that everyone gets their fair portion.

The surplus idea is taken to the extreme with people. Families cannot have more than sixteen members. When there is a surplus of babies, what happens is that they get adopted by other families that are sometimes in other cities. Kids are also free to move around, and get adopted by other families if they are interested in learning certain activities that their current families do not practice.

This idea of “kids being raised communally” can be seen on Plato’s Republic. However, in Utopia, kids aren’t automatically moved by other families as in Plato’s vision. Plato believed that biological ties between parents and children should be minimized. He proposed a system where children are taken away from their parents at birth and raised by the state in common households. This, according to him, would prevent the development of unhealthy family attachments and promote a sense of unity and shared purpose among all citizens.

He also suggested that children should be assigned to households based on their abilities and potential, rather than their biological connections, and that this would allow for the cultivation of talent and the promotion of the common good. Similar to the idea that Thomas More had about kids being able to move around to settle with other families if their interests did not align with their biological family.

It is important to note that when Thomas More wrote the book, communal life was not new. It was something that was practiced among monks in a religious life. Thomas saw this as ideal, mainly because it contrasted with his reality and the problems that were prominent throughout his lifetime.

Work, Leisure and the Common Good

One aspect that is very attractive about this speculative society is that life is well balanced between work and leisure. A typical day for an adult is a workday of six hours only, and then time is used to engage in recreation, further education or personal interests.

People are not pushed to work more than required; instead, when all necessary work has been done, people are told to finish work sooner, giving them more time to engage in other activities, since Utopians believed that sharpening the mind, as well as physical health, were keys to happiness.

The way they manage to have all they need with reduced work hours is due to several factors, one of them being that they all wear almost the same type of clothes, with small variations depending on the sex or marital status of the person. The clothes are comfortable and can be used in many different situations, making Utopians less likely to need more clothes. Fashion is kept the same, and no one attempts to feel or pretends to be of a higher status.

Something very interesting that can give us an idea of how Utopians see “commodities” is that they value iron more than gold, because they see it as more useful. They have no desire to hold gold because of its appearance, giving them a surplus of gold and precious metals. They use gold for useful purposes like pots only. This can remind us of Karl Marx’s concept that there is no object on earth that in itself has an intrinsic exchange value, but rather just a use value.

Another factor is that the authorities are always monitoring the annual food consumption, and producing surplus corn or livestock, to have more than what they need. They also use the corn only for food, since they do not drink beer, but only cider, wine or water.

Finally, another factor that could sound contradictory, is that Utopians do not support idleness. Everyone needs to spend time working on the farms for six hours, independently of their status.

In the case of children, many useful skills are taught in schools. Starting from farming, agriculture, reading, and ending with activities that help children develop themselves, like outdoor activities and games. The significance of community values is also taught, meaning that they taught the importance of seeing themselves as members of a big community rather than just individuals.

The idea of the common good is very important in Utopia. Remember our post about Rousseau?

In his Social Contract, he talks about the importance of the common good over individual personal interests, in order to create a just society.

In Utopia, the communal ownership of property and the rotational system of work are designed to ensure that resources are distributed equally and that everyone has access to what they need to live a fulfilling life. Similarly, in Rousseau’s theory, individuals must give up certain freedoms and submit to the authority of the general will in order to create a society that benefits everyone equally.

However, there are also important differences. Rousseau believed that individual freedoms could be limited in order to promote the common good, while Utopians placed a strong emphasis on individual freedom and personal choice. People can pursue their own interests without any problem and they aren’t confined to any gender roles, like it was the case during the time Utopia was written. Women could work in traditionally male-dominated fields, and had equal rights and opportunities than men. In fact, women were even trained to go to war if necessary.

The Government and the Belief System of Utopians

The social system is well formed and has some aspects that we can find interesting.

Cities are divided by groups of thirty households, each who elects every year an individual called the Styward.

For every ten Stywards there is another entity called the Senior District Controller, who operates above them.

Each group of ten Stywards is responsible for electing a Mayor - from four options that were provided by the people of the city. This Mayor is in charge of discussing problems with the Senior District Controller.

The Stywards communicate directly with each household about any major issues that may arise in the community, and then they are responsible for reporting these views back with the higher authorities. 

Any decision needs to be discussed for three days minimum before making any permanent decision.

Utopia’s direct communication is fascinating, but it simply wouldn’t work in a society with a big population. However, it is very interesting to see how open communication is between Utopians; how everyone’s perspective is valued, and how they believe it is critical to sleep on crucial issues before acting - something that would be extremely beneficial to apply in any political system.

In Utopia, there are many religions, each with its own differences, yet they all agree on the existence of a greater being that is incomprehensible to the human mind. They all refer to that being as Mythras, but what some disagree on is who Mythras is.

Everyone is 'free' to practice any religion they like, and if they want to convert someone, they can do so politely and rationally, but they cannot force anyone. No abuse or personal attacks are permitted. The only belief that had to be maintained was that humans are mortal, or that “the soul dies with the body.” This is because if you aren’t afraid of persecution or death, you’re more likely to break the law. Hence, no one who believes in immortality may be honored or serve in public service in Utopia.

This can be considered as an ideological “must” in Utopia, which ends up sliding into the domain of “no freedom of religious belief,” despite the previous claim that Utopians are religiously tolerant.

There are some conservative beliefs that were common at the time the book was written. One of them is that wives were subordinated to their husbands, and in general, the oldest male was the authority of each household.

Another intolerable aspect for modern readers is that traveling has limitations. In order to travel, people need to ask for permission from the local government and get a written note that says when they need to be back. People need to work even if they are traveling, meaning that if they go to another city, they need to use six hours of their time to work on farms or in something related to the common good.

Traveling without permission is unacceptable in Utopia, and those who do it more than once are sentenced to slavery. People who commit crimes are generally punished with slavery, and slaves who rebel are sentenced to death.

Utopia’s Relevance, Thomas More Repercussions and Our Future

We could think that Thomas was executed for his book, but that isn’t the case. More was executed in 1535 for refusing to recognize Henry VIII as the supreme head of the Church in England, because it implied a rejection of papal supremacy. However, his writings, including Utopia, were seen as a threat to the established order and were banned by the Catholic Church for many years.

The concept of an ideal society, as we have seen, was not a new one. However, he actually invented the word “utopia” by combining two Greek words: “ou” meaning “not” or “no,” and “topos” meaning “place.” Thus, “utopia” literally means “no place” or “nowhere.”

The concept of utopia, despite having been banned for many years, continued to be explored by other writers in the following centuries, including Francis Bacon, who wrote “The New Atlantis” in 1627, and Samuel Butler, who wrote “Erewhon” in 1872.

As one might expect, utopian ideas are frequently connected with socialism and communism, which envision a more equal and just society and are typically viewed as overly idealistic. This leads us to Karl Marx, who had some utopian ideas centuries later.

Thomas More criticizes his time’s feudal society, which emphasized class distinctions and hierarchical structures. More’s ideal society is one in which everyone works for the common good. Similarly, Karl Marx criticizes his time’s capitalist society, with its focus on private property and the bourgeoisie’s exploitation of the working class. Marx’s ideal society, communism, is a classless society in which everybody owns the means of production, as in Utopia.

Thomas and Marx were men who thought that people seek more than they need because they are afraid of not having enough. But it is important to say that Thomas based his vision on religion, looking at how monks lived, and his work was merely a philosophical exercise that was used to imagine an ideal society. On the other hand, Marx’s vision of communism was much more grounded in historical and economic analysis than mere fiction or imagination.

Utopian social visions are often criticized as being not only idealistic but also totalitarian. This is because they prioritize the common welfare of society over individual needs or desires. Many people consider this to be a significant problem in these approaches. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that automation can be used to achieve communal goods, while simultaneously allowing individuals to focus on their personal pursuits and needs. This approach can also ensure that individuals are compensated fairly for any extra effort they make, without having to struggle for the basic needs first. 

Many people, including myself, find it perplexing that machines are being used to generate art, music, and entertainment rather than giving humanity more time to explore their own creativity, learn, and enjoy their own freedom. These are qualities that are uniquely human and lose significance and purpose if technology can replicate them. Such creations force mankind to work harder than ever to compete with machines, as if humans weren’t already struggling to sustain their existence. It’s ironic to observe how humans are continuously finding new ways to lose the limited freedom they already have, rather than thinking in new ways to gain more or striving towards a common goal as a species.

In any case, I believe the question would then need to be: 

“What is the goal of a civilization or society?” 

The answer to this question may vary depending on whom you ask. Nevertheless, just as every great piece of speculative fiction has a compelling premise, every society should have an unifying vision that drives its people towards a shared destination. Because there is only one certainty: without a shared vision, we run the risk of losing our way and surrendering control over our future.

Despite having many notions that can be seen as wrong, “Utopia” remains a fascinating and inspiring book that invites us to reflect on our societies and how we could improve them. It challenges us to imagine a better world and create practical goals that we can pursue by applying reason.

Whether we agree with all of its principles or not, “Utopia” reminds us that we have the power to shape our own future, and that we can build a society that is fair for everyone while still providing incentive for the extra effort people may make.

Utopia is a book that explodes critical thinking. It may not have all of the answers or solutions, but it will undoubtedly expand our minds and make us rethink how our world works.

So, why not visit Utopia and see what we can learn from it?

Sources:

• (n.d.). Thomas More. Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-More-English-humanist-and-statesman/Years-as-chancellor-of-England

• More, T. (1965). Utopia. Penguin Classics.

• P. (2007). The Republic: Plato (2nd ed.). Penguin Classics.

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